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Original Articles

Molotov, the Making of the Grand Alliance and the Second Front 1939-1942

Pages 51-85 | Published online: 02 Jul 2010

References

  • Watson , Derek . 2000 . 'Molotov's Apprenticeship in Foreign Policy: The Triple Alliance Negotiations in 1939' . Europe-Asia Studies , 52 ( 4 ) : 695 – 722 .
  • 'This term, of Russian origin, had come to signify in Moscow parlance an Anglo-American invasion of France across the English channel ; it carried the insulting connotatio n that the Soviet Union alone was really fighting'. V. Mastny, Russia's Road to the Cold War: Diplomacy, Waif are and the Politics of Communism, 1941-1945 (New York, 1970), p. 46.
  • Cadogan Diaries, p. 454.
  • In April 1942 there had been preliminary agreement between the USA and Britain for a cross-channe 1 invasio n of northern France in April 1943, with the possibility of a more limited expeditio n to the Cherbourg area in September 1942; see Standley, Admiral Ambassador, pp. 201 -202. The figure of 40 division s had been mentioned to Churchill by Stalin as early as September 1941; see Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, Stalin 's Correspondence with Churchill, Attlee, Roosevelt and Truman 1941-1945 (London, 1955), pp. 20-22.
  • AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47,11.38-48; War and Diplomacy, pp. 89-96; Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 223-230.
  • AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47,11.26-27; War and Diplomacy,pp. 81-86; PRO FO371/32882, 43-44A.
  • Miner . Between Churchill and Stalin 247 AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47,11.49-57; War and Diplomacy, pp. 96-101 ; cf.1 have rechecked both the Foreign Office documents and the Eden Papers for a copy of the record of this meeting
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 102-104; Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 230-231. 122 AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47, 11. 58-69; War and Diplomacy, pp. 106-114; PRO F0371/32882, 46-48.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 105-106.
  • Ibid., p. 119.
  • Ibid., pp. 122-123.
  • Miner . Between Churchill and Stalin 258 Ibid., pp. 102;
  • 'Posetiteli kremlevskogo kabineta I. V. Stalina', Istorichesldi arkhiv, 1996, 3, p. 22. It should, however be noted that Dekanazov had strong links with the NKVD.
  • Miner . Between Churchill and Roosevelt 247 AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47, 11. 76-88; War and Diplomacy, pp. 124-130; PRO FO371/32882, 50-5IA; Cadogan Diaries, p. 454.1 have round no evidence to suggest that there was a further round of talks that day as suggests. The comment by Cadogan he cites to support this is in fact prefaced by the remark 'Russians arrived at 4', which is a reference to the main meeting
  • AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 48,1. 1 ; War and Diplomacy, p. 132; Foreign Relations of the United States, p. 560.
  • Ibid., p. 560; War and Diplomacy, p. 134; AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 48,11. 4-5.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 138-139. In his telegram instructing Molotov to accept Eden's new draft, Stalin had sent him two minor technical amendments of wording. Shortly after this reply, Molotov proposed to Stalin one amendment emphasising cooperation on individual security interests in the post-war era. Ibid., p. 139.
  • Cadogan Diaries, p. 455.
  • AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47,11. 89-94; War and Diplomacy, pp. 122-123, 139-143; PRO FO371/32882, 53-54; Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 232-235.
  • War and Diplomacy, p. 143; Sovetsko-Angliiskie Otnosheniya, pp. 234-235.
  • WiJr and Diplomacy, pp. 146-148; AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47, 11. 94-97; Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 235-237; PROFO371/32882, 60-63.
  • War and Diplomacy, p. 149.
  • AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47,1,1. The British Foreign Office arranged for Frank Sainsbury to paint a picture of the signing ceremony, but it was judged to be so awful that it was given to the Russians, 'whose aesthetic sensibilities were felt to have been so numbed by years of socialist realism that they were unlikely to be offended'. M. Kitchen, British Policy towards the Soviet Union during the Second World War (Basingstoke, 1986), p. 122.
  • Chuev, Molotov: Poluderzhavnyi vlastelin, pp. 84-85. In this 1976 interview with Chuev Molotov seems to have confused the Baltic states, where the British had made a concession, with Poland.
  • Cadogan . Diaries 455
  • Eden Papers, AP/33/9/1, vol. 25, f. 248; printed in Churchill, The Second World War: vol. 4, The Hinge of Fate, p. 280; Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt, p. 490.
  • Sovetsko-amerikonski e otnosheniya, p. 161.
  • AVPRF, f. 48, op. 24, pap. 2, del. 23,11. 320, 322-325; see A. Filitov, 'The Soviet Union and the Grand Alliance: the Internal Dimension of Foreign Policy', in G. Gorodetsky (ed.). Soviet Foreign Polity 1917-1991: a Retrospective (London, 1994), p. 98.
  • Churchill, The Second World War: vol. 4, The Hinge of Fate, pp. 268-270; War and Diplomacy, p. 183; Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt, pp. 493-500; Harriman & Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, p. 136.
  • Chuev, Molotov: Poluderzhavny i vlastelin, pp. 85-86, 131-132; War and Diplomacy, pp. 163, 176, 224, 254.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 170-175; Foreign Relations of the United States, pp. 566-568, 571-572.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 173-175; Sovetsko-amerikanski e otnosheniya, pp. 175-178; Foreign Relations of the United States, pp. 566-568, 571-572. For another American report on these early meetings see R. E. Sherwood (ed.). The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins: An Intimate History by Robert E. Sherwood, vol. iv, January 1942-July 1942 (London, 1949), pp. 559-564.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 176-179, 225; Sovetsko-amerikanski e otnosheniya, pp. 178-180; Foreign Relations of the United States, pp. 568-571, 572-574. It seems clear that Roosevelt was committing British troops, for there was little possibility of an American landing in 1942.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 179-180.
  • Sherwood (ed.). The White House Papers of Harry L Hopkins, vol. 2, p. 564.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 183-189; Sovetsko-amerikanski e otnosheniy a, pp. 181-187; Foreign Relations of the United States, pp. 575-578; Sherwood (ed.). The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, vol. 2, pp. 566-569.
  • War and Diplomacy, p. 228.
  • Harriman& Abel,Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946,p. 137. Stoler,The Politics of the Second Front, p. 47, quotes an American archival source as saying 'The President then authorised Mr Molotov to inform Mr Stalin that we expect the formation of a second front this year'.
  • War and Diplomacy, p. 193.
  • Sherwood (ed.). The White House Papers of Harry L Hopkins, vol. 2, p. 569; Foreign Relations of the United States, p. 577.
  • War and Diplomacy, p. 254.
  • Sherwood (ed.). The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, vol. 2, pp. 573-574; Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt, p. 504.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 195-197, 204; Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 25, f. 256; Sovetskoamerikanskie otnosheniya, pp. 187-192; Foreign Relations of the United States, pp. 578-581 ; Sherwood (ed.). The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, vol. 2, pp. 575-578.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 198-199; Sovetsko-amerikanski e otnosheniya, pp. 187-192; Foreign Relations of the United States, p. 582.
  • Sherwood (ed.). The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, vol. 2, p. 579; Harriman & Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, p. 137; Foreign Relations of the United States, pp. 582-583.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 199-200.
  • Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 25, f. 248; Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt, pp. 503-504. For a slight! y different versio n of this see Sherwood (ed.), The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, vol. 2,pp. 573-574.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 201-204; Sovetsko-amerikanski e otnosheniya, pp. 192-194.
  • War and Diplomacy, p. 206.
  • Ibid., pp. 207-209.
  • Ibid., pp. 210-211.
  • Sovetsko-amerikanski e otnosheniya, pp. 195-197; War and Diplomacy, pp. 211-213.
  • Ibid, pp. 215-217.
  • Gromyko . Memories 401
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 218-219; Sovetsko-amerikanski e otnosheniya, pp. 197-198.
  • Sovetsko-angliiski e otnosheniya, p. 220. Marshall and Hopkins thought the statement on the Second Front too strong and wished to have it changed, but Roosevelt would not agree, Sherwood (ed.), The White House Papers of Harry L Hopkins, vol. 2, pp. 581-582. Harriman later commented:
  • That single sentenc e was to be to be interpreted, misinterpreted and over-interprete d for many years to come. In accepting Molotov ' s version, Roosevelt provided employment for a whole generation of Cold War publicists and historians who solemnly argued its meaning in dozens of books and hundreds of articles (Harriman & Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, p. 138).
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 222-230.
