- “Russia's Foreign Policy Concept,” International Affairs (Moscow) (January 1993), pp. 14–16; “Russia's Foreign Policy Agenda for 1993,” International Affairs (Moscow) (March 1993), pp. 15–32.
- For Primakov's background, see Alessandra Staley, “Russian Diplomacy Gets a Wily Spy and Survivor,” New York Times, March 21, 1996, p. A 8; Alessandra Stanley, “Russian Spy Chief Names Foreign Minister,” New York Times, January 10, 1996, p. A 6.
- Alvin Z. Rubinstein, “Russia Adrift: Strategic Anchors for Russia's Foreign Policy,” Harvard International Review (Winter/Spring 2000), p. 19.
- ITAR-TASS, April 27, 2000.
- This document was to replace the earlier version signed by Boris Yeltsin in April 1993. For the full text of the new Foreign Policy Concept, see “The Foreign Policy Concept of the Russian Federation,' Nezavisimaya Gazeta, July 11, 2000, p. 1, p. 6 in Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 52, No. 17 (2000), pp. 13–15 and Vol. 52, No. 29 (2000), pp. 6–8.
- Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press, Vol. 52, No. 29 (2000), p. 8.
- Ibid., p. 7.
- Yonhap, March 30, 2000, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS), Daily Report/East Asia CDR/EAS) (2000-0330).
- In May 1997, a Russian parliamentary delegation led by Vladimir Lukin, chairman of the State Duma International Affairs Committee, visited Pyongyang. In June 1997, another Russian delegation led by Mikhail Monastirskiy, Chairman of the Southeast Asia and Asia-Pacific Area Subcommittee of the Geopolitical Affairs Committee of the State Duma, visited Pyongyang for talks with members of the DPRK Supreme People's Assembly.
- Eduard Shevardnadze's last visit to Pyongyang was on September 2–3, 1990, whose main purpose was to inform the North Korean leadership of the imminent conclusion of diplomatic ties between the Soviet Union and South Korea. But at that time he visited the DPRK in the capacity of Soviet foreign minister.
- During his two-day visit, he met with DPRK leaders, including Kim Young-Nam, chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme People's Assembly, but could not meet with Kim Jong-il. Russia had requested a meeting between Ivanov and National Defense Commission Chair Kim Jong-il, but North Korea did not grant the request. This issue was one of the reasons Ivanov's Pyongyang trip had been delayed. “Russian Minister's Visit to N.K. Won't Affect Seoul-Moscow Ties,” Korea Herald, February 10, 2000.
- Suh , Dae-Sook and Chae-Jin , Lee , eds. 1998 . North Korea after Kim II Sung Boulder CO : Lynne Rienner . For Kim Jong-il's foreign relations, see, eds., (Samuel Kim, ed., North Korean Foreign Relations in the Post-Cold War Era (Hong Kong: Oxford University Press, 1998); Selig S. Harrison, “Time to Leave Korea?” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 80, No. 2 (March/April 2001), pp. 62–78.
- The treaty consisted of six articles. It was signed on July 6, 1961, and came into force on September 10, 1961, when the two countries exchanged the instruments of ratification.
- Article 1 paragraph 2 of the Treaty stipulates: “Should either of the Contracting Parties suffer armed attack by any State or coalition of States and thus find itself in a state of war, the other Contracting Party shall immediately extend military and other assistance with all the means at its disposal.” Unpublished government document, “Treaty of Friendship, Co-operation and Mutual Assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea,” signed by Kim II Sung and Nikita Khrushchev, Moscow, July 6, 1961.
- The 1961 treaty expired on June 10, 1996.
- Author's interview with Vadim Tkachenko at the Institute of Far Eastern Studies, the Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, June 26, 2000.
- Initially, Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov was scheduled to visit Pyongyang in late May of the same year to sign the treaty. His visit was delayed due to Russia's involvement in NATO's air strike in the former Yugoslavia and ROK President Kim Dae-jung's official visit to Moscow. Ivanov planned to visit Pyongyang in early June right after President Kim Dae-jung's visit to Moscow in late May. This time, North Korea requested the postponement of the visit citing its Foreign Minister's busy work schedule. ITAR-TASS, July 14, 1999, in FBIS, DR/SOV (1999-0714). Obviously, by delaying Ivanov's Pyongyang trip, the DPRK wished to express its displeasure over President Kim Dae-jung's Moscow trip. Ivanov then planned to go to Pyongyang in November 1999 but, “for purely internal Russian reasons connected with the fact that it was necessary for the Minister to be in Moscow in that period,” this time the Russian side requested a postponement of the visit. ITAR-TASS, December 7, 1999, in FBIS, DR/SOV (1999-120).
