Deterrence or taboo? Explaining the non-use of nuclear weapons during the Indo-Pakistani post-tests nuclear crises

Reference list

• Basrur, R. M. (2006). Minimum deterrence and India’s nuclear security. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bidwai, P., & Vanaik, A. (2001). South Asia on a short fuse: Nuclear politics and the future of global nuclear disarmament. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Biswas, A. (2015). Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons; Deconstructing India’s doctrinal response. Strategic Analysis, 39, 683–695. doi: 10.1080/09700161.2015.1090682
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bundy, McG. (1988). Danger and survival: Choices about the bomb in the first fifty years. New York, NY: Random House.
   Google Scholar
• Bunn, G. (1999). The status of norms against nuclear testing. The Nonproliferation Review, 6(Winter), 20–32. doi: 10.1080/10736709908436747
   Google Scholar
• Carranza, M. E. (2015). Condemned to eternal confrontation? Beyond the Indo-Pakistani nuclear conundrum. Contemporary Security Policy, 36, 528–543. doi: 10.1080/13523260.2015.1091571
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chari, P. R., Cheema, P. I., & Cohen, S. P. (2007). Four crises and a peace process: American engagement in South Asia. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
   Google Scholar
• Chengappa, R. (2000). Weapons of peace: The secret story of India’s quest to be a nuclear power. New Delhi: HarperCollins.
   Google Scholar
• Cohen, S. P. (2013). Shooting for a century: The India-Pakistan conundrum. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
   Google Scholar
• Dadi, I. (2009). Nuclearization and Pakistani popular culture since 1998. In I. Abraham (Ed.), South Asian cultures of the bomb (pp. 173–194). Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Dugger, C. W. (1999, June 1). Atmosphere is tense as India and Pakistan agree to talks. The New York Times.
   Google Scholar
• Dugger, C. W. (2002, June 20). The Kashmir brink. The New York Times.
   Google Scholar
• Fearon, J. (1991). Counterfactuals and hypothesis testing in political science. World Politics, 43, 169–195. doi: 10.2307/2010470
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Feiveson, H. A., & Hogendoorn, E. J. (2003). No first use of nuclear weapons. The Nonproliferation Review, 10(Summer), 90–98. doi: 10.1080/10736700308436933
   Google Scholar
• Finnemore, M., & Sikkink, K. (1998). International norm dynamics and political change. International Organization, 52, 887–917. doi: 10.1162/002081898550789
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Frey, K. (2006). India’s nuclear bomb and national security. New York, NY: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Gizewski, P. (1996). From winning weapon to destroyer of worlds: The nuclear taboo in international politics. International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy Analysis, 51, 397–419. doi: 10.1177/002070209605100301
   Google Scholar
• Gregory, P.R. (2017). “It’s best not to mess with us”: The nuclear poker game with Moscow has already begun—or, rather, resumed. Hoover Digest, Spring, pp. 97–100.
   Google Scholar
• Hoodbhoy, P., & Mian, Z. (2014). Nuclear fears, hopes and realities in Pakistan. International Affairs, 90, 1125–1142. doi: 10.1111/1468-2346.12160
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hoyt, T. (2009). Kargil: The nuclear dimension. In P. Lavoy (Ed.), Asymmetric warfare in South Asia: The causes and consequences of the Kargil conflict (pp. 144–170). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Indian Prime Minister’s Office. (2003, January 4). Cabinet committee on security reviews progress in operationalizing India’s nuclear doctrine. Retrieved from http://pib.nic.in/archieve/lreleng/lyr2003/rjan2003/04012003/r040120033.html
   Google Scholar
• Joeck, N. (2009). The Kargil war and nuclear deterrence. In S. Ganguly, & S. P. Kapur (Eds.), Nuclear proliferation in South Asia: Crisis behavior and the bomb (pp. 117–143). New York, NY: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Kampani, G. (1998). From existential to minimum deterrence: Explaining India’s decision to test. The Nonproliferation Review, 6(1), 12–24. doi: 10.1080/10736709808436732
   Google Scholar
• Kapur, S. P. (2007). Dangerous deterrent: Nuclear weapons proliferation and conflict in South Asia. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kapur, S. P. (2010). South Asia’s nuclear past. In S. Ganguly & S. P. Kapur (Eds.), India, Pakistan, and the bomb: Debating nuclear stability in South Asia (pp. 50–54). New York, NY: Columbia University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Khan, F. H. (2003). Challenges to nuclear stability in South Asia. The Nonproliferation Review, 10(1), 59–74. doi: 10.1080/10736700308436917
   Google Scholar
• Khan, Z., & Khan, A. (2016). The strategic impasse over India’s doctrinal restructuring. The Washington Quarterly, 39(1), 139–157. doi: 10.1080/0163660X.2016.1170485
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kissinger, H. (1957). Nuclear weapons and foreign policy. New York, NY: Harper & Brothers.
   Google Scholar
• Kissinger, H., &. (1960). Limited War: Conventional or nuclear? A reappraisal. Daedalus, 89, 800–817.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Krepon, M. (2015a). Introduction. In M. Krepon (Ed.), Deterrence instability and nuclear weapons in South Asia (pp. 1–14). Washington, DC: Stimson Center.
   Google Scholar
• Krepon, M. (2015b). The myth of deterrence stability between nuclear-armed rivals. In M. Krepon (Ed.), Deterrence instability and nuclear weapons in South Asia (pp. 15–41). Washington, DC: Stimson Center.
   Google Scholar
• Krepon, M., & Nayak, P. (2006). US crisis management in South Asia’s twin peaks crisis. Washington, DC: Stimson Center.
   Google Scholar
• Ladwig, W. C. (2007/2008). A cold start for hot wars?: The Indian army’s new limited war doctrine. International Security, 32(3), 158–190. doi: 10.1162/isec.2008.32.3.158
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Malik, P. (2010). India’s nuclear debate: Exceptionalism and the bomb. New Delhi: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Narang, V. (2009/2010). Posturing for peace? Pakistan’s nuclear postures and South Asian stability. International Security, 34(3), 38–78. doi: 10.1162/isec.2010.34.3.38
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Narang, V. (2013). Five myths about India’s nuclear posture. The Washington Quarterly, 36, 143–157. doi: 10.1080/0163660X.2013.825555
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Narang, V. (2014). Nuclear strategy in the modern era: Regional powers and international conflict. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Narang, V. (2017, March 20). Remarks by Professor Vipin Narang, Department of Political Science, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.Plenary: Beyond the nuclear threshold: Causes and consequences of first use. Carnegie international nuclear policy conference. Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
   Google Scholar
• Nizamani, H. (2009). Pakistan’s atomic publics: Survey results. In I. Abraham (Ed.), South Asian cultures of the bomb: Atomic publics and the state in India and Pakistan (pp. 133–149). Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Obama, B. (2009). Remarks by President Barack Obama: Hradcany Square, Prague, Czech Republic. In J. Cirincione (Ed.), Nuclear nightmares: Securing the world before it is too late ( appendix A, pp. 191–198). New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2013.
   Google Scholar
• O’Donnell, F. (2017). Reconsidering minimum deterrence in South Asia: Indian responses to Pakistan’s tactical nuclear weapons. Contemporary Security Policy, 38, 78–101. doi:10.1080/13523260.2016.1236470
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Paul, T. V. (2005). Causes of the India-Pakistan enduring rivalry. In T. V. Paul (Ed.), The India-Pakistan conflict: An enduring rivalry (pp. 3–24). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Paul, T. V. (2009). The tradition of non-use of nuclear weapons. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Perkovich, G. (1999). India’s nuclear bomb: The impact on global proliferation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
   Google Scholar
• Perkovich, G. (2013). The non-unitary model and deterrence stability in South Asia. In M. Krepon & J. Thompson (Eds.), Deterrence stability and escalation control in South Asia (pp. 21–40). Washington, DC: Stimson Center.
