Processes and the philosophy of action

References

• Alvarez, Maria, and John Hyman. 1998. “Agents and Their Actions.” Philosophy (london, England) 73 (2): 219–245. doi:10.1017/S0031819198000199.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Armstrong, David M. 1968. A Materialist Theory of the Mind. London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Armstrong, David M. 1978a. Nominalism and Realism. Vol. 1 of Universals and Scientific Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Armstrong, David M. 1978b. A Theory of Universals. Vol. 2 of Universals and Scientific Realism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Armstrong, David M. 1989. Universals: An Opinionated Introduction. Boulder: Westview Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bennett, Jonathan. 1988. Events and Their Names. Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
   Google Scholar
• Bishop, John. 1989. Natural Agency: An Essay on the Causal Theory of Action. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bradley, Francis H. 1893. Appearance and Reality: A Metaphysical Essay. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Croether, Thomas. 2018. “Processes as Continuants and Processes as Stuffs.” In Process, Action and Experience, edited by Rowland Stout, 58–82. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Crowther, Thomas. 2011. “The Matter of Events.” Review of Metaphysics 65 (1): 3–39. https://www.jstor.org/stable/23055681.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Davidson, Donald. 2001. Essays on Actions and Events. 2nd ed. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Devitt, Michael. 1980. “‘Ostrich Nominalism’ or ‘Mirage Realism’?” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 61 (1980): 433–449. doi:10.1111/j.1468-0114.1980.tb00031.x.
   Google Scholar
• Galton, Antony. 2018. “Processes as Patterns of Occurrence.” In Process, Action and Experience, edited by Rowland Stout, 41–58. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Galton, Antony, and Riichiro Mizoguchi. 2009. “The Water Falls but the Waterfall Does not Fall: New Perspectives on Objects, Processes and Events.” Applied Ontology 4 (2): 71–107. doi:10.3233/AO-2009-0067.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Gill, Kathleen. 1993. “On the Metaphysical Distinction Between Processes and Events.” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 23 (3): 365–384. doi:10.1007/978-94-011-5052-1_7.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hornsby, Jennifer. 1980. Actions. London: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Hornsby, Jennifer. 2004. “Agency and Actions.” In Agency and Action, edited by Helen Steward, and John Hyman, 1–23. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Hornsby, Jennifer. 2012. “Actions and Activity.” Philosophical Issues 22 (1): 233–245. doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2012.00227.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hornsby, Jennifer. 2015. “Causality and “The Mental”.” Humana Mente; Journal of Philosophical Studies 8 (29): 125–140. http://www.humanamente.eu/index.php/HM/article/view/70.
   Google Scholar
• Kenny, Anthony. 1963. Action, Emotion and Will. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
   Google Scholar
• Kim, Jaegwon. 1976. “Events as Property Exemplifications.” In Action Theory, edited by Myles Brand, and Douglas Walton, 310–326. Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing Company.
   Google Scholar
• Lewis, David K. 1983. “New Work for a Theory of Universals.” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4): 343–377. doi:10.1080/00048408312341131.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lewis, David K. 1986. On the Plurality of Worlds. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Lombard, Lawrence B. 1986. Events: A Metaphysical Study. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
   Google Scholar
• Lowe, E. J. 2005. The Four-Category Ontology: A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Mourelatos, Alexander. 1978. “Events, Processes and States.” Linguistics and Philosophy 2 (3): 415–434. doi:10.1007/BF00149015.
   Google Scholar
• Quine, Willard van Orman. 1948. “On What There Is.” Review of Metaphysics 2 (1): 21–38. doi:10.2307/2267012.
   Google Scholar
• Rodríguez Pereyra, Gonzalo. 2002. Resemblance Nominalism: A Solution to the Problem of Universals. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
   Google Scholar
• Salmon, Wesley C. 1984. Scientific Explanation and the Causal Structure of the World. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Smith, Michael. 2012. “Four Objections to the Standard Story of Action (and Four Replies).” Philosophical Issues 22 (1): 387–401. doi:10.1111/j.1533-6077.2012.00236.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Steward, Helen. 2013. “Processes, Continuants, and Individuals.” Mind; A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 122 (487): 781–812. doi:10.1093/mind/fzt080.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stout, Rowland. 1997. “Processes.” Philosophy (London, England) 72 (279): 19–27. doi:10.1017/S0031819100056631.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Stout, Rowland. 2016. “The Category of Occurrent Continuants.” Mind; A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 125 (497): 41–62. doi:10.1093/mind/fzv138.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Vendler, Zeno. 1957. “Verbs and Times.” Philosophical Review 66 (2): 143–160. doi:10.2307/2182371.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar