Intentional concepts in cognitive neuroscience

References

• Barlow, H. 1995. Banishing the Homunculus. In Perception as Bayesian inference, edited by D. Knill and W. Richards, 425–450. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bechtel, W. 2008a. Mental mechanisms, New York: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Bechtel, W. 2008b. Mechanism in cognitive psychology: What are the operations. Philosophy of Science, 75, 983–94. doi: 10.1086/594540
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bechtel, W., and A. Abrahamsen 2005. Explanation: A mechanist alternative. Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 36, 421–41. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2005.03.010
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• Bechtel, W., and R. Richardson 1993. Discovering complexity, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bennett, M., D. Dennett, P. Hacker, and J. Searle 2007. Neuroscience and philosophy: Brain, mind, and language, New York: Columbia University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bennett, M., and P. Hacker 2003. The philosophical foundations of neuroscience, Malden: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Bennett, M., and P. Hacker 2008. History of cognitive neuroscience, Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Bickle, J. 1998. Psychoneural reduction: The new wave, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bickle, J. 2003. Philosophy and neuroscience: A ruthlessly reductive account, New York: Springer-Verlag.
   Google Scholar
• Bickle, J. 2006. Reducing mind to molecular pathways: Explicating the reductionism implicit in current cellular and molecular neuroscience. Synthese, 151, 411–34. doi: 10.1007/s11229-006-9015-2
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brentano, F. 1874. Psychology from an empirical standpoint, London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
   Google Scholar
• Chalupa, L. M., and J. S. Werner (Eds.). 2004. The visual neurosciences, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Chisholm, R. 1991. On the simplicity of the soul. Philosophical Perspectives, 5, 167–80. doi: 10.2307/2214094
   Google Scholar
• Churchland, P. 2005. Cleansing science. Inquiry, 48, 464–77. doi: 10.1080/00201740500242001
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Clark, A. 1989. Microcognition. Philosophy, cognitive science and parallel distributed processing, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Craver, C. 2007. Explaining the brain, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Crick, F. 1995. The astonishing hypothesis, London: Touchstone.
   Google Scholar
• Cummins, R. 1983. The nature of psychological explanation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Cummins, R. 1989. Meaning and mental representation, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Cummins, R. 2000. “How does it work?” versus “what are the laws?”: Two conceptions of psychological explanation. In Explanation and cognition, edited by F. Keil and R. Wilson, 117–44. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Dainton, B. 2007. Wittgenstein and the brain. Science, 317, 901 doi: 10.1126/science.1144965
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Darden, L. 2008. Thinking again about biological mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 75, 958–69. doi: 10.1086/594538
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dennett, D. 1987. True believers. The intentional strategy and why it works. In The intentional stance, ed. D. Dennett, 13–42. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Dennett, D. 1991. Consciousness explained, Boston: Little, Brown.
   Google Scholar
• Dennett, D. 2007. Philosophy as naïve anthropology: Comment on Bennett and Hacker. In Neuroscience and philosophy, ed. M. Bennett, D. Dennett, P. Hacker, and J. Searle, 73–96. New York: Columbia University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Friston, K. 2011. The history of the future of the Bayesian brain. NeuroImage 62: 1230–1233
   Google Scholar
• Gazzaniga, M. 2010. Neuroscience and the correct level of explanation for understanding mind. Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 14, 297–2. doi: 10.1016/j.tics.2010.04.005
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Glennan, S. 2002. Rethinking mechanistic explanation. Philosophy of Science, 69(Suppl 3), 342–353. doi: 10.1086/341857
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• von Helmholtz, H. 1962/1866. Concerning perceptions in general. In Treatise on physiological optics, Vol. III. Trans. J.P.C. Southall, 1925, Optical Society of America. London: Constable
   Google Scholar
• Hornsby, J. 2000. Personal and sub-personal; A defence of Dennett's early distinction. Philosophical Explorations, 3, 6–24. doi: 10.1080/13869790008520978
   Google Scholar
• Kalat, J. 2004. Biological psychology, 8th ed., Belmont, CA: Thomson Wadsworth.
   Google Scholar
• Kenny, A. 1971. The homunculus fallacy. In Interpretations of life and mind: Essays around the problem of reduction, edited by M. Grene, 65–74. London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Kenny, A. 2008. Foreword. In History of cognitive neuroscience, edited by M. Bennett and P. Hacker, xvii–xix. Malden: Wiley-Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Knill, D., and A. Pouget 2004. The Bayesian brain: The role of uncertainty in neural coding and computation. Trends in Neurosciences, 27, 712–19. doi: 10.1016/j.tins.2004.10.007
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kveraga, K., A. Ghuman, and M. Bar 2007. Top-down predictions in the cognitive brain. Brain and Cognition, 65, 145–68. doi: 10.1016/j.bandc.2007.06.007
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lycan, W. 1990. The continuity of levels in nature. In Mind and cognition. An anthology, ed. W. Lycan, 77–97. Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Machamer, P., and J. Sytsma 2009. Philosophy and the brain sciences. Iris: European Journal of Philosophy and Public Discourse, 1, 65–86.
   Google Scholar
• Machamer, P., L. Darden, and C. Craver 2000. Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science, 57, 1–25. doi: 10.1086/392759
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• McDowell, J. 1994. Mind and world, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Moss, L. 2012. Is the philosophy of mechanism philosophy enough?. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part C: Studies in History and Philosophy of Biological and Biomedical Sciences, 43, 164–72. doi: 10.1016/j.shpsc.2011.05.015
   PubMedGoogle Scholar
• Nagel, E. 1961. The structure of science, London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
   Google Scholar
• Patterson, D. 2003. Review of philosophical foundations of neuroscience. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. http://ndpr.nd.edu/review.cfm?id=1335 (accessed January 11, 2011)
   Google Scholar
• Ryle, G. 2000[1949]. The concept of mind, London: Penguin.
   Google Scholar
• Schaal, D. 2005. Naming our concerns about neuroscience: A review of Bennett and Hacker's philosophical foundations of neuroscience. Journal of the Experimental Analysis of Behavior, 84, 683–92. doi: 10.1901/jeab.2005.83-05
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Searle, J. 2007. Putting consciousness back in the brain: Reply to Bennett and Hacker. In Neuroscience and philosophy, ed. M. Bennett, D. Dennett, P. Hacker, and J. Searle, 97–126. New York: Columbia University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Slaney, K., and M. D. Maraun 2005. Analogy and metaphor running amok: An examination of the use of explanatory devices in neuroscience. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 25, 153–73. doi: 10.1037/h0091257
   Google Scholar
• Sytsma, J. 2007. Language police running amok. Journal of Theoretical and Philosophical Psychology, 27, 89–103. doi: 10.1037/h0091283
   Google Scholar
• Uithol, S., I. van Rooij, H. Bekkering, and P. Haselager 2011. What do mirror neurons mirror?. Philosophical Psychology, 24, 607–23. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2011.562604
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wimsatt, W. 2007. Re-engineering philosophy for limited beings, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Wittgenstein, L. 1958. Philosophical investigations, 3rd ed. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
   Google Scholar
• Wolfe, J. M., K. Kluender, D. M. Levi, L. M. Bartoshuk, R. S. Herz, R. L. Klatzky, S. J. Lederman, and D. M. Merfeld 2008. Sensation and perception, 2nd ed. Sunderland: Sinauer Associates.
   Google Scholar