Partisanship, protection, and punishment: how governments affect the distributional consequences of International Monetary Fund programs

References

• Abdulai, A.-G., & Hickey, S. (2016). The politics of development under competitive clientelism: Insights from Ghana’s Education Sector. African Affairs, 115(458), adv071–72. https://doi.org/10.1093/afraf/adv071
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Abouharb, M. R., & Cingranelli, D. (2007). Human rights and structural adjustment: The impact of the IMF and World Bank. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• AED. (2022). African Elections Database. Retrieved June 1, 2022, from https://africanelections.tripod.com/
   Google Scholar
• Almond, G. A., & Verba, S. (1963). The civic culture: Political attitudes and democracy in five nations. Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Anaxagorou, C., Efthyvoulou, G., & Sarantides, V. (2020). Electoral motives and the subnational allocation of foreign aid in sub-Saharan Africa. European Economic Review, 127, 103430–103432. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103430
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Anebo, F. K. G. (2001). The Ghana 2000 elections: Voter choice and electoral decisions. African Journal of Political Science, 6(1), 69–88. https://doi.org/10.4314/ajps.v6i1.27304
   Google Scholar
• Appiah-Kubi, K. (2001). State-owned enterprises and privatisation in Ghana. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 39(2), 197–229. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X01003597
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Babb, S. L. (2013). The Washington consensus as transnational policy paradigm: Its origins, trajectory and likely successor. Review of International Political Economy, 20(2), 268–297. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2011.640435
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Barnes, T. D., & Burchard, S. M. (2013). “Engendering” politics: The impact of descriptive representation on women’s political engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa. Comparative Political Studies, 46(7), 767–790. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414012463884
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bates, R. (1981). Markets and states in Tropical Africa. University of California Press.
   Google Scholar
• Beazer, Q. H., & Woo, B. (2016). IMF conditionality, government partisanship, and the progress of economic reforms. American Journal of Political Science, 60(2), 304–321. https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12200
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Biglaiser, G., & McGauvran, R. J. (2022). The effects of IMF loan conditions on poverty in the developing world. Journal of International Relations and Development, 25, 806–833.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Blanton, R. G., Early, B., & Peksen, D. (2018). Out of the shadows or into the dark? Economic openness, IMF programs, and the growth of shadow economies. The Review of International Organizations, 13(2), 309–333. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9298-3
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Boafo-Arthur, K. (1999). Ghana: Structural adjustment, democratization, and the politics of continuity. African Studies Review, 42(2), 41–72. https://doi.org/10.2307/525364
   Google Scholar
• Bracco, E., Lockwood, B., Porcelli, F., & Redoano, M. (2015). Intergovernmental grants as signals and the alignment effect: Theory and evidence. Journal of Public Economics, 123, 78–91. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2014.11.007
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bratton, M., Bhavnani, R., & Chen, T. (2012). Voting intentions in Africa: Ethnic, economic or partisan? Commonwealth & Comparative Politics, 50(1), 27–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/14662043.2012.642121
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bratton, M. R., & van de Walle, N. (1997). Democratic experiments in Africa: Regime transitions in comparative perspective. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Brazys, S., & Kotsadam, A. (2020). Sunshine or curse? Foreign Direct Investment, the OECD anti-bribery convention, and individual corruption experiences in Africa. International Studies Quarterly, 64(4), 956–967. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqaa072
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Breen, M., & Doak, E. (2021). The IMF as a global monitor: Surveillance, information, and financial markets. Review of International Political Economy (forthcoming). https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2021.2004441
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Breen, M., & Gillanders, R. (2015). Political trust, corruption, and ratings of the IMF and the World Bank. International Interactions, 41(2), 337–364. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2014.948154
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brierley, S. (2021). Combining patronage and merit in public sector recruitment. The Journal of Politics, 83(1), 182–197. https://doi.org/10.1086/708240
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Briggs, R. C. (2012). Electrifying the base? Aid and incumbent advantage in Ghana. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 50(4), 603–624. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X12000365
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Briggs, R. C. (2014). Aiding and abetting: Project aid and ethnic politics in Kenya. World Development, 64, 194–205. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2014.05.027
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Campos, J. E., & Esfahani, H. S. (1996). Why and when do governments initiate public enterprise reform? The World Bank Economic Review, 10(3), 451–485. https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/10.3.451
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Carlitz, R. D. (2017). Money flows, water trickles: Understanding patterns of decentralized water provision in Tanzania. World Development, 93, 16–30. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2016.11.019
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Casper, B. A. (2017). IMF programs and the risk of a coup d’état. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 61(5), 964–996. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715600759
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chandra, K. (2004). Why ethnic parties succeed: Patronage and ethnic headcounts in India. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Clegg, L. (2021). Taking one for the team: Partisan alignment and planning outcomes in England. The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 23(4), 680–698. https://doi.org/10.1177/1369148120985409
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Crawford, G., & Abdulai, A.-G. (2009). The World Bank and Ghana’s poverty reduction strategies: Strengthening the state or consolidating neo-liberalism? Labour, Capital and Society, 42(1–2), 82–115.
   Google Scholar
• Dellmuth, L. M., & Tallberg, J. (2021). Elite communication and the popular legitimacy of international organizations. British Journal of Political Science, 51(3), 1292–1313. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0007123419000620
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dreher, A. (2006). IMF and economic growth: The effects of programs, loans, and compliance with conditionality. World Development, 34(5), 769–788. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.worlddev.2005.11.002
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dreher, A., Fuchs, A., Parks, B., Strange, A., & Tierney, M. (2022). Banking on Beijing: The aims and impacts of China’s Overseas Development Program. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Edwards, M. S. (2009). Public support for the international economic organizations: Evidence from developing countries. The Review of International Organizations, 4(2), 185–209. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-009-9057-6
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ejdemyr, S., Kramon, E., & Robinson, A. L. (2018). Segregation, ethnic favoritism, and the strategic targeting of local public goods. Comparative Political Studies, 51(9), 1111–1143. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414017730079
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Evans, G., & Andersen, R. (2006). The political conditioning of economic perceptions. The Journal of Politics, 68(1), 194–207. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-2508.2006.00380.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fernández-Albertos, J., Kuo, A., & Balcells, L. (2013). Economic crisis, globalization, and partisan bias: Evidence from Spain. International Studies Quarterly, 57(4), 804–816. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12081
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Friedman, T. L. (2000). The Lexus and the Olive Tree. Anchor Books.
   Google Scholar
• GhanaWeb. (1999a). NDC expresses concern over sale of gold reserves by IMF and UK. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/artikel.php?ID=7914
   Google Scholar
• GhanaWeb. (1999b). S. Africa says European gold tour cancelled. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/S-Africa-says-European-gold-tour-cancelled-7729
   Google Scholar
• GhanaWeb. (2000). IMF criticises Ghana wage, tax increases. May 31st. https://mobile.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/IMF-criticises-Ghana-wage-tax-increases-10430
   Google Scholar
• GhanaWeb. (2001a). Kufour’s arrival means big changes for Ghana business. January 11th. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/business/Kufour-s-arrival-means-big-changes-for-Ghana-business-13007
   Google Scholar
• GhanaWeb. (2001b). Budget is a Foundation Budget- Nduom. April 4th. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/2001-Budget-is-aFoundation-Budget-Nduom-14490
   Google Scholar
• GhanaWeb. (2001c). IMF, World Bank support Ghana. July 3rd. https://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/NewsArchive/IMF-World-Bank-support-Ghana-16322
   Google Scholar
• Goes, I. (2022). Examining the effect of IMF conditionality on natural resource policy. Economics & Politics. https://doi.org/10.1111/ecpo.12214
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Goes, I., & Chapman, T. L. (2021). The Power of Ideas: IMF Surveillance and Natural Resource Sector Reform. Working Paper.
   Google Scholar
• Greene, W. H. (2003). Econometric analysis (4th ed.). Pearson Education.
   Google Scholar
• Haggard, S. & Kaufman, R. R. (Eds.). (1992). The politics of economic adjustment: International constraints, distributive conflicts and the state. Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Handley, A. (2007). Business, government, and the privatisation of the Ashanti Goldfields Company in Ghana. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue Canadienne Des Études Africaines, 41(1), 1–37. https://doi.org/10.1080/00083968.2007.10751350
   Google Scholar
• Harding, R. (2015). Attribution and accountability: Voting for roads in Ghana. World Politics, 67(4), 656–689. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887115000209
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Harris, A. S., & Hern, E. (2019). Taking to the streets: Protest as an expression of political preference in Africa. Comparative Political Studies, 52(8), 1169–1199. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414018806540
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Harris, J., & Posner, D. (2019). (Under what conditions) do politicians reward their supporters? Evidence from Kenya’s Constituencies Development Fund. American Political Science Review, 113(1), 123–139. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000709
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hartzell, C. A., Hoddie, M., & Bauer, M. E. (2010). Economic liberalization via IMF structural adjustment: Sowing the seeds of civil war? International Organization, 64(2), 339–356. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818310000068
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Henisz, W. J., & Mansfield, E. D. (2019). The political economy of financial reform: de jure liberalization vs. de facto implementation. International Studies Quarterly, 63(3), 589–602. https://doi.org/10.1093/isq/sqz035
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Herbst, J. (1990). The structural adjustment of politics in Africa. World Development, 18(7), 949–958. https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(90)90078-C
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• International Monetary Fund (IMF). (2005). Malawi – request for a three-year arrangement under the poverty reduction and growth facility and additional interim assistance under the enhanced initiative for heavily indebted poor countries [EBM/05/71]. https://archivescatalog.imf.org/Details/ArchiveExecutive/125181805.
   Google Scholar
• Isaksson, A.-S., & Kotsadam, A. (2018). Chinese aid and local corruption. Journal of Public Economics, 159, 146–159. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2018.01.002
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Jablonski, R. (2014). How aid targets votes: The impact of electoral incentives on foreign aid distribution. World Politics, 66(2), 293–330. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0043887114000045
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Jeong, H.-W. (1995). Liberal economic reform in Ghana: A contested political agenda. Africa Today, 42(4), 82–104.
   Google Scholar
• Joseph, R. A. (1987). Democracy and prebendal politics in Nigeria: The rise and fall of the Second Republic. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kaufman, R., & Zuckermann, L. (1998). Attitudes toward economic reform in Mexico: The role of political orientations. American Political Science Review, 92(2), 359–375. https://doi.org/10.2307/2585669
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kaya, A., Handlin, S., & Günaydin, H. (2020). Populism and voter attitudes toward international organizations: Cross-country and experimental evidence on the International Monetary Fund. Political Economy of International Organization Conference. https://bit.ly/2Q76mlc.
   Google Scholar
• Keen, D. (2005). Liberalization and conflict. International Political Science Review, 26(1), 73–89. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512105047897
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kentikelenis, A., Stubbs, T., & King, L. (2016). IMF conditionality and development policy space, 1985–2014. Review of International Political Economy, 23(4), 543–582. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290.2016.1174953
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kitschelt, H., & Wilkinson, S. I. (2007). Citizen–politician linkages: An introduction. In H. Kitschelt and S. I. Wilkinson (Eds.), Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition (pp. 1–49). Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kopecký, P. (2011). Political competition and party patronage: Public appointments in Ghana and South Africa. Political Studies, 59(3), 713–732. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9248.2011.00887.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kopecký, P., Mair, P., & Spirova, M. (2012). Party patronage and party government. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kopecký, P., Meyer Sahling, J.-H., Panizza, F., Scherlis, G., Schuster, C., & Spirova, M. (2016). Party patronage in contemporary democracies: Results from an expert survey in 22 countries from five regions. European Journal of Political Research, 55(2), 416–431. https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-6765.12135
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kramon, E., & Posner, D. (2013). Who benefits from distributive politics? How the outcome one studies affects the answer one gets. Perspectives on Politics, 11(2), 461–474. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1537592713001035
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lang, V. (2021). The economics of the democratic deficit: The effect of IMF programs on inequality. The Review of International Organizations, 16(3), 599–623. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-020-09405-x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lio Rosvold, E. (2020). Disaggregated determinants of aid: Development aid projects in the Philippines. Development Policy Review, 38(6), 783–803. https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12465
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Marc, A., Graham, C., Schacter, M., & Schmidt, M. (1995). Social action programs and social funds: A review of design and implementation in Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank World Bank Discussion papers. 274. World Bank.
   Google Scholar
• Marchesi, S., & Sirtori, E. (2011). Is two better than one? The effects of IMF and World Bank interaction on growth. The Review of International Organizations, 6(3–4), 287–306. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-011-9107-8
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nelson, J. M. (1984). The political economy of stabilization: Commitment, capacity, and public response. World Development, 12(10), 983–1006. https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(84)90025-1
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ninsin, K. A. (1998). Postcript: Elections, democracy and elite consensus. In K. A. Ninsin (Ed.), Transition to Democracy. CODESRIA.
   Google Scholar
• Oliveros, V. (2021). Patronage at work: Public jobs and political services in Argentina. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Öniş, Z. (2009). Beyond the 2001 financial crisis: The political economy of the new phase of neo-liberal restructuring in Turkey. Review of International Political Economy, 16(3), 409–432. https://doi.org/10.1080/09692290802408642
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ortiz, D. G., & Béjar, S. (2013). Participation in IMF-sponsored economic programs and contentious collective action in Latin America, 1980–2007. Conflict Management and Peace Science, 30(5), 492–515. https://doi.org/10.1177/0738894213499677
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Panizza, F., Larraburu, C. R. R., & Scherlis, G. (2018). Unpacking patronage: The politics of patronage appointments in Argentina’s and Uruguay’s Central Public Administrations. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 10(3), 59–98. https://doi.org/10.1177/1866802X1801000303
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• PeaceFMOnline. (1996a). Election 1996 Ashanti Region. https://ghanaelections.peacefmonline.com/pages/1996/ashanti/
   Google Scholar
• PeaceFMOnline. (1996b). Election 1996 Central Region. https://ghanaelections.peacefmonline.com/pages/1996/central/
   Google Scholar
• Pettifor, A. (2001). Global economic justice: Human rights for debtor nations. Journal of Human Development, 2(1), 47–51. https://doi.org/10.1080/14649880120050174
   Google Scholar
• Pion-Berlin, D. (1983). Political repression and economic doctrines. Comparative Political Studies, 16(1), 37–66. https://doi.org/10.1177/0010414083016001002
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Popescu, G. H. (2013). Partisan differences in evaluations of the economy. Economics, Management, and Financial Markets, 8(1), 130–135.
   Google Scholar
• Poulton, C., & Kanyinga, K. (2014). The politics of revitalizing agriculture in Kenya. Development Policy Review, 32(s2), s151–s172. https://doi.org/10.1111/dpr.12080
   Google Scholar
• Reinsberg, B., Kentikelenis, A., Stubbs, T., & King, L. (2019). The world system and the hollowing-out of state capacity in developing countries: How structural adjustment programs impact bureaucratic quality. American Journal of Sociology, 124(4), 1222–1257. https://doi.org/10.1086/701703
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Reinsberg, B., Shaw, D. O., & Bujnoch, L. (2022). Revisiting the security-development nexus: Human security and the effects of IMF adjustment programs. Conflict Management and Peace Science. https://doi.org/10.1177/07388942221111064
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Reinsberg, B., Stubbs, T., & Kentikelenis, A. (2021). Compliance, defiance, and the dependency trap: International Monetary Fund program interruptions and their impact on capital markets. Regulation & Governance. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12422
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Reinsberg, B., Stubbs, T., & Kentikelenis, A. (2022). Unimplementable by design? Understanding (non-)compliance with International Monetary Fund policy conditionality. Governance, 35(3), 689–715.). https://doi.org/10.1111/gove.12605
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Reinsberg, B., Stubbs, T., Kentikelenis, A., & King, L. (2020). Bad governance: How privatization increases corruption in the developing world. Regulation & Governance, 14(4), 698–717. https://doi.org/10.1111/rego.12265
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rickard, S. J., & Caraway, T. L. (2019). International demands for austerity: Examining the impact of the IMF on the public sector. The Review of International Organizations, 14(1), 35–57.
   Google Scholar
• Reno, W. (1996). Ironies of Post-Cold War structural adjustment in Sierra Leone. Review of African Political Economy, 23(67), 7–18. https://doi.org/10.1080/03056249608704174
   Google Scholar
• Schmidt-Catran, A. W., & Fairbrother, M. (2016). The random effects in multilevel models: Getting them wrong and getting them right. European Sociological Review, 32(1), 23–38. https://doi.org/10.1093/esr/jcv090
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shim, S. (2022). Who is credible? Government popularity and the catalytic effect of IMF lending. Comparative Political Studies (forthcoming). https://doi.org/10.1177/00104140211060280
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stone, R. (2002). Lending credibility: The IMF and the post-communist transition. Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Stubbs, T., & Kentikelenis, A. (2018). Targeted social safeguards in the age of universal social protection: The IMF and health systems of low-income countries. Critical Public Health, 28(2), 132–139. https://doi.org/10.1080/09581596.2017.1340589
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stubbs, T., Reinsberg, B., Kentikelenis, A., & King, L. (2020). How to evaluate the effects of IMF conditionality. The Review of International Organizations, 15(1), 29–73. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11558-018-9332-5
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Szarzec, K., Totleben, B., & Piątek, D. (2022). How do politicians capture a state? Evidence from state-owned enterprises. East European Politics and Societies: And Cultures, 36(1), 141–172. https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325420953485
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• The New Humanitarian. (2000). Government increases salaries by 20 per cent. May 31st. https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/15391/ghana-government-increases-salaries-20-cent
   Google Scholar
• Van de Walle, N. (2001). African economies and the politics of permanent crisis, 1979–1999. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Van de Walle, N. (2007). Meet the new boss, same as the old boss? The evolution of political clientelism in Africa. In H. Kitschelt & S. I. Wilkinson (Eds.), Patrons, clients, and policies: Patterns of democratic accountability and political competition (pp. 50–67). Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Vogt, M., Bormann, N. C., Rüegger, S., Cederman, L. E., Hunziker, P., & Girardin, L. (2015). Integrating data on ethnicity, geography, and conflict: The ethnic power relations data set family. Journal of Conflict Resolution, 59(7), 1327–1342. https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002715591215
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Vreeland, J. R. (2003). The IMF and economic development. Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Walton, J., & Ragin, C. (1990). Global and national sources of political protest: Third world responses to the debt crisis. American Sociological Review, 55(6), 876–890. https://doi.org/10.2307/2095752
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Waterbury, J. (1992). The Heart of the Matter?: Public Enterprise and the Adjustment Process. In P. Evans, M. Kahler, J. Nelson, & B. Stallings (Contributors) and S. Haggard & R. Kaufman (Eds.), The politics of economic adjustment: International constraints, distributive conflicts and the state (pp. 182–218). Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Woods, N. (2006). The globalizers: The IMF, the World Bank, and their borrowers. Cornell University Press.
   Google Scholar
• World Bank. (1981). Accelerated development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An agenda for action. World Bank.
   Google Scholar
• Youde, J. (2005). Economics and government popularity in Ghana. Electoral Studies, 24(1), 1–16. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2004.02.003
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar