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Korean Journal of Defense Analysis Volume 12, 2000 - Issue 2
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Original Articles

A Neutralized Korea? The North-South Rapprochement and China's Korea Policy

Xiaoxiong Yi
Pages 71-118 | Published online: 25 May 2011

  • For news analysis and scholarly view, see, for example, Lorien Holland and Shim Jae Hoon, “China's Korea Game,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 15, 2000, pp. 16–18; Elisabeth Rosenthal, “Big Gainer, China Hails the Summit It Sought,” International Herald Tribune, June 16, 2000; and Ralph A. Cossa, “Coming of Age and Coming Out: Shifts in the Geopolitical Landscape,” availiable at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/002Qoverview.html. As late as March 10, 2000, five days after North Korean leader Kim Jong-il's unusual visit to the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang and a week prior to DPRK Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun's Beijing visit, in answering a South Korean journalist's questions on “will you discuss with Mr. Paek the possible visit to China by General Secretary Kim Jong-il?” and “whether China will be willing to help arrange a meeting between President Kim Dae-jung and General Secretary Kim Jong-il?” PRC Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan not only downplayed the likelihood of Kim's upcoming China visit, but also stated that any dialogue between the two Koreas “is a matter for direct discussion between the two parties concerned.” For Kim Jong-il's March 5 visit to the Chinese Embassy in Pyongyang, see “Kim Jong-il visits Chinese embassy,” Korea Central News Agency (KCNA), March 6, 2000 (all KCNA citations in this article are from the KCNA web site, http://www.kcna.co.jp). For a full transcript of Tang Jiaxuan's March 11 Press Conference, see “US foments separatism,” China Daily, March 11, 2000, online.
  • Gerald Segal, “Does China Matter?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 5 (September/October 1999), p. 33.
  • Bernstein , Richard and Munro , Ross H. 1997 . The Coming Conflict with China New York : A. A. Knopf .
  • Wang Yizhou, “Policy Must Protect Needs,” China Daily, May 10, 2000, p. 4.
  • For a full text of Wang Yizhou's analysis of Chinese foreign policy, see Wang Yizhou, “Mianxiang ershiyishiji de Zhongguo waijiao: Sanzhong xuqiu de xunqiu jiqi pingheng” [Chinese Diplomacy in the 21st Century: Achieving and Balancing Three Needs], Zhanlue yit Guanli [Strategy and Management], June 1999, pp. 18–27.
  • Christensen , Thomas J. “Pride, Pressure, and Politics: The Roots of China's Worldview,” in Yong Deng and Fei-Ling Wang, eds., In the Eyes of the Dragon: China Views the World (Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield 1999), p. 241.
  • Yan Xuetong, “New Strategic Model Evolves,” China Daily, July 28, 1999, p. 4.
  • For details of Xiong Guangkai's visit and his “clear statements of strongly different views on a number of subjects” with the US military leaders, see “Chinese General Meets with US Defense Secretary,” People's Daily, January 28, 2000, p. 4. Also see Steven Mufson, “Chinese Military Leader Objects to US Missile Sale to Taiwan,” Washington Post, January 27, 2000, p. A22; and “Pentagon, Chinese General Hold Final Day of Talks,” Inside China Today, January 27, 2000, online.
  • Lu Zhongwei, “International Scene at the Dawn of a New Century,” Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 10, No. 1 (January 2000), p. 1. Mr. Lu is the president of China Institute of Contemporary International Relations (CICIR), a Beijing-based think tank related to the PRC Ministry of State Security.
  • Ibid., pp. 3–4.
  • Segal, “Does China Matter?” p. 34.
  • Ibid., p. 35.
  • Christensen , Thomas J. 1996 . Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947–1958 254 Princeton : Princeton University Press .
  • 2000 . Meiguo baquan yu Zhongguo anquan [American Hegemony and Chinese Security] Tianjin : Tianjin People's Publishing House . For an in-depth analysis of Chinese security concerns, see Guo Guanqiao, Yige daguo jueqi de Kungrao [The Challenges to A Rising China: Report on China's Regional Security Environment] (Beijing: Current Affairs Publishing House, 1999), especially Chapter 1. For a summary of Chinese strategic view, see Shi Xiaohui and Xu Hongzhi, “Editorial: Peace and Development: Keynote Theme of the Time,” People's Daily, December 6, 1999, p. 1 (All People's Daily citations in this article, without a page number reference, are from People's Daily online English available at http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/home.html). Also see Zhang Zhaozhong, Xiayige mubiao shishui? [Who Will Be the Next Target?] (Beijing: China Youth Publishing House, 1999); Lu Bin et al., Ershiyishiji: Heping, haishi zhanzheng? [The 21st Century: Peace or War?] (Beijing: China International Broadcasting Press, 2000); and Yan Xuetong, (
  • Lu Zhongwei, “International Scene at the Dawn of a New Century,” pp. 7–8.
  • Cited from PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, China's Diplomacy Since 1949, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/english/dhtml.
  • In PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “China and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea/' available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/english/dhtml/read.asp. The Chinese Foreign Ministry document then outlined the PRC-DPRK relations in other fields, “in recent years, in order to assist the DPRK in surmounting the food shortages incurred mainly by severe natural disasters, China has, for 6 years (1994-1999), provided free assistance of tens of thousands of tons of food and other disaster-relief materials worth scores of million of yuan. After providing the DPRK with a free assistance of 100,000 tons of food, 20, 000 tons of chemical fertilizer and 80,000 tons of crude oil in 1998, China rendered its free economic aid to the DPRK including 150,000 tons of food and 400,000 tons of coal in 1999. For years, China has all along been a major trading partner of the DPRK. The bilateral trade volume in 1999 amounted to about $370 million, including $328 million of exports and $42 million of imports on the Chinese side. Frequent exchanges and close cooperation in the fields of the military, culture, education, science and technology, and sports are consistently maintained between China and the DPRK. The two countries have signed many treaties and agreements including the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance. Agreements on trade and navigation and air transportation, consular agreements, and agreements on exchange programs in the fields of education, science and technology, and sports have been signed annually between departments concerned of the two countries. The DPRK is to established a consulate-general in Shenyang and China established a consulate-general in Chongjin. The DPRK is to establish a consulate-general in the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region of China. Sisterhood relations have been established between China's Liaoning Province, Heilongjiang Province, Jiangsu Province and Shanghai Municipality and the DPRK's North Pyongan Province, North Hamgyong Province, Kangwon Province and Hamheung City.” In the first half of 2000, China again provided North Korea with approximately 120,000 tons of grain and 400,000 tons of coal. Aid to North Korea is reported to comprise between one-quarter and one-third of the PRC's total budget for external assistance. For PRC aid to DPRK in 2000, see Scott Snyder, “Beijing at Center Stage or Upstaged by the Two Kims?” in Center for Strategic and International Studies, Comparative Connections—An E-journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, 2nd Quarter, 2000, available at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/002Qchina-skorea.html.
