Who’s Afraid of Disagreement about Disagreement?

References

• Alston, W., Sugden, and J. B. Sherwood. 1985. “Concepts of Epistemic Justification.” The Monist 68 (1): 57–89. https://doi.org/10.5840/monist198568116.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Christensen, D. 2007. “Epistemology of Disagreement: The Good News.” The Philosophical Review 116 (2): 187–217. https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-2006-035.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Christensen, D. 2011. “Disagreement, Question-Begging and Epistemic Self-Criticism.” Philosophers’ Imprint 11:1–22.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Christensen, D. 2013. “Epistemic Modesty Defended.” In The Epistemology of Disagreement: New Essays, edited by J. Lackey and D. Christensen, 165–181. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Christensen, D. 2021. “Akratic (Epistemic) Modesty.” Philosophical Studies 178: 2191–2214.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Decker, J. 2014. “Conciliation and Self-Incrimination.” Erkenntnis 79 (5): 1099–1134. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-014-9599-8.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Douven, I. 2009. “Uniqueness Revisited.” American Philosophical Quarterly 46:347–361. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0266267107001502.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Elga, A. 2007. “Reflection and Disagreement.” Nôus 43 (3): 478–502. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0068.2007.00656.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Elga, A. 2010. “How to Disagree About How to Disagree.” In Disagreement, edited by R. Feldman and T. A. Warfield, 175–186. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Feldman, R. 2006. “Epistemological Puzzles about Disagreement.” In Epistemology Futures, edited by S. Hetherington. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Feldman, R. 2007. “Reasonable Religious Disagreements.” In Philosophers without Gods: Meditations on Atheism and the Secular Life, edited by L. Antony, 194–214. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Fumerton, R. 2010. “You Can’t Trust a Philosopher.” In Disagreement, edited by R. Feldman and T. A. Warfield, 216–236. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Graves, S. 2013. “The Self-Undermining Objection in the Epistemology of Disagreement.” Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers 30 (1): 93–106. https://doi.org/10.5840/faithphil20133015.
   Google Scholar
• Kelly, T. 2005. “The Epistemic Significance of Disagreement.” In Oxford Studies in Epistemology, edited by T. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, Vol. 1, 167–196. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kelly, T. 2010. “Peer Disagreement and Higher Order Evidence.” In Disagreement, edited by R. Feldman and T. A. Warfield, 111–174. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kornblith, H. 2010. “Belief in the Face of Controversy.” In Disagreement, edited by R. Feldman and T. A. Warfield, 29–52. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, D. 1971. “Immodest Inductive Methods.” Philosophy of Science 38 (1): 54–63. https://doi.org/10.1086/288339.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• MacAskill, W., K. Bykvist, and T. Ord. 2020. Moral Uncertainty. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Pittard, J. 2015. “Resolute Conciliationism.” The Philosophical Quarterly 65 (260): 442–463. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqv022.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Plantinga, A. 2000. Warranted Christian Belief. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Sosa, E. 2010. “The Epistemology of Disagreement.” In Social Epistemology, edited by A. Haddock, A. Miller, and D. Pritchard, 278–297. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Titelbaum, M. G. 2015. “Rationality’s Fixed Point.” In Oxford Studies in Epistemology, edited by T. S. Gendler and J. Hawthorne, Vol. 5, 253–294. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Weatherson, B. 2013. “Disagreements, Philosophical and Otherwise.” In The Epistemology of Disagreement, edited by D. Christensen and J. Lackey, 54–75. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Wedgwood, R. 2007. The Nature of Normativity. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Weiner, M. 2007. http://mattweiner.net/blog/archives/000781.html.
   Google Scholar
• White, R. 2005. “Epistemic Permissiveness.” Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1): 445–459. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00069.x.
   Google Scholar