- Bazhanova , Natalya . “North Korea's decision to develop an independent nuclear program,” in James Moltz and Alexandre Mansourov, eds., The North Korean Nuclear Program: Security, Strategy, and New Perspectives from Russia (New York: Routledge, 2000), p. 128. Specifically, Mansourov articulates that Kim II Sung decided to pursue a nuclear weapon option in 1989 or in 1990. See Alexandre Mansourov, “North Korean decision-making processes regarding the nuclear issue at early stages of the nuclear game,” in Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hayes, eds., Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: the Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe 1997), p. 221.
- Leonard Spector and Jacqueline Smith, “North Korea: the next nuclear nightmare?” Arms Control Today, March 1991, pp. 8–13.
- On September 18, 1996, a North Korean submarine was found drifting on the east seashore near Kangrung of South Korea. A total of 26 commandos were on board, 24 of them killed, one captured and one missing. The operation continued for nearly 50 days.
- David Sanger, “North Korea site an A-bomb plant, U.S. agencies say,” New York Times, August 17, 1998.
- Sec. 582. “Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization,” The House-Senate Conference Report for HR4328 (Omnibus Appropriations Bill), October 19, 1998.
- “Text: Powell Opening Statement Before Senate Foreign Relations Committee,” January 17, 2001, available at http://www.usinfo.state.gov.
- “Secretary of State Collin Powell's Hearing of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on the Fiscal Year 2002 Foreign Operations Budget,” Federal News Service, Washington DC, March 8, 2001.
- “Remarks by President Bush and President Kim Dae-Jung of South Korea,” Office of the Press Secretary, The White House, March 7, 2001.
- The three leading House members sent a letter to President Bush on March 2, 2001. Steven Mufson, “Flexibility urged on N. Korea,” Washington Post, March 3, 2001, p. A16.
- Henry Hyde's Speech at the American Enterprise Institute in Washington, DC on March 13, 2001, available at http://www.nautilus.org/napsnet/dr/index.html#item2.
- In the withdrawal statement, North Korea stated that it would not change its attitudes until the American nuclear threat ceased and the IAEA restored its impartiality. In addition, almost every statement issued by the North Korean authorities since the withdrawal announcement emphasized settling the problem through bargaining with the United States. Seongwhun Cheon, “North Korea's nuclear problem: current state and future prospects,” The Korean Journal of National Unification, Vol. 2, 1993, p. 91. The North Korean ambassador in Geneva and deputy ambassador in the United Nations, for example, listed the following conditions as quid pro quo for returning to the NPT: (1) termination of the Team Spirit exercises, (2) inspection of US military bases in the South, (3) removal of the nuclear threat against the North, (4) no US nuclear umbrella over South Korea, (5) respect for North Korean socialism, (6) restoration of the IAEA's impartiality and neutrality. Segye Times, March 16, 1993 (in Korean); Mainichi Shimbun, March 17, April 21, 1993 (in Japanese). Another observation describes North Korea's last-ditch efforts to save the situation as follows: “A six-member North Korean parliamentary delegation, headed by Kim Yong-Sun, hoped to participate in a congressional meeting scheduled for February 3–4, 1993, in Washington, but the delegation was denied visas by the US State Department. Ultimately, the last attempt of North Korean doves to avert the confrontation was undercut by American hawks.” Alexandre Mansourov, “North Korean decision-making processes regarding the nuclear issue at early stages of the nuclear game,” p. 233.
- Chull Kim , Sung and Jong-il's Personalities , Kim . 1999 . Charisma and Governing Style 85 – 89 . Seoul : Korea Institute for National Unification . pp. (in Korean).
- This also means that Kim Jong-il can frequently change his mind. For example, when North Korea and the United States were negotiating on exchanging the liaison office, he first agreed to the idea in principle and asked for examining the impacts, and later, demanded reevaluation, agreed again, required reevaluation once again, and finally rejected the idea. Ibid., p. 87.
- At the initial report to the IAEA, North Korea declared that it extracted 90g of plutonium in March 1990. Suspicious of the truthfulness of the North's report, the IAEA believes that Pyongyang extracted at least 148g of plutonium on three occasions (1989, 1990, 1991). Kim Hyeh-Won, “P'yang agrees on IAEA examination of N-samples,” Korea Herald, March 6, 1993. Regarding the details on inconsistencies, see David Albright, “Inconsistencies in North Korea's declaration to the IAEA,” in David Albright and Kevin O'Neill, eds., Solving the North Korean Nuclear Puzzle (Washington DC: The Institute for Science and International Security, 2000), pp. 83–98.
- Adopting a resolution 2636 on February 25, 1993, the IAEA called upon the DPRK to cooperate fully and accept the special inspection within a month.
- A speech of the head of the North Korean delegation at the IAEA's Board of Governors' Meeting on February 25, 1993. Rodong Shinmun, February 27, 1993 (in Korean).
- According to Peter Hayes who visited Pyongyang on November 7–14, 1992, international observers believed that the IAEA inspections would sample the nuclear fuel of the 5MWe reactor on February 1993 when a 7th IAEA ad hoc inspection was expected. Peter Hayes, Nuclear Inspections in Korea: Rough Waters Ahead (Berkeley, CA: Nautilus Pacific Research, November 1992), p. 4.
- Foreign Minister Kim Young-Nam remarked this at the meeting with Carnegie Endowment Delegation. S. Harrison, L. Spector and J. Leonard, Preliminary Report: Carnegie Endowment Delegation Visit to Pyongyang, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, May 9, 1992.
- Rodney Jones and Mark McDonough, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation: A Guide in Maps and Charts, 1998 (Washington DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1998), p. 243.
- On January 7, 1992, Seoul announced a halt of the 1992 T/S military exercise and on that day, Pyongyang declared its signing of the IAEA full-scope safeguards agreement. Rodong Shinmun, January 8, 1992 (in Korean). Pyongyang decided to stop all the ongoing inter-Korean dialogues three days after Seoul and Washington issued an official statement to resume the 1993 T/S exercise on January 26, 1993. Rodong Shinmun, January 30, 1993 (in Korean). North Korean heads of the North-South Subcommittees held a press conference on February 25, 1993, arguing that the resumption of the T/S would be a betrayal to the North. Korean Central News Agency, February 26, 1993 (in Korean). These events well demonstrated how tightly the DPRK linked the T/S exercise with other pending issues.
- “N. Korea and the bomb: high-tech hide-and-seek,” Washington Post, April 27, 1993; David Albright, “Inconsistencies in North Korea's declaration to the IAEA,” p. 85.
- In response to North Korea's persistent attempts to nullify the armistice agreement, Presidents Kim Young Sam and Bill Clinton, on April 16, 1996, invited North Korea to take part in peace talks involving four countries: North and South Korea, the United States and China. Up to August 1999, the talks have been held six times with no clear achievements. A success would be to organize Committees for Tension Reduction and Peace Regime Building in October 1998.
- 1997 . Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: the Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula 398 – 401 . Armonk, New York : M.E. Sharpe . Regarding the differences on nuclear inspections between North and South Korea, see, Seongwhun Cheon, “Regional non-nuclear options from South Korea's perspective,” in Young Whan Kihl and Peter Hayes, eds.
- Peter Hayes revealed this after meeting with Choi U-Jin, the chairman of the northern side of the JNCC. Peter Hayes, Nuclear Inspections in Korea: Rough Waters Ahead, p. 4. The United States had agreed to accept North Korean inspections of its nuclear facilities. For example, President Bush declared, “To any who doubted declaration [President's Roh's denuclearization declaration], South Korea, with the full support of the United States, has offered to open to inspections all of its civilian and military installations, including US facilities.” FBIS-EAS-91-243, December 18, 1991.
- Hankook Ilbo and Donga Woo, September 20, 1992 (in Korean).
- Peter Hayes, Nuclear Inspections in Korea: Rough Waters Ahead, p. 2.
- At that time, Washington promoted a highly intrusive bilateral inspection regime, with short-notice challenge inspections, as a complement, or alternative, to IAEA inspections whose obvious limitations were revealed in the Iraqi case. Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities (Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 1995), p. 237. During the JNCC negotiations, there were frequent consultations and mutual visits between Seoul and Washington. At the practical level, the US side was headed by Ronald Lehman, then the director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. He called upon South Korea's patience and persistence in working out an effective reciprocal inspection system by stressing the importance of mutual inspections to clear suspicions about North Korea's nuclear program. Korea Herald, June 3, 1992. The United States regarded the Korean case as a model for other regions. Lehman mentioned “Indeed, we see experience gained here in Korea which may provide concepts useful elsewhere such as in the Middle East and South Asia.” Ronald Lehman, “Arms control and disarmament on the Korean peninsula,” Four Nations Arms Control Seminar on the Korean Peninsula, Seoul, June 2, 1992, pp. 24–25.
- An interview with a ROK government official, January 13, 2001. Previously, the DPRK made a similar proposal when Hans Blix, the director general of the IAEA, visited Pyongyang in May 1992. An interview with a senior official of ROK Ministry of Science and Technology, January 12, 2001. Although IAEA officials later denied offering a specific deal at the Blix's visit, North Korean officials, especially Premier Yon Hyong-Muk expressed their hope to pursue a more advanced light-water reactor plant in the future to replace the outmoded graphite-moderated ones. Michael Mazarr, North Korea and the Bomb: a Case Study in Nonproliferation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995), p. 84.
- Mitchell Reiss, Bridled Ambition: Why Countries Constrain Their Nuclear Capabilities, p. 240.