  • Part of the reason for such a secret approach is North Korea. A senior Chinese diplomat who was involved in Kim Yong-nam's June 1999 Beijing visit told the author that one of the main purposes of Kim Yong-nam's visit “was to prepare for Kim Jong-il's China visit” later in the year. Kim Yong-nam informed Chinese leaders that Kim Jong-il would like to pay a “secret” visit to China. Beijing, however, replied to the North Korean visitor politely that China would welcome Kim's visit, but there was no way Beijing could keep it “totally secret.” Kim then delayed his China trip. Interview by author with a senior official at the Department of International Organizations and Conferences, PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Beijing, August 1999.
  • A careful review of the statistics of two-way trade between the PRC and DPRK indicates that although the absolute quantity of the trade has been always very small—roughly 0.002% of China's total trade since 1990, it also has been relatively steady, with an aberration in 1993 when China increased its trade with North Korea significantly—a total volume of $899 million when China “imported” over $600 million—in order to “make up” for its recognition of South Korea.
  • While many scholars have pointed out correctly the fact that China has sharply reduced economic aid to North Korea, they may have reached an incorrect interpretation that such reduction is a consequence of China's “diminished desire to subsidize a communist ally.” A more balanced view on the small but steady “one-way” trade between the two former Communist allies is a form of economic aid.
  • Cited in Lo Ping, “Jiang Zemin Met North Korean Secret Envoy,” Chien Shao, August 8, 1994, pp. 6–8. For an analysis, see Xiaoxiong Yi, “China's Korea Policy: From 'One Korea' to 'Two Koreas',” Asian Affairs: An American Review, Vol. 22, No. 2 (Summer 1995), pp. 131–34.
  • Cited in Shim Jae Hoon and Adrian Edwards, “No Turning Back,” Far Eastern Economic Review, June 22, 2000, p. 17.
  • Conversation with a former Chinese vice foreign minister, Beijing, May 2000.
  • Between 1985 and 1993, Kim the junior also received almost all top “third generation” Chinese leaders in Pyongyang, including Jiang Zemin (1990), Li Peng (1985 and 1991), Li Ruihuan (1988), and Hu Jintao (1993).
  • 1999 . Quanqiuhua yinyingxia de Zhongguo zhilu [Under the Shadow of Globalization: China's Option] Beijing : China Academy of Social Sciences Press . For a Chinese view on the potential negative impact of political and strategic interdependence and economic globalization, see Wang Yizhou, Quanqiuhuashidai de guoji anquan [International Security in the Era of Globalization] (Shanghai: Peoples' Publishing House, 1999); Yan Xuetong, Analysis of China's National Interest (Tianjin: People's Publishing House, 1997); and Fang Ning, Wang Xiaodong and Song Qiang, (
  • For an excellent discussion on the emerging Chinese nationalism, see Allen Whiting, “Chinese Nationalism and Foreign Policy After Deng,” China Quarterly, No. 142 (1995), pp. 295–316. For a more recent analysis, see Xiaoxiong Yi, “Dynamics of China's South Korea Policy: Assertive Nationalism, Beijing's Changing Strategic Evaluation of the United States, and the North Korea Factor,” Asian Perspective, Vol. 24, No. 1 (2000), pp. 71–102.
  • Suh , Dae-Sook . 1995 . Kim II Sung: The North Korean Leader New York : Columbia University Press . See (“Selected Works of President Kim Jong-il 1995–97” and “Instruction by Kim Jong-il,” DPRKorea Infobank, available at http://www.eng-lish.dprkorea.com; and “Juche Idea: A summary,” People's Korea, available at http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk/others/category18.htm.
  • As early as March 2000, Beijing already “announced” that “detente has come into being on the Korean peninsula.” See “New Changes in DPRK's Diplomacy,” People's Daily, March 22, 2000.
  • See Jim Mann, “US is Trying to Prevent Tailspin by North Korea,” Los Angeles Times, February 5, 1996, p. 2; Bill Gertz, “US Commander in Korea Sees North near Disintegration,” Washington Times, March 16, 1996, p. 7; William Matthews, “Luck: Violent Collapse of North Korea Could Trigger War with South,” Army Time, April 15, 1996; and Mary Jordan, “Speculation Grows on Demise of N. Korea,” Washington Post, April 6, 1996, p. 11.
  • See “The Worldwide Threat to U.S. Interests,” Prepared statement of Lt. Gen. James R. Clapper, Jr., Director, Defense Intelligence Agency to the Senate Armed Services Committee, January 17, 1995, available at http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/clapper.htm; Major David S. Maxwell, “Catastrophic Collapse of North Korea: Implications for the United States Military (Monograph, 1996), available at http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/maxwell.htm; and “CIA's John Deutch Predicts: Big Changes for N. Korea in Next 3 Years,” Agence France-Presse, December 12, 1996, available at http://www.kimsoft.com/korea/cia-nk.htm.
  • For details of Chi's US visit and statement on North Korea, see ibid.; and Department of Defense News Briefing, December 9, 1996.
  • Such high- and working-level exchanges were temporarily put on halt in the aftermath of normalization of Chinese-South Korean diplomatic relations in August 1992. Mutual visits resumed in May 1993 and then came to a virtual stop since the death of Kim the senior. Between May 1993 and July 1994, a number of key Chinese officials, including Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, CCP Politburo Standing Committee member Hu Jintao, Defense Minister Chi Haotian, NPC Vice Chairman and CCP Politburo member Wang Hanbin, Minister of CCP Propaganda Department and Politburo member Ding Guangen, and General Hong Xuezhi, had visited Pyongyang. As the Chinese ambassador to Japan, Chen Jian, told People's Korea in 1999, “In the past few years, the mutual visits of high-ranking officials of the two countries were suspended as the Korean people had been in deep grief for the loss of President Kim II Sung.” See “Interview with Chinese Ambassador to Japan,” People's Korea, October 20, 1999.
  • Xiaoxiong Yi, “China's North Korea Policy: A Waiting Game,” a discussion paper presented at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, September 23, 1997, p. 3. For a clear indication of Beijing's “satisfaction” with its “two Koreas” policy in 1997, see People's Daily, September 6, 1997, pp. 1, 4. In this long review of the “major achievements” in China's foreign relations, People's Daily article praised CCP leadership's “successful efforts in maintaining close ties with both Chaoxian[North Korea] and Hanguo [South Korea].”
  • As David Fairlamb of Business Week reported recently, “Tensions between North and South Korea may be easing following the breakthrough. But an International Monetary Fund initiative to improve relations between the so-called Hermit Kingdom and the global financial community seems to have failed. The reason: though the IMF invited North Korea to be represented by a 'special guest' at its annual meeting in Prague, the delegate never showed up.” See David Fairlamb, “This IMF 'Special Guest' Was a No-Show,” Business Week, September 27, 2000, online.
  • Chon Shi-yong, “President Aims to Show Koreas Can Handle Issues Independently,” Korea Herald, June 7, 2000, online.
  • For a full text of Kim's talk, see “Dialogue between Kim Jong-il and Presidents of South Korean Press,” JoongAng Ilbo, available at http://english.joins.com.
  • Chen Yali, “Two Koreas Serious, but Problems Remain,” China Daily, June 17, 2000, p. 4.
  • Ibid.
  • Former president Kim Young Sam recently criticized Kim Dae-jung for partially endorsing North Korea's unification formula, a confederation-based model that goes against the South Korean constitution's requirement that unification be based on the principles of liberal democracy. Technically, even the Pyongyang government itself is illegitimate in the eyes of the charter. Constitutional law expert Im Kwang-kyu noted: “The South Korean Constitution defines the Republic of Korea as the land that includes both Koreas and the North Korean government as an illegal entity forcefully occupying part of the Republic of Korea. But we have no choice but to accept North Korea's as the de facto government.” Cited in Laxmi Nakarmi, “Meanwhile, in the South…. All is Not Well for Kim Dae-jung at Home” Asiaweek, Vol. 26, No. 36 (September 15, 2000), online.
  • Piao Jianyi, “ROK-DPRK Summit Meeting and Situation in Korean Peninsula,” Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, Vol. 7, No. 7 (July 2000), pp. 7–8.
  • See, for example, Cheng Yujie of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, “The Korean Summit and the North-South Relations,” Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 10, No. 7 (July 2000), pp. 37–40; Jin Yingji of the Institute of Asian-Pacific Studies at Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, “Change of Korea's Diplomatic Strategy: Key Factor for ROK-DPRK Summit Conference,” Contemporary Asia-Pacific Studies, Vol. 7, No. 7 (July 2000), pp. 10–14; and Lu Yousheng of Chinese National Defense University, “High-level Talks Improve Northeast Asia Security,” China Daily, June 14, 2000, p. 4.
  • Kim Yong-sam visited Beijing in June 2000 and a high-level GNP parliamentary delegation visited China in July.
  • According to a Korea Herald report, by sending a delegation to China first to discuss the post-summit situation, “the GNP is either trying to appease major foreign powers such as China or it has a dual policy on North Korea—one for the domestic audience and another for foreigners.” See the “GNP made secret promise to China that conflicts with official stance,” Korea Herald, July 20, 2000, online.
  • To a certain degree, the negative reading of President Kim Dae-jung's sunshine policy is justified and no one should think that the process of inter-Korean reconciliation has passed the point of no return. One wonders how many South Koreans, for example, are willing or ready to accept a reunification under the leadership of “communist and conscientious nationalist of Korea,” as proclaimed by Rodong Sinmun. See “Reunification Is Supreme Task of Nation,” (Korea Central News Agency), September 24, 2000.
  • “Economists Wary of Summit Rewards,” China Daily, June 21, 2000, p. 2.
  • “$52 Billion Needed to Keep North Korean Economy Afloat,” Vantage Point, July 2000, p. 59.
  • “South Korea: Pay the Pauper,” The Economist, June 26, 2000, online.
  • “Seoul's Quandary,” Global Intelligence Update, May 23, 2000, available at http://www.stratfor.com/SERVICES/giu2000.
  • During the inter-Korean ministerial talks in Pyongyang in August, for example North Korea asked for 200,000 tons of rice from the South. The opposition Grand National Party (GNP) had immediately raised objections to the move. The GNP claimed that giving 200,000 tons of rice to North Korea would strain the economy of the South. The GNP then stated that 50,000 tons would suffice and that even this should be monitored to ensure the aid is not diverted to the North Korean military. See “Pyongyang's Food Loan Request Promotes Cooperation, MDP Says,” available at http://www.koreascope.org/english/sub/10/ks10.htm. In late September, in view of the seriousness of this year's food shortage in the North, the Kim Dae-jung administration has decided to send 500,000 tons of food loans, worth about $90 million, to the North starting early October, also provide a free 100,000 tons of corn worth $11 million to Pyongyang through the United Nations' World Food Program (WFP). See “Seoul to Send 500,000 tons of Food to North in October,” Korea Herald, September 29, 2000, online.
  • “Dialogue between Kim Jong-il and Presidents of South Korean Press,” JoongAng Ilbo.
  • Cited from the interview President Kim Dae-jung gave to the Los Angeles Times on July 18. For a full text, see “Pyongyang Must Reform and Open Up, President Kim Says,” Korea Herald, July 21, 2000, online.
  • Quote from Jiang Zemin's statement at the five permanent members of the Security Council of the United Nations summit, September 7, 2000, in “UN Security Council Permanent Members Held Historic Summit,” PRC Foreign Ministry, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/english/dhtml/readsubject.asp.
  • Zhang Yan, “S. Korean Trade Hits High,” China Daily Business Weekly, March 5, 2000, p. 1.
  • Meng Yan, “Trade: Experts Raise Figures with S. Korea-Bilateral Trade May Hit US$30b by Year's End,” China Daily Business Weekly, August 6, 2000, p. 1.
  • Ibid.
  • In 1992, the year Beijing and Seoul normalized their diplomatic ties, PRC-ROK bilateral trade totaled $8.2 billion. Since then, bilateral trade has continued to grow at an annual average of 30–40 percent.
  • “China and Republic of Korea,” PRC Ministry of Foreign Affairs, available at http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/english/dhtml/read.asp.
  • According to Taeho Kim, Director of Research Cooperation at the Korea Institute for Defense Analyses, “Chi's visit is sure to go a long way toward expanding the two nations' military cooperation and exchanges. The Chinese defense minister's visit would serve as an opportunity to replace the case-by-case approach to military exchanges with an arrangement that allows for systematic and regular exchanges.” Cited in “Chinese Defense Minister's Seoul Visit to Lead to Groundbreaking Exchanges,” Korea Herald, January 20, 2000, online.
  • Cited in Kang Seok-jae, “Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff to Make Official Visit to China,” Korea Herald, August 28, 2000, online.
  • ROK Minister of Justice Kim Jung-kil and Minister of Government Administration and Home Affairs Kim Ki-jae visited Beijing in January, followed by Deputy Foreign Minister Jang Jai-ryong and Environment Minister Kim Myung-ja in February, Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade Lee Joung-binn and Commissioner-General of the National Police Association Lee Moo-young in April, Kim Bong-ho of the ROK National Assembly in May, former ROK Presidents Roh Tae Woo and Kim Young Sam and Minister of Information and Communications Ahn Byung-yub in June, Chairman of the South-North Relations Special Committee of the National Assembly Lee Sei-kee in July, and Chief Justice of the ROK Supreme Court Choi Jong-young in September.
  • Zeng's April visit, four weeks after Kim Jong-il visited the Chinese embassy in Pyongyang, and Huang's June 3–8 visit, right between the Kim-Jiang Beijing meeting (May 29–31) and the Kim-Kim Pyongyang summit (June 13–15), are an important part of Beijing's behind-the-scenes inter-Korean diplomacy.
  • For a detailed report, see Laxmi Nakarmi, “Kim Jong Il's New Direction: His Stalinist Regime is Changing—for Real,” Asiaweek, Vol. 26, No. 36 (September 15), 2000, online.
  • “South Korean President Leaves Japan after Three-day Visit,” China Daily, September 24, 2000, online.
  • “Editorial: Military Cooperation with China,” Korea Herald, August 24, 1999, online.
  • “Editorial: Mori's Offensive Remarks,” Korea Herald, September 28, 2000, online.
  • DPRK's three principles of national reunification are: independence, peaceful reunification and great national unity.
  • Conversation with a senior Chinese foreign ministry official, Marietta, Ohio, September 2000.
  • Lu Baochun, “How Long Will the Stars and Stripes Flutter Over Pusan?” Beijing Review, Vol. 43, No. 30 (July 24, 2000), p. 8.
  • “The most important outcome of my summit conference with North Korea in June,” President Kim Dae-jung said in an interview with New York Times on September 9, “was a common understanding that American troops must stay in South Korea to prevent a vacuum on the Korean peninsula that would be inviting to its neighbors.” According to Kim, during his meeting with Kim Jong-il in Pyongyang, the North Korea leader told him, “We are surrounded by big powers—Russia, Japan and China—so the United States must continue to stay for stability and peace in East Asia.” President Kim said he was “recounting almost the exact words of his counterpart.” Then President Kim added, “I believe that North Korea wants improved relations with the United States. That is their basic goal. If it is not their basic goal, there is no reason why they should change their position on American forces.” Jane Perlez, “South Korean Says North Agrees U.S. Troops Should Stay,” New York Times, September 11, 2000, online.
  • Lu Baochun, “How Long Will the Stars and Stripes Flutter Over Pusan?” p. 9; and Cheng Yujie, “The Korean Summit and the North-South Korean Relations,” Contemporary International Relations, Vol. 10, No. 7 (July 2000), pp. 37–40.
  • Lu Baochun, “How Long Will the Stars and Stripes Flutter Over Pusan?” p. 10; Jin Xide, “Two Types of Security Issues in Northeast Asia,” Contemporary Asia-Pacific, No. 8 (August 2000), pp. 26–36; and Chen Longshan, “The Historic DPRK-ROK Summit: An Analysis,” Northeast Asia Studies, No. 3 (2000), pp. 3–9.
  • The same, of course, can be said about the North Korean leaders. After all, the North Koreans are known for their ability to be small shrimps playing big fishes. Kim II Sung had played the former Soviet Union and China off against each other so well for so long, and the recent events seem to have demonstrated that Kim the junior has clearly learned from his father and is actually playing the old game in a new context. Kim Jong-il's recent plot of revealing a missiles-for-boost-er-rockets offer to Russia's Putin clearly points to that direction. Kim's offer could place Moscow squarely in the middle of Northeast Asian diplomacy, while at the same time encouraging the latent rivalry between Moscow and Beijing. Four weeks after their meeting, however, Kim Jong-il retreated from his widely publicized offer and said his original remarks were made in “a passing, laughable matter.” While it is not at all clear that Kim has withdrawn his offer, his public speech itself was a diplomatic slap to President Vladimir Putin. As President Kim Dae-jung pointed out recently, “the time for South and North Korea to make the most of the major powers may have come.” It is also unclear why Kim Jong-il made this shift, if there is one. But in any event, Beijing seems to be pleased by Kim's statement—its mouthpiece, People's Daily carried a report on Kim's talk immediately. See “Kim Jong-il Joked about Missile Stop,” People's Daily, August 15, 2000, p. 7. So while Moscow and Beijing do share some strong common interests in the Korean peninsula, the atmosphere of detente on the peninsula may also make conflicts of interest between Russia and China more conspicuous.
  • Lu Yousheng, “High-level Talks Improve Northeast Asia Security,” China Daily, June 14, 2000, p. 4. Also see Chen Ping, “Forgotten War Unforgettable,” China Daily, June 30, 2000, p. 4; and “Opinion: US Seeks to Rewrite War History to Help Military,” China Daily, July 29, 2000, p. 4.
  • Chalmers Johnson, “Does the U.S. Really Want Peace in Korea?” Los Angeles Times, September 9, 2000, online.
  • Cited in People's Korea, “China Will Keep Helping Korean People, Interview with Cheng Yonghua, Minister-Counsellor at Chinese Embassy in Japan,” August 23, 2000, available at http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk.
  • President of the Presidium of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly Kim Yong-nam and his 15-member delegation was en route to the United Nations Millennium Summit on September 4. The delegates had completed departure procedures and were about to board an American Airlines flight to New York when the people the North Koreans referred to as “US air security agents” stopped them. The Koreans said that after searching the delegates' baggage, the agents searched “every sensitive part of the body.” When they came to Kim Yong-nam, who is also the DPRK's head of state, the North Koreans become angry. After consultations with Pyongyang, where Kim Jong-il presumably had the last word, the delegation then canceled its trip and boarded a flight to Beijing. At a press conference in Frankfurt, North Korean Deputy Foreign Minister Choe Su-hon claimed “This incident cannot be construed otherwise than an intentional and premeditated plot made in advance according to the manuscript of the US administration.” North Korea's ambassador to the United Nations, Li Hyong-chol, told a news conference at the United Nations that the “incident intensified our vigilance and hatred toward the United States.” Blaming the US government, the DPRK's UN ambassador said, “such acts are only possibly by hooligans who have no regard at all to international law and practices.” For detailed report, see “N. Korea Pulls Out of UN Summit, Blames US,” China Daily, September 6, 2000, online; and “North Koreans Storm Home after Strip Search,” Sydney Morning Herald, September 7, 2000.
  • A report by the German newspaper Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung lends some weight to the conspiracy theory. The newspaper said that the German foreign ministry had informed the US airline that the North Korean delegation would board its flight and about the rank and importance of this delegation. See Werner Adam, “Pants Off to North Korea,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, September 6, 2000, online.
  • This time, even from an American perspective, they see some problem. In commenting on the DPRK-US ties, Defense Secretary William Cohen said in Seoul recently, “Unfortunately, sometimes unpredictable changes in the weather and other circumstances can alter our plans, as recently happened.” See South China Morning Post, September 22, 2000, online.
  • “North Korea Receives Washington's Letter Regretting Pat-down,” Yonhap News, September 9, 2000, available at http://www.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/20000909. In a statement issued by DPRK Foreign Ministry's spokesman, the ministry said, “We note the fact that US government has sent a letter to us regretting the incident at Frankfurt Airport and will further watch Washington's attitude.”
  • Cited in Korea Scope, “Airport Dispute May Worsen N.K.-U.S. Relations: But Analysts See Little Impact on the Process of Inter-Korean Reconciliation,” available at http://www.koreascope.org/english/sub/10/ks10.htm.
  • “North Korean to miss UN meetings, US says,” China Daily, September 12, 2000, online; and “End to U.S. Military Presence in S. Korea Urged,” Korea Central News Agency, September 12, 2000.
  • “Misbehavior of World's Largest Rogue State,” Korean Central News Agency, September 8, 2000.
  • Cited in Doug Bandow, “Military Readiness and Korean Commitments,” September 6, 2000, available at http://www.townhall.com/columnists/doug-bandow/db200096.shtml.
  • Upon receiving US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright's message of regret, North Korea's UN Ambassador Li Hyong-Chol said his nation paid attention “to the recently stated US position that it has no reason to perpetuate its hostile relations with our country. If this position is put into practice, we will be ready to respond in a positive way any time.” See Sam F. Ghattas, “North Korea Goodwill Begets Goodwill,” available at http://dailynews.yahoo.com/htx/ap/20000915/wl/un_nkorea
  • It is interesting to note that according to Korea Central News Agency, “looking through the changing situation,” Kim Jong-il's “distinguished judgment” has helped DPRK to “find the most effective way” of solving three most difficult problems: “defending the sovereignty and dignity of the country by smashing the imperialists' isolation and suffocation moves; overcoming difficulties and building a firm spring board for the construction of economically powerful country; and achievements in political diplomacy with the enemies.” “Outstanding Judgment,” Korea Central News Agency, September 26, 2000.
  • Xiao Li, “DPRK-ROK Summit Fruitful,” Beijing Review, Vol. 43, No. 26 (June 26, 2000), p. 8.
  • “Foolish Incident Harms Ties,” China Daily, September 8, 2000, online.
  • “Kim Yong-nam and His Party Return Home,” Korea Central News Agency, September 6, 2000.
  • For a full text, see “Dialogue between Kim Jong-il and Presidents of South Korean Press,” JoongAng Ilbo, available at http://english.joins.com/.
  • According to a Japan Times report, “DPRK negotiators said during August talks in Tokyo that Pyongyang hopes to normalize relations with Japan by the time the South Korean president's term expires in February 2003.” See “North Korea Wants Normal Ties with Japan, U.S. by 2003,” Japan Times, September 17, 2000, online.
  • For a summary of Pyongyang's view on its relations with Japan, see “Kidnapping of Japanese has nothing to do with DPRK,” Korea Central News Agency, September 24, 2000. The key issue, according to Rodong Sinmun, is “the DPRK has no idea to open diplomatic relations with Japan while allowing its self-respect and dignity to be impaired.”
  • For a Beijing's view on the issue of six-party dialogue or “2+4” formula, see “Chinese Experts Talk about the Situation on the Korean Peninsula,” Beijing Review, Vol. 43, No. 23 (June 5, 2000), pp. 9–15.
  • Shiping Tang, “A Neutral Reunified Korea: A Chinese View,” The journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. XIII, No. 2 (Fall/Winter 1999), p. 466.
  • “Japan urged to mind its own business,” Korea Central News Agency, June 26, 2000.
  • Cited in “We Will Never Agree to a Six-party Security Conference,” Vantage Point, July 2000, pp. 50–51.
  • “Geographical Equity Essential to Security Council Expansion: Jiang,” People's Daily, September 8, 2000, p. 1; and “Japan Not Qualified to Sit on UNSC,” Korea Central News Agency, September 8, 2000.
  • “Japan Warned to Act with Discretion,” Korea Central News Agency, September 19, 2000.
  • “Projected U.S.- Japan Military Exercise,” Korea Central News Agency, August 13, 2000.
  • Gu Ping, “Japan, Find a New Excuse to Participate in Constructing TMD,” Beijing Review, Vol. 43, No. 34 (August 21, 2000), p. 10.
  • “Checking Imperialists' Arms Race,” Korea Central News Agency, September 7, 2000.
  • For Chinese and North Korean concerns on TMD, see “TMD and Asia-Pacific Stability,” China Defense Daily, August 2, 2000, p. 1; “NMD Suspended, What about TMD?” People's Daily, September 19, 2000, online; and “Outburst of Director General of Defense Agency of Japan,” Korea Central News Agency, September 17, 2000; and “Japan, US Flayed for Tampering with Situation of Korean Peninsula,” September 26, 2000.
  • “Speech by Head of DPRK Delegation to UN General Assembly Session,” Korea Central News Agency, September 18, 2000.
  • Juche is sanctified as the essence of what has been officially called Kim II Sung chuui (Kim II Sungism) since April 1974. Juche is also claimed as “the present-day Marxism-Leninism.” North Korean leaders advocate juche thought as “the monolithic ideology of the Party.” Juche means “the independent stance of rejecting dependence on others and of using one's own powers, believing in one's own strength and displaying the spirit of self-reliance.” Juche is an ideology geared to address North Korea's contemporary goals—an independent foreign policy, a self-sufficient economy, and a self-reliant defense posture.
  • According to one report, between 1995 and 1999, North Korea received a total of 4.1 million tons of food shipments, approximately 2 million came from China. See Du Ren, “DPRK's Economic Recovery and US' Propaganda,” Lianhe Zaobao (Singapore), September 14, 2000, online.
  • More recently, some analysts in Seoul have renewed their warning that “in its pursuit of bolstering ties with the South and the foreign community, North Korea's objective rests squarely on acquiring food and funds.” According to these South Korean scholars, Kim Jong-il “is improving relations with South Korea only to stabilize the North's economy and structure.” And “As North Korea shows a friendly face to get food and money benefits, retreating to the brinkmanship ways is always possible.” See Roger Dean Du Mars, “Food, Not Philosophy, Drives North's Moves,” South China Morning Post, September 27, 2000, online.
  • “Glorify This Year Greeting the 55th Anniversary of the Party Foundation as A Year of Proud Victory in the Frame of Great Chollima Upsurge—DPRK's New Year's Joint Editorial (full text),” People's Korea, available at http://www.korea-np.co.jp/pk.
  • “North Korean Economy Grew in 1999,” Asian Wall Street Journal, June 21, 2000, online.
  • Doug Struck, “North Korean Economic Crisis Recedes, Aid Influx Helps Communist Nation Emerge Stronger and More Stable,” International Herald Tribune, September 6, 2000, online.
  • “Red Cross Says N Korea Flood Damage 'Beyond Belief,” Reuters, available at http://dailynews.yahoo.eom/h/nm/20000919; and “Appeal for North Korea Flood Victims,” BBC News, September 19, 2000. According to North Korean Agriculture Ministry's latest estimate, “about 360,000 tons of rice and 660,000 tons of maize had been lost to drought. Two typhoons that hit another area had destroyed 140,000 hectares of farmland with the loss of another 405,000 tons of grain.” “Shortage of Food Continues in DPRK,” Korea Central News Agency, September 25, 2000. Seoul, as noted, has decided to send 600,000 tons of food to help the North. And the opposition Grand National Party (GNP) reiterated its objections to the Kim administration's decision and reminded the administration that “despite its advertisement that South-North deals were progressing on schedule, all indicators show that there has been no 'actual' reduction in tensions.” The GNP party spokesman also cited the recent announcement by North Korea calling for the withdrawal of US forces from Korea as an example. See “Opposition Reiterates Objections to Sending Food to North Korea,” Korea Herald, September 30, 2000, online.
  • Cited in “S-N Economic Cooperation May Downgrade Seoul's Rating,” Korea Times, July 9, 2000, online. Since 1990 Seoul has built up a fund for inter-Korean cooperation, but its reserves of W525 billion—to rise to W882 billion in 2000— would not go far.
  • “Editorial: Crisis from Lost Leadership,” Korea Herald, September 21, 2000, online.
  • Cited in “China Supports Reunification of the Korean Peninsula,” Beijing Review, Vol. 43, No. 24 (June 12, 2000), p. 5.
  • Shin Yong-bae, “NK Leader Indicates Change in Policy During China Visit,” Korea Herald, June 3, 2000, online.
  • “Moon Myong-ja's Interview with General Secretary Kim Jong-il,” People's Korea, July 25, 2000, online.
  • “Dialogue between Kim Jong-il and Presidents of South Korean Press,” JoongAng Ilbo.
  • Choi Hoon, “215 North Korean Economic Officials Trained in Capitalism,” JoongAng Ilbo, September 4, 2000, online; and Laxmi NaKarmi, “Kim Jong Il's New Direction: His Stalinist Regime is Changing—for Real.”
  • “Cooperation between DPRK and Chinese Governments,” Korea Central News Agency, September 15, 2000; “Executive Plan Signed between Ministries of Public Health of DPRK and China,” Korea Central News Agency, September 21, 2000; and “Gift to Kim Jong-il from Chinese Delegation,” Korea Central News Agency, September 11, 2000. For Sino-North Korean economic cooperation, also see Jia Heping, “Special Policies May Help Border Areas Prosper,” China Daily, July 12, 2000, online.
  • “North Korea and China,” ROK National Intelligence Service, available at http://www.nis.go.kr:7000/democratic/index.html.
  • Lo Ping, “Jiang Zemin Met North Korean Secret Envoy.”
  • It is important to note, however, that on the issues of human rights and religious freedom and approaches to settle dispute, the two countries are discovering growing differences. The Kim administration's recent cancellation of the Dalai Lama's planned visit to South Korea to avoid annoying China, for example, has drawn strong public criticism, especially that such a reversal of previous decision seems to have come under direct pressure from Beijing and China's envoy in Seoul, Ambassador Wu Dawei. Wu has warned, “the Dalai Lama's visit would seriously hurt ties between Seoul and Beijing.” Wu made his remarks during an address to the forum of the National Assembly Pacific Policy Studies, before Seoul had reached an official decision over granting a visa to the Tibetan leader in exile. This type of Chinese behavior, just like what Beijing had done in the case of repatriation of seven North Korean citizens, will undoubtedly have longer-term adverse impact on China-ROK relations, especially in the eyes of South Korean public and media. For Wu Dawei's comments, see “Seoul Puts Brakes on Dalai Lama,” South China Morning Post, September 22, 2000, online and “Chinese Histrionics and Their implications,” Korea Herald, September 26, 2000, online. On September 25, Seoul also barred exiled Chinese dissident Wang Dan from making a visit to South Korea. In both the Dalai Lama and Wang Dan cases, Seoul authorities have said they did not want to anger China by allowing a visit. See “Seoul Bans Visit by Activist Wang Dan,” South China Morning Post, September 26, 2000.
  • President Kim reiterated his “America is our No. 1 ally and friend” position in his address at the Korea Society on September 8. See “Pyongyang Approaching Seoul on Unification, Kim Says,” Korea Herald, September 11, 2000, online. ROK Foreign Minister Lee Joung-binn articulated Seoul's position on the issue of US forces in Korea in his speech at the Asia Society on September 15. See “Foreign Minister Says US Troops Must Remain,” Korea Herald, September 16, 2000, online.
  • “Pyongyang Approaching Seoul on Unification, Kim Says,” Korea Herald.
  • See footnote 72. It is also important to note that Pyongyang clearly wants to use its “willingness to accept US troops to remain in the South” as a trump card in negotiating with Washington. In the aftermath of the September 4 incident at Frankfurt Airport, for example, between September 4 and 27, DPRK has issued eight statements calling for the US troops to withdraw from South Korea. See “U.S. Urged to Drop its Anachronistic Policy toward DPRK,” Korea Central News Agency, September 4, 2000; “Defending Independence against Imperialism,” Korea Central News Agency, September 6, 2000; “End to U.S. Military Presence in South Korea Urged,” Korea Central News Agency, September 12, 2000; “U.S. Troop Pullout Urged,” Korea Central News Agency, September 16, 2000; “U.S. Troop Pullout Called for,” Korea Central News Agency, September 21, 2000; “Withdrawal of U.S. Troops from South Korea is Urgent Need of Times,” Korea Central News Agency, September 22, 2000; “U.S. and South Korean War-Hawks Flailed,” Korea Central News Agency, September 23, 2000; and “US Attempt to Keep Its Troops in South Korea,” Korea Central News Agency, September 27, 2000.
  • President Kim Dae-jung's recent message to the US and Japan that Seoul has replaced Washington as the key player in easing tension in Northeast Asia and that he now wants the US and Japan to follow may be a good news to the Chinese. See Shingo Ito, “Seoul Replaces Washington as Regional Peacemaker,” South China Morning Post, September 25, 2000, online.
  • In response to a question on the US Defense Secretary William Cohen's proposal of increasing military exercises with countries in East Asia, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Sun Yuxi, for the first time, urged “countries in the region should abandon the Cold War mentality and adopt a new security concept based on mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and cooperation. Sun stressed that “enhancing military alliances and increasing military exercises will not be helpful to peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region.” Without mentioning South Korea, Sun's statement nevertheless sent a veiled message to Seoul—the statement was issued during Cohen's meeting with ROK Defense Minister Cho Seong-tae. Also, the Chinese government issued its warning in Beijing on the same day as Cohen was wrapping up his discussion with Cho and President Kim Dae-jung in Seoul. See “Military Alliances Not Helpful to Peace,” China Daily, September 22, 2000. Also on the same day, Pyongyang's KCNA repeated his call of “US troops to pull out from South Korea.” The KCNA statement said “It is the US troops present in South Korea that jeopardize peace in the Korean peninsula and as long as they remain in South Korea, genuine peace and security on the Korean peninsula can not be achieved but a new war may break out in the region any time. “U.S. troop pullout called for,” Korea Central News Agency, September 21, 2000.
  • “UN Security Council Permanent Members Held Historic Summit,” PRC Foreign Ministry.
  • “Chinese Defense Minister Lauds New Security Concept,” People's Daily, September 6, 2000, online.
  • Cited in Hu Qihua, “Dialogue Needed to Ensure Stability,” China Daily, September 7, p. 2.
  • As early as in October 1999, Chinese Ambassador to Japan, Chen Jian already told People's Korea that “During President Kim Yong-nam's China visit, he proposed to invite a similar-class Chinese delegation to Korea and we accepted his proposal with pleasure.” See “Interview with Chinese Ambassador to Japan,” People's Korea, October 20, 1999. During their meeting in Beijing in May 2000, Kim and Jiang “agreed that the meetings between the leaders of the KWP and the Communist Party of China, as well as those between the two countries, should continue.” See “China Supports Reunification of the Korean peninsula,” Beijing Review. In September, Dai Bingguo, head of the International Department of the CCP Central Committee, paid a five-day visit to Pyongyang and met with Kim Jong-il and Kim Yong-nam. Dai was in Pyongyang to discuss Jiang's upcoming DPRK visit. See “Kim Jong-il Meets CPC Top Official,” China Daily, September 15, 2000; and “Kim Jong-il Meets Chinese Party Delegation,” Korea Central News Agency, September 15, 2000. In 2000, working-level exchanges between Beijing and Pyongyang also increased significantly. Following Foreign Minister Paek Nam-sun and Kim Jong-il's China visits, DPRK Defense Minister Kim Il-chol also met his Chinese counterpart in Beijing in June. In return, a number of Chinese guests were in Pyongyang in the last several months, including CPPCC Vice Chairman Ye Xuanping, PRC Minister of Information Industry Wu Jichuan, and Zhang Guoguang, Governor of Liaoning Province.
  • In recent years, major Russian arms transfers include Kilo-class submarines, S-300 air defense systems, Mi-17 helicopters, Su-27 and Su-30 long-range attack jet fighters, Sovremenny-class guided missile destroyers, armed with 8 SS-N-22 Sunburn anti-ship missiles, airborne warning and control aircraft, and T-80 tanks. In 1999 the total volume of Chinese arms purchase from Russia was over $2 billion and some estimates suggest that it could run as high as $20 billion over the next five years, said in a recently released US House report. According to Hong Kong sources, Beijing and Moscow even reached a tentative agreement for a $1 billion sale to China of two Russian Typhoon-class nuclear-powered submarines with SSN-20 ballistic missiles (5,100 miles of maximum range). Both Moscow and Beijing denied the Typhoon deal. A more moderate possibility, according to Bin Yu, could be the sale of two Russian Akula-class nuclear-powered submarines that were designed to deal with US carrier groups. Moreover, Beijing and Moscow also agreed in principle for the future manufacturing of the Su-30MKs in China under a Russian license. While Moscow and Beijing were working on the Su-30s, the official Chinese press carried favorable reviews on the Su-37s, Russia's fifth and newest generation of jet fighters capable of matching the US F-22s. It was reported that the purchase of this latest multi-mission fifth-generation Russian fighter plane was also on the Moscow-Beijing arms transfer agenda. See Bill Gertz, “House Report Warns of Anti-U.S. Alliance,” Washington Times, September 25, 2000, online; and Bin Yu, “Coping With the Post-Kosovo Fallout,” in Center for Strategic and International Studies, Comparative Connections—An E-Journal on East Asian Bilateral Relations, 3rd Quarter, 1999, available at http://www.csis.org/pacfor/cc/993Qchina-rus.html. Also see Bates Gill, “China's Newest Warships,” Far Eastern Economic Review, January 27, 2000, p. 30; and Greg Torode, “Sino-Russian Ties Give US the Jitters,” South China Morning Post, July 27, 2000, online. On the issue of overall Sino-Russian “strategic partnership,” this author argues that, in spite of their differences in certain areas, a limited but real Beijing-Moscow strategic alliance is emerging, for the first time since the Sino-Soviet military clashes of the late 1960s. This author agrees with Paula J. Dorbriansky's conclusion that today, “two Eurasia's major military powers stand united in opposition to the United States, ready to counter most of Washington's international endeavors.” For Dorbriansky's argument, see Paula J. Dorbriansky, “Be Wary When the Bear Sides with a Dragon,” Los Angeles Times, September 18, 2000.
  • During his nine-day Russia visit in September, Li Peng has put emphasis on: “China, Russia and Korea must show heightened vigilance regarding the deployment of US missile defense system. By our joint efforts we must force the United States to renounce this plan.” See “Li Condemns US Missile Shield,” South China Morning Post, September 12, 2000, online; and “Li Peng Stresses Strategic Partnership with Russia,” China Daily, September 13, 2000, p. 1.
  • “Chinese Experts Talk about the Situation on the Korean Peninsula,” Beijing Review, Vol. 43, No. 23 (June 5, 2000), p. 14.
  • Ibid., pp. 14–15.
  • Interestingly enough, Pentagon has also made clear to the world leaders that “despite the changes, North Korea's military threat remains the same” and “the summit talks had had no impact on North Korean military behavior.” For details, see Don Kirk, “Threat from North Korea Rising, U.S. Army Warns,” International Herald Tribune, September 8, 2000, online; “Seoul says North Still a Threat,” South China Morning Post, September 21, 2000; and “Cohen: Peace Process Must Not Be 'One-way Street',” South China Morning Post, September 22, 2000, online.
  • “Interview with Chinese Ambassador to Japan,” People's Korea.
  • US Defense Secretary William Cohen, in an interview with Kyoto News Asahi Shimbun on September 19, proposed that “the United States, China and Japan should hold multilateral military drills as a means to ensure greater stability in the Asia-Pacific region.” For a full text, see “U.S. Defense Secretary Proposes Joint Japan, China, U.S. Military Drills,” BBC News, September 20, 2000, online. Beijing immediately rejected Cohen's proposal. See “Military Alliances Not Helpful to Peace,” China Daily.
  • With China in mind, President Clinton, in his September 24 article in the New York Times, has cautioned against reducing the US military presence in Asia, “If tensions between North and South Korea decrease and if China continues to open up, we may be tempted to draw back. We must not do so….For we are not in Asia simply to respond to danger, but to be a balance wheel for stability that prevents danger from arising.” Clinton also warned that trade with China “will not automatically bring freedom or peace.” “US to Keep Troops in Asia Regardless of Progress in China, Koreas,” Agence France-Presse, September 25, 2000, online.
  • As note, the emotional dimension in China's policy toward Korea should not be underestimated. Chinese leadership's recent decision to produce and air a thirty-episode television show called “Kang Mei Yuan Chao” [Resist America, Support Korea, the Chinese name for the Korean War of 1950–53] on China's CCTV is a clear indication that Beijing wants the world to remember what kind of impact a combined influence of security concerns and assertive Chinese nationalism may have on China's Korea policy.

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