References
- Barzel, Y. 1968. “Optimal Timing of Innovation.” Review of Economics and Statistics 50: 348–355. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/1937928
- Burke, P. F., and M. Reitzig. 2007. “Measuring Patent Assessment Quality – Analyzing the Degree and Kind of (In)Consistency in Patent Offices’ Decision Making.” Research Policy 36 (9): 1404–1430. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2007.06.003
- Claessens, S., and L. Laeven. 2003. “Financial Development, Property Rights, and Growth.” Journal of Finance 58 (6): 2401–2436. doi: https://doi.org/10.1046/j.1540-6261.2003.00610.x
- Cockburn, I. M., S. Kortum, and S. Stern. 2002. Are All Patent Examiners Equal? The Impact of Examiner Characteristics. NBER Working Paper Series, w8980
- Cotropia, C. A., M. A. Lemley, and B. Sampat. 2013. “Do Applicant Patent Citations Matter?” Research Policy 42 (4): 844–854. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2013.01.003
- de Rassenfosse, G., A. B. Jaffe, and E. Webster. 2016. Low-quality Patents in the eye of the Beholder: Evidence From Multiple Examiners (No. w22244). Boston, USA: National Bureau of Economic Research.
- de Rassenfosse, P. H., D. Jensen, A. Julius, E. Palangkaraya, and E. Webster. 2018. “Getting International Patents: Does the Quality of the Patent Attorney Matter?” Working Paper in Progress. www.semanticsholar.org
- de Rassenfosse G., P. Jensen, A. Palangkaraya, and E. Webster, 2017. Overcoming Xenophobic Outcomes in Foreign Patent Offices (Suggested Title Only). Working Paper in Progress, 23 p.
- de Rassenfosse, G., and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie. 2013. “The Role of Fees in Patent Systems: Theory and Evidence.” Journal of Economics Surveys 27 (4): 696–716. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-6419.2011.00712.x
- de Saint-Georges, M., and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie. 2013. “A Quality Index for Patent Systems.” Research Policy 42 (3): 704–719. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2012.09.003
- Frakes, M., and M. F. Wasserman. 2015. “Does the U.S. Patent & Trademark Office Grant Too Many Bad Patents?: Evidence From a Quasi-Experiment.” Stanford University Law Review 67): 14–36.
- Friebel, G., A. Koch, D. Prady, and P. Seabright. 2006. Objectives and Incentives at the European Patent Office. Toulouse, France: Centre IDEI – Institut d’Economie Industrielle, Université de Toulouse.
- Gallini, N. 1992. “Patent Policy and Costly Imitation.” The RAND Journal of Economics 23 (1): 52–63. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2555432
- Gallini, N. 2002. “The Economics of Patents: Lessons From Recent U.S. Patent Reform.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 (2): 131–154. doi: https://doi.org/10.1257/0895330027292
- Gilbert, R., and C. Shapiro. 1990. “Optimal Patent Length and Breadth.” The RAND Journal of Economics 21 (1): 106–112. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2555497
- Ginarte, J., and W. Park. 1997. “Determinants of Patent Rights: A Cross-National Study.” Research Policy 26 (3): 283–301. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/S0048-7333(97)00022-X
- Grossman, G., and E. Lai. 2004. “International Protection of Intellectual Property.” American Economic Review 94 (5): 1635–1653. doi: https://doi.org/10.1257/0002828043052312
- Harhoff, D., F. Narin, and F. M. Scherer. 1999. “Citation Frequency and the Value of Patented Inventions.” Review of Economics and Statistics 81 (3): 511–515. doi: https://doi.org/10.1162/003465399558265
- Kim, Y. K., and J. B. Oh. 2017. “Examination Workloads, Grant Decision Bias and Examination Quality of Patent Office.” Research Policy 46: 1005–1019. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2017.03.007
- Klemperer, P. 1990. “How Broad Should the Scope of Patent Protection be?” The RAND Journal of Economics 29 (1): 113–130. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2555498
- Kuhn, J. M. and N. Thompson 2017. The ways weve been measuring patent scope are wrong: How to measure and draw causal inferences with patent scope. Unpublished working paper, UNC Chapel Hill Kenan-Flagler Business School and MIT Sloan School of Management
- Langinier, C., and P. Marcoul. 2009. Monetary and Implicit Incentives of Patent Examiners, May, Working Paper. Alberta, Canada: University of Alberta.
- Lazaridis, G., and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie. 2007. “The Rigour of EPO’s Patentability Criteria: An Insight Into the “Induced Withdrawals”.” World Patent Information 29 (4): 317–326. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wpi.2007.05.001
- Lemley, M. 2001. “Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office.” Northwestern University Law Review 95 (4): 1495–1528.
- Lemley, M., and B. Sampat. 2012. "Examiner Characteristics and the Patent Office Outcomes." Review of Economics and Statistics: 817-827
- Lerner. 2002. “150 Years of Patent Protection, published in proceedings, pp. 221-225.” One Hundred Fourteenth Annual Meeting of the American Economic Association. https://www.jstor.org/stable/3083406.
- Lu, Q., Myers, A. F., & Beliveau, S. (2017). USPTO Patent Prosecution Research Data: Unlocking Office Action Traits. USPTO Economic Working Paper, No. 10
- Marco, A. C., J. D. Sarnoff, and C. DeGrazia. 2016. Patent Claims and Patent Scope. Hoover IP2 Working Paper Series N° 16001
- Nordhaus, W. 1969. Invention, Growth and Welfare: A Theoretical Treatment of Technological Change. M.I.T. Monographs in Economics, 10, 168 pp. Cambridge, MA: M.I.T. Press.
- O’Donoghue, T. 1998. “A Patentability Requirement for Sequential Innovation.” Rand Journal of Economics 29 (4): 654–679. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/2556088
- Park, W. 2008. “International Patent Protection: 1960–2005.” Research Policy 37: 761–766. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2008.01.006
- Picard, P., and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie. 2013. “Patent Office Governance and Patent Examination Quality.” Journal of Public Economics 104 (C): 14–25. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.04.009
- Scherer, F. M. 1972. “Nordhaus’ Theory of Optimal Patent Life: a Geometric Reinterpretation.” American Economic Review 62: 422–427.
- Scherer, F. M. 2002. “The Economics of the Human Gene Patents.” Academic Medicine 77/12 (part 2): 1348–1367. doi: https://doi.org/10.1097/00001888-200212001-00006
- Scotchmer, S. 1991. “Standing on the Shoulder of Giants: Cumulative Research and the Patent Law.” Journal of Economic Perspectives 5 (1): 29–41. doi: https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.5.1.29
- van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B. 2011. “The Quality Factor in Patent Systems.” Industrial and Corporate Change 20 (6): 1755–1793. doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/icc/dtr066
- van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie, B., and D. François. 2009. “The Cost Factor in Patent Systems.” Journal of Industry, Competition and Trade 9 (4): 329–355. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10842-008-0033-2
- van Zeebroeck, N., and B. van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie. 2011. “The Vulnerability of Patent Value Determinants.” Economics of Innovation and New Technologies 20 (3): 283–308. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/10438591003668638
- Wada, T. 2016. “Obstacles to Prior art Searching by the Trilateral Patent Offices: Empirical Evidence from International Search Reports.” Scientometrics 107: 701–722. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-016-1858-9
- Wada, T. 2018. “The Choice of Examiner Patent Citations for Refusals: Evidence from the Trilateral Offices.” Scientometrics 117: 825–843. doi: https://doi.org/10.1007/s11192-018-2885-5
- Webster, E., P. Jensen, and A. Palangkaraya. 2014. “Patent Examination Outcomes and the National Treatment Principle.” RAND Journal of Economics 45 (2): 449–469. doi: https://doi.org/10.1111/1756-2171.12053
- WIPO. 2018. WIPO circular on the characteristics of international search reports. Latest version at the time of submittal available at WIPO website: https://www.wipo.int/pct/en/circulars/2018/index.html
- Yamauchi, I., and S. Nagaoka. 2015. “Does the Outsourcing of Prior art Search Increase the Efficiency of Patent Examination? Evidence from Japan.” Research Policy 44: 1601–1614. doi: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.respol.2015.05.003