Accountability as justice for the Multilateral Development Banks? Borrower opposition and bank avoidance to US power and influence

References

• ADB (2000) ADF VIII Donor's Report: Fighting Poverty in Asia, Seventh Replenishment of the Asian Development Fund (ADF VIII), Manila: ADB.
   Google Scholar
• ADB (2001) Report of the Inspection Committee to the Board of Directors Asian Development Bank on Samut Prakarn Waste Water Management Project, Samut Prakarn, Thailand (ADB Loan Nos. 1410-THA [7 December 1995] and 1646-THA [3 December 1998]), 20 June 2001. Manila: ADB. On file with author.
   Google Scholar
• ADB (2002) Report and Recommendation of the Inspection Committee to the Board of Executive Directors of the Asian Development Bank on Inspection Request: Samut Prakarn Wastewater Management Project, Thailand: ADB ( ADB Loan Nos. 1410-THA [7 December 1995] and 1646-THA [3 December 1998]), 28 February 2002.
   Google Scholar
• AfDB (2004a) Stepping Up to the Future: An Independent Evaluation of AfDF VII, VIII, and IX, Tunisia: Operations Evaluation Department, African Development Bank.
   Google Scholar
• AfDB (2004b) ‘The independent review mechanism’, Board Resolution B/BD/2004/9-F/BD/2004/7, June 30 2004. Tunis Cote D'Ivoire: AfDB. On file with author.
   Google Scholar
• AIIB (2016) ‘Environmental and social policies’, Beijing, China: AIIB; accessed at http://www.aiib.org/uploadfile/2016/0226/20160226043633542.pdf, 13 April 2016.
   Google Scholar
• Babb, S. (2009) Behind the Development Banks, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Barnett, M. and Coleman, L. (2005) ‘Designing police: interpol and the study of change in international organisations’, International Studies Quarterly 49(4): 593–620.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bissell, R. and Nanwani, S. (2009) ‘Multilateral Development Bank accountability mechanisms: developments and challenges’, Central and European Journal of International and Security Studies 3(2): 154–97.
   Google Scholar
• Brown, B. (1992) The United States and the Politicization of the World Bank, London; New York: Kegan Paul International.
   Google Scholar
• Buntaine, M. (2016) Giving Aid Effectively, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• CAO (2009) Annual Report 2008–2009, Washington, DC: IFC.
   Google Scholar
• CAO (2010) The CAO at 10: Annual Report FY2010 and Review FY2000-2010, Washington, DC: IFC.
   Google Scholar
• CAO (2013) Annual Report 2013, Washington, DC: IFC.
   Google Scholar
• Chwieroth, J. (2008) ‘Normative change ‘From Within’: the International Monetary Fund's approach to Capital Account Liberalization’, International Studies Quarterly 52: 129–58.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Clark, D., Fox, J. and Treakle, K. (2003) Demanding Accountability: Civil-Society Claims and the World Bank Inspection Panel, Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
   Google Scholar
• Copelovitch, M. (2010) The International Monetary Fund in the Global Economy, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Culpeper, R. (1997) Titans or Behemoths? Multilateral Development Banks Series No 5, London: Intermediate Technology Publications and Lynne Rienner.
   Google Scholar
• DeWitt, R. P. (1977) The Inter-American Development Bank and Political Influence: With Special Reference to Costa Rica, New York; London: Preager.
   Google Scholar
• Dubnick, M. (2014) ‘Accountability as a cultural keyword’, in M. Bovens, R. Goodin and T. Schillermans (eds) The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 23–38.
   Google Scholar
• Dysart, B., Murphy, T. and Chayes, A. (2003) ‘Beyond compliance? An external review team report on the compliance advisor/ombudsman office of IFC/MIGA’, prepared for Meg Taylor, IFC/MIGA Compliance Advisor Ombudsman, July 24 2003, Washington, DC: The World Bank Group.
   Google Scholar
• EBRD (2003) President's Recommendation to the EBRD Board of Executive Directors, London, UK: EBRD.
   Google Scholar
• English, E. P. and Mule, H. M. (1996) The African Development Bank, Boulder, CO: Intermediate Technology Publishing, Lynne Rienner.
   Google Scholar
• Filho, W. L. and Rios, R. (2007) Accountability Issues in International Development Projects, Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang.
   Google Scholar
• Fox, J. (2000) ‘The World Bank inspection panel: lessons from the first five years’, Global Governance 6(3): 279–318.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• G7 (2000) ‘Strengthening the international financial architecture’, Report of the G7 Finance Ministers to the Heads of State and Government, Fukuoka, Japan, 8 July, Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; accessed at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm20000708-st.html#23-36, 20 December 2013.
   Google Scholar
• G7 (2001) ‘Strengthening the international financial system and the Multilateral Development Banks’, Report of the G7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, 7 July, Tokyo, Japan: Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan; accessed at http://www.g8.utoronto.ca/finance/fm010707.html, 28 June 2013.
   Google Scholar
• Grant, R. and Keohane, R. (2005) ‘Accountability and abuses of power in world politics’, American Political Science Review 99(1): 29–43.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Grigorescu, A. (2010) ‘The spread of bureaucratic oversight mechanisms across intergovernmental organisations’, International Studies Quarterly 54: 871–86.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Grigorescu, A. (2016) Democratic Intergovernmental Organisations? Normative Pressures and Decision-Making Rules, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Hair, J., Dysart, B. and Danielson, L. (1997) ‘Pangue hydroelectric project (Chile): an independent review of the international finance corporation's compliance with applicable World Bank group environment and social requirements’, in IFC Internal Review, Washington, DC: IFC.
   Google Scholar
• Hansungule, M. (2009) Review of the IRM, Finding and Recommendations, Tunisia: African Development Bank.
   Google Scholar
• IDA (1998) ‘Additions to IDA resources, twelfth replenishment: a partnership for poverty reduction’, 23 December, Washington, DC: World Bank; accessed at http://www.worldbank.org/ida/papers/IDA12_Replenishment/IDA12Report.pdf, 14 January 2014.
   Google Scholar
• IDB (1994) Annual Report, Washington, DC: IDB.
   Google Scholar
• IFC (1996) ‘Consultation paper for inspection mechanism for IFC and MIGA’, 10 September 1996. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. On file with author.
   Google Scholar
• IIM (1997) Yacyreta Hydroelectric Project: Report of the Review Panel, Washington, DC: IDB.
   Google Scholar
• International Financial Institution Advisory Commission (2000) Report by the International Financial Institution Advisory Commission, Chaired by Allan H Meltzer. Funded by US Congress. New York: IFIAC.
   Google Scholar
• IRM (2008) Annual Report for 2008, London: EBRD.
   Google Scholar
• IRM (2011) Compliance Review Report: Medupi Power Project, Republic of South Africa, Compliance Review Request 2010/02, 19 December, Tunis, Cote D' Ivoire: AfDB; accessed at http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Compliance-Review/Medupi%20Power%20Project%20Q20102%20%20%281%29.pdf, 2 August 2016.
   Google Scholar
• Johnson, T. (2014) Organizational Progeny, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kaya, A. (2015) Power and Global Economic Institutions, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Koenig-Archibugi, M. (2004) ‘Transnational corporations and public accountability’, Government and Opposition 39(2): 234–59.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lavelle, K. (2011) Legislating International Organisation: The US Congress, the IMF and the World Bank, Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Leiteritz, R. and Moschella, M. (2010) ‘The IMF and capital account liberalization: a case of failed norm institutionalization’, in S. Park and A. Vetterlein (eds) Owning Development: Creating Policy Norms in the IMF and the World Bank, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 163–80.
   Google Scholar
• Mashaw, J. (2006) ‘Accountability in institutional design: some thoughts on the grammar of governance’, in M. D. Dowdle (ed) Public Accountability: Designs, Dilemmas and Experiences, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 115–56.
   Google Scholar
• McGill, E. (2001) ‘The inspection policy of the Asian Development Bank’, in G. Alfredsson and R. Ring (eds) The Inspection Panel of the World Bank: A Different Complaints Procedure, The Hague, London and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 191–209.
   Google Scholar
• Meyer, J. and Rowan, B. (1991) ‘Institutional organizations: formal structures as myth and ceremony’, in W. W. Powell and P. DiMaggio (eds) The New Institutionalism in Organizational Analysis, Chicago, IL: Chicago University Press, pp. 141–62.
   Google Scholar
• Mistry, P. (1995) Multilateral Development Banks: An Assessment of their Financial Structures, Policies and Practices, The Hague: FONDAD.
   Google Scholar
• Morse, B. and Berger, T. (1992) The Independent Review of the Sardar Sarovar Projects, Ottawa: Resource Futures International.
   Google Scholar
• Mulgan, R. (2000) ‘Accountability: an ever-expanding concept?’, Public Administration 78(3): 555–73.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Naude Fourie, A. (2009) The World Bank Inspection Panel and Quasi-Judicial Oversight, Utrecht: Eleven.
   Google Scholar
• Nelson, P. (2000) ‘Whose civil society – whose governance – decisionmaking and practice in the new agenda at the inter-American Development Bank and the World Bank’, Global Governance 6: 405–31.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Park, S. (2010) World Bank Group Interactions with Environmentalists: Changing International Organisation Identities, Manchester: Manchester University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Park, S. (2014) ‘Institutional isomorphism and the Asian Development Bank's accountability mechanism: something old, something new; something borrowed, something blue?’, The Pacific Review 27(2): 217–39.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Park, S. (unpublished manuscript) The Good Hegemon: How the United States Helps People Hold the Multilateral Development Banks to Account.
   Google Scholar
• Sanford, J. (1982) US Foreign Policy and Multilateral Development Banks, Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
   Google Scholar
• Shihata, I. (1994) The World Bank Inspection Panel, Washington, DC: World Bank and Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Strand, J. (2003) ‘Measuring voting power in an international institution: the United States and the inter-American Development Bank’, Economics of Governance 4(1): 19–36.
   Google Scholar
• Strand, J. and Zappile, T. (2015) ‘Always vote for principle, though you may vote alone: explaining United States political support for multilateral development loans’, World Development 72: 224–39.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tallberg, J., Sommerer, T., Squatrito, T. and Jönsson, C. (2013) The Opening Up of International Organizations: Transnational Access in Global Governance, New York: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Tussie, D. (1995) The Inter-American Development Bank, Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.
   Google Scholar
• Udall, L. (1997) The World Bank Inspection Panel: A Three Year Review, Washington, DC: Bank Information Center.
   Google Scholar
• Umana, A. (1998) The World Bank Inspection Panel: The First Four Years (1994–1998), Washington, DC: Inspection Panel, World Bank.
   Google Scholar
• United States Congress (1993) International Development and Debt Relief Act of 1993. United States Congress.House. Committee on Banking Finance and Urban Affairs (H.R 3063), 103rd Congress, First Session, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, November 22 1993, Report 103–411, p. 11.
   Google Scholar
• United States Congress (1999) House. Committee on Appropriations.Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 2000. Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 105th Congress, Second Session, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, p. 187.
   Google Scholar
• United States Congress (2003) House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 2004: Justification of Budget Estimates. Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 108th Congress, First Session, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, p. 203.
   Google Scholar
• United States Congress (2004) House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 2005: Justification of Budget Estimates. Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, 108th Congress, Second Session, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, pp. 220–1.
   Google Scholar
• United States Treasury (1995) Prepared statement by Lawrence H Summers, Undersecretary of the Treasury for International Affairs. United States Congress, House of Representatives.Committee on Banking and Financial Services. Sub-Committee on Domestic and International Monetary Policy. ‘Administrations plan for authorization of FY96 funding for the international financial institutions’, 104th Congress, First Session, Washington, DC: US Government Printing Office, May 2 1995, p. 63.
   Google Scholar
• United States Treasury (1997) Letter from US-ED Jan Piercy to Bill Schuerch, ‘CODE meeting on IFC/MIGA inspection mechanism’, 14 October 1997. Washington, DC: US Government. On file with author.
   Google Scholar
• United States Treasury (2016) ‘2015 Report to Congress by Chairman of the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies’, 28 April 2016; accessed at https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/international/development-banks/Documents/NAC%20Report%20(Issued%20March%202016).pdf
   Google Scholar
• Upton, B. (2000) The Multilateral Development Banks: Improving U.S Leadership, Westport, CT: Praeger.
   Google Scholar
• van Putten, M. (2008) Policing the Banks: Accountability Mechanisms for the Financial Sector, Montreal; London: Magill-Queens University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Wapenhans, W. (1992) Effective Implementation: Key to Development Impact, Portfolio Management Task Force, Washington, DC: World Bank.
   Google Scholar
• Weaver, C. (2008) The Hypocrisy Trap: The World Bank and the Poverty of Reform, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Weber, S. (1994) ‘Origins of the European Bank for reconstruction and development’, International Organisation 48(1): 1–38.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Woicke, P. (2001) Speech by Peter Woicke, former EVP of the IFC, Session IV Accountability and the Private Sector, Challenges of International Accountability: Lessons from Independent Accountability Mechanisms, Hosted by American University College of Law and the World Bank Inspection Panel, June 24 2001, Washington, DC: American University.
   Google Scholar
• Woods, N. and Narlikar, A. (2001) ‘Governance and the limits of accountability: the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank’, International Social Science Journal 53(170): 569–83.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank (1993) ‘Summary of discussion at the meeting of the executive directors of the Bank and IDA in a committee of the whole, August 26 and 27, 1993’, from T.T Thahane Vice President and Secretary World Bank to the World Bank Board of Executive Directors 16 September 1993. Washington, DC: World Bank. On file with author.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank, IFC and MIGA (1996a) ‘Secretary of the committee on development effectiveness’, Proposed Inspection Mechanism for Private Sector Projects: IFC and MIGA Inspection Panel, Washington, DC: World Bank, IFC and MIGA, June 27 1996, CODE96-40. On file with author.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank, IFC and MIGA (1996b) ‘Secretary for committee on development effectiveness’, Minutes of the Meeting held on July 8 1996: Proposed Inspection Mechanism for Private Sector Projects: IFC and MIGA Inspection Panel, Washington, DC: World Bank, IFC and MIGA, August 26 1996, CODEM96-11. On file with author.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank, IFC and MIGA (1997) ‘Secretary of the committee on development effectiveness’, Consultations with Private Sector Clients and Co-Financiers on the Possible Establishment of an Inspection Mechanism for IFC and MIGA, Washington, DC: World Bank, IFC and MIGA, 9 August 1997, CODE97-50. On file with author.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank, IFC and MIGA (1998) Report from the Secretary, CODE, ‘Options to enhance environmental and social compliance and accountability in IFC and MIGA’, Washington, DC: World Bank, IFC and MIGA, 4 March 1998, CODE98-12, p. 5. On file with author.
   Google Scholar