The non-ratification of bilateral investment treaties in Brazil: a story of conflict in a land of cooperationFootnote^†

^†We have presented previous versions of this article at the Global Leaders Fellowship Workshop, Oxford, UK, May 2010; ECPR, Reykjavik, August 2011; and at Chile Catholic University, Santiago, August 2011.

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