Splitting the check: explaining patterns of counterpart commitments in World Bank projects

References

• Aitchison, J. (1986). The statistical analysis of compositional data. New York, NY: Chapman and Hall.
   Google Scholar
• Alesina, A., & Dollar, D. (2000). Who gives foreign aid to whom and why? Journal of Economic Growth, 5(1), 33–63.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Andersen, T. B., Hansen, H., & Markussen, T. (2006). US politics and World Bank IDA-lending. Journal of Development Studies, 42(5), 772–794.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bailey, M. A., Strezhnev, A., & Voeten, E. (2017). Estimating dynamic state preferences from United Nations voting data. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(2), 430–456.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (1999). The politics, power, and pathologies of International Organizations. International Organization, 53(04), 699–732.
   Google Scholar
• Barnett, M. N., & Finnemore, M. (2004). Rules for the world: International organizations in global politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bayer, P., Marcoux, C., & Urpelainen, J. (2014). When international organizations bargain: Evidence from the Global Environment Facility. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59(6), 1074–1100.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bermeo, S. B. (2010). Development and strategy: Aid allocation in an interdependent world. (Unpublished working paper). Durham, North Carolina: Duke University.
   Google Scholar
• Bermeo, S. B. (2017). Aid allocation and targeted development in an increasingly connected world. International Organization, 71(4), 735–766.
   Google Scholar
• Berthélemy, J.-C., & Tichit, A. (2004). Bilateral donors’ aid allocation decisions—A three-dimensional panel analysis. International Review of Economics & Finance, 13(3), 253–274.
   Google Scholar
• Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2007). Foreign aid and policy concessions. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 51(2), 251–284.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bueno de Mesquita, B., & Smith, A. (2009). A political economy of aid. International Organization, 63(02), 309–340.
   Google Scholar
• Claessens, S., Cassimon, D., & Van Campenhout, B. (2009). Evidence on changes in aid allocation criteria. World Bank Economic Review, 23(2), 185–208.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Clegg, L. (2013). Controlling the World Bank and IMF: Shareholders, stakeholders, and the politics of concessional lending. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Clist, P. (2011). 25 years of aid allocation practice: Whither selectivity? World Development, 39(10), 1724–1734.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Copelovitch, M. S. (2010). Master or servant? Common agency and the political economy of IMF Lending. International Studies Quarterly, 54(1), 49–77.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Denizer, C., Kaufmann, D., & Kraay, A. (2013). Good countries or good projects? Macro and micro correlates of World Bank Project performance. Journal of Development Economics, 105, 288–302.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dietrich, S. (2013). Bypass or engage? Explaining donor delivery tactics in foreign aid allocation. International Studies Quarterly, 57(4), 698–712.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dollar, D., & Levin, V. (2006). The increasing selectivity of foreign aid, 1984–2003. World Development, 34(12), 2034–2046.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dreher, A. (2004). A public choice perspective of IMF and World Bank lending and conditionality. Public Choice, 119(3/4), 445–464.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E., & Vreeland, J. R. (2009). Development aid and international politics: Does membership on the U.N. Security Council influence World Bank decisions? Journal of Development Economics, 88, 1–18.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Easterly, W. (2002). The Cartel of good intentions: The problem of bureaucracy in foreign aid. Journal of Policy Reform, 5(4), 223–250.
   Google Scholar
• Fleck, R. K., & Kilby, C. (2006). World Bank independence: A model and statistical analysis of U.S. influence. Review of Development Economics, 10(2), 224–240.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Frey, B. S., & Schneider, F. (1986). Competing models of international lending activity. Journal of Development Economics, 20(2), 225–245.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gibson, C. C., Andersson, K., Ostrom, E., & Shivakumar, S. (2005). The Samaritan’s dilemma: The political economy of development aid. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Girod, D. M. (2012). Effective foreign aid following civil war: The nonstrategic-desperation hypothesis. American Journal of Political Science, 56(1), 188–201.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hawkins, D. G., Lake, D. A., Daniel, L. N., & Michael, J. T. (2006). Delegation and agency in international organizations. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Heinrich, T. (2013). When is foreign aid selfish, when is it selfless? Journal of Politics, 75(2), 422–435.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Iannantuoni, A., Waeiss, C., & Matthew, S. W. (2018). Day-to-day decisions of Egalitarian and Non-Egalitarian international organizations: Evidence from the global environment facility. (Unpublished working paper). Urbana, IL: University of Illinois.
   Google Scholar
• International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. (2012). Articles of agreement (As Amended). Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215526322295/IBRDArticlesOfAgreement_English.pdf
   Google Scholar
• International Development Association. (1960). Articles of agreement. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/278027-1215526322295/IDAArticlesofAgreementEnglish.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Kaja, A., & Werker, E. (2010). Corporate Governance at the World Bank and the dilemma of global governance. World Bank Economic Review, 24(2), 171–198.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Katz, J. N., & King, G. (1999). A statistical model for multiparty electoral data. American Political Science Review, 93(1), 15–32.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kersting, E., & Kilby, C. (2016). The rise of supplemental lending at the World Bank. Villanova School of Business Economics Working Paper 30.
   Google Scholar
• Kilby, C. (2009). The political economy of conditionality: An empirical analysis of World Bank loan disbursements. Journal of Development Economics, 89(1), 51–61.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kilby, C. (2013). An empirical assessment of informal influence in the World Bank. Economic Development and Cultural Change, 61(2), 431–464.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kilby, C. (2013). The political economy of project preparation: An empirical analysis of World Bank projects. Journal of Development Economics, 105, 211–225.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Killick, T., Gunatilaka, R., & Marr, A. (1998). Aid and the political economy of policy change. New York, NY: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Lumsdaine, D. H. (1993). Moral vision in international politics: The foreign aid regime, 1949–1989. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lyne, M. M., Nielson, D. L., & Michael, J. T. (2006). Who delegates? Alternative models of principals in development aid. In D. G. Hawkins, D. A. Lake, D. L. Nielson, & M. J. Tierney (Eds.), Delegation and agency in international organizations (pp. 41–76). New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Malik, R., & Stone, R. W. (2018). Corporate influence in World Bank lending. Journal of Politics, 80(1), 103–118.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Morgenthau, H. J. (1962). A political theory of foreign aid. American Political Science Review, 56(02), 301–309.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Morrison, K. M. (2013). Membership no longer has its privileges: The declining informal influence of board members on IDA lending. Review of International Organizations, 8(2), 291–312.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mosley, P., Harrigan, J., & Toye, J. (1991). Aid and power: The World Bank and policy-based lending. New York, NY: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Neumayer, E. (2003). The pattern of aid giving: The impact of good governance on development assistance. New York, NY: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Nielson, D. L., & Tierney, M. J. (2003). Delegation to international organizations: Agency theory and World Bank environmental reform. International Organization, 57(02), 241–276.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Over, A. M. (1981). On the care and feeding of a gift horse: The recurrent cost problem and optimal reduction of recurrent inputs. Center for Development Economics, Williams College. Retrieved from http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/10405/1/MPRA_paper_10405.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Pallage, S., & Robe, M. A. (2015). Counterpart funding requirements and the foreign aid procyclicality puzzle. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 31(3–4), 462–480.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• de Renzio, P., David, B., Andrew, R., & Zaza, C. (2005). Incentives for harmonisation and alignment in aid agencies. London: Overseas Development Institute.
   Google Scholar
• Sharma, P. (2013). Bureaucratic imperatives and policy outcomes: The origins of World Bank structural adjustment lending. Review of International Political Economy, 20(4), 667–686.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stone, R. W. (2011). Controlling institutions: International organizations and the global economy. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Svensson, J. (2003). Why conditional aid does not work and what can be done about it? Journal of Development Economics, 70(2), 381–402.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Swedlund, H. J. (2017). The development dance: How donors and recipients negotiate the delivery of foreign aid. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Tendler, J. (1975). Inside foreign aid. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Vreeland, J. R., & Dreher, A. (2014). The political economy of the United Nations Security Council: Money and influence. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Wang, Y. (2018). Bargaining matters: An analysis of bilateral aid to developing countries. Journal of International Relations and Development OnlineFirst, 21(1), 1.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wang, Y. (2016). The effect of bargaining on US economic aid. International Interactions, 42(3), 479–502.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Weaver, C. (2008). Hypocrisy trap: The World Bank and the poverty of reform. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Winters, M. S. (2010). Choosing to target: What types of countries get different types of World Bank projects. World Politics, 62(3), 422–458.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Winters, M. S. (2014). Targeting, accountability and capture in development projects. International Studies Quarterly, 58(2), 393–404.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Winters, M. S., & Martinez, G. (2015). The role of governance in determining foreign aid flow composition. World Development, 66, 516–531.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Woods, N. (2006). The globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank and their borrowers. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank. (1998). Assessing aid: What works, what doesn’t, and why. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank Operations Policy and Country Services. (2004). Eligibility of expenditures in World Bank lending: A new policy framework. Retrieved from http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/pe/befa05/march26expenditureeligibilityboardpaper.pdf
   Google Scholar
• World Bank Operations Policy and Country Services. (2005). Eligibility of expenditures in World Bank financing: FY05 report on implementation experience. Retrieved from http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTOPEELI/64168360-1132754290708/20734079/ExpenditureEligibilityFY05AnnualReport.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Xu, J. (2017). Beyond US hegemony in international development: The contest for influence at the World Bank. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar