Political institutions and FDI inflows in autocratic countriesFootnote^*

* An earlier version of this article was presented at the 4th Annual Conference of the Australian Society for Quantitative Political Science, University of Melbourne, 9 December 2015. The article draws in part on chapter 3 of Chungshik Moon, “Credible Commitment Institutions and Foreign Direct Investment: How are Autocratic Countries able to Attract FDI?” Ph.D. diss., Florida State University, 2014.

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