When lack of accountability allows observing unobservables: moral hazard in sub-national government credit markets in Mexico

References

• Aggarwal, S., S. Chomsisengphet, and C. Liu. 2010. “Adverse Selection in the Credit Market: Evidence from Randomized Trials of Credit Card Solicitation.” Journal of Money Credit and Banking 42 (4). (June). doi:10.1111/j.1538-4616.2010.00305.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Arslan-Ayadin, Ö., D. Barnum, M. B. Karan, and H. Özdemir. 2014. “How Is Moral Hazard Related to Financing R&D and Innovations?” European Research Studies Journal 17 (4): 111–131.
   Google Scholar
• Ausubel, L. M. 1999. “Adverse Selection in Credit Market.” Working paper, Department of Economics, University of Maryland.
   Google Scholar
• Bagehot, W. 1876. Lombard Street: A Description of the Money Market. London: Henry King and Co. Reprinted by the Library of Economics and Liberty 2014.
   Google Scholar
• Bastable, C. F. 1892. Public Finance. London: Macmillan and Co. Limited.
   Google Scholar
• Besley, T., and I. Preston. 2002. Accountability and Political Competition: Theory and Evidence. Paper prepared for the PIEP meeting at Harvard on June 1, 2002.
   Google Scholar
• Cardon, J. H., and I. Hendel. 2001. “Asymmetric Information in Health Insurance: Evidence from the National Medical Expenditure Survey.” RAND Journal of Economics 32 (32): 408. doi:10.2307/2696362.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chiapori, P. A., I. Macho, P. Rey, and B. Salanié. 1994. “Repeated Moral Hazard: The Role of Memory, Commitment and the Access to Credit Markets.” European Economic Review 38 (38): 1527–1553. doi:10.1016/0014-2921(94)90026-4.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chiapori, P. A., and B. Salanié. 2000. “Testing for Asymmetric Information in Insurance Markets.” Journal of Political Economy 108: 56–78. doi:10.1086/262111.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Demirgüç-Kunt, A., and E. J. Kane Deposit. 2002. Insurance around the Globe: Where Does It Work? The Journal of Economic Perspectives 16 2: (Spring) 175–195. doi:10.1257/0895330027319.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dobbie, W., and P. M. Skibba. 2013. “Information Asymmetries in Consumer Credit Markets: Evidence from Payday Lending.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5 (4): 256–282(27). October.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gibson, E. 2012. Boundary Control: Subnational Authoritarianism in Federal Democracies. New York: Cambridge.
   Google Scholar
• Von Hagen, Jurgen, Massimo Bordignon, Matz Dahlberg, Bhajan Grewal, Per Petterson, Helmut Seitz (2000). “Subnational Government Bailouts in OECD Countries: Four Case Studies”. Research Network Paper #R-399. Inter American Development Bank. Washington DC.
   Google Scholar
• Hernández, F., A. Díaz, and R. Gamboa. 2002. “Determinants and Consequences of Bailing Out States in México.” Eastern Economic Journal, 28 (3): 365–380.
   Google Scholar
• Hernandez, F., and R. Smith. 2009. “Credit Ratings in the Presence of Bailout: The Case of Mexican Sub-National Government Debt.” Economia, Journal of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic Association 10(1): 45–79.
   Google Scholar
• Karlan, D., and J. Zinman. 2009. “Observing Unobservables: Identifying Information Asymmetries with a Consumer Credit Field Experiment.” Econometrica. 776: 1993–2008 (November).
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Musgrave, R. 1959. The Theory of Public Finance: A Study in Public Economy. New York: Mc-Graw-Hill.
   Google Scholar
• Stiglitz, J., and A. Weiss. 1981. “Credit Rationing with Imperfect Information.” American Economic Review 71: 393–410.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ter-Minassian, Teresa, and Jon Graig. 1997. “Control of Subnational Government Borrowing.“ In Fiscal Federalism in Theory and Practice, edited by Teresa Ter-Minassian, 156–174. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund.
   Google Scholar
• Trejo, G., and S. Ley 2016. “Federalismo, drogas y violencia: Por qué el conflicto partidista intergubernamental estimuló la violencia del narcotráfico en Mexico.” In Politica y Gobierno. 23 (1) :11–56.
   Google Scholar