- Hansard, House of Lords Parliamentary Debates (1998), cols 1968–1969.
- In explaining why the independence of architects when settling building disputes is no longer unquestioned, Lord Hoffmann stated, in Beaufort Developments (NI) Limited v Gilbert-Ash NI Limited [1998] 2 All ER 778 at 786, that “in the nineteenth century and the early part of this one… the notion of what amounted to a conflict of interest was not then as well understood as it is now”.
- [1980] 1 All ER 529 at 541; see also at p. 551, per Lord Scarman: “the constitution's separation of powers, or more accurately functions, must be observed if judicial independence is not to be put at risk”.
- “The Weakest and Least Dangerous Department of Government'' [1997] PL 84.
- Harris, O'Boyle and Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, p. 231, citing Ringeisen v Austria, A13 para. 95 (1971) and Crociani v Italy No. 8603/79, 22 DR 147 at 221 (1980).
- Campbell and Fell v UK, A80 para. 78 (1984).
- See Crociani v Italy (above) at p. 229, and Zand v Switzerland No. 7360/76, 15 DR 70 at 82 (1978).
- Application No. 28488/95. The Report was adopted by the Commission on 20 October 1998.
- For a discussion of the possible reasons for the lack of a statutorily imposed retirement age for the Lord Chancellor, see Daniel Lightman “Lord Chancellors can go on, and on, and…,” The Times, 3 October 1995.
- It was because he was a substantial shareholder in the defendant company that the House of Lords held in Dimes v Proprietors of Grand Junction Canal (1852) 3 HL Cas 759 that the then Lord Chancellor, Lord Cottenham, should not have heard the appeal.
- In his article “The Weakest and Least Dangerous Department of Government” [1997] PL 84.
- In the Joseph Jackson Memorial Lecture, delivered on 3 November 1993 and reprinted in New Law Journal, 12 November 1993.
- In The Search for Justice, (Sceptre, 1994) p. 12.
- Lord Irvine, in contrast, has assumed what he describes as “the pivotal role” in the implementation of the Government's constitutional reform programme, chairing the Cabinet Committee on constitutional reform and a number of important sub-committees: see Diana Woodhouse, “The Office of Lord Chancellor'' [1998] PL 617 at 618–619.
- In his article “The Office of Lord Chancellor and the Separation of Powers'' (1989) CJQ 308 at 312 and 317–318.
- “Judicial Review–the Tensions between the Executive and the Judiciary'' (1998) 114 LQR 579 at 582.
- See Wade and Bradley, Constitutional and Administrative Law, 11th ed (1993), p. 60; and Colin R Munro, Studies in Constitutional Law (1987), pp. 200–201.
- Hansard (1998), cols 1971–1972.
- Hansard (1998), cols 1984–1985.
Judicial Review
Volume 4, 1999 - Issue 1