Polarization and the Top-Two Primary: Moderating Candidate Rhetoric in One-Party Contests

References

• Acree, B., Justin, G. A., Sim, B. Y., & Smith, N. A. (2018). Etch-a-sketching: Evaluating the post-primary rhetorical moderation hypothesis. American Politics Research. doi:10.1177/1532673X18800017
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Adams, J., Engstrom, E., Joesten, D., Rogowski, J., Shor, B., & Stone, W. (2017). No evidence that moderate voters weigh candidates’ ideologies: Voters’ decision rules in the 2010 congressional elections. Political Behavior, 39, 205–227. doi:10.1007/s11109-016-9355-7
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ahler, D., Citrin, J., & Lenz, G. (2016). Do open primaries improve representation? An experimental test of California's 2012 top-two primary. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 41, 237–268. doi:10.1111/lsq.12113
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Aldrich, J., & Coleman Battista, J. S. (2002). Conditional party government in the states. American Journal of Political Science, 46, 164–172. doi:10.2307/3088420
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ansolabehere, S., Snyder, J., & Stewart, C. (2001). Candidate positioning in U.S. House elections. American Journal of Political Science, 45, 136–159. doi:10.2307/2669364
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Banda, K. (2013). The dynamics of campaign issue agendas. State Politics & Policy Quarterly, 13, 446–470. doi:10.1177/1532440013498879
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Banda, K. (2016). Issue ownership, issue positions, and candidate assessment. Political Communication, 34, 651–666. doi:10.1080/10584609.2016.1192569
   Google Scholar
• Banda, K., & Carsey, T. (2015). Two stage elections, strategic candidates, and agenda convergence. Electoral Studies, 40, 221–230. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2015.09.008
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brady, D., Han, H., & Pope, J. (2007). Primary elections and candidate ideology: Out of step with the primary electorate? Legislative Studies Quarterly, 32, 79–105. doi:10.3162/036298007X201994
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Burden, B. (2004). Candidate positioning in US congressional elections. British Journal of Political Science, 34, 211–227. doi:10.1017/S000712340400002X
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Caen, C. (2015, December 29). The Consequences of California’s Top-Two Primary. The Atlantic. Retrieved from https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2015/12/california-top-two-open-primary/421557
   Google Scholar
• Canes-Wrone, B., Brady, D., & Cogan, J. (2002). Out of step, out of office: Electoral accountability and house members’ voting. American Political Science Review, 96, 127–140. doi:10.1017/S0003055402004276
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Carsey, T. (2000). Campaign dynamics: The race for governor. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.
   Google Scholar
• Carsey, T., Jackson, R., Stewart, M., & Nelson, J. (2011). Strategic candidates, campaign dynamics, and campaign advertising in gubernatorial races. State Politics and Policy Quarterly, 11, 269–298. doi:10.1177/1532440011413085
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Carsey, T., Niemi, R., Berry, W., Powell, L., & Snyder, J. (2008). State legislative elections, 1967-2003: Announcing the completion of a cleaned and updated dataset. State Politics and Policy Quarterly, 8, 430–443. doi:10.1177/153244000800800405
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Downs, A. (1957). An economic theory of democracy. New York, NY: Harper.
   Google Scholar
• Druckman, J., Hennessy, C. L., Kifer, M., & Parkin, M. (2009). Issue engagement on congressional candidate web sites, 2002-2006. Social Science Computer Review, 28, 3–23. doi:10.1177/0894439309335485
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Feinstein, M. (2016, November 8). What isn’t on California’s ballot today: Real choice. The Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com/opinion/opinion-la/la-ol-top-two-voting-blowback-20161108-story.html
   Google Scholar
• Fenno, R. (1978). Home style. Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
   Google Scholar
• Fiorina, M. (1974). Representatives, roll calls, and constituencies. Lexington, MA: D.C. Heath.
   Google Scholar
• Fisk, C. (2017). No republican, no vote: Undervoting and consequences of the top-two primary system. Prepared for the 2017 American Political Science Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco.
   Google Scholar
• Fowler, J. (2005). Dynamic responsiveness in the U.S. senate. American Journal of Political Science, 49, 299312. doi:10.1111/ajps.2005.49.issue-2
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Frendreis, J., Gitelson, A. R., Jenkins, S., & Roscoe, D. (2003). Testing spatial models of elections: The influence of voters and elites on candidate issue positions. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 28, 77–101. doi:10.3162/036298003X200818
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gierzynski, A., & Breaux, D. (1991). Money and votes in state legislative elections. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 16, 203–217. doi:10.2307/439978
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Greenhut, S. (2016, May 31). Top-two primary limits voters’ choices. Hoover Institution. Retrieved from https://www.hoover.org/research/top-two-primary-limits-voters-choices
   Google Scholar
• Hall, R., & Wayman, F. (1990). Buying time: Moneyed interests and the mobilization of bias in congressional committees. American Political Science Review, 84, 797–820. doi:10.2307/1962767
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hayes, M., Hibbing, M., & Sulkin, T. (2010). Redistricting, responsiveness, and issue attention. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 35, 91–115. doi:10.3162/036298010790821996
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Haynes, A., Flowers, J., & Gurian, P.-H. (2002). Getting the message out: candidate communication strategy during the invisible primary. Political Research Quarterly, 55, 633–652.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Highton, B., Huckfeldt, R., & Hale, I. (2016). Some general consequences of California’s top-two primary system. California Journal of Politics and Policy, 8, 1–12. doi:10.5070/P2CJPP8230564
   Google Scholar
• Holden, Z. (2016, March 9). 2013 and 2014: Monetary competitiveness in state legislative races. National Institute on Money in State Politics. Retrieved from http://www.followthemoney.org/research/institute- reports/2013-and-2014-monetary-competitiveness-in-state-legislative-races/
   Google Scholar
• Iyengar, S., & Westwood, S. (2015). Fear and loathing across party lines. American Journal of Poitical Science, 59, 690–707. doi:10.1111/ajps.12152
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kaplan, M., Goldstein, K., & Hale, M. (2003). Local TV news coverage of the 2002 general election. The Norman Lear Center. Los Angeles, CA: University of Southern California.
   Google Scholar
• King, A. (1997). Running scared: Why America’s politicians campaign too much and govern too little. New York, NY: Martin Kessler Books.
   Google Scholar
• Levendusky, M., Pope, J., & Jackman, S. (2008). Measuring district level preferences with implications for the analysis of U.S. elections. Journal of Politics, 70, 736–753. doi:10.1017/S0022381608080729
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mayhew, D. (1974). Congress: The electoral connection. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
   Google Scholar
• McDermott, M. (2006). Not for members only: Group endorsements as electoral information cues. Political Research Quarterly, 59, 249–257. doi:10.1177/106591290605900207
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Miller, P., & Conover, P. (2015). Red and blue states of mind: Partisan hostility and voting in the United States. Political Research Quarterly, 68, 225–239. doi:10.1177/1065912915577208
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nagler, J. (2015). Voter behavior in California’s top two primary. California Journal of Politics and Policy, 7, 1–14. doi:10.5070/P2CJPP7125524
   Google Scholar
• Nielson, L., & Visalvanich, N. (2016). Primaries and candidates: Examining the influence of primary electorates on candidate ideology. Political Science Research Methods, 4, 1–12.
   Google Scholar
• Olson, J., & Ali, O. 2015. The early successes of California’s top-two nonpartisan primary (Prepared for Open Primaries). New York, NY: Open Primaries.
   Google Scholar
• Overby, M., & Cosgrove, K. (1996). Unintended consequences? Racial redistricting and the representation of minority interests. The Journal of Politics, 58, 540–550. doi:10.2307/2960239
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Polsby, N. W. (1980). Consequences of party reform. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Rhodes, J. (2014). Party polarization and the ascendance of bipartisan posturing as a dominant strategy in presidential rhetoric. Presidential Studies Quarterly, 44, 120–142. doi:10.1111/psq.12090
   Google Scholar
• Rhodes, J., & Albert, Z. (2017). The transformation of partisan rhetoric in American presidential campaigns, 1952–2012. Party Politics, 23, 566–577. doi:10.1177/1354068815610968
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schaffner, B., & Streb, M. (2002). The partisan heuristic in low-information elections. Public Opinion Quarterly, 66, 559–581. doi:10.1086/343755
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shear, M. (2012, March 22). For Romney’s trusted adviser, Etch-A-Sketch comment is a rare misstep. The New York Times, pp. A18
   Google Scholar
• Shor, B., & McCarty, N. (2011). The ideological mapping of American legislatures. American Political Science Review, 105, 530–551. doi:10.1017/S0003055411000153
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sinclair, B., & Wray, M. (2015). Googling the top two: Information search in California’s top two primary. California Journal of Politics and Policy, 7, 1–12. doi:10.5070/P2CJPP7125443
   Google Scholar
• Smith, S. (2016). 5 facts about America’s political independents. Retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/07/05/5-facts-about-americas- political-independents/
   Google Scholar
• Sparks, S. (2018). Campaign spending and the top-two primary: How challengers earn more votes per dollar in one-party contests. Electoral Studies, 54, 56–65. doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2018.04.018
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Squire, P., & Moncrief, G. (2015). State legislatures today: Politics under the Domes. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.
   Google Scholar
• Sulkin, T. (2009). Campaign appeals and legislative action. Journal of Politics, 71, 1093–1108. doi:10.1017/S0022381609090902
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sulkin, T., & Swigger, N. (2008). Is there truth in advertising? Campaign ad images as signals about legislative behavior. Journal of Politics, 70, 232–244. doi:10.1017/S0022381607080164
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tausanovitch, C., & Warshaw, C. (2013). Measuring constituent policy preferences in Congress, state legislatures, and cities. The Journal of Politics, 75, 330–342. doi:10.1017/S0022381613000042
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Trubowitz, P., & Mellow, N. (2005). ‘Going bipartisan’: Politics by other means. Political Science Quarterly, 120, 433–453. doi:10.1002/j.1538-165X.2005.tb00553.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wright, G., & Berkman, M. (1986). Candidates and policy in United States senate elections. American Political Science Review, 80, 567–588. doi:10.2307/1958274
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar