- For an overview of the missile defense issue in East Asia, see Robert D. Shuey, Shirley A. Kan, and Mark Christofferson, Missile Defense Options for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan: A Review of the Defense Department Report to Congress, Congressional Research Service, November 1999; Kenneth W. Allen et al., Theater Missile Defenses in the Asia-Pacific Region: A Henry L Stimson Center Working Group Report, Henry L, Stimson Center, June 2000; and Monterey Institute of International Studies, Center for Nonproliferation Studies, East Asian Nonproliferation Project, Theater Missile Defense (TMD) in Northeast Asia: An Annotated Chronology, 1990-Preseut, updated frequently, available at http://www.cnns.miis.edu/research/neasia.
- Boeicho, Dando misairu boei (BMD) ni kansuru keukyu ni tsuite, July 28, 2000, available at www.jda.go.jp/j/library/archives/bmd/bmd.pdf gives an official account of Japan's participation in the NTW research. The US Navy hopes to begin equipping its ships with an earlier version of NTW around 2008 but this date is regarded as highly optimistic. Allen et al., Theater Missile Defenses, p. 9. At this juncture, difficulty of siting as well as service interests makes it unlikely for Tokyo to choose for deployment the land-based theater high altitude area defense (THAAD) system, which the Pentagon expects to introduce by 2007.
- 1986 . Reader Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . The literature on missile defense controversies in NATO, quite voluminous, includes David S. Yost, “Ballistic Missile Defense and the Atlantic Alliance,” in Stephen E. Miller and Stephen Van Evera, eds., The Star Wars Controversy: An International Security (For the European reaction to NMD, see, for example, Francois Heisbourg, “Brussel's Burden,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Summer 2000).
- Cronin , Patrick M. , Giarra , Paul S. and Green , Michael J. 1999 . “The Alliance Implications of Theater Missile Defense,” . In The US-Japan Alliance: Past, Present, and Future Edited by: Green and Cronin . 175 – 179 . New York : Council on Foreign Relations Press . in, eds., (pp., 182; Urayama Kaori, “TMD wo tai chugoku gaiko no kado ni seyo,” Chuo koron, Vol. 115, No. 5 (April 2000), pp. 134–135; Michael J. Green and Katsuhisa Furukawa, “New Ambitions, Old Obstacles: Japan and Tts Search for an Arms Control Strategy,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 30, No. 6 (July/August 2000), p. 19.
- Proliferation pressures in Asia are discussed in Paul Bracken, “The Second Nuclear Age,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 1 (January/February 2000); and Joseph Cirincione, “The Asian Nuclear Reaction Chain,” Foreign Policy, No. 118 (Spring 2000).
- In other words, this study concentrates on the “reassurance” aspect of the nuclear umbrella. Michael Howard, “Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Winter 1982/83).
- Carnesale , Albert . 1983 . Living with Nuclear Weapons 34 – 35 . Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press . pp.; National Academy of Sciences, Committee on International Security and Arms Control, The Future of US Nuclear Weapons Policy (Washington DC: National Academy Press, 1997), pp. 24–25.
- The concept of existential deterrence was propounded in McGeorge Bundy, “The Bishops and the Bomb,” New York Review of Books, Vol. 30, No. 10 (June 16, 1983).
- For the basic character of extended deterrence over Japan, see Terumasa Nakanishi, “US Nuclear Policy and Japan,” Washington Quarterly, Vol. 10, No. 1 (Winter 1987); and Shinichi Ogawa, “US Nuclear Forces and Japanese/Western Pacific Security,” in Patrick Garrity and Steven A. Maaranen, eds., Nuclear Weapons in the Changing World: Perspectives from Europe, Asia, and North America (New York: Plenum Press, 1992).
- 1983 . Alliance Security: NATO and the No-First-Use Question Washington DC : Brookings Institution . The literature on the European fear of decoupling and efforts to allay it, which is also quite voluminous, includes John D. Steinbruner and Leon V. Sigal, eds., (
- Ibid.
- Nakagawa Yatsuhiro, “Higashi ajia ni okeru 'kakudai yokushiryoku' to INF: 'Shin higashi ajia INF senryaku' shian,” Shin boei ronshu, Vol. 11, No. 3 (January 1984) typifies this viewpoint.
- The nuclear forces of the United States, along with those of Britain and France, have come to be viewed as “truly weapons of last resort” by NATO, although they remain “supreme guarantee of the security of the Allies.” “Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance” (”London Declaration”), July 6, 1990; “The Alliance's Strategic Concept,” November 8, 1991; “The Alliance's Strategic Concept,” April 23–24, 1999.
- It is against this background that even some supporters of the Japan-US alliance have begun to call for removal of the nuclear dimension from it. Kumao Kaneko, “Japan Needs No Umbrella,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Vol. 52, No. 2 (March/April 1996). Of course, as long as Japan is allied with a nuclear-armed United States, existential deterrence can be assumed to serve its security well, even if the nuclear guarantee is verbally rejected.
- 1997 . Asian Security, 1997–1998 19 – 25 . London : Brassey's . For the Senkaku incident in 1996, see Research Institute for Peace and Security
- The reliability of the 1992 Russian declaration that it had removed all its sea-based tactical nuclear weapons has been questioned. Boei Kenkyujo, ed., Higashi ajia senryaku gaikan 2000 (Tokyo: Boeicho Boei Kenkyujo, 2000), p. 57. According to US sources, moreover, the Russian navy as of 1994 had 500 nuclear-tipped cruise missiles on board its submarines and surface vessels. “Kakuheiki: tosai hitei, fushin nuguezu,” Yomiuri Shimbun, August 17, 2000.
- At least as far as North Korea is concerned, it seems advisable to reformulate the provocation avoidance condition and political bond condition so that they may address the threat of an attack with weapons of mass destruction other than nuclear weapons. At the same time, it must be noted that an invulnerable United States might in some circumstances arouse anxiety among the Japanese about a more cavalier attitude to nuclear war in the Far East on the part of Washington.
- Cronin , Giarra and Green . “The Alliance Implications,” . 182 p.; Green and Furukawa, “New Ambitions,” p. 19; and Morimoto Satoshi, Anzen hosho ron: 21-seiki no kiki kanri (Tokyo: PHP Kenkyujo 2000), p. 435.
- 2000 . Ballistic-Missile Defence and Strategic Stability (Adelphi Paper 334) 54 London : International Institute for Strategic Studies . Only three or four NTW ship positions are needed under these circumstances to protect the continental United States, according to Dean A. Wilkening, (Moreover, NTW could form a basis for boost-phase defense of the US homeland, as suggested in John Deutch, Harold Brown, and John P. White, “National Missile Defense: Is There Another Way?” Foreign Policy, No. 119 (Summer 2000). Generally speaking, many of the technologies developed in the TMD program can be applied to NMD.
- Eric Eckholm, “China Says US Missile Shield Could Force an Arms Buildup,” New York Times, May 11, 2000.
- Alastair Iain Johnston, “China's New 'Old Thinking': The Concept of Limited Deterrence,” International Security, Vol. 20, No. 3 (Winter 1995/96) gives a detailed account of changing Chinese outlook on nuclear weapons. See also Brad Roberts, Robert A. Manning, and Ronald N. Montaperto, “China: The Forgotten Nuclear Power,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 4 (July/August 2000). A more cautious view of Beijing's reaction is presented in Charles Ferguson, “Sparking a Buildup: US Missile Defense and China's Nuclear Arsenal,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 30, No. 2 (March 2000).
- Steven A. Cambone, “The United States and Theater Missile Defence in Northeast Asia,” Survival, Vol. 39, No. 3 (Autumn 1997), pp. 71–73.
- For the Russian position on the issue, see Igor Ivanov, “The Missile-Defense Mistake: Undermining Strategic Stability and the ABM Treaty,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, No. 5 (September/October 2000).
- Philipp C. Bleek, “Russia Adopts New Security Concept; Appears to Lower Nuclear Threshold,” Arms Control Today, Vol. 30, No. 1 (January/February 2000).
- Cronin, Giarra, and Green, “The Alliance Implications”; Morimoto, Anzen hosho ron; Allen et al., Theater Missile Defenses; and Satoshi Morimoto, Ken Jimbo, Ken Suzuki, and Yoichiro Koizumi, “Theater Missile Defense (TMD) and Japan's Security,” Plutonium, No. 20 (Winter 1998), available at http://www.glocomnet.or.jp/cnfc/p120/index.html; among others, throw light on various aspects of TMD that would impinge on the conventional balance condition and/or the political bond condition.
- Boeicho, Dando misairu boei, pp. 11, 14.
- In 1994, the Pentagon presented four TMD options for Japan, whose estimated costs ranged from $4.5 billion to $16.3 billion. These figures included research and development as well as acquisition costs but excluded facilities, site preparation, operations and maintenance, and other recurring costs. Malcolm O'Neill, Ballistic Missile Defense: Options for Japanese TMD, Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, US Department of Defense, June 13, 1994.
- Boeicho, Dando misairu boei, pp. 11, 14.
- Richard L. Armitage et al., The United States and Japan: Advancing toward a Mature Partnership, Institute for National Strategic Studies/National Defense University, October 11, 2000, pp. 2–3 presents TMD cooperation as an element to bring the Japan-US alliance closer in nature to the “special relationship between the United States and Great Britain.”
- Morimoto, Anzen hosho ron, pp. 439–40.
- Cronin, Giarra, and Green, “The Alliance Implications”; Urayama, “TMD wo tai chugoku gaiko no”; and Abe Junichi, “21-seiki no higashi ajia anzen hosho kankyo no naka no chugoku fakuta: chugoku no gun kindaika to TMD wo chushin ni,” Shin boei ronshu, Vol. 27, No. 4 (March 2000) contain such proposals. While taking a dim view of Japan and its involvement in TMD, Thomas J. Christensen nevertheless puts forth a similar suggestion in “China, the US-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia,” International Security, Vol. 23, No. 4 (Spring 1999).
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis
Volume 12, 2000 - Issue 2