- See J.M. Balkin, “What is a Postmodern Constitutionalism?,” 90 Michigan Law Review 1966, 1967–72 (1992), for a brief survey of the various “facets” of postmodernism.
- See Berel Lang, “The Representation of Limits,” Probing the Limits, at 314.
- Gertrude Himmelfarb, “Telling it as you like it: Post-modernist history and the flight from feet,” Times Literary Supplement, October 16, 1992, at 12–15.
- Steven Connor, letter to the editor, Times Literary Supplement, November 13, 1992, at 17.
- George Will, “All the reasons for picking Bush,” Roanoke Times & World News, Oct. 26, 1992, at A9.
- David Lehman, “Point,” in debate entitled “Oh No, [de] Man again!,” Lingua Franca, April 1991, at 28.
- Gerald Graff, “What Has Literary Theory Wrought?,” The Chronicle of Higher Education, Feb. 12, 1992, at 48.
- Letters to the Editor, “Literature, Politics, and ‘Heart of Darkness,’” The Chronicle of Higher Education, March 11, 1992, at B4 (letter by Barbara Rhoades Ellis).
- Id. (letter by Barry R. Gross).
- Id. (letter by William McMahon).
- David Lehman, Signs of the Times: Deconstruction and the Fall of Paul de Man (New York: Poseidon Press, 1988).
- Lehman, supra note 6, at 32.
- Id.
- Walter Kendrick, “Counterpoint” in the debate, supra note 6, at 27.
- Id., at 28, 31.
- See R.V. Young, “Deconstruction and the Fear and Loathing of Logos,” 34 Modem Age 143,145 (1992).
- See, e.g., Gary Peller, “The Metaphysics of American Law,” 73 California Law Review 1151 (1985) (using Derrida); Peter Goodrich, “Psychoanalysis in Legal Education: Notes on the Violence of the Sign,” 1 Law And Semiotics 193 (R. Kevelson ed., 1987), (informed by Foucault, Derrida, and Lacan, as well as by Kristeva and Irigaray); see generally Thomas C. Heller, “Structuralism and Critique,” 36 Stanford Law Review 127 (1984) (exploring Saussure and his influence on Derrida and Foucault).
- See J. M. Balkin, “Nested Oppositions,” 99 Yale Law Journal 1669 (1990).
- Norman Holland, The Critical I, at 3–19 (1992); citations to each book here reviewed will appear in the text discussing that book as page numbers in parentheses, e.g., “(p. 50).”
- By almost all accounts, including Holland's, the publication of Chomsky's Syntactic Structures in 1957 was revolutionary—it is supposedly “known among linguists as the Event.” Rymer, supra note 47, at 41. Expanding the discipline of linguistics into psycholinguistics, Chomsky outlined a cognitive and mentalistic psychology of language. So-called “learning” theories of language could not account for children's rapid language acquisition, universal “competence” principles, and the creative productivity in language systems. L S. Hearnshaw, The Shaping of Modern Psychology (New York: Routledge, 1987), p. 287. Chomsky's review of B. F. Skinner's Verbal Behavior (1957), see 35 Language 26 (1959), was a “devasting and indeed almost mortal blow to behaviorist ideology.” Hearnshaw, supra, at 286. A more mature or “powerful” explanation of language then appeared in Aspects of the Theory of Syntax (1965), where Chomsky confirmed that
- language is defined by syntactical structure (not by the use of the structure in communication [= performance]) and syntactical structure is determined by innate properties of the human mind (not by needs of communication).
- John Searle, “Chomsky's Revolution in Linguistics,” On Noam Chomsky: Critical Essays, G. Harmon, ed. (Amherst: University of Massachussetts Press, 1982), p. 17. In Chomsky's account, phonological (sound structure) and semantic (meaning structure) components, fundamental to structural linguistics, are not generative and are therefore less significant for understanding language and the workings of the human mind. Id., at 9.
- These ideas are developed in Lacan's major writings in English, including Écrits: A Selection, A. Sheridan, trans. (New York: Norton, 1977); The Four Fundamental Concepts Of Psychoanalysis, J.A. Miller, ed., A. Sheridan, trans. (New York: Norton, 1977); Book I of The Seminar Of Jacques Lacan: Freud's Papers on Technique, J.-A. Miller, ed., J. Forrester trans. (New York: Norton, 1988); Book II of The Seminar Of Jacques Lacan: The Ego in Freud's Theory and in the Technique of Psychoanalysis, J.-A. Miller, ed., S. Tomaselli, trans. (New York: Norton, 1988); and Book VII of The Seminar of Jacques Lacan: The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, J.-A. Miller, ed., D. Porter, trans. (New York: Norton, 1992). For a bibliographical note on Lacan's published work and translations, see Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, Jacques Lacan and the Philosophy of Psychoanalysis (Champaign: University of Illinois Press, 1987), pp. 309–312.
- Summations of Saussurean theory appear in almost every commentary on Lacan or Chomsky; Holland's own is found in The Critical I at 122–32. Lacan explained his revision of Saussure in “The agency of the letter in the unconscious or reason since Freud” in Écrits, supra note 21, at 147–159. Heller's account is also helpful, in Heller, supra note 17, at 140–155, which contrasts Saussure's and Chomsky's views.
- We know that Lacan rejected Chomsky's confinement of the subject in grammar, and Ellie Ragland-Sullivan, a superb commentator on Lacan's writings, is critical of both Chomsky and those like Holland who paint Lacan as a slavish follow of Saussure:
- Lacan's marriage of the concepts of subject, structure, and signifier creates…an entirely different meaning to that of the static Saussurean structuralism with which he is thoughtlessly associated. Lacanian theory…not only deconstructs neo-Saussurean linguistics but also throws doubt on Noam Chomsky's claim to have supplanted the usefulness of any structuralism in linguistics.
- Ragland-Sullivan, supra note 20, at 203; see also id., at 209–10:
- [A] s Culler points out [in Ferdinand de Saussure (New York: Cornell University Press, 1977)], Chomsky's attention to the creative character of language and its syntax makes Saussure's linearity and fixed forms appear archaic. But…there is now a semiotic tradition that rejects the formal, static nature of Saussure's closed-system linguistics. Umberto Eco, for example, has emphasized the sign-user over the codes used (Saussure) and has differed from Chomsky in giving precedence to performance over linguistic competence.
- Paradoxically, language appears in Lacanian theory as both imposed from the outside and organic, “but never as genetically, biologically, or neurologically based—never innate.” Id., at 205. The linguistic network which forms the subject in its conscious and unconscious identities and discourse—the symbolic order—is the place of signifiers, symbols, and cultural meanings, not innate syntactic structures. Ragland-Sullivan and Holland seem to agree, at least, that nothing could be farther from Lacan than Chomsky.
- Consider Lacan's seminar on Poe's Purloined Letter, a detective story about a compromising letter that is stolen from a royal personage, hidden from the police, found by the clever Dupin, and returned to its owner. The story illustrates for Lacan
- that it is the symbolic order which is constitutive for the subject—by demonstrating the decisive orientation which the subject receives from the itinerary of a signifier [i.e, the “letter”]….
- [Freud discovered] that the displacement of the signifier determines the subjects in their acts, in their destiny, in their refusals, in their blindnesses, in their end and in their fate…and that…everything that might be considered the stuff of psychology…will follow the path of the signifier.
- Jacques Lacan, Seminar on “The Purloined Letter,” 48 Yale French Studies 39 (J. Mehlman, trans., 1972).
- The account of Lacan's meeting with Chomsky appears in Sherry Turkle, Psychoanalytic Politics: Freud's French Revolution (New York: Guilford Press, 1978), pp. 244–245. Lacan's 1964 seminar on Chomsky, not yet translated into English, is summarized in E. Roudinesco, Jacques Lacan & Co.: A History of Psychoanalysis in France, 1925–1985, J. Mehlman, trans. (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1990), pp. 398–402.
- Lacan opposed a formal theory of the signifier to a grammatical model. In so doing, he reproached Chomskyan formalization with forgetting “being” and its “rift” for the sake of confining the subject in grammar.
- Id., at 401.
- Holland (at 145) quotes Chomsky's Knowledge of Language: Its Nature, Origin and Use (Westport: Greenwood, 1986), p. 261:
- [O]ur goals, beliefs, expectations, and so forth clearly enter into our decision to use the rules in one way or another, and principles of rational inference and the like may also play a role in these decisions. This is true not only of what we decide to say but how we decide to say it, and similar factors enter at some level into determining how we understand what we hear.
- For an account of Ricoeur's accusation that Lacan proposes a linguistic conception of the unconscious, see Roudinesco supra note 25, at 390–98; see also Ragland-Sullivan, supra note 21, at 169–70 (summary of criticism by Ricoeur, Coulter and Ingleby of Lacan's apparent linguistic reductionism).
- See, e.g., Ragland-Sullivan, supra note 21, at 169–70:
- Lacan said that the laws of the unconscious—condensation and displacement—work like the principal laws of language (metaphor and metonymy). What the psychic and linguistic systems have in common is an analogous manner of functioning by substitutions, combinations, and references.
- Lacan's complicated notion of the Other implies not only exteriority but also a determinative (for the subject) feature; in various formulations, the Other is the unconscious, the place of authority (sometimes family, father, mother, law, community, culture), or the order of language (refer to note 61, infra), and is tentatively distinguished from the subject and other people generally. See Jacques Lacan, “Introduction of the Big Other,” in Book II of The Seminar, supra note 21, at 235–47.
- See Patrick Colm Hogan, “Introduction,” Lacan & Criticism: On Language, Structure, and the Unconscious, P. Hogan & L Pandit, eds. (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1990), at xii.
- See “The mirror stage as formative of the function of the I as revealed in psychoanalytic experience,” Écrits, supra note 21, at 1–7.
- See, e.g., Ragland-Sullivan, supra note 21, at 25.
- See Lacan, supra note 31, at 2:
- We have only to understand the mirror stage as an identification, in the full sense that analysis gives to the term: namely, the transformation that takes place in the subject when he assumes an image This jubilant assumption of his specular image by the child…would seem to exhibit in an exemplary situation the symbolic matrix in which the I is precipitated in a primordial form, before it is objectified in the dialectic of identification with the other, and before language restores to it…its function as subject.
- Michael Walsh, “Reading the Real in the Seminar on the Psychoses,” Lacan & Criticism, supra note 30, at 70.
- Far from ignoring the clinic…Lacan's Seminar (on the psychoses, 1955–56) is predicated on it and permeated by it; weekly meetings regularly begin with [references to Lacan's clinical teaching presentations.] This is so much the case, in fact, that today's reader is sometimes left in the dark: discussion may proceed on the basis of a reference to “last week's presentation” in the absence of any clue as to the particular nature of the case.
- Id., at 70–71. Jacques-Alain Miller also has tried to emphasize to American Lacanians that Lacan was a practicing psychoanalyst, not a literary critic. See Miller, “How Psychoanalysis Cures According to Lacan,” 1 Newsletter of the Freudian Field (No. 2)3, 6–7 (1987):
- What did Lacan do in his lifetime? There is one answer. He saw patients…so keep that in mind. Lacan was practicing psychoanalyst You know the important interest that Lacan elicits among…literary critics But he was a practicing psychoanalyst
- The Lacan conferences sponsored by the Newsletter of the Freudian Field and various departments of Literature and Psychoanalysis obviously are intended to close the rift between clinicians and theorists, and such conferences are typically attended (and include papers) by both.
- See John Brenkman, Culture and Domination (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1987) atx:
- Lacan shifts the Freudian paradigm from intrapsychic mechanisms to intersubjective relations, from quasi-biological instincts to language, partially opening psychoanalysis to cultural theory.
- In another formulation.
- Lacan's project has been to give language and intersubjectivity primacy…. He recognizes that the Umwelt, the environment or outer world, of [the infant] is preeminently social.
- Id., at 152.
- See Mark Bracher, “Lacanian Theory and the Future of Cultural Criticism,” 3 Newsletter of the Freudian Field (Nos. 1/2) 103–04 (1989).
- Stephen Frosh, The Politics Of Psychoanalysis: An Introduction To Freudian And Post-Freudian Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), p.131.
- See Shoshana Felman, “On Reading Poetry: Reflections on the Limits and Possibilities of Psychoanalytical Approaches,” The Purloined Poe: Lacan, Derrida, and the Possibilities of Psychoanalytic Reading, J. Muller & W. Richardson, eds. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1988), at 149.
- See Ragland-Sullivan, supra note 21, at 211.
- See, e.g. Lacan, “The Function and Field of Speech and Language in Psychoanalysis,” in Écrits, supra note 21, at 66:
- The primordial Law is therefore that which in regulating marriage ties superimposes the kingdom of culture on that of a nature abandoned to the law of mating….
- This law, then, is revealed clearly enough as identical with an order of language.
- Lacan's famous L-schema, described in “On a question preliminary to any possible treatment of psychosis,” in Écrits, supra note 21, at 193–99, illustrates a network of linguistic and identificatory relations between the speaking subject, the ego, others and the Other—the subject “is stretched over the four corners of this schema.” Id., at 194. See generally David Caudill, “Lacan and Law: Networking with the Big O[ther],” 1 Studies in Psychoanalytic Theory 25 (1992).
- See, e.g., Dragan Milovanovic, “Law and the Challenge of Semiotic Analysis…,” 14 Legal Studies Forum 71 (1990) (review essay of Bernard Jackson, Law, Fact and Narrative Coherence (Merseyside: Deborah Charles, 1988)).
- See, e.g., Peter Gabel, “Dukakis's Defeat and the Transformational Possibilities of Legal Culture,” 4 Tikkun 14 (Mar/Apr 1989).
- See, e.g., Peter Goodrich, Languages of Law: From Logics of Memory to Nomadic Masks (Littleton: Rothman, 1990).
- Noam Chomsky, Language and Problems Of Knowledge: The Managua Lectures (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1988), p. 164 (emphasis added).
- Id., at 173.
- Id., at 175.
- In fact, different historical and social circumstances allow certain aspects of human nature to appear and flourish while others are suppressed.
- Id., at 174–75. Russ Rymer's recent foray into the contemporary
- debates in linguistics made him realize why different disciplines have wished so fervently to keep hold of the language question. Chomsky started out talking about language, and pretty soon he was talking about the nature of man.
- Rymer, “Annals of Science: A Silent Childhood—[part] I,” The New Yorker, April 13, 1992, at 51.
- Chomsky, supra note 45, at 195.
- Refer to note 20, supra (downplay of semantic component by Chomsky); see Searle, supra note 20, at 17:
- Many of Chomsky's best students find [his] picture of language implausible and the linguistic theory that emerges from it unnecessarily cumbersome. They argue that one of the crucial factors shaping syntactic structure is semantics. See also Linguistic Theory And Psychological Reality, M. Halle, J. Bresnan & G. Miller, eds. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1978), a volume of essays by specialists influenced by Chomsky but attempting to improve on his theories.
- See Chomsky, Knowledge of Language, supra note 26.
- Hearnshaw, supra note 20, at 288–89.
- So while recognizing the stimulating character of Chomsky's provocative views, and their immense value in bringing language back into the ambit of psychological consideration, we must insist that language be viewed in a broader framework than the rigid formalism of his transformational system. Id., at 289; see also Searle, supra note 20, at 30:
- Any attempt to account for the meaning of sentences must take into account their role in communication, in the performance of speech acts, because an essential part of the meaning of any sentence is its potential for being used to perform a speech act.
- M.A.K. Holliday, Language as a Social Semiotic: The Social Interpretation of Language and Meaning (Baltimore: University Park Press, 1978), p. 17.
- Id., at 17, 56.
- The great thing Chomsky achieved was that he was the first to show that natural language could be brought within the scope of formalization…. The cost of this was a very high degree of idealization; obviously, he had to leave out of consideration a great many of those variations and those distinctions that precisely interest [sociologists] of language.
- Id., at 37–38. In Halliday's inter-organism perspective, there “is no place for the dichotomy of competence and performance, opposing what the speaker knows to what he does.” Id. at 38.
- John B. Thompson, Studies in the Theory of Ideology (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984) p. 44.
- [W]hat an expression means' is not a fixed and invariant given, but is a fluctuating phenomenon which is determined as much by the contextual conditions of its production and reception as by the syntactic features of its construction.
- Jürgen Habermas, “Toward a theory of Communicative Competence,” Recent Sociology, No. 2, H. Dreitzel, ed. (New York: MacMillan, 1970), p. 131, quoted in Thompson, supra note 54, at 260.
- Thompson, supra note 54, at 260.
- Refer to note 23 supra.
- Thompson, supra note 54, at 44.
- See Howard Gardner, The Quest For Mind: Piaget, Lévi-Strauss, and the Structuralist Movement (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1974), p. 243:
- Except within the camp of the structuralists, Chomsky, Lévi-Strauss, and Piaget may be regarded as engaged in similar activities and in fundamental agreement on central issues.
- See Anthony Wilden, “Lacan and the Discourse of the Other,” Jacques Lacan, Speech And Language In Psychoanalysis, A. Wilder, trans. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1981), p. 309.
- See Joseph H. Smith, Arguing With Lacan: Ego Psychology and Language (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991) p. 20.
- Chomsky's way of phrasing the idea that the unconscious is structured like a language is that the rules (inferable only) that generate sentences (including the statements and questions in terms of which symptoms are read) are unconscious Lacan calls these rules—other to me but closer to me than myself—“the Other.”
- Id., at 1.
- Elizabeth Grosz, Jacques Lacan: A Feminist Introduction (New York: Routledge, 1990), p. 32.
- Norman Holland, The Brain Of Robert Frost: A Cognitive Approach To Literature (New York: Routledge, 1988), pp. 2, 155.
- Charles Moser, “Literary Theory, The University, and Society,” 34 Modern Age 117, 123 (1992).
- Id., at 124.
- See Ragland-Sullivan, “Stealing Material: The Materiality of Language According to Freud and Lacan,” Lacan And The Human Sciences, A. Leupin, ed. (Reno: University of Nebraska Press, 1991), p. 77.
- Parallels to Weisberg's methodology can be seen in Martha Nussbaum, Love's Knowledge: Essay On Philosophy And Literature (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990) (recently reviewed critically in Jesse Kalin, “Knowing Novels: Nussbaum on Fiction and Moral Theory,” 103 Ethics 135 (Oct. 1992)); like Weisberg, Nussbaum collapses style and content, and privileges literary texts as a source of ethical knowledge.
- Benjamin N. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1921), p. 12, quoted in Poethics at 16–17.
- But see Emily Fowler Hartigan, “From Righteousness to Beauty: Reflections on Poethics and Justice as Translation” 67 Tulane Law Review 455 (1992). Hartigan characterizes Weisberg's discourse as hostile, “combative,” “hierarchic,” and “grating,” and she finds the taste of Weisberg's “scathing” critique of White “bitter, harsh, [and] confusing.” Id., at 455, 459, 461. To the extent that Hartigan's reactions are based on her sense that Poethics reinforces patriarchy—by its “near total exclusion of women,” Id., at 455, or its “tone of competition for dominance,” Id., at 461—I do not question such reactions. However, compared to the hostile and grating discourse of literary theorists generally—for example, Holland's and much of today's literary criticism in journals and magazines—Weisberg's discourse and his treatment of White is amazingly respectful.
- Richard Posner, “From Billy Budd to Buchenwald,” 96 Yale Law Journal 1173 (1987).
- Brook Thomas, Cross-Examinations Of Law And Literature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987), p. 211.
- Id., at 212.
- Franklin H. Little, The Crucifixion of The Jews (Macon: Mercer University Press, 1975), p. 35, quoted in Poethics at 143. With respect to the idealization of “the West” (and its values) in discussions of the Holocaust as unique and irrational, Vincent Pecora remarks:
- [The] “Final Solution”…indeed possesses a horific singularity; but it does so only in the context of a more or less continuous, increasingly systematic, “Western”—and terrifyingly Christian—traditions of religious, political, economic, and cultural persecution of the Jews.
- Probing The Limits at 161; see also John S. Conway, “The Political Role of German Protestantism,” 1870–1990, 34 Journal of Church & State 819 (1992), for an account of the enthusiasm with which most German Protestants greeted Hitler's rise to power.
- Christian critiques of both value-avoidance and “cultural Christianity” include, for example, Roman Catholic liberation theology (see Third World Liberation Theologies: A Reader, D. Ferm, ed. (Maryknoll: Orbis Books, 1986)); Anabaptist radicalism (see Arthur Gish, The New Left and Christian Radicalism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970)); Neo-Calvinist “anti-revolutionary” critiques (see Nicholas Wolterstorff, Until Justice And Peace Embrace (San Marcos: Eerdmans, 1983)); and self-critical, evangelical attacks on secularism (see Harry Blamires, The Christian Mind (Ann Arbor: Servant, 1963)).
- Saul Friedlander, “Introduction,” in Probing The Limits, at 2–3.
- Hayden White, “Historical Emplotment and the Problem of Truth,” in Probing The Limits, at 25.
- See Ernst Nolte, “Vergangenheit, die nicht vergehen will,” Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, June 6, 1986; see also Nolte, “Between Myth and Revisionism? The Third Reich in the Perspective of the 1980's,” Aspects Of The Third Reich, H.W. Kock, ed. (New York: St. Martin, 1985).
- Jürgen Habermas, “A Kind of Settlement of Damages” and “Concerning the Public Use of History,” 44 New German Critique 25 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1988) (translations by J. Leaman of the July 11 and Nov. 7, 1986, Die Zeit articles).
- See Hayden White, The Content Of The Form (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1988), pp. 76–82.
- Peter Haidu, “The Dialectics of Unspeakability: Language, Silence, and the Narratives of Desubjectification,” in Probing The Limits, at 281.
- Theodore W. Adorno, “Cultural Criticism and Society,” Prisms, S. Weber and S. Weber, trans. (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1967), p. 34
- William Kerrigan, “Terminating Lacan,” 88 South Atlantic Quarterly 993, 1007 (1989).
- See Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Tradition, Insight and Constraint,” 66 Proceedings and Addresses Of The American Philosophical Association 45 (1992).
- See Paul Smith, c (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1988), for a Lacanian recovery of the self for genuine social and political action.
- Stanley Fish, “Why No One's Afraid of Wolfgang Iser,” 11 Diacritics 2, 10 (1981).
- Id., Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), pp. 344–45.
- Howard Felperin, Beyond Deconstruction: The Uses And Abuses Of Literary Theory (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985), p. 210 quoting J. Tompkins, ed., Reader- Response Criticism: From Formalism To Poststructuralism (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1980), at xiii.
- Id., at 211; see also Ayer, “Aliens are Coming! Drain the Pool” (book review), 88 Michigan Law Review 1584, 1588 (1990):
- [W]hat Fish is describing are the ways we not only find but make our world…. If you like Fish's argument, this is exactly what you would hope for; if you dislike it, it is what you would fear or suspect. But, in either event, you will have to go elsewhere for the larger implications. With Fish, you are limited to a presentation…of the narrower case.
- L.H. LaRue, “The Portrayal of Law in Literature: Weisberg's Failure of the Word” 1986 ABA Foundation Research Journal, 313, 314–15 (1986).
- See Peter Brooks, “Bouillabaisse” (book review), 99 Yale Law Journal 1147, 1154 (1990):
- What is wrong with [Fish's critique of H.L.A. Hart] is…its ultimately trivial view of mind, or psyche, and its relation to the notion of law. If you want to equate reason and belief, then you need to pursue a more probing argument about the nature of beliefs, including the belief in justice and rules Fish is strangely uninterested in the problem he keeps throwing up: the problem of belief, of ideology, ultimately cognitive and ethical problems of mind. One has the impression that mind, in so Ear as he takes notice of it, is merely the repository of professional determinations.
- Poethics, at 250.
- Hayden White, The Content of Form: Narrative Discourse and Historical Representation (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins, 1987).
- Fredric Jameson, Postmodernism or the Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Duke University Press, 1991), p. 257.
- Carlo Ginzburg, “Mythologie germanique et nazisme: Sur un ancien livre de Georges Dumézil” in Annales Esc, July-August 1985, no. 4, pp. 695–715.
- Stanley Fish, Doing What Comes Naturally: Change, Rhetoric, and the Practice of Theory in Literary and Legal Studies (Durham: Duke University Press, 1989), p. 10: “Does might make right? In a sense the answer I must give is yes…”
- Id., at 12.
Law & Literature
Volume 5, 1993 - Issue 1: A Symposium Issue on The Merchant of Venice