Inter- and intra-party relations in the formation of the Benkirane coalition governments in Morocco

References

• Austen-Smith, D., and J. Banks. 1988. “Elections, Coalitions and Legislatives Outcomes.” American Political Science Review 82 (2): 405–422. doi: 10.2307/1957393
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Axelrod, R. 1970. Conflict of Interest. Chicago: Markham.
   Google Scholar
• Bäck, H., M. Debus, and P. Dumont. 2011. “Who Gets What in Coalition Governments? Predictors of Portfolio Allocation in Parliamentary Democracies.” European Journal of Political Research 50: 441–478. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2010.01980.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Baron, D. P., and J. A. Ferejohn. 1989. “Bargaining in Legislatures.” American Political Science Review 83: 1182–1206. doi: 10.2307/1961664
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bergman, T. 1993. “Formation Rules and Minority Governments.” European Journal of Political Research 23: 55–66. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1993.tb00348.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bergman, T. 1995. Constitutional Rules and Party Coals in Coalition Formation. Umea: Umea Universitet.
   Google Scholar
• Browne, E. C., and K. A. Feste. 1975. “Qualitative Dimensions of Coalition Payoffs: Evidence from European Party Governments, 1945–1970.” American Behavioral Scientist 18: 530–556. doi: 10.1177/000276427501800406
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Browne, E. C., and M. N. Franklin. 1973. “Aspects of Coalitions Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies.” American Political Science Review 67: 453–469. doi: 10.2307/1958776
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Browne, E. C., and J. P. Frendreis. 1980. “Allocating Coalition Payoffs by Conventional Norm: An Assessment of the Evidence for Cabinet Coalition Situations.” American Political Science Review 24: 753–768. doi: 10.2307/2110957
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Budge, I., and H. Keman. 1990. Parties and Democracy: Coalition Formation and Government Functioning in Twenty States. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Debus, M. 2008. “Office and Policy Payoffs in Coalition Governments.” Party Politics 14 (5): 515–538. doi: 10.1177/1354068807088121
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Desrues, T. 2013. First Year of Islamist Government in Morocco: Same Old Power, New Coalition. Barcelona: IEMed. ( Mediterranean Yearbook 2013).
   Google Scholar
• Desrues, T., and I. Fernández. 2013. “L'expérience gouvernementale du Parti de la Justice et du Développement: les islamistes au pouvoir?” Année du Maghreb XI: 345–365. doi: 10.4000/anneemaghreb.1954
   Google Scholar
• De Swaan, A. 1973. Coalition Theories and Cabinet Formations: A Study of Formal Theories of Coalition Formation Applied to Nine European Parliaments After 1918. Amsterdam: Elsevier Scientific.
   Google Scholar
• Dodd, L. C. 1976. Coalitions in Parliamentary Government. New York: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• El Messaoudi, A. 2001. Les ministres dans le système politique marocain. Casablanca: Dar Najah Al-Jadida.
   Google Scholar
• Falcó-Gimeno, A., and I. H. Indridason. 2013. “Uncertainty, Complexity, and Gamson's Law: Comparing Coalition Formation in Western Europe.” West European Politics 36: 221–247. doi: 10.1080/01402382.2013.742758
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Franklin, M. N., and T. T. Mackie. 1983. “Familiarity and Inertia in the Formation of Governing Coalitions in Parliamentary Democracies.” British Journal of Political Science 13: 275–298. doi: 10.1017/S0007123400003276
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gamson, W. 1961. “A Theory of Coalition Formation.” American Sociological Review 26: 373–382. doi: 10.2307/2090664
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Geddes, B. 2004. “Minimum-Winning Coalitions and Personalization in Authoritarian Regimes.” Paper prepared for presentation at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 2–5.
   Google Scholar
• Gianetti, D., and K. Benoit, eds. 2008. Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments. Londres: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Hague, R., M. Harrop, and S. Breslin. 2004. “The Comparative Method.” In Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, edited by R. Hague and M. Harrop, 272–283. Hampshire: McMillan.
   Google Scholar
• Harmel, R., and K. Janda. 1994. “An Integrated Theory of Party Goals and Party Change.” Journal of Theoretical Politics 6 (3): 259–287. doi: 10.1177/0951692894006003001
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hernando de Larramendi, M. (2013). “El islamismo político y el ejercicio del poder tras el despertar árabe: los casos de Egipto, Túnez y Marruecos.” In El islamismo en (R)evolución: movilización social y cambio político, Cuaderno de Estrategia, edited by Instituto Español de Estudios Estratégicos, Vol. 163, 71–116. Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa.
   Google Scholar
• Indridason, I. H. 2011. “Coalition Formation and Polarisation: A Comparative Study.” European Journal of Political Research 50 (5): 689–718. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2011.01990.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Indridason, I. H., and S. Bowler. 2014. “Determinants of Cabinet Size.” European Journal of Political Research 53: 381–403. doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12030
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Indridason, I. H., and G. H. Kristinsson. 2013. “Making Words Count: Coalition Agreements and Cabinet Management.” European Journal of Political Research 52: 822–846. doi: 10.1111/1475-6765.12022
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Jové, J. M. 2013. “La negociación de un gobierno de coalición: los acuerdos coalicionales.” In Pactar para gobernar. Dinámicas coalicionales en la España multinivel, edited by J. M. Reniú, 127–153. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch.
   Google Scholar
• Laver, M. J. 1989. “Party Competition and Party System Change: The Interaction of Electoral Bargaining and Party Competition.” Journal of Theoretical Politics I: 301–324. doi: 10.1177/0951692889001003003
   Google Scholar
• Laver, M. J., and I. Budge, eds. 1992. Party Policy and Government coalitions. London: MacMillan.
   Google Scholar
• Laver, M., and K. A. Shepsle. 1990. “Coalition and Cabinet Government.” American Political Science Review 84 (3): 873–890. doi: 10.2307/1962770
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Laver, M., and K. A. Shepsle. 1996. Making and Breaking Governments: Cabinets and Legislatures in Parliamentary Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Leiserson, M. 1966. Coalitions in Politics. A Theoretical and Empirical Study. New York: Yale University.
   Google Scholar
• Luebbert, G. M. 1986. Comparative Democracy: Policy Making and Governing Coalitions in Europe and Israel. New York: Columbia University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Masbah, Mohammed. 2014. “Morocco's Slow Motion Reform Process. The Tug of War between the Palace and the Justice and Development Party”. Sfiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Comments. Accessed http://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/comments/2014C06_msb.pdf
   Google Scholar
• Matas, J., and J. Ridao, 2013. “Las pautas de funcionamiento de los gobiernos de coalición: los protocolos internos.” In Pactar para gobernar. Dinámicas coalicionales en la España multinivel, edited by J. M. Reniú, 154–178. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch.
   Google Scholar
• Müller, W. C., and K. Strøm, ed. 1999. Coalitions Governments in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Müller, W. C. and K. Strøm 2008. Coalition agreements and cabinet governance. In Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe, edited by K. Strøm, W. C. Müller and T. Bergman, 159–199. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Pedersen, H. 2010. “How Intra-party Power Relations Affect the Coalition Behaviour of Political Parties.” Party Politics 16: 737–754. doi: 10.1177/1354068809345855
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Reniu, J. M. 2002. La formación de gobiernos minoritarios en España 1977–1996. Madrid: Centro de Investigaciones Sociológicas.
   Google Scholar
• Reniu, J. M., and T. Bergman. 2001. “Who Will Pay the Bill? Costs and Benefits of Forming Government in Spain, 1977–2000.” Paper prepared for presentation at the Conference of the Spanish Political Science Association. La Laguna, Canarias.
   Google Scholar
• Riker, William. 1962. The Theory of Political Coalitions. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Robles-Egea, A. 2003. “Negociaciones, payoffs y estabilidad de los gobiernos de coalición.” Revista de Estudios Políticos 126: 91–112.
   Google Scholar
• Saalfeld, T. 2008. “Intra-Party Conflict and Cabinet Survival in 17 West European Democracies, 1945–1999.” In Intra-Party Politics and Coalition Governments, edited by D. Gianetti and B. Kenett, 169–186. Londres: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Saalfeld, T. 2010. “Veto Players, Agenda Control and Cabinet Stability in 17 European Parliaments, 1945–1999.” In Reform Processes and Policy Change: Veto Players and Decision-making in Modern Democracies, edited by T. König, G. Tsebelis, and M. Debus, 125–143. New York: Springer.
   Google Scholar
• Schofield, N. 1993. “Political Competition and Multiparty Coalition Governments.” European Journal for Political Research 23: 1–33. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1993.tb00346.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1979. “Institutional Arrangements and Equilibrium in Multidimensional Voting Models.” American Journal of Political Science 23: 23–57. doi: 10.2307/2110770
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Strøm, K. 1990. “A Behavioral Theory of Competitive Political Parties.” American Journal of Political Science 34 (2): 565–598. doi: 10.2307/2111461
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Strøm, K., I. Budge, and M. J. Laver. 1994. “Constraints on Cabinet Formation in Parliamentary Democracies.” American Journal of Political Science 38 (2): 303–335. doi: 10.2307/2111406
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Szmolka, I. 2010. “Party System Fragmentation in Morocco.” The Journal of North African Studies 15 (1): 13–37. doi: 10.1080/13629380902727569
   Google Scholar
• Szmolka, I. 2011. “Democracias y autoritarismos con adjetivos: la clasificación de los países árabes dentro de una tipología general de regímenes políticos.” Revista Española de Ciencia Política 26: 11–62.
   Google Scholar
• Taylor, M., and M. Laver. 1973. “Government Coalitions in Western Europe.” European Journal of Political Research 1: 205–248. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.1973.tb01228.x
   Google Scholar
• Timmermans, A., and C. Moury. 2006. “Coalition Governance in Belgium and the Netherlands. Rising Electoral Stability Against All Electoral Odds.” Acta Politica 41: 389–407. doi: 10.1057/palgrave.ap.5500139
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tsebelis, G., and E. Ha. 2013. “Coalition Theory: A Veto Players’ Approach.” European Political Science Review 52 (6): 1–27.
   Google Scholar
• Urquizu, I. 2013. “La supervivencia de los gobiernos autonómicos en España.” In Pactar para gobernar. Dinámicas coalicionales en la España multinivel, edited by J. M. Reniú, 205–228. Valencia: Tirant lo Blanch.
   Google Scholar
• Verzichelli, L. 2008. “Porfolio Allocation.” In Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe, edited by K. Strøm, W. C. Müller, and T. y Bergman, 237–267. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Von Neumann, J., and O. Morgenstern. 1944. Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Warwick, P. 1994. Government Survival in Parliamentary Democracies. Nueva York: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Warwick, P. 2005. “Do Policy Horizons Structure the Formation of Parliamentary Governments: The Evidence from an Expert Survey.” American Journal of Political Science 49: 373–387. doi: 10.1111/j.0092-5853.2005.00129.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Warwick, P. V., and J. N. Druckman. 2006. “The Portfolio Allocation Paradox: An Investigation into the Nature of a Very Strong but Puzzling Relationship.” European Journal of Political Research 45: 635–665. doi: 10.1111/j.1475-6765.2006.00632.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wegner, E., and M. Pellicer. 2011. “Left–Islamist Opposition Cooperation in Morocco.” British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies 38 (3): 303–322. doi: 10.1080/13530194.2011.621690
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar