Self-knowledge and imagination

References

• Addis, D. R., L. Pan, M.-A. Vu, N. Laiser, and D. L. Schacter. 2009. “Constructive Episodic Simulation of the Future and the Past: Distinct Subsystems of a Core Brain Network Mediate Imagining and Remembering.” Neuropsychologia 47: 2222–2238. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2008.10.026
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Addis, D. R., A. T. Wong, and D. L. Schacter. 2007. “Remembering the Past and Imagining the Future: Common and Distinct Neural Substrates During Event Construction and Elaboration.” Neuropsychologia 45 (7): 1363–1377. doi: 10.1016/j.neuropsychologia.2006.10.016
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Armstrong, D. 1968. A Materialist Theory of Mind. London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Bar-On, D. 2004. Speaking My Mind. New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bar-On, Dorit, and Matthew Chrisman. 2009. “Ethical Neo-expressivism.” In Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 4, edited by Russ Shafer-Landau, 132–165. Oxford: OUP.
   Google Scholar
• Byrne, Alex. 2005. “Introspection.” Philosophical Topics 33 (1): 79–104. doi: 10.5840/philtopics20053312
   Google Scholar
• Byrne, Alex. 2007. “Possibility and Imagination.” Philosophical Perspectives 21 (1): 125–144. doi: 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2007.00123.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Byrne, Alex. 2011. “Knowing That I Am Thinking.” In Self-knowledge, edited by A. Hatzimoysis, 105–124. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Byrne, Alex. 2012a. “Knowing What I See.” In Introspection and Consciousness, edited by Declan Smithies and D. Stoljar, 183–210. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Byrne, Alex. 2012b. “Knowing What I Want.” In Consciousness and the Self, edited by J. Liu and J. Perry, 165–183. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Carruthers, Peter. 2006. “Why Pretend?” In The Architecture of Imagination, edited by S. Nichols, 89–110. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Chalmers, David. 2002. “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” In Conceivability and Possibility, edited by Tamar Gendler and John Hawthorne, 145–200. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Currie, G., and I. Ravenscroft. 2002. Recreative Minds: Imagination in Philosophy and Psychology. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Doggett, T., and A. Egan. 2007. “Wanting Things You Don't Want: The Case for an Imaginative Analogue of Desire.” Philosophers’ Imprint 7 (9): 1–17.
   Google Scholar
• Evans, Gareth. 1982. The Varieties of Reference. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Fodor, Jerry A. 1974. “Special Sciences (Or: The Disunity of Science as a Working Hypothesis).” Synthese 28 (2): 97–115. doi: 10.1007/BF00485230
   Google Scholar
• Gendler, Tamar. 2000. “The Puzzle of Imaginative Resistance.” The Journal of Philosophy 97 (2): 55–81. doi: 10.2307/2678446
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gendler, Tamar. 2005. “Imagination (Addendum).” In Encyclopedia of Philosophy, edited by Donald Borchert, 1–48. Detroit, MI: Macmillan.
   Google Scholar
• Goldman, Alvin. 2006. Simulating Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Harris, P. L., and R. D. Kavanaugh. 1993. Young Children's Understanding of Pretense. Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 58 (1, Serial No. 231).
   Google Scholar
• Hohwy, J. 2013. The Predictive Mind. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• von Holst, E., and H. Mittelstadt. 1950/1973. “Das Reafferenzprinzip. Naturwissenscaften” [The Reafference Principle]. In The Behavioral Physiology of Animals and Man. The Collected Papers of Erich von Holst, translated by R. Martin, Vol. 37; 464–476. Miami, FL: University of Miami Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kind, Amy. 2001. “Putting the Image Back in Imagination.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 62 (1): 85–109. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2001.tb00042.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kung, P. 2010. “Imagining as A Guide to Possibility.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (3): 620–663. doi: 10.1111/j.1933-1592.2010.00377.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Langland-Hassan, Peter. 2008. “Fractured Phenomenologies: Thought Insertion, Inner Speech, and the Puzzle of Extraneity.” Mind & Language 23 (4): 369–401. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2008.00348.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Langland-Hassan, Peter. 2012. “Pretense, Imagination, and Belief: The Single Attitude Theory.” Philosophical Studies 159: 155–179. doi: 10.1007/s11098-011-9696-3
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lillard, A. 1994. “Making Sense of Pretense.” In Children's Early Understanding of Mind: Origins and Development, edited by C. Lewis and P. Mitchell, 211–234. Hove: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.
   Google Scholar
• Lillard, A. S., and D. C. Witherington. 2004. “Mothers’ Behavior Modifications During Pretense and their Possible Signal Value for Toddlers.” Developmental Psychology 40 (1): 95–113. doi: 10.1037/0012-1649.40.1.95
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lycan, W. 1996. Consciousness and Experience. Cambridge: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Miall, R. C., D. J. Weir, D. M. Wolpert, and R. C. Stein. 1993. “Is the Cerebellum a Smith Predictor?” Journal of Motor Behavior 25: 203–216. doi: 10.1080/00222895.1993.9942050
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nichols, S., and S. Stich. 2000. “A Cognitive Theory of Pretense.” Cognition 74: 115–147. doi: 10.1016/S0010-0277(99)00070-0
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nichols, S., and S. Stich. 2003. Mindreading: An Integrated Account of Pretence, Self-Awareness, and Understanding of Other Minds. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Noordhof, Paul. 2002. “Imagining Objects and Imagining Experiences.” Mind and Language 17 (4): 426–455. doi: 10.1111/1468-0017.00206
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Onishi, K. H., and R. Baillargeon. 2005. “Do 15-Month-Old Infants Understand False Beliefs?” Science 308: 255–258. doi: 10.1126/science.1107621
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Peacocke, Christopher. 1985. “Imagination, Possibility and Experience.” In Essays on Berkeley: A Teracentennial Celebration, edited by John Foster and Howard Robinson, 19–36. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Rakoczy, Hannes, and Michael Tomasello. 2006. “Two-Year-Olds Grasp the Intentional Structure of Pretense Acts.” Developmental Science 9 (6): 557–564. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-7687.2006.00533.x
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rakoczy, Hannes, Michael Tomasello, and T. Striano. 2004. “Young Children Know That Trying is not Pretending: A Test of the ‘Behaving-as-if’ Construal of Children's Early Concept of ‘Pretense’.” Developmental Psychology 40 (3): 388–399. doi: 10.1037/0012-1649.40.3.388
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Shea, N. 2014. “Reward Prediction Error Signals are Meta-Representational.” Noûs 48 (2): 314–341. doi: 10.1111/j.1468-0068.2012.00863.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sobel, D. M. 2009. “Enabling Conditions and Children's Understanding of Pretense.” Cognition 113 (2): 177–188. doi:10.1016/j.cognition.2009.08.002.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sperry, R. W. 1950. “Neural Basis of the Spontaneous Optokinetic Response Produced by Visual Inversion.” The Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology 43: 482–489. doi: 10.1037/h0055479
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wolpert, D. M., Z. Ghahramani, and M. I. Jordan. 1995. “An Internal Model for Sensorimotor Integration.” Science 269 (5232): 1880–1882. doi: 10.1126/science.7569931
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Yablo, Stephen. 1993. “Is Conceivability and Guide to Possibility?” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 53 (1): 1–42. doi: 10.2307/2108052
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar