- Kim , Sung-Han . February 1995 . “Northeast Asia After the Geneva Agreement: A Korean Perspective,” . In IFANS Review Vol. 3 , February , Seoul : Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security . , No. 1,, p. 2.
- The first missile talks between the US and North Korea were held in April 1996. The meetings resumed on June 13, 1997, but no agreement was reached, thereby postponing another meeting until July or August.
- Clinton asked for $2.8 billion for all anti-missile programs, a figure the Republican-led Congress increased to $3.7 billion. Included within the umbrella is the development of a national defense that could be in place by 2003 to protect US territory from a limited number of attacking missiles. The administration requested $508 million in fiscal 1997 for this national defense system, but Congress increased the authorization to $858 million-a 69 percent boost that Republicans want to use to accelerate development and testing of system components before 2000, the year in which Clinton says he would assess the threat of missile attack and decide whether to deploy a defense system. Republicans are ready to commit now to putting such a system in place and have criticized the president for his reluctance to make the same pledge. Pat Towell, “Two Initiatives for Anti-Missile Defense,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, August 10, 1996, p. 2258.
- Kyung-Won Kim, “Korea and the US in the Post-Cold War World,” presented at the Korea-US Twenty-First Century Council, February 17–19, 1994, p. 8.
- The 1996 Republican platform argues: “We support the aspiration of the Chinese people for both economic and political liberty, which includes respect for the human rights of the people of the Tibet. Our relationship with the Chinese government will be based on vigilance with regard to its military potential, proliferation activities, and its attitude toward human rights, especially in Hong Kong…. We reaffirm our commitment to Taiwan's security and will regard any threat to alter its status by force as a threat to our own security interests. We will make available to Taiwan the material it needs for self-defense, particularly theater missile defense and coastal patrol submarines….” See “The Republican Platform: Prosperity, Self-Government and Moral Clarity,” Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, August 17, 1996, p. 2334.
- 1996 . Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China New York : Council on Foreign Relations Press . Concerning the three types of US policy to China, see, James Shinn, (
- Kyung-Won Kim, “No Way Out: North Korea's Impending Collapse,” Harvard International Review, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, Spring 1996, p. 24.
- “A Coming Crisis on the Korean Peninsula?: The Food Crisis, Economic Decline, and Political Considerations,” United States Institute of Peace Special Report (Washington, DC: 1996), p. 7.
- James Laney, former US ambassador to Korea, emphasized that engagement is the “incentive to cooperation,” while deterrence is the “disincentive to confrontation.” This implies that criticizing the US government for its oscillation between engagement and deterrence in its North Korea policy is misguided. See James Laney, “Washington and Seoul: An Alliance That Works,” Speech at the US National Press Club, October 31, 1996.
- US Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (February, 1995).
- Three days of talks on Pyongyang's missile program between the US and North Korean officials, June 13–15, 1997, ended without any agreement. The missile talks were a follow-up to a first session in Berlin in April 1996 at which US officials asked North Korea to stop producing, testing, and selling missiles, notably to Syria and Iran.
- The Basic Agreement between the two Koreas signed in December 1991, with its subsidiary protocols, is an ambitious document committing South and North Korea to build Confidence and improve relations in political, security, trade and other areas. In particular the agreement, as a road map towards peaceful coexistence, contains specific measures of confidence and security building and arms control with the goal of ending the costly arms race and confrontation between the two parts of Korea. Sung-Han Kim, “Toward the Elaboration of Confidence-Building Measures in Northeast Asia: A Korean Perspective,” Presented at the Third Kanazawa Symposium, June 3–5, 1997, Kanazawa, Japan, pp. 13–14.
- South Korea's “domestic” approach in dealing with the inter-Korean relations has resulted in policy inconsistencies, growing cleavages with its allies, particularly with the US, and polarized domestic security norms. This seems to be an enduring security dilemma of South Korea, which hampers it in fully achieving diplomatic goals. Although South Korea has achieved democratization and a remarkable economic growth, South Korea's security dilemma continues, and it must be overcome on a gradual basis. Concerning this dilemma, see In-Taek Hyun, “Janus-Faced Post-Cold War and South Korea's Enduring Security Dilemma,” Paper Presented at the ISA-JAIR Joint Convention, September 20–22, 1996, Japan.
- 1997 . Crisis Management on the Korean Peninsula: Korea-US Responses Seoul : Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security . Concerning US and South Korean management of possible crises on the peninsula, see (This is a proceedings issue of the annual conference between IFANS and the Brookings Institution, held November 19–20, 1996.
- Even before Korean reunification, the first issue North Korea may come up with, if and after its relations with Washington are normalized, will regard the existing ROK-US alliance. North Korea's demand has long been that the United States must remove its troops from Korea. Its current heightened voice calling for replacement of the armistice agreement with a bilateral peace pact between North Korea and the United States has been aimed at realizing its longstanding demand for the withdrawal of US forces from the South. The possibility for Washington to accept Pyongyang's demand can be ruled out for the time being, but once the two enter into full diplomatic relations, it will be inevitable for both Washington and Seoul to redefine the characteristics and role of US troops in Korea, at least in formality. Korea needs to work out appropriate measures to cope with all the possible changes in relations between Washington and North Korea. Sung-Han Kim, “Prospects for Changes in Korea-US Alliance and the Question of Korea's Security,” East Asian Review, Vol. VII, No. 4, Winter 1995, p. 18.
- 1996 . Redressing the Balance: American Engagement with Asia 8 New York : Council on Foreign Relations . The future of Northeast Asia, particularly the Korean peninsula, hinges on the US-China relationship. China's rise to great-power status is the most important challenge facing the United States in Asia. A cooperative China would reinforce stability in the region and the foundations of Asian economic growth; an aggressive China would polarize the region. US policy should aim at working with other nations to bring China into the regional and global community on terms that conform with international standards on economic practices, human rights, and nonproliferation. To upgrade the policy of engagement, the US president should seek a full-scale summit meeting at least once a year with the Chinese leader regardless of the state of political relations. Regular cabinet-level meetings and exchanges between US and Chinese legislators should also be sought. See W. Michael Blumenthal et al., (p.
- US Department of Defense, United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region (February 1995), pp. 26–29.
- Pollack , J. Cha , Y. K. 1995 . A New Alliance for the Next Century Santa Monica, CA : RAND . (
- 1995 . Asia Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures 1 – 18 . Washington, DC : CSIS . Concerning security-building measures in the Asia-Pacific, see Ralph A. Cossa, “Asia-Pacific Confidence and Security Building Measures,” Ralph A. Cossa, ed., (pp.
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis
Volume 9, 1997 - Issue 1