- H. Richard Yarger, “Toward A Theory of Strategy: Art Lykke and the Army War College Strategy Model,” War, National Security Policy & Strategy, Vol. II (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2004), pp. 65–66.
- James Kelly, “Ensuring a Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons,” Remarks to The Research Conference, Feb. 13, 2004, available at http://www.hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uscn/state/2004/021301.htm (accessed on Sept. 20, 2004).
- December 2004 . The Korean Conundrum—America's Troubled Relations with North and South Korea December , 49 – 50 . New York : Palgrave Macmillan . The United States was slow to implement its commitments under the Agreed Framework. The Clinton administration was so intimated by Congressional opposition to the Agreed Framework, the President never asked Congress for even a token U.S. financial contribution to the reactor project. Not until August 1997 were there firm plans for construction of the light-water reactors, and it was not until December 1999 that the final contract was signed by the Korea Energy Development Organization (KEDO). That meant that the firstreactor could not be completed until at least 2007—some four years behind schedule. These types of delays may have intensified North Korean suspicions about U.S. duplicity. Ted Galen Carpenter and Doug Bandow
- Joel S. Wit, “A Strategy for Defusing the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” ArmsControl Today, Vol. 33 (Jan-Feb 2003): p. 6, available at http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_01–02/wit_janfeb03.asp (accessed on Sept. 20, 2004).
- In his 2002 State of the Union address, President Bush explicitly condemned North Korea as part of an “Axis of Evil.” Moreover, Bush subsequently stated, “I loathe Kim Jong Il. I have a visceral reaction to this guy because he is starving his people.” Although he did not explicitly call for forcible regime change, Bush added that he did not understand how the world continued to “coddle” Kim's regime. Carpenter and Bandow, The Korean Conundrum, p. 73.
- Ibid.
- The current situation presents Pyongyang with a number of interesting opportunities. Not only can it explore the possibility of reaching a diplomatic solution or going nuclear and then returning to the negotiating table, Pyongyangcan also use the current tensions to drive a wedge between Washington and Seoul. Wit, “A Strategy for Defusing the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” p. 6.
- If North Korea possesses nuclear weapons it would justify South Korea's and Japan's development of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, it could stimulate Taiwan to develop nuclear weapon—the last thing in the world Beijing wants to occur.
- Xu Weidi, “Resolving the Korean Peninsula Nuclear Crisis and Moving the Korean Peninsula Out of the Cold War,” Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi, World Economy and Politics, Sept. 16, 2003, in FBIS-CHI.
- Andrew Scobell, “China and North Korea: from Comrades-in-Arms to Allies at Arm's Length,” March 2004, pp. 17–18, available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/ssi (accessed on Sept. 18, 2004).
- William E. Berry, Jr., North Korea's Nuclear Program: The Clinton Administration's Response, INSS Occasional Paper 3 (Colorado: U.S. Air Force Academy, March 1995), pp. 36–37.
- Feb. 1987–Feb. 1993 . Korea Backgrounder: How the South Views Its Brother from Another Planet Feb. 1987–Feb. , 1 Seoul/Brussels : ICG . Before President Kim's engagement policy, there had been some movement between South and North Korea to reduce tension between the two Koreas. When all of the world's communist countries besides Cuba refused to honor North Korea's call to boycott the Seoul Olympics in 1988, President Roh Taewoo (seized on the opening to pursue détente with the communist bloc. Roh launched a series of moves collectively known as “Nordpolitik.” By the end of his term, he had established diplomatic relations with both the Soviet Union and China, achieved joint admission for both Koreas into the United Nations, and signed the first-ever direct agreement between North and South Korea in 1992, although its terms have never been implemented. The cumulative effect was to make “peaceful coexistence” with the North politically acceptable within South Korea for the first time. International Crisis Group, (Dec. 14, 2004
- This is not a two-Korea policy. The engagement policy is a method to achieve a peaceful reunification of the Korean peninsula (one-Korea policy) in the long term. To accomplish a peaceful reunification, the two Koreas must first develop inter-Korean relations with peaceful coexistence and later achieve national unification.
- May 1 2004 . Peace, Prosperity and National Security May 1 , 23 Seoul : The Blue House . National Security Council of the Republic of Korea
- Manyin , Mark E. Nov. 26 2003 . Japan-North Korea Relations: Selected Issues Nov. 26 , 3 Washington DC : Congressional Research Service .
- Task Force on Foreign Relations for the Prime Minister, “Basic Strategies for Japan's Foreign Policy in the 21st Century: New Era, New Vision, New Diplomacy,” Nov. 28, 2002, available at http://www.kantei.go.jp/11/2002 (accessed on Sept. 20, 2004).
- During the August 2003 six-party talks in Beijing the Japanese delegation reportedly reiterated its position that significant aid would be forthcoming if North Korea abandoned its nuclear program and cooperated on the issue of Japanese citizens kidnapped by North Korean agents in the 1970s and 1980s. Manyin, Japan-North Korea Relations, p. 1.
- Ibid.
- Feb. 25 2003 . Japan's View of the Korea Crisis Feb. 25 , 1 Monterey, CA : Center for Nonproliferation Studies . Katsu Furukawa, (available at http://cns.miis.edu/research/korea/jpndprk.htm (accessed on Sept. 20, 2004.
- Clay Moltz, “Russian Policy on the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” April 2003, p. 1, available at http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/russia/ruspol.htm (accessed on Dec. 12, 2004).
- Ibid., p. 3.
- Aug. 1 2003 . North Korea: A Phased Negotiation Strategy Aug. 1 , 18 Washington DC/Brussels : ICG . International Crisis Group (ICG), (available at http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/multilateralTalks/negotiationStategy.html (accessed on Dec. 20, 2004.
- Daryl M. Plunk, “Time for a New North Korea Policy,” Backgrounder #1304, July 2, 1999, p. 2, available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/BG1304.cfm (accessed on December 20, 2004).
- Berry, Jr., North Korea's Nuclear Program, pp. 30–31.
- Daryl M. Plunk, “Time for a New North Korea Policy,” p. 6.
- Kelly , James A. July 15 2004 . Dealing with North Korea's Nuclear Programs July 15 , 4 Washington DC : U.S. Department of State . available at http://hongkong.usconsulate.gov/uscn/state/2004/071501.htm (accessed on Jan. 12, 2005.
- North Korea reacted to the U.S. proposal by characteristically demanding more energy assistance, more time for implementation, greater security assurances, and more incentives of other kinds. However, it expressed willingness to “compromise” and “show flexibility” on the U.S. proposal if the Bush administration increases the incentives and specifically gives energy aid of its own. Donald G. Gross, “U.S.-Korea Relations: Strains in the Alliance, and the U.S. Offers a Nuclear Deal,” Selected Reading, International Fellows Field Study (Carlisle Barracks: U.S. Army War College, 2004), p. 298.
- Carpenter and Bandow, The Korean Conundrum, p. 72.
- Andrew Scobell, “China and North Korea,” p. 25.
- Kelly, “Ensuring a Korean Peninsula Free of Nuclear Weapons.”
- 2003 . Crisis on the Korean Peninsula: How to Deal with a Nuclear North Korea 16 Washington DC : The Brookings Institution . Michael O'Hanlon and Mike Mochizuki
- Li Gun, Deputy Director-General of the North Korean Ministry for Foreign Affairs, “Requisites for Resolving the Nuclear Issue,” Dec. 16, 2003, available at http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/multilateralTalks/Li-Gun-NukeIssue.pdf (accessed on Oct. 28, 2004).
- In the mid-1990s, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan transferred about 8,000 former Soviet nuclear warheads deployed in their territories to Russia. In return, the three countries received security assurances from Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Duk-ho Moon, “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program: Verification Priorities and New Challenges,” Cooperative Monitoring Center Occasional Paper, No. 32 (December 2003), pp. 20–21.
- Ibid., p. 22.
- Ibid., pp. 25–26.
- KAERI, estimates that completing three stages of one reactor would require more than US$100 million. Moreover, because North Korea has no facilities, a third country should be involved in disposition program of radioactive wastes.
- Moon, “North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program,” p. 26.
- At the end of the Korean War the Korea Military Armistice Agreement (KMAA) was signed on July 27, 1953 by General Mark W. Clark, Commander in Chief of the United Nations Command, and military representatives from North Korea and China. The KMAA is still effective today.
- Robert E. Bedeski, “Challenges to Peace on the Korean Peninsula,” July 18, 1997, available at http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/7a-Bedeski.html (accessed on Oct. 28, 2004).
- Ibid., p. 11.
- June 2003 . Conventional Arms Control on the Korean Peninsula June , 11 New York : The Carnegie Corporation of New York . The Carnegie Corporation of New York
- Bermudez , Joseph S. Jr. 2001 . The Armed Forces of North Korea 1 London & New York : I.B. Tauris Publishers . p.
- The Carnegie Corporation, Conventional Arms Control, p. 21.
- Ibid., p. 31.
- O'Hanlon and Mochizuki, Crisis on the Korean Peninsula, p. 110.
- On June 22, 1965, Japan and South Korea signed a Treaty of Basic Relations, normalizing relations between the two countries for the first time since Japan annexed the Korean peninsula in 1910. As part of the final settlement, Japan agreed to provide South Korea with a total sum of US$800 million, which consisted of: (a) an outright grant of US$300 million, to be distributed over a 10-year period: (b) a US$200 million loan to be distributed over a 10-year period and repaid over 29 years at 3.5% interest; and (c) US$300 million in private credits over 10 years from Japanese banks and financial institutions. Manyin, Japan-North Korea Relations, p. 16.
- The Republic of Korea's economy grew rapidly under President Park. President Park launched four five-year economic development plans: the First Five-Year Economic Development Plan (1962–66), the Second (1967–71), Third (1972–76), and Fourth (1977–81).
- ICG, North Korea, p. 4.
- Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The End Game,” Wall Street Journal, Dec. 23, 2003, sec. A.
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis
Volume 17, 2005 - Issue 2