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Applied Economics Letters Volume 21, 2014 - Issue 5
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Original Articles

Cost minimizing sequential punishment policies for repeat offenders

Evgenia MotchenkovaDepartment of Economics, VU University Amsterdam, 1081HV Amsterdam, The NetherlandsCorrespondence[email protected]
Pages 360-365 | Published online: 07 Jan 2014

References

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  • Chu, C., Hu, S. and Huang, T. (2000) Punishing repeat offenders more severely, International Review of Law and Economics, 20, 127–40.
  • Dana, D. A. (2001) Rethinking the puzzle of escalating penalties for repeat offenders, Yale Law Journal, 110, 733–83.
  • Emons, W. (2003) A note on optimal punishment for repeat offenders, International Review of Law and Economics, 23, 253–9.
  • Emons, W. (2007) Escalating penalties for repeat offenders, International Review of Law and Economics, 27, 170–8.
  • Endres, A. and Rundshagen, B. (2012) Escalating penalties: a supergame approach, Economics of Governance, 13, 29–49.
  • Miceli, T. and Bucci, C. (2005) A simple theory of increasing penalties for repeat offenders, Review of Law and Economics, 1, 71–80.
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  • Polinsky, M. and Shavell, S. (1998) On offense history and the theory of deterrence, International Review of Law and Economics, 18, 305–24.
  • Rubinstein, A. (1979) Offenses that may have been commited by accident – a policy of retribution, in Applied Game Theory, Brams, J., Shotter, A. and Schwodiauer, G. (Eds), Physica-Verlag, Wurzburg, pp. 406–13.
  • Rubinstein, A. (1980) On an anomaly of the deterrent effect of punishment, Economic Letters, 6, 89–94.

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