Stained glass as a model for consciousness

References

• Boghossian, Paul A., and J. David Velleman. 1989. “Colour as a Secondary Quality.” Mind 98 (389): 81–103. doi: 10.1093/mind/XCVIII.389.81
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Byrne, Alex, and Michael Tye. 2006. “Qualia Ain't in the Head.” Noûs 40 (2): 241–255. doi: 10.1111/j.0029-4624.2006.00608.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chalmers, David J. 2002. “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” In Conceivability and Possibility, edited by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne, 145–200. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Chalmers, David J. 2009. “The Two-dimensional Argument Against Materialism.” In The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Mind, edited by Brian P. McLaughlin, 313–335. Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Dretske, Fred. 1995. Naturalizing the Mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Dretske, Fred. 1996. “Phenomenal Externalism or If Meanings Ain't in the Head, Where Are Qualia?” Philosophical Issues 7: 143–158. doi: 10.2307/1522899
   Google Scholar
• Harman, Gilbert. 1990. “The Intrinsic Quality of Experience.” Philosophical Perspectives 4: 31–52. doi: 10.2307/2214186
   Google Scholar
• Hill, Christopher S. 2009. Consciousness. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kind, Amy. 2007. “Restrictions on Representationalism.” Philosophical Studies 134 (3): 405–427. doi: 10.1007/s11098-007-9079-y
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kind, Amy. 2010. “Transparency and Representationalist Theories of Consciousness.” Philosophy Compass 5 (10): 902–913. doi: 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00328.x
   Google Scholar
• Kriegel, Uriah. 2009. Subjective Consciousness: A Self-Representational Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lycan, William G. 1996. Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Lycan, William G. 2001. “The Case for Phenomenal Externalism.” Philosophical Perspectives 15: 17–35.
   Google Scholar
• McDowell, John. 1994. “The Content of Perceptual Experience.” The Philosophical Quarterly 44 (175): 190–205. doi: 10.2307/2219740
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Molyneux, Bernard. 2009. “Why Experience Told Me Nothing About Transparency.” Noûs 43 (1): 116–136. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2008.01698.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Montero, Barbara. 2010. “A Russellian Response to the Structural Argument Against Physicalism.” Journal of Consciousness Studies 17 (3–4): 70–83.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Pereboom, Derk. 2011. Consciousness and the Prospects of Physicalism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Putnam, Hilary. 1975. “The Meaning of ‘Meaning’.” In Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Vol. 2, edited by Hilary Putnam, 215–271. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Russell, Bertrand. 1948. Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits. New York: Simon & Schuster.
   Google Scholar
• Shoemaker, Sydney. 1994a. “Phenomenal Character.” Noûs 28 (1): 21–38. doi: 10.2307/2215918
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shoemaker, Sydney. 1994b. “Self-Knowledge and ‘Inner Sense.’ Lecture III: The Phenomenal Character of Experience.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 54 (2): 291–314. doi: 10.2307/2108490
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shoemaker, Sydney. 2000. “Introspection and Phenomenal Character.” Philosophical Topics 28 (2): 247–273. doi: 10.5840/philtopics20002825
   Google Scholar
• Shoemaker, Sydney. 2003. “Content, Character and Color.” Philosophical Issues 13 (1): 253–278. doi: 10.1111/1533-6077.00014
   Google Scholar
• Strawson, Galen. 2003. “Real Materialism.” In Chomsky and His Critics, edited by Louise M. Antony and Norbert Hornstein, 49–88. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.
   Google Scholar
• Tye, Michael. 1992. “Visual Qualia and Visual Content.” In The Contents of Experience: Essays on Perception, edited by Tim Crane, 158–176. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Tye, Michael. 1995. Ten Problems of Consciousness: A Representational Theory of the Phenomenal Mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Tye, Michael. 2000. Consciousness, Color, and Content. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Tye, Michael. 2002a. “Representationalism and the Transparency of Experience.” Noûs 36 (1): 137–151. doi: 10.1111/1468-0068.00365
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tye, Michael. 2002b. “Visual Qualia and Visual Content Revisited.” In Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings, edited by David J. Chalmers, 447–456. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Van Gulick, Robert. 2004. “Outing the Mind – A Teleopragmatic Perspective.” In The Externalist Challenge, edited by Richard Schantz, 255–284. Current Issues in Theoretical Philosophy. Berlin: De Gruyter.
   Google Scholar