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Original Articles

Strategic union delegation and incentives for merger

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Pages 1-5 | Published online: 01 Sep 2006

References

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  • González-Maestre , M and López-Cuñat , J . 2001 . Delegation and mergers in oligopoly . International Journal of Industrial Organization , 19 : 1263 – 79 .
  • Horn , H and Wolinsky , A . 1988 . Bilateral monopolies and incentives for merger . Rand Journal of Economics , 19 : 409 – 19 .
  • Jones , SRG . 1989 . The role of negotiators in union-firm bargaining . Canadian Journal of Economics , 22 ( 3 ) : 630 – 42 .
  • Mauleon , A and Vannetelbosch , V . 2005 . Strategic union delegation and strike activity . Canadian Journal of Economics , 38 ( 1 ) : 149 – 73 .
  • Rubinstein , A . 1982 . Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model . Econometrica , 50 : 97 – 109 .
  • Sklivas , S . 1987 . The strategic choice of managerial incentives . Rand Journal of Economics , 18 : 452 – 8 .

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