7,243
Views
13
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Articles

Puzzled out? The unsurprising outcomes of the Greek bailout negotiations

ORCID Icon, ORCID Icon & ORCID Icon

References

  • Blanchard, O. (2015) ‘Greece: a credible deal will require difficult decisions by all sides’, IMF Blog, 14 June, available at https://blog-imfdirect.imf.org/2015/06/14/greece-a-credible-deal-will-require-difficult-decisions-by-all-sides/ (accessed 11 November 2016).
  • Cerny, P.G. (1995) ‘Globalization and the changing logic of collective action’, International Organization 49(4): 595–625. doi: 10.1017/S0020818300028459
  • Clark, W.R., Duchesne, E. and Meunier, S. (2000) ‘Domestic and international asymmetries in United States–European Union trade negotiations’, International Negotiation 5(1): 69–95.
  • Economides, N. and Smith, R. (2011) ‘How should a Greek debt restructuring be done and what are its consequences’, Kathimerini, 8 May, available at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/How_Should_a_Greek_Debt_Restructuring_Be_Done_and_What_Are_Its_Consequences_05082011.pdf (accessed 5 July 2016).
  • Erlanger, S. (2011) ‘Greek threat to quit euro is labeled a false report; Prime minister denies plans to restructure debt as crisis deepens’, International Herald Tribune, 9 May.
  • Evans, P.B., Jacobson, H.K. and Putnam, R.D. (eds) (1993) Double-edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics, Berkeley: University of California Press.
  • Fearon, J. (1998) ‘Bargaining, enforcement, and international cooperation’, International Organization 52(2): 269–305. doi: 10.1162/002081898753162820
  • George, A. and Bennett, A. (2005) Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
  • Hennessy, A. (2017) ‘Good samaritans vs. hardliners: the role of credible signalling in Greek bailout negotiations’, Journal of Common Market Studies 55(4): 744–61. doi: 10.1111/jcms.12523
  • Iida, K. (1993) ‘When and how do domestic constraints matter? Two-level games with uncertainty’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 37: 403–26. doi: 10.1177/0022002793037003001
  • Kathimerini, I. (2015) ‘Tsipras: Iparchi kindynos anatinaksis toy Kratoys’ (‘Tsipras: There is a danger that the state apparatus might explode’) 11 July, available at http://www.kathimerini.gr/823063/article/epikairothta/politikh/tsipras-yparxei-kindynos--anatina3hs-toy-kratoys (accessed 10 November 2016).
  • Keohane, R.O and Nye, J.K. (1977) Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition, Boston, MA: Little, Brown.
  • Kourtikakis, K. (2010) ‘Imitation and supranational politics: some lessons from the European Ombudsman and the European Court of Auditors’, European Political Science Review 2(1): 27–48. doi: 10.1017/S1755773909990270
  • Lehman, H. and McCoy, J. (1992) ‘The dynamics of the two-level bargaining game’, World Politics 44: 600–44. doi: 10.2307/2010489
  • Matthijs, M. (2016) ‘Powerful rules governing the Euro: the perverse logic of German ideas’, Journal of European Public Policy 23(3): 375–91. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2015.1115535
  • Milner H.V. and Rosendorff, B.P. (1997) ‘Democratic politics and international trade negotiations: elections and divided government as constraints on trade liberalization’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 41: 117–46. doi: 10.1177/0022002797041001006
  • Mo, J. (1994) ‘The logic of two-level games with endogenous domestic coalitions’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 38: 402–22. doi: 10.1177/0022002794038003003
  • Moravcsik, A. (2010) ‘Active citation: a precondition for replicable qualitative research’, PS: Political Science and Politics 43: 29–35
  • Moravcsik, A. (2014) ‘Transparency: the revolution in qualitative research’, PS: Political Science and Politics 47(1): 48–53.
  • Papaconstantinou, G. (2016) Game Over: The Inside Story of the Greek Crisis, Athens: CreateSpace Independent Publishing Platform.
  • Peel, Q., Hall, B. and Chaffin, J. (2010) ‘Germany sets conditions for Greece’, Financial Times, 23 March.
  • Pitsoulis, A. and Schwuchow, S.C. (2017) ‘Holding out for a better deal: brinkmanship in the Greek bailout negotiations’, European Journal of Political Economy 48: 40–53. doi: 10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2016.08.011
  • Porzecanski, A. (2005) ‘From rogue creditors to rogue debtors: implications of Argentina’s default’, Chicago Journal of International Law 6: 311–32.
  • Putnam, R.D. (1988) ‘Diplomacy and domestic politics: the logic of two-level games’, International Organization 42(3): 427–60. doi: 10.1017/S0020818300027697
  • Raiffa, H. (1982) The Art and Science of Negotiation, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • Schaeuble, Wolfgang. (2010) ‘Rede zum Währungsunion Finanzstabilitätsgesetz’ (‘Speech concerning law for currency union and financial stability’), available at http://www.bundesfinanzministerium.de/Content/DE/Reden/2010/2010-05-07-waehrungsunion-finanzstabilitaetsgesetz.html (accessed 25 May 2017).
  • Schelling, T.C. (1960) The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • Schimmelfenning, F. (2015) ‘Liberal intergovernmentalism and the euro area crisis’, Journal of European Public Policy 22(2): 177–95. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2014.994020
  • Schneider, C.J. and Slantchev, B.L. (2018) ‘The domestic politics of international cooperation: Germany and the European debt crisis’, International Organization 72(1): 1–31. doi: 10.1017/S0020818317000406
  • Schoppa L.J. (1993) ‘Two-level games and bargaining outcomes: why Gaiatsu succeeds in Japan in some cases but not others’, International Organization 47: 353–86. doi: 10.1017/S0020818300027995
  • Spiegel, P. and Donnan, S. (2015) ‘IMF criticises Greek bailout deal with EU’, Financial Times, 15 July.
  • Tagesschau. (2011) ‘Griechische Staatsschulden “außer Kontrolle”’ (‘Greek public debt “out of control”’), 1 September, available at http://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/griechenland1430.html (accessed 8 February 2017).
  • Tarar, A. (2001) ‘International bargaining with two-sided domestic constraints’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 45(3): 320–40. doi: 10.1177/0022002701045003004
  • Tarar, A. (2005) ‘Constituencies and preferences in international Bargaining’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 49(3): 383–407. doi: 10.1177/0022002705276567
  • To Vima. (2016) ‘Wikileaks reveals Thomsen-Velculescu talks on Greek review’, 2 April, available at http://www.tovima.gr/en/article/?aid=789620 (accessed 8 February 2017).
  • Tsebelis, G. (2016) ‘Lessons from the Greek crisis’, Journal of European Public Policy 23(1): 25–41. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2015.1087215
  • Venizelos, E. (2017) Mithoi kai Alithies gia to Dimosio Chreos 2012–2017. Myths and Truths Regarding the Public Debt. 2012–2017 Athens: Epikentro.
  • Wall Street Journal (2013) ‘IMF document excerpts: disagreements revealed’, Real Time Economics Blog, 13 October, available at http://blogs.wsj.com/economics/2013/10/07/imf-document-excerpts-disagreements-revealed/ (accessed 25 May 2017).
  • Wearden, G. (2010) ‘Europe’s financial crisis: as it happened’, The Guardian, 28 April.
  • Wearden, G. (2012) ‘Eurozone crisis live: deal reached on Greece after all-night talks’, The Guardian, 20 February.
  • Yue, V. (2010) ‘Sovereign default and debt renegotiation’, Journal of International Economics 80(2): 176–87. doi: 10.1016/j.jinteco.2009.11.004
  • Zahariadis, N. (2016a) ‘Bargaining power and negotiation strategy: examining the Greek bailouts, 2010–2015’, Journal of European Public Policy 24(5): 675–94. doi: 10.1080/13501763.2016.1154977
  • Zahariadis, N. (2016b) ‘Values as barriers to compromise? Ideology, transnational coalitions, and distributive bargaining in negotiations over the third Greek bailout’, International Negotiation 21: 473–94. doi: 10.1163/15718069-12341339