NOTES
- S Freud, “Inhibitions, Symptoms, Anxiety,” Vol 10: The Penguin Freud Library On Psychopathology: Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety and Other Works, trans. J Strachey, London: Penguin, 1993, p 288.
- ibid.
- A Green, “Conceptions of Affect”, On Private Madness, trans. T Hartnup, London: Karnac, 1997, p 174.
- Freud accounts for affects in this way in both Studies on Hysteria (1893–95) and again in “Inhibitions, Symptoms, Anxiety” (1926). See Freud's case study of “Fraülein Elisabeth von R”, S Freud and J Breuer, Vol 3: Penguin Freud Library Studies on Hysteria, trans. J and A Strachey, London: Penguin, 1991, p 254. He explicitly refers to Darwin in the first work. As the editor indicates in “Inhibitions, Symptoms and Anxiety”, p 235, Freud reiterates this same point in the later work.
- C Darwin, The Expression of the Emotions in Man and Animals, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1965, p 12. For a brilliant discussion of the Lamarckian aspects of Darwin's work on the emotions, and its influence upon Freud, see EA Wilson, “Darwin's Nervous System: Investigating Critical and Physiological Psychology”, Australian Psychologist 36.1 April 2001: pp 62–9.
- S Freud, “The Ego and the Id”, (1923) Vol 11: Penguin Freud Library On Metapsychology: The Theory of Psychoanalysis, trans. J Strachey, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1984, p 360.
- Sublimation is an undeveloped part of Freud's theory. James Strachey notes, in an editorial footnote, that there may have been a paper directly on sublimation, which was lost or destroyed. Strachey in Freud, “Instincts and their Vicissitudes” (1915). On Metapsychology, p 123, fn 4. The renunciative aspect of sublimation can be complicated, as both Elizabeth Grosz and Sarah Kofman demonstrate, by emphasising the plasticity of the drives. Kofman, The Childhood of Art: An Interpretation of Freud's Aesthetics, trans. W Woodhull, New York: Columbia University Press, 1988, pp 159–64; E Grosz, The Strange Detours of Sublimation: Psychoanalysis, Homosexuality and Art, Sydney: Artspace, 1997.
- In a suggestive introduction to the Umbr(a) special issue on aesthetics and sublimation, Joan Copiec notes that the compensatory aspect of sublimation could also be critically inflected as resistance. She connects sublimation with sensory life, rather than the renunciation of it through idealisation Umbr(a): A Journal of the Unconscious 1 1999, pp 8–9.
- It might also be possible to link Tomkins with Freud around the issue of interest. Freud does initially have a concept of general interest that is separate from libido when he distinguishes the ego (self preservation) instincts and the sexual instincts; with the introduction of the death drive this notion of general interest disappears. Strachey indicates that the last use of “interest” occurs in “Lecture 26: Libido Theory and Narcissism” (1917). Vol 1: The Pelican Freud Library Introductory Lectures: On Psychoanalysis, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1973, p 464, fn 1.
- E Kosofsky Sedgwick and A Frank, “Shame in the Cybernetic Fold: Reading Silvan Tomkins”, Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins Reader, E Kosofsky Sedgwick and A Frank (eds), Durham: Duke University Press, 1995, p 2.
- S Tomkins, Affect Imagery Consciousness: Vol 1 The Positive Affects (New York: Springer, 1962). Startle, he says, is “ancillary to every other affect since it orients the individual to turn his attention away from one thing to another”: p 498.
- C Bollas, Hysteria, London: Routledge, 2000, p 43.
- A Green, The Fabric of Affect in the Psychoanalytic Discourse, trans. A Sheridan, London: Routledge, 1999, pp 178, 252.
- Freud, “Inhibitions”, pp 289–90.
- Freud, “Fraülein Elisabeth von R”, Studies on Hysteria, pp 254–5.
- For Merleau-Ponty, the body, as it were, takes up its possibility for being, given to it by the flesh. This is presented in more intentional terms: “I lend them my body in order that they inscribe upon it and give me their resemblance, this fold, this central cavity of the visible which is my vision.” This fold in the flesh, the body, is given to the subject by the flesh. The existence of the body for-itself is affirmed when the body sees itself or touches itself. The specific fold formed in the flesh of the world by the body's self-affirmation of its existence does not deny its continuous and interimplicated relation with that world. The individuated embodiment (the fold) remains indebted to the flesh of the world. See Merleau-Ponty, The Visible and the Invisible, trans. A Lingis, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968, p 146.
- This phrase from Grünbaum is quoted approvingly by Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception trans. C Smith, London: Routledge, 1989, p 142.
- For a concise explanation of this idea see C Caruth, “An Interview with Jean Laplanche”, Postmodern Culture, 11.2 2001, pp 1–12.
- Against the common view that affects are disorganisers, Tomkins argues for their role as amplifiers of the drives: S Tomkins, Affect Imagery Consciousness: Vol 1 The Positive Affects, New York: Springer, 1962, pp 40–46.
- See J Laplanche and JB Pontalis, The Language of Psychoanalysis, London: Karnac, 1988, for a discussion of both identification in Freud and projective identification in Melanie Klein, pp 205–7, 356–7.
- Freud, ‘The ‘Uncanny’”, Vol 14: Penguin Freud Library Art and Literature, trans. J Strachey, Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990, p 358.