- Leventhan , Paul and Sharon , Tanzer , eds. 1992 . Averting a Latin American Nuclear Arms Race: New Prospects and Challenges for Argentine-Brazilian Nuclear Cooperation London : Macmillan Press . For the two sides' nuclear collaboration, see, eds., (
- As was noted in footnote 20, North Korea announced to accept the IAEA inspections and South Korea declared to halt the 1992 T/S exercise on the same day of January 7, 1992. Two weeks later, on January 22, a first official US-DPRK high-level talk was held between Arnold Kanter and Kim Yong-Sun. According to Mansourov, North Korea “interpreted the compromise [the result of the Kanter-Kim meeting] as quid pro quo deal that set the modalities of all further developments: the DPRK's permanent entrance into the nuclear safeguards agreement and acceptance of continuous IAEA inspections in exchange for permanent US cancellation of the Team Spirit exercises [emphasis added] and removal of its nuclear threat to the DPRK.” Alexandre Mansourov, “North Korean decision-making processes regarding the nuclear issue at early stages of the nuclear game,” p. 231.
- According to Selig Harrison, after the Kanter-Kim meeting in January 1992, Seoul, Washington, and Tokyo abandoned a previous “carrot and stick policy,” refusing to engage in further high-level dialogue or to discuss at any level the size and content of the carrot. Harrison argued that this approach was completely insensitive to the internal debate in Pyongyang and has progressively undermined the position of the reform elements, with pressure alone merely strengthening the hard-liners. Selig Harrison, “Korea at the crossroads: absorption, confederation or chaos?” a paper presented at an international seminar organized by Seoul Shinmun in Seoul on April 9–10, 1993, p. 6.
- North Korea shut off the 5MWe reactor at Yongbyon on April 1, 1994. Pyongyang informed the IAEA that it began removing the fuel from the reactor “for safety reasons” on May 12, 1994. The spent fuels of the reactor were taken out and stored safely in dry casks by early 2000.
- A report of American Security Council Foundation listed six concessions made by the United States in the Agreed Framework, one of which is no requirement to give up or not use the nuclear weapons North Koreans already have. The report predicted that North Korea had two “low yield” atomic explosives that would be able to obliterate everything with a three-quarter mile radius. It also criticized Robert Gallucci never to ask his DPRK counterparts if they already had nuclear weapons. See “The North Korean nuclear agreement: a clear and present danger,” American Security Council Foundation National Security Analysis, November 1994. Wall Street Journal also noted that the Agreed Framework recognized that “Pyongyang might have some nukes tucked away that could complicate the endgame.” “New deal for Pyongyang,” Review & Outlook, Wall Street Journal, October 21, 1994.
- Regarding possible losses in terms of ROK national interest caused by the Agreed Framework, see Taewoo Kim, “North Korea-US nuclear rapprochement in the South Korean dilemma,” Third World Quarterly, November 1995, pp. 661–674.
- The United States performed two site-surveys: one in May 1999 and another in May 2000. See “Text: US concludes North Korea underground site not nuclear,” US Department of State Office of the Spokesman on June 25, 1999; “Text: State Department release on visit to North Korean facility,” US Department of State Office of the Spokesman on May 31, 2000. Both are available at http://www.usinfo.state.gov.
- 1998 . GAO/RCED-98-210 4 Washington DC : GAO . The installations are (1) a graphite-moderated 5MWe reactor, (2) a radiochemical laboratory, (3) a fuel rod fabrication facility, (4) two unfinished graphite-moderated reactors-50MWe and 200MWe. US General Accounting Office, Nuclear Nonproliferation: Difficulties in Accomplishing IAEA's Activities in North Korea
- A full text of the Article 4.3 is as follows: “When a significant portion of the LWR project is completed, but before delivery of key nuclear components, the DPRK will come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA (INFCIRC/403), including taking all steps that may be deemed necessary by the IAEA, following consultations with the Agency with regard to verifying the accuracy and completeness of the DPRK's initial report on all nuclear material in the DPRK.”
- Seongwhun Cheon, “A South Korean view of the US counter proliferation initiative,” in Mitchell Reiss and Harald Muller, eds., International Perspectives on Counter proliferation, Working Paper, No. 99 (Washington DC: The Woodrow Wilson Center, 1995), pp. 103–115.
- North and South Korea already indicated the possibility of such cooperation. On September 17, 1991, the South Korean Minister of Science and Technology said that if North Korea accepted the IAEA inspections, the South would be willing to provide the North with atomic technologies and cooperate with Pyongyang. Choi U-Jin, chairman of the North side of the JNCC and deputy director of North Korea's Disarmament and Peace Institute, also argued that if North Korea's suspicions were eliminated through IAEA inspections, the two Koreas should cooperate to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. HanKyoreh Shinmun, May 20, 1992 (in Korean).
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis
Volume 13, 2001 - Issue 1