India-Pakistan: Nuclear Stability and Diplomacy

References/End Notes

• “Statement by T.P. Seetharam, Minister, Permanent Mission of India to the Conference on Disarmament”, Geneva, at United Nations Disarmament Commission, New York, April 1, 2003, at http://www.un.int/india/ind698.pdf
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• Since the literature on this debate is quite extensive, it is difficult to include all the studies in this footnote. Two specific issues of Security Studies include wide range of scholarly views on the subject: Security Studies, 4(3) 1995, and Security Studies, 4(4) 1995. The most commonly reviewed article on the non-proliferation debate can be cited as of Peter R. Lavoy, “The Strategic Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation”, Security Studies, 4(4) Summer 1995, pp. 695–753.
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• Aver Cohen and Benjamin Frankel, “Opaque Nuclear Proliferation”, quoted in Devin T. Hagerty, The Consequences of Nuclear Proliferation: Lessons from South Asia, The MIT Press, London, 1998, p. 3.
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• Jeffrey W. Knopf, “Recasting The Proliferation Optimism-Pessimism Debate”, Security Studies, 12(1) Autumn 2002, p. 41. Also, see the classic exposition of ‘Proliferation Optimism’ by Kenneth N. Waltz, 'The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better”, Adelphi Paper No. 171, International Institute of Strategic Studies, 1981.
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• Dagobert L. Brito and Michael D. Intriligator, “Proliferation and the Probability of War: Global and Regional Issues”, in Dagobert L. Brito and Michael D. Intriligator (Eds), Strategies for Managing Nuclear Proliferation, Lexington, 1983, pp. 135–43; also cited by Peter R. Lavoy, no. 2, p. 706.
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• Kenneth N. Waltz, “More May Be Better” in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate, W. W. Norton & Company, New York, 1995, pp. 1–45.
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• Ibid., p. 11.
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• Peter R. Lavoy, no. 2, p. 713.
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• Robert Jervis, “The Political Effects of Nuclear Weapons”, International Security, 3(2) Fall 1988, p. 89.
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• Defending argument of ‘More May Be Better’ in Kenneth N. Waltz, “A Reply”, Security Studies, 4 (4) Summer 1995, p. 803.
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• Peter Lavoy, no. 2, p. 709.
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• Scott D. Sagan, “More Will Be Worse”, in Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, no. 6, pp. 46–94.
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• Ibid., p. 48.
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• Robert Gilpin, Jonathan Schell, Daniel Ellsberg, Jack Steinberger Rotblat, cited in Peter R. Lavoy, no. 2, p. 708.
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• Beatrice Heuser, The Bomb, Longman, London, 2000, p. 223.
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• Peter D. Feaver, “Optimists, Pessimists, And Theories of Nuclear Proliferation Management”, Security Studies, Vol. 4, No. 4, Summer 1995, p. 755.
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• Peter Lavoy, no. 2, p. 718.
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• At an international seminar held in Islamabad, February 21–22, 2000, on “Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia”, organised by Islamabad Council of World Affairs (ICWA) and Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) and the support of the Hanns Seidel Foundation, experts from Pakistan, US, UK, Russia and Germany addressed the need for appropriate command and control measures to avert nuclear catastrophe. The experts advised for non-deployment of nuclear forces. The experts in the seminar included Agha Shahi, A.Q. Khan, A.H. Nayyar; Rodney Jones, Shaun Gregory; Michael Quinlan; Karl-Heinz Kamp (Konrad Adenauer Foundation of Germany); Gregory Khozin (Professor at Moscow's Diplomatic Academy). The experts also expressed the fear that since “no nuclear control system (in the world) has ever experienced the need to function under nuclear attack, there are great unknowns about what effectiveness means or what it requires under nuclear attack”; Nadeem Iqbal, “Safety lies in non-deployment, say experts”, Asia Times Online, March 14, 2000, at www.atimes.com/ind-pak/BC14Df01.html; See also, Maqbool Ahmad Bhatty, “The issue of nuclear command”, Dawn, March 6, 2000, at www.dawn.com/2000/03/06/op.htm
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• For elaboration on issues like security, deterrence and stability in the region, see P.R. Chari, Sonika Gupta and Arpit Rajan (Eds.), Nuclear Stability in Southern Asia, Manohar, New Delhi, 2003; Bharat Karnad, Nuclear Weapons and Indian Security, Macmillan, New Delhi, 2002; Amitabh Mattoo (Ed.), India's Nuclear Deterrent: Pokhran II and Beyond, Har Anand, New Delhi, 1999.
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• “Joint Statement, India-Pakistan Expert-Level Talks on Nuclear CBMs”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, June 20, 2004, at http://meaindia.gov.in
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• Michael Quinlan, “How robust is India-Pakistan deterrence?” Survival, Winter 2000, 42 (4) p. 143.
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• George Perkovich, Joseph Cirincione, Rose Gottemoeller, Jon B. Wolfsthal, and Jessica T. Mathews, “Universal Compliance: A Strategy for Nuclear Security”, Draft Report, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace (CEIP), New York, June 2004.
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• Michael Krepon and Ziad Haider (Eds.), “Reducing Nuclear Dangers in South Asia”, Report No. 50, The Henry L. Stimson Center, Washington D.C, February 2004. The Stimson Center, with the support from the Nuclear Threat Initiative and the Carnegie Corporation of New York, as stated in the preface, has worked quietly with former diplomatic, military, intelligence and academic leaders of India and Pakistan to develop a collaborative analysis about ways to reduce nuclear dangers.
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• Rahul Roychaudhary, “Nuclear Doctrine, Declaratory Policy, and Escalation”, April 2004, at http://www.stimson.org/southasia/pubs.cfm?ID=105&print=1
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• K. Raja Menon, A Nuclear Strategy for India, Sage Publications, New Delhi, 2000, p. 306.
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• Shirin Tahir-Kheli, Kent L. Biringer, “Reducing Risk in South Asia: Managing India-Pakistan Tensions”, Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper, DE-AC04-94AL85000, South Asia Program, Sandia National Laboratories, Sandia Corporation, Albuquerque, NM, USA, March 2001.
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• “Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers In South Asia”, Working Group Report, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington D.C., May 2004. This report is the product of a study carried out by a group of senior, non-governmental Indians, Pakistanis, and Americans between December 2003 and May 2004. The project was organised by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a Washington-based policy research institute, and supported by the Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI). This working group met three times between December 2003 and May 2004; December 8–10, 2003, in Woodstock, United Kingdom; and March 11–13 and May 13–15, 2004, in Cobham, United Kingdom. Group Captain Khalid Banuri, Deputy Director, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, Strategic Plans Division, Joint Staff Headquarters, Rawalpindi, Pakistan, had participated as a government observer. The report's recommendations are based on the assumption that “South Asia is often portrayed — especially by observers outside the region — as a nuclear powder keg. Those who subscribe to this view tend to believe that, during the military crises of Kargil and 2002, there were serious risks of armed conflict escalating to the nuclear level.… While not dismissing the dangers, they maintain that their respective governments have adopted a mature and responsible approach towards the possession of nuclear weapons and that the nuclear risks in recent confrontations were minimal.”
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• Ibid.
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• Rodney W. Jones, “Military Asymmetry and Instability in Emerging Nuclear States: India and Pakistan”, Fourth Nuclear Stability Round Table on ‘Strategic Stability and Global Change’, Policy Architects International, Washington D.C, March 12–13, 2002. Rodney W. Jones explains the actual situation in South Asia wherein Indian conventional forces are burgeoning and Pakistan's falling behind. He also assumes that Pakistan has dubious second-strike capability.
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• Ibid., p. 28.
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• “Early Warning Systems in South Asia”, Draft summary by Dr. Zia Mian and Dr. M.V Ramana of Princeton University, as Annexure II in R. Rajaraman, “Nuclear Weapons in South Asia: Risk and Their Reduction”, Discussion Paper, Pugwash Workshop on South Asian Security, Pugwash Meeting No. 277, Geneva, November 1–3, 2002.
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• Ibid. Though both USA and the former Soviet Union had a response time gap of 25 minutes in which ICBMs could travel from USSR to US, the paper cites that between 1977 and 1984 the early warning systems gave 20,000 false alarms of incoming missile attacks. Of these about 1,000 were considered serious enough for bombers and missiles to be placed on full alert waiting only for a Presidential order to retaliate. In another occasion, in 1995, a Norwegian rocket launched for scientific purpose was treated as a possible enemy attack by the Russian detection devices.
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• Sources cited as http://www.Ceip.org/foles/pdf/Deadly_Arsenals_Chap12.pdf; as http://www.thebulletin.org/issues/nukenotes/jfo2nukenote.htmal; and http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/library/report/2001/south_asia.pdf, Graham Allison in the third chapter of his book, Nuclear Terrorism. The Ultimate Preventable Catastrophe, Times Books, Henry Holt and Company, New York, 2004, p. 231.
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• David Albright and Kimberly Kramer, “Stockpiles still growing”, in the forthcoming Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, November/December 2004, p. 16, at http://www.isis-online.org/global_stocks/bulletin_albright_kramer.pdf
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• Lee Feinstein, “Avoiding Another Close Call in South Asia”, Arms Control Today, July/August 2002, at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2002_07-08/feinsteinjul_aug02.asp
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• “Proliferation and Response”, US Department of Defense Report, January 2001, Pakistan section, at http://www.fas.org/spp/starwars/program/news01
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• David Albright, “Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Complex”, in Michael Kraig and James Henderson (Eds.), US Strategies for Regional Security: A Report, Airlie Conference Center, Warrenton, October 25–27, 2002, p. 147.
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• Zawar Haider Abidi, “Threat Reduction in South Asia”, The Henry L. Stimson Center, November 25, 2003. The author is the Assistant Director Equivalent, Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs, State Plans Division, JSHQ, Pakistan
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• Bharat Karnad, no. 21, p. 503.
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• Josy Joseph, “Major ally for US = Major worry for India”, March 27, 2004, at http://www.rediff.com/news/2004/mar/27spec.htm
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• “Pak UN envoy threatens nuclear strike”, The Times of India, May 31, 2002.
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• Feroz Hassan Khan, “Challenges to Nuclear Stability in South Asia”, The Non-Proliferation Review, 10(1) Spring 2003, p. 63. Brigadier General Feroz Hassan Khan retired from the Pakistan Army in 2003, has served as Director of Arms Control and Disarmament Affairs in the Strategic Plans Division, Pakistan; Agha Shahi also has advocated for maintaining ambiguity (at the international seminar held in Islamabad, February 21–22, 2000, on “Command and Control of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia”, organised by Islamabad Council of World Affairs [ICWA] and Institute of Strategic Studies [ISS]; no. 20)
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• Asad Durrani, “Doctrinal Double Speak”, Pugwash Meeting No. 28, March 11–12, 2003, Lahore. In this paper Lt Gen Durrani has stated that as part of the operational planning Pakistan has not identified the core issues of interests, which if threatened, could trigger a nuclear retort. He believes that it serves a psychological end, other than a potent conventional deterrence to keep the threshold high.
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• “India-Pakistan relations: Speakers call for resumption of dialogue”, The Dawn, February 22, 2000. The speaker, Agha Shahi, was addressing a two-day international seminar jointly organised by the Islamabad Council of World Affairs and the Institute of Strategic Studies (ISS) seminar on “Command and Control System of Nuclear Weapons in South Asia” in Islamabad.
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• “No Nuclear Threat, says Musharraf”, The Times of India, June 2, 2002.
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• Ibid.
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• Graham Allison, no. 36, p. 77.
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• Ibid.
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• General Assembly Resolution 3265 (XXIX), December 9, 1974, 2309th Plenary Meeting, 29th Session of the UN General Assembly, p. 30.
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• Ibid., pp. 29–30.
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• Ibid.
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• Excerpts from the Statement by Mr. Anand Sharma, Member of Parliament and Member of the Indian Delegation at the 59th Session of the First Committee of the United Nations General Assembly, October 7, 2004. The First Committee of UN General Assembly handles all matters on Disarmament and International Security, and meets every year in October for a 4–5 weeks session, after the General Assembly Debate. All 191 member-states of the UN can attend it.
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• “India-Pakistan Joint Statement”, New Delhi, September 8, 2004, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, at http://meaindia.gov.in
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• “Agreement on the Prohibition of Attack Against Nuclear Installations and Facilities”, Signed on December 31, 1988, Islamabad. Instrument of Ratification Exchanged in December 1990.
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• The subsequent references are taken from “The Text of the Memorandum of Understanding”, signed by Indian Foreign Secretary K. Raghunath, and Pakistan Foreign Secretary Shamshad Ahmad in Lahore on February 21, 1999, at http://www.stimson.org/southasia/?sn=sa20020109215
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• The subsequent references are from the “Joint Statement, India-Pakistan Expert-Level Talks on Nuclear CBMs”, Ministry of External Affairs, Government of India, June 20, 2006, at http://www.meaindia.gov.in
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• “Joint Statement, Meeting between Foreign Secretaries of India and Pakistan”, Islamabad, December 28, 2004.
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