References
- The members were located around the world: 30,000 in Russia, 10,000 in Japan, and the remainder in the United States, Germany, and elsewhere. David A. Kaplan, "Aum Shinrikyo," in Jonathan B. Tucker, ed., Toxic Terror (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2000), pp. 207-226.
- David E. Kaplan and Andrew Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World: The Incredible Story of Aum (London: Hutchinson Press, 1996).
- "The humiliations resulting from this public rejection intensified Aum's own gradual estrangement from the world: one is tempted to speculate that this rejection, when in Aum's eyes Japanese society spurned the chance to be saved . . . might well have pushed Aum's leadership into feeling that society was damned and should be abandoned. It also meant, once its hopes of influencing society through legal, democratic means such as political campaigns were wrecked, that if "Sahara's contention that spiritual action was no longer enough to fulfil its mission were correct, it had to look elsewhere for the means by which to influence or control Japanese society." Ian Reader, Poisonous Cocktail (Denmark: Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Special Report, 1996), p. 45.
- D. W. Brackett, Holy Terror: Armageddon in Tokyo (New York: Weatherhill, Inc., 1996), p. 13. 13 "Aum seemed to enjoy a curious immunity from public complaints. The police investigated each charge made against the sect promptly, yet it never went any farther and there were never any arrests." Brackett, Holy Terror, p. 49.
- "[A] contributing factor to Aum's behavior was the degree of impunity that the cult enjoyed. Despite an extraordinary six-year crime spree, the sect met with surprisingly little resistance from Japanese officials, who were hampered by jurisdictional problems, a reluctance to probe religious organizations, and a lack of investigative initiative. Only after the Tokyo subway attack did authorities move quickly against the cult." Ian Reader, Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan: The Case of Aum Shinrikyo (Great Britain: Curzon Press, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies Monograph Series No. 82, 2000), p. 223.
- Japan is widely considered to be a safe society. Anthony Head explores this perception and concludes that although Japan is safer than the United States, it is not the nonviolent Utopia people often describe. For example, Japan is not "gun-free"; there are many illegal handguns, and Japan has more handgun deaths each year than Great Britain. Moreover, there is significant under-reporting of crime in Japan, especially of rape and domestic violence, much of which results from the stigma of being a victim of crimes. Anthony Head, "Japan and the Safe Society," Japan Quarterly (April-June 1995).
- Naofumi Miyasaka, 'Terrorism and Antiterrorism in Japan: Aum Shinrikyo and After," prepared for the Japan Society Roundtable on Terrorism: Prevention and Preparedness, October 2000, p. 3, on file with the author.
- Shun'ichi Furukawa, "An Institutional Framework for Japanese Crisis Management," Journal of Contingencies and Crisis Management 8(1) (March 2000), pp. 3-15 at p. 4.
- Miyasaka, "Terrorism and Antiterrorism in Japan," p. 4.
- Ibid., p. 5.
- The Matsumoto attack may have been a trial run for the subway attack. A secondary effect was "to punish the judges and citizens of Matsumoto for having opposed Aum." Reader, Religious Violence in Contemporary Japan, p. 209.
- KyIe Olson, "Aum Shinrikyo: Once and Future Threat?' Emerging Infectious Diseases 5(4) (July-August 1999), available at (http://www.cdc.gov/ncidod/EID/vol5no4/olson.htm).
- Reader, Religious Violence, 2000, p. 221. Kono remained a suspect until Aum members confessed to the crime in the summer of 1995.
- Ibid., p. 211.
- Reader, Religious Violence, p. 23.
- Okumura et al., "The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack," p. 626.
- Ohbu et al., "Sarin Poisoning on Tokyo Subway."
- Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, p. 255.
- Tetsushi Kajimoto, "Aum Three Years Later: Victims Struggle for Redress," Japan Times March 18, 1998.
- Mullins, "The Political and Legal Response."
- Kajimoto, "Aum Three Years Later."
- Miyasaka, "Terrorism and Antiterrorism in Japan," p. 2.
- Ibid.
- Brackett, Holy Terror, p. 181.
- Asukai, "Health Effects Following the Sarin Attack," p. 5.
- "Sarin Victims Say More Must be Done," Asahi Shimbun, 20 March 2000
- Furukawa, "An Institutional Framework," p. 3. Over 6,000 people lost their lives in the Hanshin Kobe earthquake.
- For more on the lack of surge capacity and the consequences for the United States, see Joe Barbera, Anthony G. Macintyre, and Craig A. DeAtley, "Ambulances to Nowhere: America's Critical Shortfall in Medical Preparedness for Catastrophic Terrorism." BCSIA Discussion Paper 2001-15, ESDP Discussion paper ESDP-2001-07, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, October 2001.
- For more information on the status of the law and recommendations for legal preparedness, see Juliette Kayyem, "U.S. Preparations for Biological Terrorism: Legal Limitations and the Need for Planning." BCSIA Discussion Paper 2001-4, ESDP Discussion Paper ESDP-2001-02, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, March 2001.
- Early calls to emergency assistance switchboards complained of "strange smells" and "powerful odors" in the subway system. Brackett, Holy Terror, p. 1.
- Tetsu Okumura, Kouichiro Suzuki, Atsuhiro Fukuda, Akitsugu Kohama, Nobukatsu Takasu, Shinichi Ishimatsu, and Shigeaki Hinohara, "The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack: Disaster Management, Part 1: National and International Response," Academic Emergency Medicine 5(6) (1998), pp. 613-617, at p. 625.
- Ibid., p. 614.
- Furukawa, "An Institutional Framework," p. 4.
- Okumura et al, "The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack," p. 614.
- Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, pp. 248-249.
- Physicians at St. Luke's Hospital asserted that, "The police did not inform us directly." According to several reports, a physician who treated victims of the Matsumoto attack contacted St. Luke's hospital after seeing news coverage of the subway situation and suggested the possibility that the causative agent was sarin. The physician, from Shinshu University Medical Department, personally phoned all Tokyo regional hospitals and faxed them information on sarin. See Okumura, et al., "The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack," p. 621. See also Haruki Murakami, Underground (New York: Vintage Books, 2000), pp. 217-219.
- See also Furukawa, "An Institutional Framework."
- Okumura et al. "The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack," p. 626.
- Hank Christen, Paul Maniscalco, Alan Vickery, and Frances Winslow, "An Overview of Incident Management Systems," Perspectives on Preparedness, No. 4, Executive Session on Domestic Preparedness, John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University (September 2001), available at (http://www.esdp.org.).
- Okumura et al, "The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack," p. 615.
- Okumura et al., "The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack," p. 616.
- The Hygienic Department of the Tokyo metropolitan government is directly responsible for metropolitan disaster planning. See Okumura, et al., "The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack," p. 626.
- Mike Green, Conference Report, "New Approaches to U.S.-Japan Security Cooperation," proceedings from Japan Society Conference, 30-31 October 2000, p. 11, on file with the author.
- Okumura et al., "The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack," p. 626.
- Furukawa, "An Institutional Framework," p. 6.
- Furukawa, "An Institutional Framework," p. 5.
- Okumura et al., "The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack," p. 614.
- It was not until three hours after the incident that the Tokyo Metropolitan Police communicated the positive identification of sarin to the public at a press conference. Once the medical staff receiving patients were convinced sarin was involved, they were able to tailor patient treatment accordingly. Nozomu Asukai, MD, PhD, "Health Effects Following the Sarin Attack in the Tokyo Subway System," unpublished manuscript on file with the author. See also Okumura et al., p. 615; Amy Smithson and Leslie-Anne Levy, "Ataxia: The Chemical and Biological Terrorism Threat and U.S. Response," Stimson Center Report No. 35 (October 2000), p. 97.
- Kaplan and Marshall, The Cult at the End of the World, p. 265.
- Ibid., p. 259.
- Reader, Poisonous Cocktail, p. 108.
- Furukawa, "An Institutional Framework," p. 6.
- Okumura et al., "The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack," p. 617.
- See Asukai, "Health Effects Following the Sarin Attack," p. 3.
- Okumura et al., "The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack," p. 615.
- Smithson, Ataxia, p. 93.
- None were seriously affected. See Sadayoshi Ohbu, MD, Akira Yamashina, MD, Nobukatsu Takasu, MD, Tatsuo Yamaguchi, MD, Tetsuo Murai, MD, Kanzoh Nakano, MD, Yukio Matsui, MD, Ryuzo Mikami, MD, Kenji Sakurai, MD, and Shigeaki Hinohara, MD, "Sarin Poisoning on Tokyo Subway" (Tokyo, Japan), available at (http://www.sma.org/smj/97june3.htm).
- Okumura et al., "The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack," p. 620.
- Smithson, Ataxia p. 94.
- Okumura et al., "The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack," p. 615.
- Smithson, Ataxia, p. 95.
- Asukai, "Health Effects Following the Sarin Attack," p. 2.
- Okumura et al., "The Tokyo Subway Sarin Attack," p. 619.
- Ibid., p. 621.
- Smithson, Ataxia, p. 96.
- Asukai, "Health Effects Following the Sarin Attack," p. 3.
- Mark Mullins, "The Political and Legal Response to Aum-related Violence in Japan: A Review Article," The Japan Christian Review (Tokyo) 63 (1997).
- Ibid.
- Abigail Haaworth, "The Naked City," Tokyo Journal, July 1995, pp. 32-37, p. 37.
- Brackett, Holy Terror, p. 155.
- Mullins, "The Political and Legal Response," p. 63.
- Available at (http://www.npa.go.jp/keibi2/it8.htm).
- Mullins, "The Political and Legal Response."
- Miyasaka, "Terrorism and Antiterrorism in Japan," p. 7.
- These figures are in 1998 dollars. Mari Yamaguchi, "For Victims of the Subway Nerve Gas Attack, the Nightmare Goes On," Associated Press, 18 March 1998.
- The government estimates that these claims will total over Y3 million. "Victims of Sarin Incident on Tokyo's Subway System Recognized as Eligible for Workmen's Compensation," Public Policy 34(12) (December 1995).
- Yamaguchi, "The Nightmare Goes On."
- Ibid.