Advanced search
Publication Cover
Applied Economics Letters Volume 28, 2021 - Issue 3
Submit an article Journal homepage
443
Views
0
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
Research Article

Substitutes or complements? Co-opted boards and antitakeover provisions

Eunsuh Leea Department of Accounting, Gyeongsang National University, BERI, Jinju, Korea
,
Chaehyun Kimb School of Business and Technology Management, Korea Advanced Institute of Science and Technology, Daejeon, KoreaCorrespondence[email protected]
ORCID Iconhttps://orcid.org/0000-0002-7936-2893
ORCID Icon &
Junyoup Leec School of Business Administration, Ulsan National Institute of Science and Technology, Ulsan, Korea
Pages 186-190 | Published online: 11 Mar 2020

References

  • Bebchuk, L., A. Cohen, and A. Ferrell. 2009. “What Matters in Corporate Governance?” Review of Financial Studies 22 (2): 783–827. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhn099.
  • Borokhovich, K., K. Brunarski, and R. Parrino. 1997. “CEO Contracting and Antitakeover Amendments.” Journal of Finance 52 (4): 1495–1517. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb01118.x.
  • Coles, J. L., N. D. Daniel, and L. Naveen. 2014. “Co-opted Boards.” Review of Financial Studies 27 (6): 1751–1796. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhu011.
  • Dhaliwal, D., J. S. Judd, M. Serfling, and S. Shaikh. 2016. “Customer Concentration Risk and the Cost of Equity Capital.” Journal of Accounting and Economics 61 (1): 23–48. doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2015.03.005.
  • Gompers, P., J. Ishii, and A. Metrick. 2003. “Corporate Governance and Equity Prices.” Quarterly Journal of Economics 118 (1): 107–156. doi:10.1162/00335530360535162.
  • Masulis, R. W., C. Wang, and F. Xie. 2007. “Corporate Governance and Acquirer Returns.” Journal of Finance 62 (4): 1851–1889. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01259.x.
  • Misangyi, V. F., and A. G. Acharya. 2014. “Substitutes or Complements? A Configurational Examination of Corporate Governance Mechanisms.” Academy of Management Journal 57 (6): 1681–1705. doi:10.5465/amj.2012.0728.
  • Withisuphakorn, P., and P. Jiraporn. 2017. “Co-opted Directors and Powerful CEOs: Evidence from the CEO Pay Slice (CPS).” Applied Economics Letters 24 (6): 381–386. doi:10.1080/13504851.2016.1194960.

Reprints and Corporate Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

To request a reprint or corporate permissions for this article, please click on the relevant link below:

Order Reprints Request Corporate Permissions

Academic Permissions

Please note: Selecting permissions does not provide access to the full text of the article, please see our help page How do I view content?

Obtain permissions instantly via Rightslink by clicking on the button below:

Request Academic Permissions

If you are unable to obtain permissions via Rightslink, please complete and submit this Permissions form. For more information, please visit our Permissions help page.

Related research

People also read lists articles that other readers of this article have read.

Recommended articles lists articles that we recommend and is powered by our AI driven recommendation engine.

Cited by lists all citing articles based on Crossref citations.
Articles with the Crossref icon will open in a new tab.