- Interfax, October 30, 2000, in FBIS, DR/EAS (2000-1030). The Supreme People's Assembly of North Korea ratified the treaty on April 6. The State Duma and the Federation Council of the Russian Federation ratified it on July 19 and July 24, respectively. President Putin completed the ratification process by signing the treaty into law on August 5, 2000. Natalia Panshina, “Federation Council Ratifies Treaty with North Korea,” ITAR-TASS, July 24; Irina Bazhenova, “Foreign Ministry Stresses Importance of Cooperation Treaty with DPRK,” ITAR-TASS, August 11, 2000.
- Unpublished government document, “Dogovor o Druzhbe, Dobrososedstve i Sotrudnichestve Mezhdu Rossiiskoi Federatziei i Koreiskoi Narodno-demokraticheskoi Respublikoi,” [Treaty of Friendship, Good Neighborliness and Cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea] (the Russian version) signed by Paik Nam-Sun and Igor Ivanov, Pyongyang, February 9, 2000.
- Article 11 stipulates that the treaty will be effective for ten years and will be automatically extended in subsequent five-year periods unless one of the parties renounces the treaty in writing 12 months prior to its expiration.
- The Russo-Vietnamese friendship treaty also contains a similar clause that calls for “mutual contact” in case of a security crisis. Russia initially proposed to the ROK that their basic treaty include a similar clause, but dropped the demand after the ROK opposed it.
- Author's interview with an ROK diplomat, Moscow, June 2000.
- In January 1993, Deputy Foreign Minister Georgi Kunadze unilaterally notified North Koreans that Russia would assist North Korea militarily only when the latter was the victim of an unprovoked attack. The new treaty would allow Russia even more latitude than the proposed reinterpretation of the old treaty in its intervention in Korean affairs.
- None of the Soviet or Russian leaders had visited North Korea before Putin.
- For the full text of the joint declaration, see KCNA (Pyongyang), July 20, 2000.
- Point 2 of the declaration was identical with Articles 2 and 3 of the treaty, and Point 4 was indistinguishable from Article 3.
- In July 1998, Cho Sung-Woo, a political counselor at South Korea's Moscow embassy, was expelled from Russia on espionage charges. In retaliation, Seoul expelled Oleg Abramkin, a Russian councilor in Seoul. The mutual expulsion of diplomats was a result of mounting tensions between Russian and ROK intelligence agencies over covert intelligence gathering activities. The expelled diplomats were career intelligence officers operating under diplomatic cover. In the wake of this incident, the two countries experienced the worst diplomatic crisis in the history of their relationship. The fact that a spy scandal quickly escalated into a diplomatic crisis testified to a widening gap in perception and interests between the two countries.
- At this time, Putin characterized Moscow-Seoul relationship as a “mature partnership.” ITAR-TASS, February 28, 2001. Presidents Kim Dae-jung and Putin held summit talks twice in 2000. They met during the UN Millennium summit in New York in September and met again during the APEC meeting in Brunei in November.
- “Putin Pledges Efforts for Korean Peace,” UPI, February 27, 2001.
- During his talks with President Bush in March 2001, Kim Dae-jung stated that the joint communique should not be interpreted as Seoul's opposition to NMD. Seoul has been deliberately ambivalent toward NMD and maintained that is still reviewing its position on the issue. See Don Kirk, “Now Pulls Back from Russia on Missile Shield,” New York Times, March 2, 2001, p. 6.
- Seoul has tried to maintain independence between the US and Russia. ROK Foreign Minister Lee Joung-Binn revealed at a seminar that Seoul rejected Moscow's request for US troop withdrawal during Putin's Seoul trip and refused Washington's demand for Seoul's express support for NMD. “Seoul Resisted US Pressure to Support NMD: Foreign Minister,” Agence France Presse, March 23, 2001.
- For ROK-Russian military cooperation, see Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo, “Military Cooperation Between Russia and South Korea,” International Journal of Korean Unification Studies, Vol. 8 (1999), pp. 147–77.
- Yonhap, September 2, 1999, in FBIS, DR/EAS (1999-0902).
- Pavel Koryashkin, “Russia, ROK Agree on Defense Ministries Phone Hotline,” ITAR-TASS, May 16, 2000, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2000-0516).
- Interfax, October 14, 2000, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2000-1014).
- Hanguk Ilbo, October 8, 1999.
- In November 2000, South Korea decided not to purchase Russian diesel submarines due to its failure to meet the minimum requirements in telecommunications systems, logistics abilities, battery capacity and continued operation. “ROK Decides Not to Buy Russian Submarine, Quality Problems Cited,” Yonhap, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2000-1024).
- “Moscow and Seoul Agree on Russian Arms Deliveries,” ITAR-TASS, February 28. 2001.
- Yonhap, March 27, 1999, in FBIS, DR/EAS (1999-0327); Yonhap, July 24, 2000, in FBIS, DR/EAS (2000-0724).
- ITAR-TASS, July 20, 2000, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2000-0720).
- ITAR-TASS, July 22, 2000, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2000-0722). In response to South Korean media reports that Kim Jong-il's proposal to cancel his missile program in exchange for commercial launches of Pyongyang's satellites by other countries was a joke, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov stated “our new contacts with the North Korean side left no impression that it was a joke.” Kim Jong-il made the proposal during the July meeting in Pyongyang with President Putin. ITAR-TASS, September 11, 2000, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2000-0911).
- ITAR-TASS, September 1, 2000, in FBIS, DR/EAS (2000-0901).
- Valery Denisov, “The Problem of Nuclear Nonproliferation in Korea,” International Affairs (Moscow), p. 42.
- Valentin Moiseev, then Deputy Director of the First Asian Department of the Russian Foreign Ministry, published an article in the May-June, 1997 issue of International Affairs (the journal published by the Russian Foreign Ministry) that, for the first time, contained details about the Russian proposal. Moiseev was head of the Korean desk at the First Asian Department, the Russian Foreign Ministry. An almost identical description of the proposal is found in Evgueni Bajanov, “A Russian Perspective on Korean Peace and Security,” Northeast Peace and Security Network Special Report, July 28, 1997, available at http://www.nau-tilus.org/napsnet//special_reports/. Bajanov is the Director of the Institute of Contemporary International Problems in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.
- In March 2001, Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Alexander Losyukov reiterated the call for six-party (North and South Korea, the US, Russia, China, and Japan) consultations on Northeast Asia. Russia, however, does not have an illusion about the proposal's immediate implementation. See Yuri Denisovich and Vladimir Solntsev, “Six-Party Consultations on NE Asia will be Useful,” ITAR-TASS. March 3, 2001.
- Debt repayment issue was also discussed during this meeting. Filippov stated that North Korea's debt to Russia should be restructured before Russian investments into North Korean economy resume. Aleksandr Valiyev, ITAR-TASS, October 17, 2000, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2000-1017).
- Yonhap, September 8, 2000, in FBIS, DR/EAS (2000-0908).
- Marat Abulkhatin, “Moscow, Pyongyang Contemplate Mine-Clearing Operations Near DMZ,” ITAR-TASS, October 31, 2000, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2000-1031).
- Interfax, December 14, 2000, FBIS, DR/SOV (2000-1214). In 2000, 72, 700 containers with cargoes were carried across Russia by transit along the Trans-Siberian railway. ITAR-TASS, January 3, 2001, in FBIS, DR/SOV (2001-0103).
- South Korea exported 468, 270 TEUs (twenty foot equivalent unit container) to Europe in 1999, of which 17, 791 TEUs (3.8%), were transported to Europe through the Vostochiny port and TSR. Yonhap, September 18, 2000, in FBIS, DR/EAS (2000-0918).
- Rossiyskaya gazeta (Ekonomicheskiy Soyuz Supplement), March 30, 1996, 11, in FBIS, DR/SOV (96-084-S).
- KOGAS, “The Irkutsk Natural Gas Project,” January 2000, available at http://www.kogas.or.kr/homepage/news.htm.
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis
Volume 13, 2001 - Issue 1