  • Ibid., p. 230.
  • Ibid, p. 254.
  • Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt, p. 508. There is no indicatio n in the correspondenc e as to the nature of this proposal.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 264-266.
  • Ibid., pp. 267-274; AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47,11.110-120; Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 25, ff. 257-260; Sovetsko-angliiski e otnosheniya, pp. 244-247. The result of these plans was the Dieppe raid of August 1942.
  • PRO FO371 132882, 216. The statement in the communique on the American talks referring to 'a Second Front in 1942' apparently alarmed Churchill and Eden. See M. Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill vol. XIV. Road to Victory 1941-1945 (London, 1986), p. 119.
  • War and Diplomacy, p. 264.
  • Ibid., pp. 275-280; PRO FO371/32882, 216-217A.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 283-284; Sovetsko-angliiski e otnosheniya, pp. 246-247.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 295-297; AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47,11. 133-137. 187 War and Diplomacy, pp. 298-300; Sovetsko-angliiski e otnosheniya, pp. 247-248; AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47,11. 138-139.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 300-301; AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 48,1. 23. 189 AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 48,11. 13-16; War and Diplomacy, pp. 285-288.
  • Ibid., pp. 291-294; AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 48,11. 17-22. 191 AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 49,11. 5-73.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 301-302.
  • Ibid., pp. 306-307.
  • Chuev, Molotov: Poluderjiavnyi vlastelin, pp. 83-84.
  • Standley . Admiral Ambassador 203 Harriman & Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, p. 139;
  • Standley . Admiral Ambassador 212 Ibid., 290;
  • Ibid., p. 243.
  • W. S. Churchill, The Second World War: vol. 1, The Gathering Storm (Bungay, 1950), p. 301.
  • Khrushchev, 'Vospominaniya', Ogonek, 1989, 36, p. 18.
  • A. Gromyko, Memories, translated by H. Shukman (London, 1989), p. 404.
  • K. Simonov, 'Zametki k biografii G. K. Zhukova', Voenno-istoricheski i zhumal, 1987,9, p. 49.
  • Watson, 'Molotov's Apprenticeship in Foreign Policy', p. 715.
  • Public Record Office (hereinafter PRO) FO371/24845,163; ArIMv Vneshnei Politiki Rossisskoi Federatsii (hereinafter AVPRF), f. 6, op. 1, pap. 1, del. 4,11. 167-170.
  • G. Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (New Haven, 1999), p. 16.
  • H. Hanak, 'Sir Stafford Cripps as British Ambassador in Moscow, May 1940 to June 1941 ', English Historical Review, 94,1, 1979, p. 54; G. Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, 1941-1942 (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 18-19. There was friction over the USSR's delivery of raw materials and mutual suspicion was growing.
  • PROFO371/24846,6-7. Two of the fburTikhomirnov brothers had been closely associated with Molotov since he had been a student. Molotov was the patron of one, G.A. Tikhomimov, who wrote the official kratkaya biografiya of Molotov.
  • Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, 1941-1942, pp. 20-23.
  • PRO FO371/24847, 134, 184, 186; Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, 1941-1942, pp. 32-36.
  • Ibid., pp. 55-57; PRO FRO F371/24845, 2.
  • Haslam . 1991 . 'Soviet Foreign Policy 1939-41: Isolation and Expansion' . Soviet Union/Union Soviétique , 18 : 112 – 113 .
  • Gorodetsky . Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow 51
  • Churchill , W. S. 1952 . The Second World War , Their Finest Hour vol. 2 , 122 – 123 . Bungay
  • Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 52-53; Hanak, 'Sir Stafford Cripps,' p. 61.
  • Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 64-65; PRO FO371/24847, 263-264.
  • Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 80-81.
  • AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 81,1.2; Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 98-99.
  • Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 126-127; W. S. Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 3: The Grand Alliance (Bungay, 1952), pp. 290-292; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, pp. 159-169.
  • Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 126,131 -135 ; G. Gorodetsky, 'The Hess Affair and Anglo-Soviet Relations on the Eve of "Barbarossa" ',English Historical Review, 94,4,1986, p. 419; Gorodetsky, Grand Delusion, pp. 247-274.
  • for instance R. Overy, Russia's War (London, 1998), pp. 73-79; A. V. Korotkov et al., 'Posetiteli kremlevskogo kabineta I.V. Stalina', Istoricheskii arkhiv, 1996, 2, pp. 51-57.
  • "Churchul, The Second World War, vol. 3: The Grand Alliance, p. 301.
  • G. P. Kynin et al (eds), Sovetsko-angliiski e otnosheniya vo vremya velikoi otechestvenno i voiny, 1941-1945, T. l, 1941-1943 (Moscow, 1983) (hereinafter Sovetsko-angliiski e otnosheniya), p. 47.
  • Gorodetsky, SiV Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 178-179; Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 47-52.
  • AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 81,11.6-14, printed, Sovetsko-angliiski e otnosheniya, pp. 47-52; cf. S. M. Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin: the Soviet Union and the Origins of the Grand Alliance (Chapel HOl, 1988), p. 141.
  • *2 AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 81,11.15-17, printed, Sovetsko-angliiski e otnosheniya, pp. 53-55.
  • Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 181-182.
  • G. A. Arbatov et al (eds), Sovetsko-amerikanski e otnosheniya vo vremya velikoi otechestvenno i voiny 1941-1945, T. 1, 1941-1943 (Moscow, 1984) (hereinafter Sovetsko-amerikanski e otnosheniya), p. 46.
  • Gorodetsky, SiV Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 196, 198, 203.
  • AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 81,11.24-41 ; Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, p. 181; Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 56-62, 65-68.
  • AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 81, IL, 42-50; printed, Sovetsko-angliiski e otnosheniya, pp. 69-73; Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, pp. 145-146.
  • Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 77-81.
  • Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, p. 150; Gomaetsky,Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 188-189, 193.
  • V. M. Kulish, Istoriya vtorogo fronta (Moscow, 1971), pp. 51, 54.
  • Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 85, 111-113, 118-119.
  • Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 193-194.
  • Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, p. 153; Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 3: The Grand Alliance, pp. 346-355. Much of the initiative for this conference came from Cripps. See Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 193-203. In the key clauses of the Atlantic Charter Roosevelt and Churchil 1 stated that they rejected territorial aggrandisemen t at the end of the war and that territorial changes should be in accordance with the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned.
  • O. A. Rzheshevsky, 'Vizit A. Idena v Moskvu v dekabre 1941 g. peregovory s I. V. Stalinym i V.M. Molotovym', Novaya i noveishaya istoriya, 1994,2, p. 86. For the 'three-power conference' see Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 235-248; and W. A. Harriman & E. Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946 (New York, 1975), pp. 87-97.
  • Ibid., p. 97; W. H. Standley & A.A. Ageton, Admiral Ambassador to Russia (Chicago, 1955), p. 71.
  • AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 82,11.45-47; Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, p. 165; Avon Papers, Birmingham University Library (hereinafter Eden Papers), AP/33/9/l/vol. 24, f. 437. I am grateful to Lady Avon for allowing me to use and cite these papers.
  • AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 82,11,52-3; printed, Sovetsko-angliiski e otnosheniya, pp. 156-157.
  • O. A. Rzheshevsky (ed.). War and Diplomacy: the Making of the Grand Alliance: Documents from Stalin 's Archives (Amsterdam, 1996) (hereinafter War and Diplomacy), p. 293. This work prints the reports from the presidential archive on Molotov's conversations in London and Washington, and correspondenc e between him and Stalin during the negotiations. The reports sometimes differ from those in AVPRF, part-printed in Sovetsko-angliiski e otnosheniya and Sovetsko-amerikanski e otnosheniya.
  • Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 236-241.
  • Ibid, pp. 247-248. For Molotov's relations with Litvinov see J. Haslam, 'Soviet-German Relations and the Origins of the Second World War: the Jury is Still Out', Journal of Modem History, 69, 1997, p. 788.
  • Gorodetsky . Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow 251 PRO FO 371/29558,123, quoted in
  • S. Kot, Conversations with the Kremlin and Dispatches from Russia (London, 1963), p. 71.
  • Miner . Between Churchill and Stalin 171 Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 24, ff. 455-59;
  • W. Citrine, In Russia Now (London, 1942), p. 91.
  • Sovetsko-angliiski e otnosheniya, pp. 171-172; quoted in Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 3: The Grand Alliance, pp. 414-415.
  • Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 24, ff. 510-20; Sovetsko-angliiski e otnosheniya, pp. 176-177. Stalin had by this time raised the question of the post-war western frontiers of the USSR being based on the territorial gains of 1939-41. Harriman & Abel, Special Envoy to Churchill and Stalin, 1941-1946, pp. 109-110.
  • 1941 . The Times , 8 December (the same day on which the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour was reported)
  • Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, pp. 180-183.
  • Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 277-279; Rzheshevsky, 'Vizit A. Idena v Moskvu', pp. 85-86; J. Harvey (ed.). The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey (London, 1978), pp. 70,72. Oliver Harvey was a British Foreign Office official and Eden's private secretary.
  • Dilks , D. 1971 . The Diaries of Alexander Cadogan 1938-1941 (hereinafter Cadogan Diaries) 420 London
  • Rzheshevsky . “ 'Vizit A. Idena v Moskvu' ” . 90
  • Sovetsko-angliiski e otnosheniya, pp. 184-186.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 15-16. This work translates and reprints in slightly amended form Rzheshevsky, 'Vizit A. Idena v Moskvu', Novaya i noveishaya istoriya, 1994,2, pp. 85-103 and 1994, 3, pp. 100-123.
  • PRO FO371/32875,5OA; War and Diplomacy, pp. 11-22. In the record of this conversation in the Presidential Archive, Eden says only that he must consult the British government. In the British version he mentions Churchill, the USA and the Dominions. See also Eden's account of this meeting in his memoirs. The Earl of Avon, The Eden Memoirs: the Reckoning (London, 1965), pp. 289-290, where Eden refers only to consulting the Cabinet. Cripps had already indicated on 22 October that the British government was prepared to recognise de facto control (not sovereignty) over the Baltic states, A VPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, del. 82,11. 50-52; cf. A. Polonsky (ed.). The Great Powers and the Polish Question 1941-1945: A Documentary Study in Cold War Origins (London, 1976), p. 17.
  • Miner . Between Churchill and Stalin 237
  • PRO FO371/32875,53-56; Sovetsko-angliiski e otnosheniya, pp. 188-190; War and Diplomacy, pp. 28-35.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 35-40; PRO FO 371/32874, 56-58A; The Eden Memoirs: the Reckoning, p. 295; Eden Papers, AP20/3/3. See also E. Mark, 'Revolution by Degrees : Stalin' s National Front Strategy for Europe, 1941-1947', Cold War International History Project, Working Paper no. 31, Washington, 2001, pp. 8-10.
  • AVPRF, f. 6, op. 3, pap. 8, ii. 82, 70-78; War and Diplomacy, pp. 43-49. Maisky had in fact approached Eden about the USSR's frontiers with Poland as early as 4 July 1941. Polonsky (ed.). The Great Powers and the Polish Question, pp. 81-82.
  • War and Diplomacy, p. 54. Stalin had suggested joint military action in the Petsamo region at an earlier meeting, with the USSR providing land forces and the British naval forces. Eden had agreed to consider this but had not replied.
  • Miner . Between Churchill and Stalin 248 Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 280-288; PRO FO 371/32874,45-61 ; cf. the record of the conversation s in Eden Papers, AP/33/9/1, vol. 25,1-18. It is difficult to substantiate Miner's suggestio n that Eden was anxious for an agreement at any price.
  • Harvey (ed.). The War Diaries of Oliver Harvey, pp. 78-80
  • PRO FO 371/32874, 45a, 55, 55a, 58; War and Diplomacy, pp. 33, 39.
  • The Eden Memoirs: the Reckoning, pp. 302-303 ; Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 2, Their Finest Hour, p. 463.
  • Gorodetsky, Sir Stafford Cripps Mission to Moscow, pp. 291-292.
  • G. Ross, The Foreign Office and the Kremlin: British Documents on Anglo-Soviet Relations 1941-1945 (Cambridge, 1984), p. 19.
  • Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 213-215.
  • J. Erickson, The Road to Stalingrad: Stalin 's War with Germany, vol. 1 (London, 1975), p. 455.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 29-30.
  • Ross, The Foreign Office and the Kremlin, pp. 19-21. For British attempts to persuade Roosevelt to make concessions to Stalin on post-war Soviet frontiers see US Congress, Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic Papers 1942, vol. Ill, Europe (hereinafter Foreign Relations of the United States) (Washington, 1961), pp. 505-540.
  • Sovetsko-amerikanski e otnosheniya, pp. 150-151, 155-158.
  • Ross, The Foreign Office and the Kremlin, p. 22; W. S. Churchill, The Second World War: vol. 4, The Hinge of Fate (London, 1954), p. 272.
  • Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 217-218; PRO FO 371/32879, 112.
  • Sovetsko-amerikanski e otnosheniya, pp. 159-160; Foreign Relations of the United States, p. 543.
  • Sovetsko-amerikanski e otnosheniya, pp. 160, 164.
  • Sovetsko-angliiskie otnosheniya, pp. 219-220.
  • M. A. Stoler, The Politics of the Second Front: American Military Planning and Diplomacy in Coalition Warfare, 1941-1943 (Westport, 1977), p. 43.
  • Ross, The Foreign Office and the Kremlin, pp. 22-23, 95-101.
  • Ibid., p. 23; PRO FO371/32882, 93.
  • Miner . Between Churchill and Stalin 226
  • Sovetsko-amerikanski e otnosheniya, p. 164.
  • Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 25, f. 118; W.F. Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt: the Complete Correspondence, vol. 1, Alliance Emerging, October 1933-November 1942 (hereinafter. Kimball (ed.), Churchill and Roosevelt) (Princeton, 1984), pp. 466, 470.
  • War and Diplomacy, p. 104.
  • Harvey (ed.). War Diaries of Oliver Harvey, p. 119.
  • F. Chuev, Molotov: Poluderzhavnyi vlastelin (Moscow, 1999), pp. 83,87; PRO FO371/32882, 158; 32908, 53.
  • Eden Papers, AP33/9/1, vol. 25, ff. 142,164,172-173; Foreign Relations of the United States, p. 553.
  • Cadogan Diaries, pp. 451^153.
  • V. B. Shavrov, Istoriya konstruktsii samoletov v SSSR 1938-1950gg.: materialy k istorii samoletostroeniya (Moscow, 1994), pp. 150-155; V. Suvorov, Den' -M: kogda nachalas' vtoraya mirovaya voina (Moscow, 1994), pp. 21-31; War and Diplomacy, p. 63; PRO FO371/32879, 177. Chuev, Molotov, Poluderzhavnyi vlastelin, p. 84.1 am indebted to Dr L. Samuelson for providing me with source material on the Tb-7 (Pe-S) and on Molotov's flight.
  • Cadogan Diaries, p. 453; Harvey (ed.). War Diaries of Oliver Harvey, p. 125.
  • Churchill, The Second World War, vol. 4, The Hinge of Fate, pp. 278-279.
  • Chuev . Molotov: Poluderzhavnyi vlastelin 84
  • f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47,11.4-5; War and Diplomacy, p. 67; PRO FO371/32882, 36. There is a difference between the British and Soviet reports here, the British implying that Molotov said that the 'Second Front' was the more important question. The Soviet report on this first meeting is far more detailed than the British.
  • AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47,11.7-12; War and Diplomacy, pp. 68-72; PRO FO371/32882, 37-38A. Contrary to Miner, Between Churchill and Stalin, p. 237, who claims that Molotov assumed that the future of the Baltic states was settled and did not mention them at this first meeting, he did find it necessary to defend Soviet claims to them, when the question was raised by the British.
  • Cadogan Diaries, p. 453.
  • Mutual Assistance Agreement of 25 August 1939 formalised Britain's March 1939 guarantee to Poland. As early as November 1939 General Sikorski, as leader of the Polish government in exile, had agreed that if Poland could not recover the territory she had lost to Russia she should be compensated at the expense of Germany. See Polonsky (ed.). The Great Powers and the Polish Question 1941-1945, pp. 15-16. Under the Polish-Soviet Agreement of 30 July 1941 the USSR recognised 'the Soviet-German Treaties of 1939 as to territorial changes in Poland as having lost their validity' (ibid.,pp. 18, 22), but the agreement said nothing about the Polish-Soviet frontier, and the Poles clearly felt that they had not ceded their 1939 eastern boundary.
  • AVPRF, f. 6, op. 4, pap. 5, del. 47,11.14-25; War and Diplomacy,pp. 72-78; PRO FO371/32882, 40-41A.
  • War and Diplomacy, pp. 78-81.

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