- Robinson , Thomas W. 1994 . “ 'Chinese foreign policy from the 1940s to the 1990s' ” . In Chinese Foreign Policy: Theory and Practice , Edited by: Robinson , Thomas W. and Shambaugh , David . 556 Oxford : Clarendon Press .
- Tsou , Tang . 1963 . America's Failure in China 1941-1950 , Chicago : University of Chicago Press . See for example
- Jian , Chen . 1994 . China's Road to the Korean War: The Making of the Sino-American Confrontation , New York : Columbia University Press .
- Robinson . “ 'Chinese foreign policy from the 1940s to the 1990s' ” . 569
- Tucker , Nancy B. 1994 . Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992 , 213 New York : Twayne Publishers . Several instances illustrate the political embarrassment sustained by China by leaving Hong Kong in British hands. (1) India's march into the Portuguese colony of Goa in December 1961 prompted the Soviet press to condemn the ‘urinal of colonialism' along the China coast. (2) As Sino-Soviet relations deteriorated in the early 1960s, the Soviets constantly taunted China for failing to expel the British from Hong Kong. In September 1964, a meeting in Moscow of the World Youth Forum intentionally affronted the Chinese by including Hong Kong and Macao in a resolution on the elimination of colonies in Asia. (3) In early 1963, the Communist Party of the United States criticized the PRC for acquiescing to British imperialism. See, for example
- Lane , Kevin P. 1990 . Sovereignty and the Status Quo: The Historical Roots of China's Hong Kong Policy , 65 – 66 . Boulder : Westview Press .
- Yahuda , Michael . 1996 . Hong Kong: China's Challenge , 46 London : Routledge .
- Ibid., p. 45.
- Chan , Ming K. , ed. 1994 . “ 'World War to Cold War: Hong Kong's future and Anglo-Chinese interactions, 1941-55' ” . In Precarious Balance: Hong Kong Between China and Britain, 1842-1992 , 116 – 117 . Hong Kong : Hong Kong University Press . According to James T. H. Tang, as early as November 1948, the Chinese Communists had indicated to British authorities that they would not attack Hong Kong. The head of the New China News Agency, Qiao Mu, told the Reuter correspondent in Hong Kong that the Communists had no intention of changing the status quo of the colony. And, according to a former Xinhua News Agency employee in Hong Kong, a few days after 1 October 1949, Qiao Mu relayed the following message from Zhou to the agency's staff members in the colony: ‘We are not taking Hong Kong back, but it does not mean that we are abandoning or retreating from Hong Kong'. See his
- Shengwu , Yu and Shuyong , Liu , eds. 1995 . Ershi Shift de Xianggang (Hong Kong in the Twentieth Century) , 197 – 198 . Hong Kong : Qilin Shuye .
- Ibid., pp. 196-197.
- Hou , Li . 1997 . Huigui de Licheng (The Path of Hong Kong's Return) , 47 Hong Kong : Joint Publishing .
- Wilson , Dick . 1990 . Hong Kong! Hong Kong! , 65 London : Unwin Hyman .
- Kimball , Warren F. 1997 . Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second Worm War , 287 New York : William Morrow & Co., Inc. . 'The Soviet Union should have "effective rights at Port Arthur"', said Churchill. More important, ‘any claim by Russia for indemnity at the expense of China, would be favorable to our resolve about Hong Kong'. The Hong Kong issue led Churchill quickly to instruct that no agreements be reached with the United States to oppose a ‘restoration of Russia's position in the Far East'. See
- Ibid., p. 328.
- Tang . America's Failure in China 1941-1950 114
- Shengwu , Yu and Shuyong , Liu , eds. Ershi Shiji de Xianggang 175 – 180 .
- Kimball . Forged in War: Roosevelt, Churchill, and the Second Worm War 304 Roosevelt had no faith in the willingness of either Chiang Kai-shek or Mao Zedong playing a ‘responsible' role in world peace. He thought that ‘three generations of education and training was required before China could be a serious [political] factor'. With no American force in East or Southeast Asia, and with China needing ‘tutelage' before it could play the role of responsible policeman, Roosevelt's only option was to have the Europeans reclaim their empires. See
- Christensen , Thomas J. 1996 . Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 , 8 Princeton : Princeton University Press .
- McCullough , David . 1992 . Truman , 742 – 744 . New York : Touchstone .
- Powers , Richard G. 1995 . Not Without Honor: The History of American Anticommunism , 228 – 229 . New York : The Free Press .
- Tucker . Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the United States, 1945-1992 200 As London reinforced the garrison in Hong Kong, the US Army placed a liaison officer in British defense headquarters, the first such peacetime appointment by Britain. See
- See Ibid., pp. 200-209.
- Guowuyuan Gangaobangongshi Xianggangshehuiwenhuasi (Bureau of Hong Kong's Society and Culture, Hong Kong and Macao Affairs Office, State Council) . 1997 . Xianggang Wenti Duben (Reader on the Hong Kong Problem) , 24 Beijing : Zhongyang Dangxiao Chubanshe .
- Hou , Li . Huigui de Licheng 116 – 117 .
- Salisbury , Harrison E. 1992 . The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng , 14 – 15 . 84 – 85 . Boston : Little, Brown & Co. .
- Zubok , Vladislav and Pleshakov , Constantine . 1996 . Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev , 6 Cambridge, MA : Harvard University Press .
- Cohen , Warren I. 1990 . America's Response to China: A History of Sino-American Relations , 150 – 176 . New York : Columbia University Press .
- Zubok and Pleshakov . Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev 57
- Salisbury . The New Emperors: China in the Era of Mao and Deng 85 During WWII, Stalin was persistent in regaining the Russian sphere of influence in Xinjiang, Outer Mongolia, Manchuria, and Korea. He expected to ‘obtain' Manchuria by virtue of its liberation by the Red Army from the Japanese. In November 1944, the Soviets supported a separatist rebellion in Xinjiang and since that time have controlled the area. See Zubok and Pleshakov, Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev, pp. 33 and 56; and
- Li , Zhisui . 1994 . The Private Life of Chairman Mao: The Inside Story of the Man who Made Modern China , 124 514 566 London : Chatto & Windus . According to Mao's personal doctor, though Mao adopted the ‘lean to one side' approach to the Soviet Union, he still had an admiration for the technology, dynamism, and science of the US and the West. His propensity to ‘lean to one side' was always tempered by a recognition that the Soviet Union was not the only potential source of lessons in revitalization. Mao also reportedly said that the US and the Soviet Union were different in the sense that the US never occupied Chinese territory. Mao believed that America's intentions in China had always been relatively benign. While Great Britain, Japan and Russia had imperalistic designs and became deeply involved in China's internal affairs, the US had remained aloof. See
- Zubok and Pleshakov . Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev 142 – 143 . According to a report sent to Moscow by Petr P. Vlasov (Vladimirov) from his headquarters in Yenan, Mao in 1944 tried very hard to come to terms with America. Mao was even prepared to ‘soften' Marxism, and the works of the corresponding period reflected this. In fact, since 7 December, the Communists became extremely friendly toward the United States, not only on the surface, but even in their educational programs. In the quarrels between the United States and the Chinese government, the Communists persistently sided with the Americans. When the Japanese warned China of the dangers of the embrace of American imperialism, the Communists defended the United States against the charges. In 1944, the 4th July was celebrated in Yenan with tremendous enthusiasm and fulsome praise for Roosevelt, whose policies were lauded as expressions of the great tradition of freedom and democracy in the United States. See
- Ibid., p. 213.
- Volkogonov , Dmitri . 1991 . Stalin: Triumph and Tragedy , 538 – 541 . New York : Grove Weidenfeld . After the establishment of the PRC, the Soviet Union assumed that China was its ideological inferior and a junior partner in the international Communist Revolution. Stalin treated Mao arrogantly. See, for example
- Zubok and Pleshakov . Inside the Kremlin's Cold War: From Stalin to Khrushchev 61 The Soviet Union also made clear to China that it would retain its ‘interests' in China (a base in Port Arthur, railroad access to it, and exclusive rights in Manchuria and Xinjiang). In the Sino-Soviet Treaty of 1950, a supposedly equal treaty reluctantly signed by Stalin, several secret agreements were imposed on Mao which were extremely embarrassing to China. One agreement prohibited foreigners from living in Manchuria and Xinjiang and encouraged joint Sino-Soviet economic concessions; another agreement, with no expiration date, allowed Soviet troops to move to Port Arthur across Manchuria at any time, and without forewarning Chinese authorities. In an agreement on intelligence cooperation Stalin asked Mao to set up a joint global network of espionage among Chinese living abroad. See
- Ibid., p. 201.
- Renwick . Fighting with Allies: American and Britain in Peace and at War 149 157 235 237
- Christensen . Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958 135
- Benren , Sa and Xingming , Pan . 1996 . Ershi Shift de Zhongying Guanxi (Sino-British Relationship in the Twentieth-Century) , 340 – 341 . 354 Shanghai : Shanghai Renmin Chubanshe .
- Hongzhao , Huang . 1990 . Zhong Ying Guanxi Shi (The History of Sino-British Relationship) , 260 – 263 . Hong Kong : Kaiming Shudian .
- Yi , Huang . 1990 . Xianggang Wenti he Yiguo Liangzhi (The Hong Kong Problem and One Country Two Systems) , 15 Beijing : Dadi Chubanshe .
- Guowuyuan . Xianggang Wenti Duben 25
- Changgeng , Yu . 1996 . 'Zhou Enlai Yaokong "Fanying Kangbao" Neimu' (Inside stories of the remote control by Zhou Enlai of the ‘anti-British, resist suppression') . The Nineties , 316 May : 70 – 76 . 317 (June 1996), pp. 92-98
- 1963 . The People's Daily , 8 March See the editorial of
- Cottrell , Robert . 1993 . The End of Hong Kong: The Secret Diplomacy of Imperial Retreat , 27 London : John Murray .
- Wilson . Hong Kong! Hong Kong! 65 – 66 .
- Bin , Xu . 1996 . 97 Xianggang Huigui Fengyun (The Winds and Clouds of Hong Kong's Return in 1997) , 47 Changchun : Jilin Sheying Chubanshe . Some of these demands were given by Zhou Enlai to Sir Alexander Grantham, who paid a private visit to Beijing in October 1955 and met with Zhou ‘unofficially' for a 3-hour conversation
- Miners , Norman . 1995 . The Government and Politics of Hong Kong , 32 – 42 . Hong Kong : Oxford University Press . See, for example
- Guowuyuan . Xianggang Wenti Duben 52 – 57 .
- Lane . Sovereignty and the Status Quo: The Historical Roots of China's Hong Kong Policy 70 – 78 .
- Benren , Sa and Xingming , Pan . Ershi Shiji de Zhongying Guanxi 367 – 370 .
- Shangyuan , Liang . 1989 . Zhonggong zai Xianggang (The Chinese Communist Party in Hong Kong) , 131 – 134 . 167 – 168 . Hong Kong : Wide Angle Press . For example, China's request to station an official representative in Hong Kong was rejected by Britain, afraid of the co-existence of two power centers. The result was that a news agency--the Hong Kong Branch of the New China News Agency--became the de facto representative of China in the colony. Even so, Britain was willing to give it de facto recognition only in the late 1970s. See
- Pengfei , Qi . 1997 . Yichu Yiluo: Xianggang Wenti Yibaiwushiliu Nian (1841-1997) (Sunrise, Sunset: Hong Kong Problem for One Hundred and Fifty-Six Years [1841-1997]) , 309 – 349 . Beijing : Xinhua Chubanshe .
- Hou , Li . Huigui de Licheng 72 – 73 .
- Yi , Huang . Xianggang Wenti he Yiguo Liangzhi 13 – 14 . According to Huang Wen-fang, a retired senior official with the Hong Kong Branch of the New China News Agency--the de facto Chinese consulate in Hong Kong--China initially had reservations about recovering Hong Kong in 1997. If Britain was willing to officially recognize that Hong Kong was part of China and that China had sovereignty over the place, there might have been a possibility that Hong Kong would remain administered by Britain. There is no way to corroborate Huang's argument, but in any case Britain had not done anything along that line
- Huang's . 1997 . Zhongguo dui Xianggang Huifu Xingshi Zhuquan de Juece Licheng yu Zhixing (China's Renewed Exercise of Sovereignty over Hong Kong: The Process of Policy-making and Policy-implementation) , 8 – 9 . Hong Kong : Hong Kong Baptist University .
- Xiaoping , Deng . 1993 . Lun Xianggang Wenti (On the Hong Kong Problem) , 1 – 3 . 9 – 10 . Hong Kong : Joint Publishing . Deng Xiaoping had expressed his suspicions back in the early 1980s to Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and Foreign Secretary Geoffrey Howe. He was worried that Britain would instigate serious disorders in Hong Kong during the transition. He expressed his hope that the following would not happen: (1) the Hong Kong dollar becoming unstable; (2) the colonial government spending the revenue from land sales irresponsibly; (3) the colonial government creating fiscal burdens for the HKSAR government; (4) the colonial government grooming a separate political leadership and imposing it upon the HKSAR; and (5) British capital taking the lead in fleeing Hong Kong. See
- Siu-kai , Lau . 1997 . 'Decolonization a Hong Kong: Britain's search for governability and exit with glory in Hong Kong' . The Journal of Commonwealth & Comparative Politics , 34 (2) July : 28 – 54 .
- Xiaoping , Deng . Lun Xianggang Wenti 29 33
- Rui , Zhao and Mingyu , Zhang , eds. 1997 . Zhongguo Lingdaoren Tan Xianggang (Chinese Leaders talked about Hong Kong) , 16 29 – 31 . 34 36 64 185 – 186 . 188 196 Hong Kong : Ming Pao Press .
- Siu-kai , Lau . 1996 . 'Democratization and decline of trust in public institutions in Hong Kong' . Democratization , 3 (2) Summer : 158 – 180 .
- Jiatun , Xu . 1993 . Xu Jiatun Xianggang Huiyi Lu (Xu Jiatun's Recollections on Hong Kong) , 142 190 Taibei : Lianhe Bao . The equation of capitalism with bourgeois rule was typical of Marxian analysis. A former Director of the Hong Kong Branch of the New China News Agency, Xu Jiatun, had unmistakably pointed out that the ‘political regime of the future Special Administrative Region should be composed chiefly of the bourgeois class, but with the participation of the proletariat. While it should be a regime reflecting the unity of different social classes, it however is basically bourgeois in nature'. And, ‘the thinking of the [CPP] center is: (1) the bourgeoisie should have substantial influence on the regime of Hong Kong, (2) there should be political parties [to reflect the interests of] not merely the individual elements of the bourgeois class but the [politically] organized bourgeoisie'. See
- Siu-kai , Lau . 1997 . 'The fraying of the socioeconomic fabric of Hong Kong' . The Pacific Review , 10 (3) : 426 – 441 .
- Jiatun , Xu . Xu Jiatun Xianggang Huiyi Lu 132 – 133 .
Journal of Contemporary China
Volume 9, 2000 - Issue 23