Bargaining power in bilateral monopoly and cooperative choice of corporate social responsibility

References

• Anbarci, N., and C. J. Sun. 2013. “Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solutions: A Simple Nash Program.” Economics Letters 120 (2): 211–214. doi:10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.026.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Baron, O., O. Berman, and D. Wu. 2016. “Bargaining within the Supply Chain and Its Implications in an Industry.” Decision Sciences 47 (2): 193–218. doi:10.1111/deci.12189.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bénabou, R., and J. Tirole. 2010. “Individual and Corporate Social Responsibility.” Economica 77 (305): 1–19. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0335.2009.00843.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Binmore, K., A. Rubinstein, and A. Wolinsky. 1986. “The Nash Bargaining Solution in Economic Modelling.” Rand Journal of Economics 17 (2): 176–188. doi:10.2307/2555382.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brand, B., and M. Grothe. 2015. “Social Responsibility in a Bilateral Monopoly.” Journal of Economics 115 (3): 275–289. doi:10.1007/s00712-014-0412-6.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Britz, V., P. J. J. Herings, and A. Predtetchinski. 2010. “Non-cooperative Support for the Asymmetric Nash Bargaining Solution.” Journal of Economic Theory 145 (5): 1951–1967. doi:10.1016/j.jet.2010.04.003.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Clark, D. J., and J. C. Pereau. 2021. “Group Bargaining in Supply Chains.” Review of Economic Design 25 (3): 111–138. doi:10.1007/s10058-021-00244-9.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fanti, L., and D. Buccella. 2017a. “Corporate Social Responsibility in a Game-theoretic Context.” Economia e Politica Industriale 44 (3): 371–390.
   Google Scholar
• Fanti, L., and D. Buccella. 2017b. “Corporate Social Responsibility, Profits and Welfare with Managerial Firms.” International Review of Economics 64 (4): 341–356. doi:10.1007/s12232-017-0276-5.
   Google Scholar
• Fell, H., and A. Haynie. 2011. “Estimating Time-varying Bargaining Power: A Fishery Application.” Economic Inquiry 49 (3): 685–696. doi:10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00275.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• García, A., M. Leal, and S. H. Lee. 2018. “Social Responsibility in a Bilateral Monopoly with R&D.” Economics Bulletin 38 (3): 1467–1475.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ge, J., A. Flores-Lagunes, and R. L. Kilmer. 2015. “An Analysis of Bargaining Power for Milk Cooperatives and Milk Processors in Florida.” Applied Economics 47 (48): 5159–5168. doi:10.1080/00036846.2015.1044645.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gervais, J. P., and S. Devadoss. 2006. “Estimating Bargaining Strengths of Canadian Chicken Producers and Processors Using a Bilateral Monopoly Framework.” Agribusiness: An International Journal 22 (2): 159–173. doi:10.1002/agr.20078.
   Google Scholar
• Guo, L., and G. Iyer. 2013. “Multilateral Bargaining and Downstream Competition.” Marketing Science 32 (3): 411–430. doi:10.1287/mksc.1120.0766.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Humphrey, L. 1998. “How Effective Is B&Q’s Timber Purchasing Policy in Encouraging Sustainable Forest Management?” In Greener Purchasing: Opportunities and Innovations, edited by T. Russel, 296–309. Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing.
   Google Scholar
• Kogg, B. 2003a. “Power and Incentives in Environmental Supply Chain Management.” In Strategy and Organization in Supply Chains, edited by S. Seuring, M. Müller, M. Goldbach, and U. Schneidewind, 65–81. Heidelberg: Physica.
   Google Scholar
• Kogg, B. 2003b. “Greening a Cotton-textile Supply Chain: A Case Study of the Transition Towards Organic Production without a Powerful Focal Company.” Greener Management International 43: 53–64.
   Google Scholar
• Kopel, M., and B. Brand. 2012. “Socially Responsible Firms and Endogenous Choice of Strategic Incentives.” Economic Modelling 29 (3): 982–989. doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2012.02.008.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• KPMG. 2017. The Road Ahead. The KPMG Survey of Corporate Responsibility Reporting 2017. KPMG International
   Google Scholar
• Lambertini, L., and A. Tampieri. 2015. “Incentives, Performance and Desirability of Socially Responsible Firms in a Cournot Oligopoly.” Economic Modelling 50: 40–48. doi:10.1016/j.econmod.2015.05.016.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Li, C., and P. Zhou. 2019. “Corporate Social Responsibility: The Implications of Cost Improvement and Promotion Effort.” Managerial and Decision Economics 40 (6): 633–638. doi:10.1002/mde.3034.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Matsui, K. 2020. “Optimal Bargaining Timing of a Wholesale Price for a Manufacturer with a Retailer in a Dual-channel Supply Chain.” European Journal of Operational Research 287 (1): 225–236. doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2020.05.004.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Murphy, D. F., and J. Bendell. 1998. “Do-It Yourself or Do-It Together? The Implementation of Sustainable Timber Purchasing Policies by DIY Retailers in the UK.” In Greener Purchasing: Opportunities and Innovations, edited by T. Russel, 118–134. Sheffield: Greenleaf Publishing.
   Google Scholar
• Nagarajan, M., and G. Sošić. 2008. “Game-theoretic Analysis of Cooperation among Supply Chain Agents: Review and Extensions.” European Journal of Operational Research 187 (3): 719–745. doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2006.05.045.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nagarajan, M., and Y. Bassok. 2008. “A Bargaining Framework in Supply Chains: The Assembly Problem.” Management Science 54 (8): 1482–1496. doi:10.1287/mnsc.1080.0880.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nash, J. F., Jr. 1950. “The Bargaining Problem.” Econometrica 18 (2): 155–162. doi:10.2307/1907266.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Oczkowski, E. 1999. “An Econometric Analysis of the Bilateral Monopoly Model.” Economic Modelling 16 (1): 53–69. doi:10.1016/S0264-9993(98)00024-8.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ouchida, Y. 2019. “Cooperative Choice of Corporate Social Responsibility in a Bilateral Monopoly Model.” Applied Economics Letters 26 (10): 799–806. doi:10.1080/13504851.2018.1497843.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Planer-Friedrich, L., and M. Sahm. 2020. “Strategic Corporate Social Responsibility, Imperfect Competition, and Market Concentration.” Journal of Economics 129 (1): 79–101. doi:10.1007/s00712-019-00663-x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Qing, Q., T. Deng, and H. Wang. 2017. “Capacity Allocation under Downstream Competition and Bargaining.” European Journal of Operational Research 261 (1): 97–107. doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2017.01.031.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rubinstein, A. 1982. “Perfect equilibrium in a bargaining model”. Econometrica 50 (1): 97–109
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sheu, J. B., and X. Q. Gao. 2014. “Alliance or No alliance—Bargaining Power in Competing Reverse Supply Chains.” European Journal of Operational Research 233 (2): 313–325. doi:10.1016/j.ejor.2013.09.021.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Spengler, J. J. 1950. “Vertical Integration and Antitrust Policy.” Journal of Political Economy 58 (4): 347–352. doi:10.1086/256964.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tirole, J. 1988. The Theory of Industrial Organization. Cambridge: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar