Positive illusion and the normativity of substantive and structural rationality

References

• Berker, Selim. 2018. “A Combinatorial Argument Against Practical Reasons for Belief.” Analytic Philosophy 59 (4): 427–470. doi:10.1111/phib.12140
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bortolotti, Lisa. 2015. Irrationality. Cambridge: Polity.
   Google Scholar
• Broome, John. 2013. Rationality Through Reasoning. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Chignell, Andrew. 2018. "The Ethics of Belief." https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2018/entries/ethics-belief/.
   Google Scholar
• Cross, K. Patricia. 1977. “Not Can, but Will College Teaching be Improved?” New Directions for Higher Education 1977 (17): 1–15. doi:10.1002/he.36919771703.
   Google Scholar
• Daoust, Marc-Kevin. 2020. “The Explanatory Role of Consistency Requirements.” Synthese 197 (10): 4551–4569. doi:10.1007/s11229-018-01942-8.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Daoust, Marc-Kevin. forthcoming. “Structural Rationality and the Property of Coherence.” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, doi:10.1111/papq.12404.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dennett, Daniel. 1987. The Intentional Stance. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Gagné, Faby M., and John E. Lydon. 2004. “Bias and Accuracy in Close Relationships: An Integrative Review.” Personality and Social Psychology Review 8 (4): 322–338. doi:10.1207/s15327957pspr0804_1.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hieronymi, Pamela. 2005. “The Wrong Kind of Reason.” The Journal of Philosophy 102 (9): 437–457. doi:10.5840/jphil2005102933.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ho, Tsung-Hsing. 2018. “The Normativity of Doxastic Correctness.” American Philosophical Quarterly 55 (4): 379–388. doi:10.2307/45128632.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ho, Tsung-Hsing. 2021. “Evidentialists’ Internalist Argument for Pragmatism.” Logos and Episteme 12 (4): 427–436. doi:10.5840/logos-episteme202112433.
   Google Scholar
• Horowitz, Sophie. 2014. “Epistemic Akrasia.” Noûs 48 (4): 718–744. doi:10.1111/nous.12026
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kahneman, Daniel, Paul Slovic, and Amos Tversky. 1982. Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases. Vol. 36. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kiesewetter, Benjamin. 2017. The Normativity of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Kolodny, Niko. 2005. “Why Be Rational?” Mind; A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 114 (455): 509–563. doi:10.1093/mind/fzi509.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kolodny, Niko. 2008. “Why Be Disposed to Be Coherent?” Ethics 118 (3): 437–463. doi:10.1086/528783.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Langer, Ellen J. 1975. “The Illusion of Control.” Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 32 (2): 311–328. doi:10.1037/0022-3514.32.2.311.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lee, Wooram. 2020. “The Real Myth of Coherence.” Erkenntnis 87: 1211–1230. doi:10.1007/s10670-020-00239-y.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lee, Wooram. 2021. “The Independence of (In)Coherence.” Synthese 199 (3–4): 6563–6584. doi:10.1007/s11229-021-03081-z.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lord, Errol. 2017. “What You’re Rationally Required to Do and What You Ought to Do (Are the Same Thing!).” Mind; A Quarterly Review of Psychology and Philosophy 126 (504): 1109–1154. doi:10.1093/mind/fzw023.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lord, Errol. 2018. The Importance of Being Rational. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Marušić, Berislav. 2011. “The Ethics of Belief.” Philosophy Compass 6 (1): 33–43. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00368.x.
   Google Scholar
• Mason, H. E. 1996. Moral Dilemmas and Moral Theory. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• McConnell, Terrance. 2018. "Moral Dilemmas." https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2018/entries/moral-dilemmas.
   Google Scholar
• McKay, Ryan T., and Daniel C. Dennett. 2009. “The Evolution of Misbelief.” Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6): 493–510. doi:10.1017/S0140525X09990975.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Nisbett, Richard E., and Lee Ross. 1980. Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
   Google Scholar
• Olson, Jonas. 2004. “Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons.” The Philosophical Quarterly 54 (215): 295–300. doi:10.1111/j.0031-8094.2004.00353.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Parfit, Derek. 2011. On What Matters. 3 Vols. Vol. 1. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Shah, Nishi. 2006. “A New Argument for Evidentialism.” Philosophical Quarterly 56 (225): 481–498. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9213.2006.454.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sinnott-Armstrong, Walter. 1988. Moral Dilemmas. Vol. 39. Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Svenson, Ola. 1981. “Are We All Less Risky and More Skillful Than Our Fellow Drivers?” Acta Psychologica 47 (2): 143–148. doi:10.1016/0001-6918(81)90005-6
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Taylor, Shelley E., and Jonathon D. Brown. 1988. “Illusion and Well-Being: A Social Psychological Perspective on Mental Health.” Psychological Bulletin 103 (2): 193–210. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.103.2.193
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Taylor, Shelley E., and Jonathon D. Brown. 1994. “Positive Illusions and Well-Being Revisited: Separating Fact from Fiction.” Psychological Bulletin 116 (1): 21–27. doi:10.1037/0033-2909.116.1.21
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Taylor, S. E., M. E. Kemeny, G. M. Reed, J. E. Bower, and T. L. Gruenewald. 2000. “Psychological Resources, Positive Illusions, and Health.” The American Psychologist 55 (1): 99–109. doi:10.1037/0003-066X.55.1.99.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Tessman, Lisa. 2015. Moral Failure: On the Impossible Demands of Morality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Way, Jonathan. 2010. “The Normativity of Rationality.” Philosophy Compass 5 (12): 1057–1068. doi:10.1111/j.1747-9991.2010.00357.x.
   Google Scholar
• Way, Jonathan. 2012. “Transmission and the Wrong Kind of Reason.” Ethics 122 (3): 489–515. doi:10.1086/664749.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Way, Jonathan. 2016. “Two Arguments for Evidentialism.” Philosophical Quarterly 66 (265): 805–818. doi:10.1093/pq/pqw026.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wedgwood, Ralph. 2017. The Value of Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Wenger, Andrew, and Blaine J. Fowers. 2008. “Positive Illusions in Parenting: Every Child Is Above Average.” Journal of Applied Social Psychology 38 (3): 611–634. doi:10.1111/j.1559-1816.2007.00319.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Worsnip, Alex. 2018. “What is (In)Coherence?” In Oxford Studies in Metaethics. Vol. 13, 184–206. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Worsnip, Alex. 2021a. Fitting Things Together: Coherence and the Demands of Structural Rationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Worsnip, Alex. 2021b. “Making Space for the Normativity of Coherence.” Noûs 56 (2): 393–415. doi:10.1111/nous.12362.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zimmerman, Michael J. 1996. The Concept of Moral Obligation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
   Google Scholar