- There are no specific stipulations concerning security and peace in the “June 15 Joint Declaration.” However, the fact that the two hostile countries held the summit talks at all carries a significant meaning in terms of political confidence building. Item 2, which states that the two Koreas agreed to work for their reunification based on a proposal for federation of lower stage advanced by the North and a proposal for confederation put forth by the South, meaning to maintain the established system, can be viewed as a significant stipulation for peaceful co-existence. In addition, both sides were known to agree to stop mutual slander along the DMZ and to avoid war in the near future.
- Suh , Dae-sook and Lee , Chae-jin , eds. 1998 . North Korea After Kim Il-Sung Colorado : Lynne Reinner Publishers, Inc. . eds., (
- Rodong Sinmun, August 22, 1998.
- Rodong Sinmun, September 17, 1998.
- Rodong Sinmun, January 1, 2001. Related stories, Rodong Sinmun, January 9 and March 6, 2001.
- See Choo-suk Suh, “Bukhan eui cheje byeonhwa wa nambuk gwangye jeon-mang” [North Korean Regime Changes and Prospects for Inter-Korean Relations] paper presented at the 5th ROK-China Defense Forum, September 3, 2001.
- April 27,1992, marked the largest number of general officer promotions ever on a single day, totaling 664; promotions included 16 generals, 28 colonel generals, 96 lieutenant generals and 524 major generals. A total of 1,164 have been promoted to date including 99 in July 1993, 14 in October 1995, 6 in February 1996, 123 in April 1997, 22 in April 1998, 79 in April 1999, 44 in April 2000 and 19 in April 2001.
- On September 5, 1998, when Kim Jong-il was reappointed, the position of chairman was designated “the highest position, which leads and controls all activities of the nation's politics, military and economy and organizes and guides all projects for the sake of national defense and wealth and prosperity”; however, this is understood as relating only to Kim Jong-il.
- “Naegakeui 2002 nyeon sa-eop jeonghyeong gwa 2001 nyeon gwa eop e dae-hayeo [Concerning 2002 Project Results and Tasks for 2001]” Korean Central News Agency, April 5, 2001.
- In this respect, increasing the political role of the North Korean Army and the “military-first” policy can be understood as basic operational mechanisms for a socialist state, although they differ by degree in each nation. See “Bukhan eui gunsa jeong chaek jaepyeongga” [Re-evaluation of Military Policy of North Korea], Choo-Suk Suh and Beomchul Shin (Seoul: KID A, December 2000).
- According to the former Korean Workers' Party Secretary Hwang Jang-yeop, he values a “blitzkrieg” strategy, which means “suicidal military strikes” as an extreme way to reverse and breakthrough a stalemated situation, rather than a military doctrine of envelopment and occupation like the doctrine of mobile warfare. See the “Hwang Jang-yeop Bimil File [Hwang Jang-Yeop Secret File]” Wolgan Chosun, April 1998.
- Cordesman , Anthony H. , ed. January 30 2002 . Proliferation in the “Axis of Evil”: North Korea, Iran, and Iraq January 30 , 1 – 9 . Washington, DC : CSIS . See (Daniel A. Pinkston, “The DPRK's Nuclear and Missile Programs and Northeast Asian Stability,” KNDU Review, Vol. 6, No. 1 (June 2001), pp. 87–110; Don Oberdorfer, The Two Koreas: A Contemporary History (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1997).
- Whereas North Korea has reported to the IAEA that it extracted 90g of Plutonium, US CIA estimated it extracted 10–12kg. Some estimates go as high as a maximum of 40–80kg.
- Currently, there is a stalemate concerning this issue with North Korea's demanding compensation for the loss caused by delay in light-water reactor construction and the US's demanding “improved implementation” such as resumption of general inspections and preparation for special inspections. In the midst of the delay, there is concern that the special inspection would be conducted too late or even that it might not even be conducted at all.
- See Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “DPRK Ballistic Missile Characteristics,” available at http://www.asia-research.com/missile.html.
- The General Staff issued a statement regarding the ROK-US Operation Plan 5027–98 saying, “We have our own operation plans. “surgical strike” and “preemptive strike” are by no means just US options and the type of strike is also by no means limited to the US.” This was followed immediately by a series of rallies supporting this position inside North Korea. See Korean Central News Agency, December 2, 1998 (internet).
- Although if economic wealth can be transferred to North Korea due to improvements in inter-Korean relations and relations with the US and Japan, it will improve the logistics sector, secure military POL (petroleum, oils and lubricants) reserves, reinforce military exercises and resume military activities. However, an increased North Korean threat toward South Korea is unlikely.
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis
Volume 14, 2002 - Issue 2