- Since 1990, North Korea's economy has continued to shrink with increasingly more frequent reports of severe food and energy supply shortages. While reports vary on the level of food shortages currently confronting North Korea, there is a consensus in the international community based on in-country reports and data assessment by such bodies as the World Health Organization (WHO), the International Red Cross, and the World Food Program (WPG) as well as other international organizations that North Korea currently suffers from a grain shortage of about 1.5 to 2 million tons. The situation worsened in 1996 owing to massive floods in the fall of 1995. For additional details, see the Asian Wall Street Journal, December 12, 1995, the Washington Post, December 13, 1995, (and also May 15, 1996). For statistical background and information, refer to “The Recent Food Shortage Situation in North Korea,” Korea Overseas Information Service, No. 1.39, January 29, 1996, pp. 1–5.
- On April 5, 6, 7 and again on May 18 several hundred North Korean soldiers entered the Joint Security Area of the DMZ with recoilless anti-tank guns, machine guns and individual firearms in direct violation of the armistice agreement. This was not the first time North Korea entered into the JSA incidents in recent times as evidenced by the fact that JSA intrusions also occurred in February 1995. The April incident was followed by five North Korean naval vessels that crossed into South Korean territorial waters on May 23. On that same date, a North Korean MiG-19 pilot defected to the South—the first time since 1983. For additional details, see the New York Times, May 24, 1996, and the Hankook Ilbo, May 24, 1996.
- The possibility cannot be excluded whereby North Korea launches a comprehensive “electronic and digital sabotage” against major governmental, military, and industrial centers. With South Korea's increasing reliance on electronic and digital communication systems and information storing and processing systems, North Korean special forces could exploit key vulnerabilities without too much difficulty. Although North Korean terrorist attacks reached their peak in the late 1960s and early 1970s (although it also planned and executed the Rangoon bombing in September 1983 as well as the downing of a Korean Air jetliner in December 1987), South Korean vulnerabilities have increased with greater industrialization and reliance on a range of computer-generated and driven information systems.
- Builder , Carl H. and Karasik , Theodore W. 1995 . Organizing, Training, and Equipping for Crises and Lesser Conflicts Santa Monica, CA : RAND, MR-626-AF) . (p. 4. The authors also note five major CALC operational categories, (1) humanitarian aid, (2) peace operations, (3) crisis response, (4) enforcing sanctions, and (5) military intervention.
- With the increasing number of North Korean defectors to the South—over 110 defections since 1990 directly or through third countries compared to only 49 defections in the period 1980–1989—Seoul has taken several steps to prepare for a massive refugee problem. An inter-ministerial committee has been set up to deal with the refugee problem including allocating budgets for resettlement programs and emergency accommodations. Shim Jae Hoon, “The Image Cracks,” Far Eastern Economic Review, February 29, 1996, p. 15.
- ROK air defense radars first picked up the incoming MiG-19 at 10:40 a.m. and the Ministry of Home Affairs (in charge of civil defense and coordination of civil defense drills and evacuations with cities and local governments) notified the Seoul Metropolitan Government's Civil Air Defense Transmission Center at 10:50 for “Real Standby” followed immediately by an order to sound the alarm. Neither the CADTC's director nor his staff responded to the order, and hence no alarms were sounded in Seoul for the duration of the crisis. Hankook Ilbo, May 24, 1996 and Joong-ang Ilbo, May 24–26, 1996.
- For instance, the Combined Government Office Building situated in the heart of Seoul and home to various ministries (including the Prime Minister's Office) and the Second Combined Government Office Building housed in the outskirts of Seoul only have rudimentary (and ineffective) terrorism countermeasures. In an acute crisis involving widespread terrorist or sabotage operations, communication systems, protection of high-ranking (e.g., members of the cabinet) officials, key traffic arteries and hubs, as well as major industrial and energy-supply (such as oil refineries and nuclear power plants) centers would be highly vulnerable to combined special forces' attacks. In the aftermath of the MiG-19 defection, President Kim Young Sam issued a directive that calls upon the prime minister thoroughly to review existing civil and air defense mechanisms and to implement rapidly any necessary modification.
- February 1995 . 1995-1996 February , Seoul : Ministry of National Defense . See Defense White Paper, (especially Chapter Four “Military Exchange and Cooperation with Foreign Countries,” pp. 121–26 and Chapter Five “Arms Control Policy,” pp. 133–51.
- ROK Army Chief of Staff Yoon Yong Nam stated on May 19, 1996 that “we will take firm action if the enemy takes even one step over the demilitarized zone.” Quoted in Chicago Tribune, May 19, 1996.
- According to retired Lt. Gen. Moon B. H., former Commander of Special Operations and Commandant of the Korean Military Academy, the ROK 7th Division launched a heavy artillery attack on a North Korean brigade when it crossed into the DMZ on April 12, 1967—the first time that the ROK had actually retaliated with heavy artillery since the end of the Korean War. On March 7, 1973, North Korean forces shot two ROK soldiers who were on a routine inspection tour inside the South Korean side of the DMZ. The commander of the ROK 3rd Division ordered his troops to direct artillery fire against a North Korean Guard Post resulting in the explosion of North Korean mines. For additional details, see Moon B. H., “Dobalhan Inmingun-eul Hon naejun Tongkwehan Eeyagi,” (The Climactic Story of Countering the People's Army's Confrontation) Wolgan Chosun (The Chosun Monthly), No. 5 (March 1996), pp. 112–21.
- Private discussions with a number of ROK officials from various ministries and agencies reveal a widely shared consensus that while no one can be certain of the possible chain of events in North Korea under Kim Jong-il, contingency plans are being made and updated in the event of a political and or economic collapse in the North.
- When South Korean Foreign Minister Gong Ro Myung visited Moscow in mid-May to garner support for the four-party peace proposal (announced by President Kim Young Sam and President Bill Clinton on April 16 at Cheju island), Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeny Primakov indicated that Moscow could not support the proposal since it was not a direct party. In an interview published on May 30, Russian Ambassador to South Korea Georgi Kunadze stated that “[I]n case Russia's national interest cannot be guaranteed if it does not participate in the conference, it is inevitable that its national interest can be guaranteed by other means.” He further noted that “[I]f the need arises to take independent action, the [South Korean government] could be informed of such a policy based on [Russia's] friendly relations with [South] Korea.” Sisa Journal, No. 344, May 30, 1996, pp. 4647 (emphasis added).
- The forward-looking security agreement signed by the United States and Japan on April 17, 1996, calls on Japan to assume a more active defense role including “provisions for Japanese and American troops to supply one another with spare parts and fuel (though not ammunition) during military exercises, UN peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions abroad. Anything more than that, the treaty's [US-Japan Security Treaty] critics claim, is forbidden by Japan's constitution.” Quoted from “Japan edges forward,” The Economist, April 27, 1996, p. 35.
- Nigel Holoway and Sebestain Moffett, “Cracks in the Armor,” Far Eastern Economic Review, May 2, 1996, p. 15.
- Kristina Helmick, “Perry Puts Deterrence in Dustbin And Calls for Preventive Defense,” Christian Science Monitor, May 15, 1996.
- Address and Question and Answer Session by Secretary of State Warren Christopher on US National Interest in the Asia-Pacific Region, National Press Club (Washington, DC: US Department of State, Office of the Spokesman), July 28, 1995, p. 3.
- For an update on Washington-Pyongyang talks on the MIA issue, see Phillip Shenon, “U.S. and North Korea Agree On Joint Search for Missing,” New York Times, May 10, 1996.
- Quoted in Nicholas D. Kristoff, “U.N. Says North Korea Will Face Famine as Early as This Summer,” New York Times, May 14, 1996.
- Quoted in John J. Failka, “Administration to Set Accord Over Missiles,” Wall Street Journal, May 24, 1995, p. 12.
- Kristoff, p. 1.
- Kim Kyung Won, “No Way Out: North Korea's Impending Collapse,” Harvard International Review 7 (Spring 1996), p. 24.
- Ibid.
- Steven L. Solnick, “The Breakdown of Hierarchies in the Soviet Union and China,” World Politics 48 (January 1996). pp. 231–32.
- “Let Us Advance Vigorously in the New Year, Flying the Red Flag,” Rodong Shinmun, January 1, 1996, in FBIS-EAS-96-001, January 2, 1996, p. 33.
- If communist party candidate Gennadi A. Zyuganov had won the presidential election in June, Russian foreign policy towards the two Koreas could have changed. A dramatic 180-degree turn in Moscow-Pyongyang relations is unlikely given the burgeoning South Korean-Russian economic relationship. Moreover, Zyuganov's principle agenda would not have differed in substance from Yeltsin's such as revamping the declining Russian economy. Since Russia cannot deliver economic assistance to North Korea, not even sustained oil and food supplies, Russian support for North Korea will most likely be curtailed to the political and diplomatic arenas.
- The Ministry of Home Affairs recently reported that the number of radical student demonstrations increased to forty-eight by May 1996, up from an average of fourteen since 1992: The government estimates that a total of some 30,000 students, factory workers, and other anti-government groups are involved in demonstrations and other anti-government activities although the core group is said to hover around 3,000 to 4,000. See Hankook Ilbo, May 19, 1996.
- Headquarters, Department of the Army . September 30 1991 . FM 34–36 Special Operations Forces Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations September 30 , 1 – 5 . Washington, DC : Department of the Army . An intelligence source from one intelligence discipline is referred to as “single-source intelligence” and SOF-related examples of intelligence discipline includes HUMINT, SIGINT, COMINT, ELINT, FISINT, IMINT, and TECHINT. For additional details, see (pp., 1–6.
- Hoffman , Bruce and Morrison Taw , Jennifer . 1992 . A Strategic Framework for Countering Terrorism and insurgency 136 Santa Monica, CA : RAND, N-3506-DOS .
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis
Volume 8, 1996 - Issue 1