- 1984 . “ Predrag Cvitanovic, a particle physicist and editor of ” . In Universality in Chaos Bristol : Adam Hilger . (quoted in Paul Davies, The Cosmic Blueprint: Order and Complexity at the Edge of Chaos (London: Penguin, 1995), p. 23.
- 1970 . The Structure of Scientific Revolutions Chicago : Chicago University Press . For the notion of paradigm shift, see Thomas S. Khun, (Second Edition, Enlarged).
- The term used to describe unpredictable and apparently random behavior in dynamical systems.
- 1995 . Frontiers of Complexity: The Search for Order in a Chaotic World London : Faber and Faber . In a qualitative sense, non-linear behavior means “getting more than you bargained for” unlike linear systems, which produce no surprises. Peter Coveney and Roger Highfield, (p. 430.
- 1995 . The Quark and the Jaguar: Adventures in the Simple and Complex London : Abacus . For an introduction to complexity by a leader in the field, Nobel laureate Murray Gell-Mann, see (see also Frontiers of Complexity; John Brockman, The Third Culture: Beyond the Scientific Revolution (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994); and The Cosmic Blueprint. Gell-Mann uses the term “plectics,” arguing that the term “complexity” distorted the nature of what was involved because the simplicity of the underlying rules was a critical feature. See Murray Gell-Mann, “Plectics” in The Third Culture, p. 317.
- Walker , Martin . 1996 . Clinton: The President They Deserve Sydney : Allen & Unwin . See (
- For example, Christopher Layne, “The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Rise,” International Security, No. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), footnote p. 9.
- “Foreign Media Analyze US. Election Results,” The Washington File/East Asia-Pacific Edition, United States Information Agency, Canberra, November 20, 1996, quoting a commentary by NHK-TV's commentator Hori. Hashimoto in Vision of Japan: A Realistic Direction for the 21 st Century (Tokyo: KK Bestsellers, 1994) wrote that the America-Japan relationship “is extremely important” but not “something that we have to protect to the point of throwing away our national sovereignty” (p. 77). And he says that while he did not regard the Mahathir Plan for an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) highly, he would emphasize Japan's position in East Asia (with EAEC) if America were to strengthen its posture towards “forming a protectionist bloc by extending NAFTA and closing off South and North America” (p. 71).
- “Remarks by Anthony Lake Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs to the Japan-America Society,” The Washington File/East Asia-Pacific Edition, United States Information Agency, Canberra, Thursday, October 24, 1996.
- A bipartisan report by some fifty American foreign policy experts, including former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brezezinski, former President Cater, Senator Richard Lugar, and Congressman Lee Hamilton, under the auspices of the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Washington, acknowledged the need to shape a global framework of cooperation “in an age in which global politics is now the emerging central reality.” The Washington File/East Asia-Pacific Edition, United States Information Agency, Canberra, Friday, October 4, 1996. A conference on “Complexity, Global Politics, and National Security,” sponsored by the National Defense University and the Rand Corporation, was held in Washington, DC on November 13, 1996.
- Negroponte , Nicholas . 1996 . Being Digital 11 – 20 . Sydney : Hodder & Staughton . (A parallel with the “bit” (binary digit) of computer technology is the chemical form of information technology in which the genetic material in a single human cell contains enough information-storing capacity to hold the complete Encyclopedia Britannica three or four times over by using only four different nucleotides arranged in differing sequences on long strands of DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid). Frontiers of Complexity, p. 195.
- 1986 . Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age 241 Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . Quoted in Edward Mead Earle, “Adam Smith, Alexander Hamilton, Friedrich List: The Economic Foundations of Military Power,” in Peter Paret (ed.), (p. In a letter to the French economist and free trader Jean Baptiste Say, Jefferson was explaining why America had “become manufacturers to a degree incredible to those who do not see it” (i.e. preservation as the state's first interest).
- 1996 . The Future of Capitalism: How Today's Economic Forces Will Shape Tomorrow's World Sydney : Allen & Unwin . For example, Lester Thurow, (for the thinking of the University of California at Berkely economist Paul Romer, see “Romer's radical approach to economics,” Forbes (reprinted in Business Review Weekly, Melbourne, July 3, 1995, pp. 70–73; and Jim Rowher, Asia Rising (London: Nicholas Brealey, 1996), pp. 73–76; and Robert Reich, The Work of Nations: Preparing Ourselves for 21st Century Capitalism (New York: Alfred Knopf, 1991).
- 1994 . Diplomacy 23 New York : Simon & Schuster . For example, as asserted by Henry Kissinger, (p.
- 1996 . The Death of Competition: Leadership and Strategy in the Age of Business Ecosystems New York : Harper Business . See, for example, James F. Moore, (Jordan D. Lewis, The Connected Corporation: How Leading Companies Win through Custom Supplier Alliances (New York: Free Press, 1996); Neal Templin, “Falling into the Arms of the Competition,” Asian Wall Street Journal, November 2, 1995, p. 1.
- “Plectics,” in The Third Culture, pp. 317–32.
- J. Doyne Farmer, “The Second Law of Organization,” in The Third Culture, p. 369.
- For one of the more forthright assertions of these concerns, see Samuel P. Huntington, “America's Changing Strategic Interests,” Survival, 33, 1 (January/February) 1991.
- 1990 . Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power 236 – 31 . New York : Basic Books . For a brief comments on these “visions,” see Joseph S. Nye, (pp.; for economically-oriented “blocs,” Thurow, Head to Head and for the “poly-archic” vision, Seyom Brown, New Forces, Old Forces, and the Future of World Politics (Glencoe, Ill.: Scott Foreman, 1988).
- 1944 . The Great Transformation 259 – 62 . New York : Rinehart & Co. . For a comment on “balance of power” as “policy, historical law, principle, and system,” see Karl Polanyi, (pp.
- 1981 . Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War 1941–1945 Cambridge, MA : Harvard, University Press . For example, the writings of Akira Iriye, including (China and Japan in the Global Setting (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1994); and “The United States and Japan in Asia: A Historical Perspective,” in Gerald L. Curtis, (ed.), The United States, Japan, and Asia: Challenges for US. Policy (New York: W. W. Norton, 1994); see also Immanuel Wallerstein, Geopolitics and Geoculture (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
- 1992 . Natural Selection: Domains, Levels, and Challenges New York : Oxford University Press . For the importance of the distinction between the medium and the message for clarity of thought about evolution, see George C. Williams, “A Package of Information,” in The Third Culture, pp. 39–47, and (for comment on the “DNA of information,” see Being Digital, pp. 13–20; The Quark and the Jaguar, pp. 292–94.
- Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man (New York The Free Press, 1992).
- Francis Fukuyama, “The End of History?” National Interest, Summer 1990, p. 21.
- 1992 . Transition to Modernity: Essays on Power Wealth and Belief 4 Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . An image used by Ernest Gellner to dramatize the cognitive divide between pre-modem and modern societies. John A. Hall and I. C. Jarvie (eds.), (p.
- 1994 . Conditions of Liberty: Civic Society and Its Rivals London : Hamish Hamilton . See, for example, Ernest Gellner, (esp. pp. 197–200; even Fukuyama appeared to have retreated somewhat from the thrust of The End of History in a sequel, Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity (London: Hamish Hamilton, 1995) in which he acknowledges the great variety of broadly similar economic systems and warns against the possible economic costs of tendencies towards individualism in some democracies.
- 1990 . Rethinking the Pacific London : Oxford University Press . For example, Gerald Segal, (
- Frontiers of Complexity, pp. 222–26, 228–32, 337–38. The modelling uses a branch of mathematics now called “game theory.” It seeks to determine the strategies that individuals and organizations should adopt in their search for the best possible outcome for themselves when the outcome is uncertain and depends crucially on what strategies others adopt. The field of study has its roots in the work of one of the architects of the mathematical, logical, and physical foundations of the electronic digital computer, John von Neumann and the mathematical economist Oskar Morgenstern, who jointly published Theory of Games and Economic Behavior in 1944. Fifty years later, the Nobel Prize for economics was awarded to John Harsanyi, John Nash, and Reinhard Selten, who played a central role in establishing game theory as a powerful tool with applications ranging from the economics of industrial organization, through international trade to the theory of monetary policy. Robert Axelrod has played a leading role in applying game theory to political studies, for example, The Evolution of Co-operation (London: Penguin, 1990). Kenneth A. Oye (ed.); Cooperation Under Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1986) provide analyses applying insights from game theory to both security and economic affairs.
- Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, 72, 3, Summer 1993, pp. 22–47; and “If Not Civilizations, What?” Foreign Affairs, 72, 5, November/December 1993, pp. 186–94.
- “If Not Civilizations, What?” pp. 190–91.
- 1993 . The Collision of Two Civilizations: The British Expedition to China 1792–4 London : Harvill . For a masterly analysis of this encounter using Chinese archival sources, see Alain Peyrefitte, (
- For example, see Charles William Maynes, “The New Pessimism,” Foreign Policy, 100, Fall 1995, referring to the writings of Robert Kaplan, “The Coming Anarchy,” Matthew Connelly and Paul Kennedy, “Must It Be the Rest Against the West,” and John Mearsheimer, “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” published in the Atlantic, and Huntington's “The Clash of Civilizations?”
- 1993 . Asia Pacific: A View of Its Role in the New World Order Hong Kong : Longman Asia . For one of the few exceptions to this general observation, see M. S. Dobbs-Higginson, (
- A point made forcefully by a Japanese advisory panel in its report entitled “The Modality of the Security and Defense Capability of Japan: The Outlook for the 21st Century,” August 12, 1994, p. 6. The report provided the basis for rewriting Japan's 1976 National Defence Program Outline (NDPO).
- See Robert O'Neill, “Concluding Remarks,” in East Asia, the West and International Security: Prospects for Peace, Adelphi Papers 218, Pt.III, IISS, London, Spring 1987, pp. 69–70, summarizing the deliberations of the 28th IISS Annual Conference held in Kyoto, Japan, from 8–11 September 1986.
- Kennedy , Paul . 1991 . Grand Strategies in War and Peace 1 – 7 . New Haven : Yale University Press .
- Nisbet , Robert . 1980 . History of the Idea of Progress 323 New York : Basic Books .
- President Nixon spoke of a future in which “we have a strong, healthy United States, Europe, Soviet Union, China and Japan, each balancing the other, not playing one against the other, an even balance.” Time, January 3, 1972. Clearly his “vision” caused some discomfort in Japan. See, for example, Kiichi Saeki, “Japan's Security in a Multipolar World,” East Asia and the World System Part II: The Regional Powers, Adelphi Papers 92, IISS, London, November 1972.
- Howard , Michael . 1983 . The Causes of War Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press . (pp. 235–36.
- Two Germans who championed the “benefits” of war were the philosopher Friedrich Hegel and historian Heinrich von Treitschke. Hegel corrupted the Western idea of progress as individual freedom by promoting the idea of progress (and freedom) in the absolute power of the unified, organic, collective state. For Hegel, war preserved the “ethical health of a nation” and protected the people from “the corruption which everlasting peace would bring upon it.” For Treitschke, “the concept of the State implies the concept of war, for the essence of the State is Power.” History of the idea of Progress, p. 283.
- For an analysis of state behavior of the times, see Stephan Van Evera, “Why Cooperation Failed in 1914,” in Cooperation Under Anarchy, pp. 80–117.
- The Great Transformation provides an insightful analysis from this perspective.
- Carr , E. H. 1944 . Conditions of Peace London : Macmillan . (and History of the Idea of Progress, esp. pp. 237–96 and 317–51
- Power and Culture: The Japanese-American War 1941–1945.
- G. John Ikenberry, “The Myth of Post-Cold War Chaos,” Foreign Affairs, 75, 3, May/June 1996, pp. 79–91, for whom the 1940s world order remains with us, and for the most part stronger than ever.
- Paul Krugman, “The Myth of Asia's Miracle,” Foreign Affairs, 73, 6, November/December 1994.
- Richard Halloran, “The Rising East,” Foreign Policy, 102, Spring 1996, pp. 3–21; and Asia Rising.
- Naisbitt , John . 1995 . Megatrends Asia London : Nicholas Brealey . (
- For example, “The Rupture between Japan and the United States-Exploring the Communication Gap between a Disoriented People and an Idealistic Empire,” Japan's Post Gulf International Initiatives (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan, 1991).
- For example, Yukio Satoh, “Regional security trends in the Asia Pacific,” Pacific Review, 8, 2, 1995, esp. pp. 276–78.
- “Foreign Media Analyze US Election Results,” The Washington File/East Asia-Pacific Edition, USIS, Canberra, November 20, 1996.
- For a discussion of Japan's options, see Takashi Inoguchi, “Trade, Technology and Security: Implications for East Asia and the West: Part II, in East Asia, the West and International Security: Prospects for Peace, Adelphi Papers 218 Part III, IISS, London, Spring 1987, pp. 39–55.
Korean Journal of Defense Analysis
Volume 9, 1997 - Issue 1