   Google Scholar
• Pervez, M. (2013). Security community in South Asia: India and Pakistan. New York, NY: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Press, D. G., Sagan, S. D., & Valentino, B. A. (2013). Atomic aversion: Experimental evidence on taboos, traditions, and the non-use of nuclear weapons. American Political Science Review, 107, 188–206. doi: 10.1017/S0003055412000597
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rehman, I. (2012). Drowning stability: The perils of naval nuclearization and brinkmanship in the Indian Ocean. Naval War College Review (Autumn), 65(4), 64–88.
   Google Scholar
• Riedel, B. (2002). American diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil summit at Blair House. Policy paper series. Philadelphia, PA: Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania.
   Google Scholar
• Riedel, B. (2013). Avoiding Armageddon: America, India, and Pakistan to the brink and back. Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press.
   Google Scholar
• Ross, A. L. (2014). The origins of limited nuclear war theory. In J. A. Larsen & K. Kartchner (Eds.), On limited nuclear war in the 21^st century (pp. 21–48). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Roy-Chaudhury, R. (2004). Nuclear doctrine, declaratory policy, and escalation control. In M. Krepon, R. W. Jones, & Z. Haider (Eds.), Escalation control and the nuclear option in South Asia (pp. 101–118). Washington, DC: Stimson Center.
   Google Scholar
• Rublee, M. R. (2009). Nonproliferation norms: Why states choose nuclear restraint. Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press.
   Google Scholar
• Sagan, S. (Spring 2000). The commitment trap: Why the United States should not use nuclear threats to deter biological and chemical weapons attacks. International Security, 24(4), 85–115. doi: 10.1162/016228800560318
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sagan, S., & Vaynman, J. (2011). Introduction: Reviewing the nuclear posture review. The Nonproliferation Review, 18(1), 17–37. doi: 10.1080/10736700.2011.549169
   Google Scholar
• Saran, S. (2014, April 22). The dangers of nuclear revisionism. Business Standard. Retrieved from http://www.business-standard.com/article/printer-friendly-version?article_id=11404220133
   Google Scholar
• Sauer, T. (2016, June). Just leave it: NATO’s nuclear weapons policy at the Warsaw summit. Arms Control Today, 46, 16–21.
   Google Scholar
• Schell, J. (2010, April 19). Reaching zero. The Nation, 290(15), 11–18.
   Google Scholar
• Schelling, T. (1960). Arms and influence. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Schelling, T. (1994). The role of nuclear weapons. In L. B. Ederington & M. J. Mazarr (Eds.), Turning point: The Gulf War and U.S. military strategy (pp. 105–115). Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
   Google Scholar
• Sood, V. K., & Sawhney, P. (2003). Operation Parakram: The war unfinished. New Delhi: Sage.
   Google Scholar
• Stimson Center. (2015, January). Confidence-building and nuclear risk reduction measures in South Asia. Retrieved from http://www.stimson.org/research-pages/confidence-building-measures-in-south-asia-/
   Google Scholar
• Tannenwald, N. (1999). The nuclear taboo: The United States and the normative basis of nuclear non-use. International Organization, 53, 433–468. doi: 10.1162/002081899550959
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tannenwald, N. (2007). The nuclear taboo: The United States and the non-use of nuclear weapons since 1945. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Waltz, K. (1981). The spread of nuclear weapons: More may be better. Adelphi Paper, 171. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies.
   Google Scholar
• Yusuf, M., & Kirk, J. (2016). Keeping an eye on South Asian skies: America’s pivotal deterrence in nuclearized India-Pakistan crises. Contemporary Security Policy, 37, 246–272. doi:10.1080/13523260.2016.1177954
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar