Hungarian and Polish Reactions to the Events of 1956: New Archival Evidence

References

• 1956 . "The Events in Poznan' . Borba (Belgrade) , 1 July Jaroslaw Maciejewski & Zofia Trojanowicz (eds), Poznanski Czerwiec (Poznan: Wydawn, 1981). Some controversy surrounds the number of deaths in the Poznan rebellion. In another study published in 1981 the number of deaths is stated to be 73. See Nalepa, op. cit. p. 55. He cites a study by Aleksander Ziemkowski, Poznanski Czerwiec 1956 (1981), 2nd ed. (No publisher is named). See Aleksander Ziemkowski, Poznanski Czerwiec 1956, 2nd edition. Cited also in Nalepa, p. 55. According to the original Polish Press Agency's report on 30 June, 1956 38 people were killed and 270 injured. See
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• Zinner , Paul , ed. 1956 . National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe , 139 New York : Columbia University Press . Later, on 17 July 1956, Marian Rybicki (the Polish Chief Public Prosecutor) revealed in an interview that the death toll was actually 53, if one included those who died in the hospitals. See Syrop, p. 42
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• Ibid.
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• Ibid. According to Nalepa, Colonel Pietrzak, the commander of the Citizens' Militia in Poznan, received a report about the ZISPO workers' demonstration at 6.30 a.m. All he did was send a few patrols to report on the general location of demonstrators. Then, as late as 6.00 p.m. that day, Pietrzak decided to move all policemen back to their departments to avoid the robberies, but it was already too late.
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• AAN, KC PZPR, paczka 12, teczka 46a, str. 66-68. For an English translation of this document see L. W. Gluchowski, 'Poland, 1956: Khrushchev, Gomulka, and the "Polish October" ', Document 2, Cold War International History Bulletin, Issue 5, Spring 1995 (Washington DC, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), p. 40. Gomutka was in prison for two years and then spent time in a rest home in the summer of 1956. Some US diplomats believed his return to the political scene would not be significant because of his weakened condition. See 'Memorandum of Conversation by James W. Pratt, US Mission to the UN, regarding Liberalization Trends in Poland, Yugoslav-Soviet Relations, Western Radio Broadcasts', 16 October 1956, National Security Archive, Washington DC, 'Flashpoints' Project, Box 2, Record # 79996, Folder 10/15-21/56, p. 1.
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• AAN, Arch. KC PZPR, 237/V-241. 'Stenogram Krajowej Narady Aktywu Partyjnego odbutego w dn. 4 listopada (November) 1956 r.: Wystapenia W. Gomutki', s. 166. (Nieraz w jezyku partyjnym, ze tak powiem, jezyk partyjny nie bywa czesto jezykiem dyplomacji. Oni mówili co my si el i i mysmy mówili cosmy mysleli. Dyskusja byla nieraz moze i ostra.)
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• Ibid. Gomulka later told the party aktyw on 4 November: 'Neither I nor any Politburo member wants to damage the friendship with a great powerful socialist country. No communist, Pole and patriot could have such an intention based on the normal state interests of Poland'.
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• Hajdu , Tibor . 1992 . “ 'Az 1956.október 24-i moszkvai értekezlet' ” . In Évkönyv I , 149 – 156 . Budapest : 1956-os Intézet . . For an English translation see Mark Kramer, 'Hungary and Poland, 1956: Khrushchev's CPSU CC Presidium Meeting on East European Crises, October 24, 1956', Cold War International History Bulletin, Issue 5, Spring 1995 (Washington DC, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars), pp. 1, 50-56This report was written in Czech by Jan Svoboda, a top aide to Czech Communist leader Antonin Novotny, of a key meeting on 24 October of top CPSU Presidium members and East European Communist leaders (except Gomulka and Gero). Stabil Ustredni Archiv (Central State Archive in Prague, or SUA), Fond 07/16, Svazek 3, 'Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Mad'arsku' (Account of a Meeting at the CPSU CC, 24 October 1956, on the Situation in Poland and Hungary). See
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• Talbott , Strobe , ed. 1974 . Khrushchev Remembers: the Last Testament , 203 New York : Bantam Books .
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• Gluchowski , L. W. and Poleszczuk , Agnieszka . 1996 . “ 'The Osinski Reports' ” . In The Hidden History of Hungary, 1956: A Compendium of Declassified Documents , Washington DC : National Security Archive . Major Witold Osinski was a deputy chief in the Second Section of the Chief Directorate of Information (Glówny Zarzad Informacji, GZI). See CAW, sygn. 1812/92/8 and Bylego Archiwum Wojskowej Sluzby Wewnetrznej, sygn. 2859/20/K. For an English translation seeThis collection was prepared for the conference on 'Hungary and the World, 1956: The New Archival Evidence', Budapest, 26-29 September 1996
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• The other Stalinist leaders include Bieiut (Poland), Gottwald (Czechoslovakia) and Dmitrov (Bulgaria). As Rákosi complained to Voroshilov in June 1956: 'They say that Hungary needs leaders not connected with the past. You can hear talk in Hungary about how Rákosi was … 'the faithful student of Stalin', and that after the deaths of Dmitrov, Gottwald and Bierut, Rákosi is 'the last Mohican of the Stalinist era' and thus … he doesn't fit the spirit of the times'. TsKhSD, f. 89, per. 45, dok. 2, 1.2, 'Note by K. Voroshilov About a Conversation with Rákosi', 26 June 1956.
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• Toranska , Teresa . 1987 . 'Them:' Stalin's Polish Puppets , 78 New York : Harper and Row . In an interview, Ochab later said: 'I wasn't at all anxious to keep my position'. See
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• 1956 . "The Events in Poznan' . Borba , 1 July Yugoslav newspapers reported frequently on Polish events, providing a perspective different from that of the Soviet Union. According to Pravda, the Poznan riots were caused by 'imperialist and reactionary Polish underground agents, taking advantage of certain economic difficulties', whereas Borba quotes the official Polish communique: 'the objective motives of the Poznan demonstrations should be sought in the workers' discontent caused by the unsettled wage scale and social problems as well as by the unsatisfactory living conditions'. See 'Polish People Brand Organisers of Provocation', Pravda, 1 July 1956, and
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• Trailovic , D. 1956 . 'The World Today: Poznan Epilogue' . Borba , 6 July and 'The Plenum of the Polish Party', Borba, 23 October, 1956 (cited also in Zinner, pp. 136-142)
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• AVP RF, f. 077, op. 37, p. 191, d. 39,11. 49-64 passim. Written by V. Kazimirov, Attachéat the Soviet Embassy in Hungary, 11 August 1956, "The Recent Internal Events in Hungary and the Yugoslav Press (Survey)', sekretno; and f. 077, op. 37, p. 191, d. 39,11. 68-73, V. Kazimirov, 'About the State of Hungarian-Yugoslav Relations', 23 August 1956.
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• AVP RF, f. 077 (Referentura po Vengrii), op. 37, por. 7, p. 187,1. 95, From the Diary of Yu. V. Ponomarev, 'Notes of a Conversation with the Director of the Protocol Section of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, József Marjai', 2 January 1956: 'Marjai said "with a person like Zsigmund, it is hardly likely that anything can be done"'. In a footnote to his report, Ponomarev wrote: 'The second secretary of the Yugoslav mission [Zsigmund] is indeed different from the other Yugoslav diplomats in his reactionary views. In a number of conversations with our comrades he asks provocative questions about the normalisation of relations and responds in a wholly unfriendly way about Hungary'.
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• AAN, 237/XXII-841, 'Notatka z rozmów przeprowadzonyc h na temat czerwcowej konferencji WSPR', 6. VI. 1957, s. 30, Budapeszt (from the consul of the Polish embassy in Budapest, Moszczenski, to Korolczyk, Director of the First Department of the Polish Foreign Ministry). Rákosi was never permitted to return to Hungary. He lived in Moscow, was then exiled to Krasnodar, Tokmak (Kirghizia), Arzamas, and finally to Gorky, where he died on 5 February 1971. See the letters written in 1957 by Rákosi to the CC CPSU in attempts to return to Hungary, e.g. RGANI, f.89, per.45, dok.67, II. 1-9, Pis'mo Matyasa Rakoshi, Moskva, 15 fevralya 1957 g., perevod s venger-skogo. Also see reference to several phone calls and visits Rákosi made to János Boldotszki, the Hungarian Ambassador to the USSR. TsKhSD, f.89, per. 45, dok. 54, 1.5, Iz Dnevnika Zamchevskogo, Zaveduyushchii Pyatego Evropeiskogo Otdela MIDa, 'Zapis' besedy s Poslom Boldotskim, 28 noyabrya 1956 g'. For a recent account of Rákosi's years in exile, based on new archival documents, see V. L. Musatov, 'Istoriya odnoi ssylki: "Zhitie" Matyasa Rakoshi v SSSR (1956-1971 gg)', Kentavr, 1993, 6 (November-December), pp. 72-81.
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• It is now known that Gerö summoned the military attaché of the Soviet embassy for military assistance. Soviet ambassador Yurii Andropov then attempted to call into action the Special Corps (Osobyi korpus) in Hungary, headed by Petr Lashchenko, who replied that he needed a direct command from Moscow. See 'Zprava o jednani na UV KSSS 24. rijna 1956 k situaci v Polsku a Mad'arsku'; also Fedor Lukyanov, 'Khrushchev Ostorozhen; Andropov Nastaival, Izvestiya, 24 July 1992. The Soviet Presidium could not take action, however, until it received a formal request from the Hungarian leadership. Strangely enough, when Khrushchev called Gero (after Gero's call to the Soviet military attache) to invite him to the emergency meeting on 24 October in Moscow, the latter declined, saying the Hungarian situation was too serious, but he did not say a word about his earlier call for military assistance. Only after Andropov called Moscow to inform Khrushchev did the Soviet leader then call Gero again to tell him the request would be fulfilled, but only if it was in writing. Gerö refused, saying he did not have time to summon a meeting. The formal request did not actually arrive in Moscow until five days later. Andropov sent it in a ciphered telegram on 28 October 1956. See AVPRF, f. 059a, op. 4, p. 6, d. 5, 1. 12, Shifrtelegramma 28 October 1956.
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• Nikita S. Khrushchev, "The Crimes of the Stalin Era: Special Report to the 20th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Closed Session, February 24-5, 1956', annotated by Boris Nicolaevsky, The New Leader (New York, 1956), p. S48. He said; "The July Plenum of the Central Committee studied in detail the reasons for the development of conflict with Yugoslavia. It was a shameful role which Stalin played here. The "Yugoslav affair" contained no problems which could not have been solved through party discussions among comrades. There was no significant basis for the development of this "affair", it was completely possible to have prevented the rupture of relations with that country. This does not mean, however, that the Yugoslav leaders did not make mistakes or did not have shortcomings. But these mistakes and shortcomings were magnified in a monstrous manner by Stalin, which resulted in a break of relations with a friendly country [emphasis added]'.
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• Robert V. Daniels, Studying History: How and Why, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ, Prentice Hall, 1981), p. 58.
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• AAN, 'Polska Zjedoczon a Partia Robotnicza Komitet Centralny, Biuro Listów i Inspekcji, Biuletyn #32/143, Warszawa, 7.VII.1956', s. 24. One worker, Józef Juszczyk, complained in a letter to the KC PZPR: 'About 40 people left the shop today without bread, butter, and meat. Why is it so? Why do people complain? They are right. They bring potatoes, but after an hour they are gone. No one feels responsible for the supplies. Maybe it is not important, but after a while it becomes important for a person and then unhappiness arises (Dzis, wtasnie okoto 40 osób odeszlo ze sklepu Z gorzkimi slowami, brak chleba, masta, eigsa. Dlaczego tak jest, dlaczego ludzie przeklinaja? Przeciez maja racje … Brak poczucia odpowiedzialno sci za ten odcinek pracy. To sa, soprawy tak malo wazne ale jak doniosle dla czlowieka i miedzy innmi rodza niezadowolenie].
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• The minor demands relating to bonuses and repayment of taxes, however, had been met. On the rumours about the arrest see PZPR 237/V/237, 'Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza Komitet Centralny Sekretariat-Narada poswiecona omówieniu wypadków poznanskich', 7. VII.56, s. 9.
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• PZPR 237/V/237, 'Polska Zjednoczona Partia Robotnicza Komitet Centralny Sekretariat-Narada poswiecona omówieniu wypadków poznanskich', 7. VII.56, s. 7, Gierek eventually succeeded Gomulka as First Secretary in 1970. He resigned from this post after the Gdansk accords were signed in August 1980.
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• Nalepa , Edward Jan . 1992 . Pacyfikacja Zbuntowanego Miasta. Wojsko Polskie w Czerwcu 1956 r. w Poznaniu w swietle dokumentów wojskowych , 22 Warsaw : Wydawnictwo Bellona .
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• Syrop , Konrad . 1957 . Spring in October: The Story of the Polish Revolution 1956 , 49 – 52 . New York : Frederick A. Praeger .
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• Ibid. At 6.30 a.m. on 28 June Józef Lipinski, commander of the Tenth Division of the KBW, was the first person to deliver the message to Brigadier General Wlodzimierz Mus (head of the KBW) about the possibility of street demonstrations in Poznan. Mus then called Franciszek Józwiak, Deputy Prime Minister. Around 7.00 am. Leon Stasiak, the first secretary of the PZPR Central Committee in Poznan, informed Ochab about the situation. General Ryszard Dobieszak, commander of the MO, Wladyslaw Wicha, the Minister of Internal Affairs, and Witold Sienkiewicz, Chairman of the Committee for Public Security Affairs (Komitet do Spraw Bezpieczenstwa Publicznego) were also informed early that morning.
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• Ibid.
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• Litván , György , ed. 1996 . The Hungarian Revolution of 1956: Reform, Revolt, and Repression, 1953-1963 , 19 London : Longman . Besides Rajk, the three other prominent victims of the purge trials in 1949 were György Pálfy, Tibor Szönyi and András Szalai. The total number of those in some way purged in the 1948-56 period was approximately 350 000. This figure includes those accused of being 'class enemies' (kulaks, clerical reactionaries, etc.), those accused of being 'Zionist agents' (Jews), and those accused of having 'infiltrated the party' ('Titoists', Trotskyists', 'cosmopolitans' etc.). See also Kovrig, Myth of Liberation
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• Banac , Ivo . 1988 . With Stalin against Tito: Cominformist Splits in Yugoslav Communism , 225 Ithaca : NY: Cornell University Press . Brankov was one of the most damaging witnesses at the rigged trial of Làszló Rajk in September 1949. He testified that he had attended meetings during which Tito and Rankovic instructed Rajk about Overthrowing the socialist order in Hungary'. It is unclear whether or not Brankov was coerced to testify. He left Hungary in 1956. See
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• VaIi . Rift and Revolt in Hungary 62
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• MOL, M-KS-276-52/34 ö.e., (MDP), old. 14, Budapest, 30.VI. 1956.
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• Ibid, old. 14.
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• Ibid OId. 24-25.
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• Ibid., emphasis added. The phrase 'events in Czechoslovakia' in all likelihood refers to the hitherto unknown abortive student revolts in Prague and Bratislava in April-May 1956. See John P. C. Matthews, 'Majales: the Abortive Student Revolt in Czechoslovakia in 1956', Cold War International History Project Working Paper No. 24, Washington DC, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, September 1998.
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• Hermann , Charles F. 1987 . New Directions in the Study of Foreign Policy , London : HarperCollins Academic . AMSZ, Z depesz T.783 W.57, s. 89, szyfiogram nr. 4746, 17 kwiecien 1958, from Ambassador Willman, Budapest, to Korolczyk, Warsaw. Incidentally, this situation in fact bears out crisis decision-making theory well. Hermann defined a crisis as having three key features. First, it entails a threat to high-priority goals; secondly, it involves surprise (shock) to the decision makers; and third, there is very little time for the leaders to decide how to respond Also Charles F. Hermann, 'Sorting Out Crisis Outcomes', International Studies Quarterly, 40, 2, 1996; p. 311
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• Meray , Tibor . 1969 . That Day in Budapest: October 23, 1956 , 114 New York : Funk and Wagnalls . Tibor Meray, a noted Hungarian Communist writer who supported Imre Nagy after 1954 wrote: Obviously the idea for the trials and trial staging was conceived by the Russians during their battle against Tito and Yugoslavia. [But] it is equally certain that Rákosi and his crew were the most brilliant of the stage directors since they outstripped their Polish, Bulgarian and Romanian colleagues. Intent on gaining the attention not only of Stalin but also of international opinion, they made a complete success of this spectacle … The methods of the Hungarian Gauleiters proved to be the best of all because they were the simplest'.
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• VáIi , Ferenc . 1961 . Rift and Revolt in Hungary: Nationalism versus Communism , 62 Cambridge : Mass.: Harvard University Press . 'It [the Rajk trial] was the most grandiosely staged trial of Stalin's reign, inside or outside Russia. Whereas the prewar rigged trials in the Soviet Union had served internal Soviet politics, the Rajk trial was intended to bear fruits in the foreign field and have an impact on international events to come' (emphases added)
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• AVP RF, f. 077, op. 37, por. 7, p. 187, 1.94, from the Diary of Yu. V. Ponomarev, 'Notes of a Conversation with the Director of the Protocol Section of the Hungarian Foreign Ministry, József Marjai', 2 January 1956: 'Marjai said it is still difficult to restore normal relations with Yugoslavia. The diplomats of the Budapest mission are a big obstacle. The majority of them, in Marjai's words, had built their careers on the rupture of relations with the democratic camp, on slander and lies, and now it is difficult for them to start on a new basis' (emphasis added). Ponomarev agreed: I said [to Marjai] that in reality the Yugoslav Foreign Ministry is littered with people who are hostilely disposed (zasoren) toward the normalisation of relations between the USSR and Yugoslavia, as well as between Yugoslavia and the other democratic countries. But we must work with these people'.
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• AVP RF, f. 077 (Referentura po Vengrii), op. 37, por. 7, p. 187, d. 036,1. 148, From the Diary of V. N. Kazimirov, 'Notes of a Conversation with the Second Secretary of the Yugoslav Mission, Marko Zsigmond, and the Attaché Novak Radenovic', 5 March 1956. At a film presentation at the Czech embassy, Zsigmund 'tried again to begin a conversation about the events of 1948-49, saying that he knows well the history of the rift of Soviet-Yugoslav relations, since he worked in the archive of the CC CPY and is acquainted with the correspondence of that period. Then he tried to lay the blame for the rift completely on the USSR'.
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• Tito , Josip Broz . 1982 . “ 'Power Shall Not Be a Decisive Factor in Relations Between Socialist Countries' ” . In Josip Broz Tito: Military Thought and Works: Selected Writings (1936-1979) , Edited by: Pejcinovic , Boro . 302 Belgrade : Vojnoizdavacki Zavod . Tito expressed his puzzlement in a speech made on 1 October 1949 at the end of manoeuvres by the Yugoslav People' Army in Serbia: 'It is interesting that Brankov, who is also one of the accused, immediately, from the very beginning, came out in support of the letters which were sent to our Central Committee. But it is well-known who Brankov is, a common thief and defrauder; this has been written about him earlier. And how is it possible that this rascal who considered himself to be the leader of all likeminded persons on whom they rely in the attack on our country, how is it possible that he was put on trial in such a role?'. It would be natural for the Yugoslav diplomats to conclude from this episode that it was much safer to be an overt Titoist' in Hungary, since 1) the Hungarian 'Stalinist' leadership was adept at using opponents of Tito for its own purposes; 2) no Yugoslav diplomat was safe from Hungarian Stalinists, despite ostensible diplomatic immunity; and 3) it was safer to be a Titoist because of Tito's own repression against 'Cominformists'
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• Ibid, old. 14. The reference is to 15 March 1848, a key date in Hungarians' revolutionary struggles for independence. Two especially vocal speakers in the Petöfi Circle, Tibor Déry and Tibor Tardos, were expelled from the MDP, but readmitted in September 1956.
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• 1997 . Ötvenhat októbere és a hatalom: a Magyar dolgozók Pártja vezeto testületeinek dukumentumai 1956 Oktober 24-október 28 , Budapest : Napvfág Kiadó . Feljegyzés az MDP Központi vezetoségének ülésérol, 28 Október 1956, old. 116
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• Houghton , David Patrick . 2001 . U.S. Foreign Policy and the Iran Hostage Crisis , New York : Cambridge University Press . According to the crisis management literature, the number of decision makers necessarily narrows at the height of any national security crisis. See
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• Dougherty , James E. and Pfaltzgraff , Robert L. 2001 . Contending Theories of International Relations: a Comprehensive Survey, , 5th edition , New York : Longman .
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• Sándor Petofi is arguably the most famous Hungarian poet. He became the aide-de-camp of General József Bern, then head of the Transylvanien army, who had great affection for the somewhat unsoldierly but enthusiastic poet. Petofi played a leading role in the literary life of the period preceding the outbreak of the Hungarian Revolution of 1848. He disappeared during the Battle of Segesvár, on 31 July 1849. According to one account. Soviet investigators found archival documents in the late 198Os revealing Petöfi to have been one of the 1800 Hungarian prisoners of war who were marched to Siberia. According to this source, he died of tuberculosis in 1856. See Gyula Parkas, 'About the supposed skeleton of Sándor Petöfi found in Siberia', Acta Biologica, Nova series, Tomus XLIII, Fasciculil-4, 1999. http://www.sci.u-szeged.hU/ABS/old./90sJitml. Also mentioned on the web site of the University of the West of England; see 'Biographies: Mass Politics and the Revolutions of 1848', http://humanities.uwe.ac.uk/corehistorians/1848/coredocs/biogs.htm.
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• Moss , Joyce and Wilson , George , eds. 1993 . Eastern Europe and the post-Soviet republics: the Culture, Geographical Setting, and Historical Background of 34 Eastern European Peoples , 203 Detroit : Gale Research . Through strategic marriages with Hungarians, the Polish monarchy was able to extend its power and territory. In the 14th century, for example, the main line of the Piast dynasty ended in 1370 with Casimir III, and the crown passed to Casimir's nephew, Louis I of Hungary and to Louis's daughter Jadwiga, who married the Duke of Lithuania, the ruler of the house of Jagellon. Poland and Lithuania then began 187 years of joint rule and expansion. See
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• Wlodzimierz Jastrzebski, "Bydgoski Pazdziemik 1956 r. jako przejaw oporu spolecznego przeciwko totalitarnej wladzy" in Wlodzimierz Jastrzebski, ed. Rok 1956 w Bydgoskiem. Materialy Z konferencji naukowej na temat: 'Bydgoski pa?rnik 1956r.' (Bydgoszcz: Instytut Historii Wyzszej Szkory Pedagogicznej w Bydgoszczy, 1966), p. 57.
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• 1956 . Trybuna Ludu , 2 November
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• 1956 . Trybuna Ludu , 25 October For an English translation see Zinner (ed.). National Communism and Popular Revolt in Eastern Europe, pp. 270-276
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• 1956 . 'Apel KC PZPR do narodu wegierskiego , 28 pazdziernika
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• 1956 . Sztandar Miodych , 28 October r., p. 1 ; also in Tischler (ed.), Dokumenty do Dziejów PRL: Rewolucja wegierska 1956 w polskich dokumentach, p. 132; and
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• 1956 . Szabad Nép , 29 October
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• 1956 . Szabad Nép , 2 November
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• 1956 . Adam Wazyk, Nowa Kultura , 25 November cited in Bromke, p. 91
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