Rational deterrence by proxy: designing cooperative security agreements

References

• Adler, Emanuel. 2010. “Damned If You Do, Damned If You Don’t: Performative Power and the Strategy of Conventional and Nuclear Defusing.” Security Studies 19: 199–229.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Arce, D., and T. Sandler. 2005. “Counterterrorism: A Game Theoretic Analysis.” The Journal of Conflict Resolution 49 (2): 183–200.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Atzili, Boaz, and Wendy Pearlman. 2012. “Triadic Deterrence: Coercing Strength, Beaten by Weakness.” Security Studies 21: 301–335.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Azam, J.-P., and A. Delacroix. 2006. “Aid and the Delegated Fight Against Terrorism.” Review of Development Economics 10 (2): 330–344.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Azam, J.-P., and V. Thelen. 2008. “The Role of Foreign Aid and Education in the War on Terror.” Public Choice 135: 375–397.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bandyopadhyay, S., and T. Sandler. 2011. “The Interplay between Preemptive and Defensive Counterterrorism Measures: A Two Stage Game.” Economica 78 (311): 546–564.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bandyopadhyay, S., T. Sandler, and J. Younas. 2011. “Foreign Aid as Counterterrorism Policy.” Oxford Economic Papers 63: 423–447.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bapat, Navin A. 2011. “Transnational Terrorism, US Military Aid, and the Incentive to Misrepresent.” Journal of Peace Research 43 (3): 303–318.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bednar, Jenna. 2006. “Is Full Compliance Possible? Conditions for Shirking with Imperfect Monitoring and Continuous Action Spaces.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 55 (4): 701–799.
   Google Scholar
• Bier, V. M., S. Oliveros, and L. Samuelson. 2007. “Choosing What to Protect.” Journal of Public Economic Theory 9 (4): 563–587.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Boutton, A. 2012. US Foreign Aid, Interstate Rivalry and Implications for Counterterrorism Cooperation. Manuscript, Department of Political Science, Pennsylvania State University.
   Google Scholar
• Bueno de Mesquita, E. 2005. “Conciliation, Counterterrorism and Patterns of Terrorist Violence.” International Organization 59 (1): 145–176.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Caulkins, J. D., Grass G. Feichtinger, and G. Tragler. 2008. “Optimizing Counterterror Operations: Should One Fight Fire with ‘Fire’ or ‘Water’?” Computers and Operations Research 35: 1878–1885.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Crenshaw, Martha. 2012. "Will Nuclear Threats Deter Terrorism?". In Deterring Terrorism: Theory and Practice, Stanford: Stanford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Doraszelski, U., and J. F. Escobar. 2010. “A Theory of Regular Markov Perfect Equilibria in Dynamic Stochastic Games: Genericity, Stability, and Purification.” Theoretical Economics 5: 369–402.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fudenberg, D., and J. Tirole. 1991. Game Theory. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Fuller, Graham. 2013. “Has Obama (Inadvertently) Broken the Mold in US Foreign Policy?” WorldPost 10/03. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/graham-e-fuller/obamaforeign-policy_b_4036512.html.
   Google Scholar
• Green, Edward J., and Robert H. Porter. 1984. “Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information.” Econometrica 52 (1): 87–100.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Katz, Marc. 2015. “Pakistan and the ‘War on Terror’: War on Terror in Perspective”. Middle East policy Council. http://www.mepc.org/articles-commentary/commentary/pakistan-and-war-terror?print
   Google Scholar
• Knoff, Jeffrey. 2009. “Three Items in One: Deterrence as Concept, Research Program and Political Issue”. In Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, edited by T. V. Paul, Patrick Morgan, and James Wirtz, 31–57. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
   Google Scholar
• Koremenos, Barbara. 2005. “Contracting Around International Uncertainty.” American Political Science Review 99 (4): 549–565.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Koremenos, Barbara, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal. 2001. “The Rational Design of International Institutions.” International Organization 55 (4): 701–799.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Langlois, C., and J. P. Langlois. 2001. “Engineering Cooperation: A Game Theoretic Analysis of Phased International Agreements.” American Journal of Political Science 45 (3): 599–619.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Langlois, C., and J. P. Langlois. 2004. “Provisions for Non Compliance and Treaty Value: A Game Theoretic Analysis.” International Studies Quarterly 48 (2): 383–408.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lupovici, Amir. 2010. “The Emerging Fourth Wave of Deterrence Theory-Towards a New Research Agenda.” International Studies Quarterly 54: 705–732.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mantell, E. 2007. “On the Political Economy of Binational Counterterrorism.” American Economist 21 (2): 89–100.
   Google Scholar
• Maskin, E., and J. Tirole. 1994. “Markov Perfect Equilibrium”. Discussion Paper No. 23. Harvard Institute for Economic Research.
   Google Scholar
• Morgan, Patrick. 1983. Deterrence, A Conceptual Analysis. Beverly Hills: Sage.
   Google Scholar
• Nelson, Dean. 2009. “India: Pakistan ‘sending Taliban to fight in Kashmir’.” The Telegraph, October 7.
   Google Scholar
• Paul, T. V. 2009. “Complex Deterrence, An Introduction.” In Complex Deterrence: Strategy in the Global Age, edited by T. V. Paul, Patrick Morgan, and James Wirtz, 1–27. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
   Google Scholar
• Powell, R.. 2007. "Defending Against Terrorist Attacks with Limited Resources." American Political Science Review101 :527–541.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Press, William H., and Freeman J. Dyson. 2012. “Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma Contain Strategies that Dominate Any Evolutionary Opponent.” Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences 109: 10409–10413.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rosendorff, B. Peter, and Helen Milner. 2001. “The Optimal Design of International Trade Institutions: Uncertainty and Escape.” International Organization 55 (4): 829–857.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sandler, T., and K. Siquiera. 2006. “Global Terrorism: Deterrence Versus Preemption.” Canadian Journal of Economics BOl. 39: 1370–1387.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sandler, T., and K. Siqueira. 2009. “Game and Terrorism: Recent Developments.” Simulation and Gaming 40: 164–192.
   Google Scholar
• Shankar, T. 2013. “Aid to Pakistan to Resume as Tension With U.S. Eases.” New York Times, October 19.
   Google Scholar
• Siquiera, K., and T. Sandler. 2008. “Defensive Counterterrorism and Domestic Politics.” Defense and Peace Economics 19: 405–413.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wilner, A. l. e. x.. 2010. "Targetted Killings in Afghanistan: Measuring Coercion and Deterrence in Counterterrorism and Counterinsurgency." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism33 :307–329.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wilner, A. l. e. x.. 2013. "Fencing in Warfare: Threats, Punishments and Intra-war Deterrence in Counterterrorism." Security Studies22 :740–772.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zagare, Frank, and Marc Kilgour. 2006. “The Deterrence-Versus-Restraint Dilemma in Extended Deterrence: Explaining British Policy in 1914.” International Studies Quarterly 8 (4): 623–641.
   Google Scholar
• Zhuang, J., and V. M. Bier. 2007. “Balancing Terrorism and Natural Disasters-Defensive Strategy with Endogenous Attacker Effort.” Operations Research 55 (5): 976–991.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar