- For a comparison between English law and the position in certain civil law jurisdictions see eg Luigi Russi, Cooperation Before Contract: The Law and Policy of Expenses Incurred During Negotiations in Comparative Perspective (Vandeplas, Lake Mary 2009); John Cartwright and Martijn Hesselink (eds), Precontractual Liability in European Private Law (CUP, Cambridge 2008); Joachim Dietrich, ‘Classifying Precontractual Liablity: A Comparative Analysis’ (2001) 21 Legal Studies 153.
- See eg Lord Neuberger of Abbotsbury, ‘The Stuffing of Minerva's Owl: Taxonomy and Taxidermy in Equity' [2009] Cambridge LJ 537, 544 casting possible doubt on the result in Crabb v Arun District Council [1976] 1 Ch 179 (CA) (’Crabb’).
- Of course, a non-promissory liability may arise if, for example, A makes a fraudulent misrepresentation to B: see eg Markov v ABC Transfer and Storage Co 76 Wash 2d 388 (1969) (Supreme Court of Washington) (’Markov’).
- [2001] EWCA Civ 274 (’Baird Textiles’).
- Baird Textiles (n 4) [30]. The contention made here is that the promise was too uncertain to give rise to any form of promissory liability.
- See eg Regalian Properties plc v London Docklands Development Corp [1995] 1 WLR 212 (Ch) (’Regalian Properties’); A-G of Hong Kong v Humphreys Estate (Queen's Gardens) Ltd [1987] AC 114 (PC). Of course, this is not to suggest that the absence of a ‘subject to contract’ stipulation necessarily means that the first stage has been passed: see eg Lord Neuberger (n 2) 541.
- Unreported, Ch, 21 June 2000, Hart J.
- [1954] 1 QB 428 (QB).
- [2008] 1 WLR 1752. See too Benedetti v Sawaris [2009] EWHC 1330 (Ch) (’Benedetti’) and Whittle Movers Ltd v Hollywood Express Ltd [2009] EWCA Civ 1189 (’Whittle Movers’).
- Crabb (n 2).
- For an argument that this detachment is the defining feature of contractual liability, see Dori Kimel, From Promise to Contract: Towards a Liberal Theory of Contract (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2003).
- This point is discussed in Susan Bright and Ben McFarlane, ‘Proprietary Estoppel and Property Rights’ [2005] Cambridge LJ 449, 458–66.
- See eg Markov (n 3).
- For example, in Leading Edge Events Australia Pty Ltd v Kiri Te Kanawa [2007] NSWSC 288 (Supreme Court of New South Wales (NSWSC)) (’Leading Edges Events’), B made claims against A under the New South Wales Fair Trading Act 1987 s 42 and the Commonwealth of Australia Trade Practices Act 1974 s 52. Those claims were unsuccessful, but B was permitted to recover some of the costs of its pre-contractual expenses through a quantum meruit claim: the facts of the case fit with the general model set out in this article. They also provide an interesting partner to Elvin Associates v Franklin 735 F Supp 1177 (1990) (United States District Court, SD New York) (’Elvin’), in which the recovery of such expenses was also allowed: in each case the planned contract concerned the holding of a musical event; and in each case, a star's reluctance to board an airplane contributed to the collapse of the project.
- For discussion of such a possibility see eg David McLauchlan, ‘Rethinking Agreements to Agree’ (1998) 18 New Zealand UL Rev 77 and David McLauchlan, ‘In Defence of the Fourth Category of Preliminary Agreements: Or Are There Only Two?’ (2005) 21 J of Contract L 286.
- See eg Walford v Miles [1992] 2 AC 128 (HL) (’Walford’).
- The term is used by E Allan Farnsworth, ‘Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements: Fair Dealing and Failed Negotiations' (1987) 87 Columbia L Rev 217.
- See eg E Allan Farnsworth, Contracts (4th edn, Aspen, New York 2005) [3.26]; Jason Johnston, ‘Investment, Information and Promissory Liability’ (2004) 152 U of Pennsylvania L Rev 1923.
- Richard Craswell, ‘Offer, Acceptance and Efficient Reliance’ (1996) 48 Stanford L Rev 481.
- See eg Easat Antennas (n 7) and Cyberchron Corp v Calldata Systems Development Inc 47 F 3d 39 (1995) 46 (United States Court of Appeals, 2nd Circuit) (’Cyberchron’): the decisions are discussed below in sections B. 2 and C.1 respectively. The potential benefits of pre-contractual work in the context of preparing for a concert were noted by Bergin J in Leading Edge Events (n 14) [263]–[266].
- Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott, ‘Precontractual Liability and Preliminary Agreements’ (2007) 120 Harvard L Rev 661.
- Schwartz and Scott (n 24) 689.
- Omri Ben-Shahar and John Pottow, ‘On the Stickiness of Default Rules’ (2006) 33 Florida State UL Rev 651, 682.
- Robert Scott, ‘A Theory of Self-Enforcing Indefinite Agreements’ (2003) 103 Columbia L Rev 1641.
- See eg Schwartz and Scott (n 24); Robert Scott, ‘Hoffman v Red Owl Stores and the Myth of Precontractual Reliance’ (2007) 68 Ohio State LJ 71, 99: ‘In sum, courts will not grant recovery for “early reliance” unless the parties, by agreeing on something significant, have indicated their intention to be bound’. Note too that McLauchlan (n 18), in arguing for the enforcement of at least some preliminary agreements, focuses on those agreements that are intended by the parties to be legally binding.
- This point is forcefully made by Kimel (n 11) 140–1 and is supported by the decisions in, for example, Yeoman's Row (n 9); Crabb (n 2); Sabemo Pty Ltd v North Sydney Municipal Council [1977] 2 NSWLR 880 (NSWSC) (’Sabemo’); E K Nominees Pty Ltd v Woolworths Ltd [2006] NSWSC 1172 (NSWSC).
- Easat Antennas (n 7) [4].
- Easat Antennas (n 7) [43].
- Easat Antennas (n 7) [11].
- See Walford (n 16). For discussion of this rule, and arguments in favour of disregarding it, see the references cited at n 15 and n 17.
- See too Benedetti (n 9), where B's work assisted A to conclude a lucrative deal with a third party.
- See too Whittle Movers (n 9). No award was made by the Court of Appeal in that case, but the possibility of protection for B's pre-contractual reliance was recognised: an instruction was given for an inquiry to be made by as to whether B's work led to an unjust enrichment of A. See further Section C. 3 below.
- See section C. 2 below for a consideration of why B's successful claim is not a simple contractual claim.
- Thorner v Major [2009] UKHL 18 [5] (’Thorner’).
- See Kenneth Hayne, ‘Anticipated Contracts that Fail to Materialise’ in Simone Degeling and James Edelman (eds), Unjust Enrichment in Commercial Law (Lawbook Co, Sydney 2008) 249 (emphasis omitted). Similar approaches are evident in Countrywide Communications Ltd v ICL Pathway Ltd [1999] All ER (D) 1192 (HC) (’Countrywide Communications’) and Sabemo (n 26).
- For example, the principle of ‘estoppel by acquiescence’ seems to depend not on a commitment by A, but on A's failure to intervene when B undertakes work on A's land in a mistaken belief as to B's own rights in the land: see eg Ramsden v Dyson (1866) LR 1 HL 129, 141 (Lord Cranworth), 168 (Lord Wensleydale).
- For recent consideration of the doctrine by the House of Lords, see Thorner (n 34). See further Ben McFarlane, The Structure of Property Law (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2008) ch E4.
- This was accepted by Lord Denning MR in Crabb (n 2) 187.
- See eg Bright and McFarlane (n 14); Andrew Robertson, ‘The Reliance Basis of Proprietary Estoppel Remedies’ (2008) 4 The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 295. For an alternative view see eg Simon Gardner, ‘The Remedial Discretion in Proprietary Estoppel—Again’ (2006) 122 LQ Rev 492.
- [2000] Ch 162 (CA).
- [2001] EWCA Civ 1754 (’Lloyd’).
- [2005] EWCA Civ 45.
- See Ben McFarlane, ‘Proprietary Estoppel and Failed Contractual Negotiations’ (2005) 6 The Conveyancer and Property Lawyer 501.
- (1998) 75 P&CR 447 (CA) (’Pridean’).
- Pridean (n 48) 451–2.
- Pridean (n 48) 452.
- (1989) 16 NSWLR 582 (New South Wales Court of Appeal).
- [1952] TLR 409 (CA).
- Regalian Properties (n 6).
- 133 NW 2d 267 (1965) (Supreme Court of Wisconsin).
- Hoffman (n 50) 275.
- Section 90 has been described as ‘… perhaps the most radical and expansive development of [the 20th] century in the law of promissory liability’: Charles Knapp, ‘Reliance in the Revised Restatement: The Proliferation of Promissory Estoppel' (1981) 81 Columbia L Rev 52, 53. As set out in the First Restatement (1932) it provides that: ‘A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character on the part of the promisee and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise’. The revised version in the Second Restatement (1981) states that: ‘(1) A promise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on the part of the promisee or a third person and which does induce such action or forbearance is binding if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires'. A new section 90(2) also provides a special rule allowing for promises to be enforced without reliance in cases of charitable subscriptions or marriage settlements.
- For an example of promissory estoppel being used in such a way see Ricketts v Scothorn 77 NW 365 (1898) (Supreme Court of Nebraska) (’Ricketts’). Note in particular Sullivan J's comments at 366: ‘It seems to us that the true reason [for enforcing A's promise] is the preclusion of the defendant, under the doctrine of estoppel, to deny the consideration’.
- Hoffman (n 50) 275. See also Cyberchron (n 20) discussed in section B.3.
- In discussing different forms of estoppel, Treitel makes the key distinction between those forms which relate to a party's ability to plead or prove a particular matter of fact or law, and those which instead attribute legal consequences to a promise or action of a party: Sir Guenter Treitel, Landmarks of Twentieth Century Contract Law (Clarendon Press, Oxford 2002) 37–40.
- Cyberchron (n 20).
- Including the issue of what penalties were to be applied if the equipment supplied was over-weight.
- Cyberchron (n 20) 46 referring to the passage in the District Court's judgment (831 F Supp 116).
- The case is analogous to Lloyd (n 41) in which B expressed concerns to A about doing work on land before the conclusion of a contract for the sale of A's long lease to B. A assured B that A was a ‘man of [his] word' ([5]). A then withdrew from contractual negotiations and it was held that B had a proprietary estoppel claim against A. A number of further American decisions also suggest that A's liability depends on A having led B to believe that an agreement in principle would be honoured: see Werner v Xerox Corp 732 F 2d 580 (1984) (Court of Appeal of Wisconsin); Elvin (n 14); Bixler v First National Bank of Oregon 49 Or App 195 (1980) (Court of Appeal of Oregon).
- See also Hoffman (n 50); Elvin (n 14); Janke Construction Co v Vulcan Materials Co 386 F Supp 687 (1974) (District Court of Wisconsin).
- This point has been noted by, for example, Hayne (n 35). See also McLauchlan ‘Rethinking Agreements to Agree’ (n 18) and ‘In Defence of the Fourth Category of Preliminary Agreements: Or Are There Only Two?’ (n 18); Steve Hedley, ‘Work Done in Anticipation of a Contract that Does Not Materialise: A Response’ in William Cornish, Richard Nolan, Janet O'Sullivan and Graham Virgo (eds), Restitution: Past, Present and Future: Essays in Honour of Gareth Jones (Hart Publishing, Oxford 1998) 195.
- Way v Latilla [1937] 3 All ER 759 (HL) and British Steel Corporation v Cleveland Bridge and Engineering Co Ltd [1984] 1 All ER 504 (QB) appear to be examples, although the court in the latter case did not apply a contractual analysis.
- Brewer Street (n 8) 435.
- Rather, as Denning LJ noted in Brewer Street (n 8) 436: ‘the parties themselves did not envisage the situation which has emerged and did not provide for it; and we do not know what they would have provided if they had envisaged it’. See further Ewan McKendrick, ‘Work Done in Anticipation of a Contract that Does Not Materialise' in Cornish et al (n 61) 163.
- Peter Millett, ‘Crabb v Arun District Council: A Riposte' (1976) 92 LQ Rev 342, 343.
- Law of Property Act 1925 s 40. See now Law of Property (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1989 s 2, under which an unwritten agreement for the sale or other disposition of an interest in land imposes no contractual duty on A (not even an unenforceable duty).
- Patrick Atiyah, ‘When is an Enforceable Agreement not a Contract? Answer: When it is an Equity’ (1976) 92 LQ Rev 174.
- Atiyah (n 67) also invoked developments in the United States, stating at 179 that: ‘It is worth observing that a parallel phenomenon is occurring in the United States, where the huge growth of the doctrine of promissory estoppel is seen, by some at least, as threatening to engulf the entire law of contract’.
- See eg Daniel Farber and John Matheson, ‘Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract Law and the “Invisible Handshake”’ (1985) 52 U of Chicago L Rev 903, arguing that the s 90 principle promotes contract law's mission in enforcing promises made in furtherance of economic activity; Jay Feinman, ‘The Last Promissory Estoppel Article’ (1992) 61 Fordham L Rev 303, arguing that it instead promotes the relational goal of contract law.
- See eg Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Ohio State University Press, Columbus 1974) 72.
- See eg Edward Yorio and Steve Thel, ‘The Promissory Basis of Section 90’ (1991) 101 Yale LJ 111, arguing that the effect of the s 90 principle is to ensure that seriously-made promises are enforced, even if unsupported by consideration. See also Randy Barnett, ‘The Death of Reliance’ (1996) 46 J of Legal Education 518; ‘Is Reliance Still Dead?’ (2001) 38 San Diego L Rev 1, arguing that the principle permits the enforcement of promises intended to be legally binding.
- See Cardozo J's dictum, in the context of charitable subscriptions, in Allegheny College v National Chautauqua County Bank of Jamestown 159 NE 173 (1927) (New York Court of Appeal (NYCA)) 175: ‘we have adopted the doctrine of promissory estoppel as the equivalent of consideration in connection with our law of charitable subscriptions'.
- See Farnsworth (n 17) [2.19]: ‘even during the nineteenth century, reliance on a gratuitous promise came to be recognized as a basis for recovery in a few categories of cases'.
- The same point was made in relation to the common law in Australia by Mason CJ and Wilson J in Waltons Stores (1988) 164 CLR 387 (High Court of Australia (HCA)) [25]–[26].
- See eg Spiegel v Spear & Co 234 NY 479 (1923) (NYCA).
- See eg Ricketts (n 53) 367, discussed in section C.1 above. Compare the similar English case of Shadwell v Shadwell (1860) 142 ER 62 (CCP) in which B's marriage following A's promise to pay B a yearly sum during B's life was said to provide consideration for A's promise.
- See eg Bainbridge v Firmstone (1838) 8 A&E 743, 112 ER 1019 (KB). Edwin Peel (ed), Treitel on the Law of Contract (12th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007) 169–70 treats such promises as a special case in which enforcement is possible despite the likely absence of consideration.
- See Michael Metzger and Michael Phillips, ‘The Emergence of Promissory Estoppel as an Independent Theory of Recovery’ (1983) 35 Rutgers L Rev 472.
- This point is implicitly conceded in the analysis of Yorio and Thel (n 71) and Randy Barnett and Mary Becker, ‘Beyond Reliance: Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities and Misrepresentations' (1987) 15 Hofstra L Rev 443: in each article the authors wish to emphasize the function of s 90 in enforcing promises, but are forced to recognize that this approach cannot explain all s 90 cases. As a result, the authors are forced to suggest alternative explanations for those cases, focusing on the possibility of a tort claim for misrepresentation. Metzger and Phillips (n 78) do recognise the significance of cases such as Hoffman (n 50), but they also use this decision as the basis for a wider assessment of the nature of contract law, arguing at 505 that: ‘[i]n its customary role as substitute for various contractual elements, promissory estoppel has eroded the integrity of the classical syndrome from within’.
- See eg Gareth Jones, ‘Claims Arising Out of Anticipated Contracts Which Do Not Materialise’ (1980) 18 U West Ontario L Rev 447; John Carter, ‘Ineffective Transactions’ in Paul Finn (ed), Essays on Restitution (Lawbook Co, Sydney 1990) 206; McKendrick (n 64); Kit Barker, ‘Coping with Failure’ (2003) 19 J of Contract L 105; Hayne (n 35).
- In addition to Yeoman's Row (n 9), see Benedetti (n 9) and Whittle Movers (n 9).
- Yeoman's Row (n 9) [4].
- See eg Gareth Jones (ed), Goff and Jones, The Law of Restitution (7th edn, Sweet & Maxwell, London 2007) [26.001]–[26.010], referring to difficulties unresolved by the ‘sparse body of English law’ on the question.
- Yeoman's Row (n 9) [42].
- See too Benedetti (n 9) [574]–[575].
- Yeoman's Row (n 9) [43].
- In this context, it is important to note that in Benedetti (n 9) at least some of B's work was undertaken at a time when B mistakenly believed that he was contractually entitled to a particular reward for that work.
- See eg Samuel Stoljar, ‘Unjust Enrichment and Unjust Sacrifice’ (1987) 50 Modern L Rev 603; Garry Muir, ‘Unjust Sacrifice and the Officious Intervener’ in Finn (n 80) 297; Jack Beatson, The Use and Abuse of Unjust Enrichment: Essays on the Law of Restitution (Clarendon Press, Oxford 1991) 36–9. The judgment of Bergin J in Leading Edge Events (n 14) [269] provides an example of the convolutions necessary to find a benefit to A in a case where B's pre-contractual reliance was deemed worthy of protection.
- Sabemo (n 26).
- Sabemo (n 26) 897.
- Sabemo (n 26) 902–3.
- Coleman Engineering Co v North American Aviation 420 P 2d 713 (1966) (Supreme Court of California) 729: ‘If in fact the performance of services has conferred no benefit on the person requesting them, it is pure fiction to base restitution on a benefit conferred’.
- See eg Beatson (n 88) 34: ‘[Brewer Street] is particularly striking as since the work was done on the plaintiff's property’. Barker (n 80), whilst generally favouring an unjust enrichment analysis, admits that, even under a wider test of benefit than that currently used, it would not be possible to show an enrichment of A in Brewer Street (n 8).
- This point is expanded on by Hayne (n 35) 250–1.
- Lord Scott's reasons for rejecting that alternative analysis are set out at Yeoman's Row (n 9) [41].
- Countrywide Communications (n 35). See also Regalian Properties (n 6); Easat Antennas (n 7).
- Countrywide Communications (n 35) 349.
- Countrywide Communications (n 35) 349.
- See n 9.
- Whittle Movers (n 9) [46].
- Kit Barker has argued that any liability in unjust enrichment of A to B must be justified by the prospect of some harm to B: see eg ‘The Nature of Responsibility for Gain’ in Robert Chambers, Charles Mitchell and James Penner (eds), Philosophical Foundations of Unjust Enrichment (OUP, Oxford, 2009). He argues at 162 fn 52 that cases where B performs a service for A can be brought within this rationale as such cases involve a ‘set-back of entitlement’, coming from the fact that ‘we have both a moral interest in, and right to, our time and labour and that interest is set back when we expend those resources'. A reliance-based model can perhaps be seen as giving more complete and direct recognition to that interest.
- One possible role is where B's work occurs before any relevant conduct of A (so that B cannot be said to have relied on A), but A then later chooses to take advantage of B's work to acquire a benefit: compare eg Weatherby v Banham (1832) 5 C & P 228 and the discussion at Ben McFarlane, ‘Blue Haven Enterprises Ltd v Tully [2006] UKPC 17: case note' (2006) 1 Journal of Equity 156, 158–9. It is however worth noting that s 23 of the Third Restatement of Restitution and Unjust Enrichment (Tentative Draft No 2, 2002) rejects any role for unjust enrichment reasoning in cases of pre-contractual reliance. Moreover, the reasoning of Gummow, Hayne, Crennan and Kiefel JJ in Lumbers v W Cook Builders Pty Ltd (2008) 232 CLR 635 (HCA), and, in particular, its analysis of the earlier High Court of Australia decision in Pavey & Matthews Pty Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221, is inimical to the application of unjust enrichment to cases of pre-contractual reliance.
- It is worth noting that in Benedetti (n 9) [563], Patten J held that B's quantum meruit claim could include a reward for services rendered to A which duplicated services also provided to A by a third party. I am grateful to Professor Graham Virgo for bringing this aspect of the decision to my attention. It is of course explicable under a reliance-based model, but not under a wholly benefit-based model.
- Yeoman's Row (n 9) [14].
- Treitel (n 55) 37–40.
- Waltons Stores (n 74).
- Waltons Stores (n 74) (Deane and Gaudron JJ).
- Waltons Stores (n 74) (Mason CJ and Wilson J) (Brennan J).
- Waltons Stores (n 74) 404.
- Waltons Stores (n 74) 405. That formulation reflects the language used in s 90 of the Second Restatement of Contracts, that A's promise will be binding ‘if injustice can be avoided only by enforcement of the promise. The remedy granted for breach may be limited as justice requires'.
- Waltons Stores (n 74) 408.
- Where A's commitment relates both to land and other property, the doctrine may also apply to give B a claim in relation to property other than land: re Basham [1986] 1 WLR 1498 (Ch). It has also been suggested that the doctrine can apply where A's commitment relates to intellectual property: Yeda Research & Development Co Ltd v Rhone-Poulenc Rorer International Holdings Inc [2007] UKHL 43 [22] (Lord Hoffmann).
- The position in Hoffman (n 50) was complicated by the fact that, after B had acquired the land in question, A was then to procure a third party to buy the land from B, construct a store on the land, and then lease the land back to B.
- For further discussion on this point see McFarlane (n 37) 445–6.
- The unsuitability of using the term ‘promissory estoppel’ to describe a principle that gives rise to an independent cause of action has been noted by both courts and commentators in America: see Pavel Enterprises v AS Johnson 674 A 2d 521 (Md 1996) (Court of Appeals of Maryland); Eric Mills Holmes, ‘Restatement of Promissory Estoppel’ (1996) 32 Willamette L Rev 263. Holmes at 275 prefers the term ‘equitable detrimental reliance’.
- [1947] KB 130 (KB).
- That principle seems to have been considered as applicable by the Court of Appeal in Collier v P & MJ Wright (Holdings) Ltd [2007] EWCA Civ 1329.
- This point is important in considering the application of the principle where B's duty arises under a contract required to be made or evidenced in writing. For example, if a contract for the sale of goods were covered by the Statute of Frauds 1677, an oral variation of the contract would not be enforceable. However, A's acceptance of a modified performance would discharge B's duty under that written contract.
- (1877) 2 App Cas 439 (HL).
- B had written to A proposing to defer the repairs, and A had agreed to that proposal: Hughes (n 136) 444–5 (Lord Cairns LC).
- See DM Gordon ‘Creditors' Promises to Forego Debts’ [1963] Cambridge LJ 222.
- [1951] KB 215 (KB), 220.
- Samuel Williston and George Thompson, A Treatise on the Law of Contracts Revised Edition (Baker Voorhis and Co, New York 1936) Vol 1 ss 129–40. The correspondence between the approach of Denning LJ and Williston on Contracts is pointed out by Donal Nolan, ‘Following in Their Footsteps: Equitable Estoppel in Australia and the United States’ (2000) 11 King's College LJ 202.
- See eg McFarlane and Andrew Robertson, ‘The Death of Proprietary Estoppel’ [2008] Lloyd's Maritime and Commercial LQ 449.
- Thorner (n 34).
- Lord Neuberger (n 2) 543.
- Yeoman's Row (n 9) [68].
- Yeoman's Row (n 9) [38].
- It is interesting to note by way of comparison that, in Stack v Dowden [2007] UKHL 17 Lord Neuberger expressed concern about a similar distinction, made by the other members of the House of Lords in that case, between domestic cases on the one hand (in which resulting trusts principles do not apply) and other cases (where resulting trusts principles can apply). He said at [107] ‘while the domestic context can give rise to very different factual considerations from the commercial context, I am unconvinced that this justifies a different approach in principle to the issue of the ownership of the beneficial interest in property held in joint names'.
- It is abundantly clear that, in non-commercial proprietary estoppel cases, there is no requirement that B must believe he already has a legal right. See eg Wayling v Jones (1995) 69 P&CR 170 (CA); Campbell v Griffin [2001] EWCA Civ 990; Ottey v Grundy [2003] EWCA Civ 1176; Gillett v Holt [2001] Ch 210 (CA); Jennings v Rice [2002] EWCA Civ 159.
Oxford University Commonwealth Law Journal
Volume 10, 2010 - Issue 1