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Original Articles

Dual frames for causal induction: the normative and the heuristic

ORCID Icon, ORCID Icon, ORCID Icon, ORCID Icon & ORCID Icon
Pages 292-317 | Received 28 May 2015, Accepted 30 Mar 2017, Published online: 27 Apr 2017

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