Independent Director Networks and Executive Perquisite Consumption——“Collusion” or “Coordination” in Governance?

References

• Adams, R. B., and D. Ferreira. 2007. A theory of friendly boards. The Journal of Finance 62 (1):217–50. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2007.01206.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Adithipyangkul, P., I. Alon, and T. Zhang. 2011. Executive perks: Compensation and corporate performance in China. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 28 (2):401–25. doi:10.1007/s10490-009-9162-3.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Ai, J. 2006. Guanxi networks in China: Its importance and future trends. China & World Economy 14 (5):105–18. doi:10.1111/j.1749-124X.2006.00034.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Aldrich, H., C. Zimmer, and T. Jones. 1986. Small business still speaks with the same voice: A replication of ‘the voice of small business and the politics of survival. The Sociological Review 34 (2):335–56. doi:10.1111/j.1467-954X.1986.tb02705.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Allen, F., A. Babus, P. R. Kleindorfer, and Y. Wind. 2009. Networks in finance. In The network challenge: Strategy, profit, and risk in an interlinked world, ed. P. Kleindorfer, Y. Wind, and R. Gunther, 367. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Wharton School Publishing.
   Google Scholar
• Au, K., M. W. Peng, and D. Wang. 2000. Interlocking directorates, firm strategies, and performance in Hong Kong: Towards a research agenda. Asia Pacific Journal of Management 17 (1):29–47. doi:10.1023/A:1015432819596.
   Google Scholar
• Baker, G. 2000. The use of performance measures in incentive contracting[J]. American Economic Review 90 (2):415–20.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bradley, D., S. Gokkaya, X. Liu, and F. Xie. 2017. Are all analysts created equal? Industry expertise and monitoring effectiveness of financial analysts. Journal of Accounting and Economics 63 (2–3):179–206. doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2017.01.003.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Burt, R. S. 1983. Corporate profits and cooptation: Networks of market constraints and directorate ties in the American economy. New York: Academic Press.
   Google Scholar
• Butler, A. W., and U. G. Gurun. 2012. Educational networks, mutual fund voting patterns, and CEO compensation. Review of Financial Studies 25 (8):2533–62. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhs067.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cai, H., H. Fang, and L. C. Xu. 2011. Eat, drink, firms, government: An investigation of corruption from the entertainment and travel costs of Chinese firms. The Journal of Law and Economics 54 (1):55–78. doi:10.1086/651201.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chen, C., D. Jiang, W. Li, et al. 2022. Does analyst coverage curb executives’ excess perks? Evidence from Chinese listed firms[J]. Asia-Pacific Journal of Accounting & Economics 29 (2):329–43.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chen, D., X. Chen, and H. Wan. 2005. Regulation and non-pecuniary compensation in Chinese SOEs. Economic Research (In Chinese) 02:92–101.
   Google Scholar
• Chen, D., O. Z. Li, and S. Liang. 2009. Do managers perform for perks? Available at SSRN 1464015.
   Google Scholar
• Chen, T., J. Harford, and C. Lin. 2015. Do analysts matter for governance? Evidence from natural experiments. Journal of Financial Economics 115 (2):383–410. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2014.10.002.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Chen, Y. and D. Xie. 2012. Director network, independent directors governance and executive incentives. Financial Research (In Chinese) 02:168–82.
   Google Scholar
• Chiu, P. C., S. H. Teoh, and F. Tian. 2013. Board interlocks and earnings management contagion. The Accounting Review 88 (3):915–44. doi:10.2308/accr-50369.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cohen, L., A. Frazzini, and C. Malloy. 2008. The small world of investing: Board connections and mutual fund returns. Journal of Political Economy 116 (5):951–79. doi:10.1086/592415.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Davies, H., T. K. Leung, S. T. Luk, and Y. H. Wong. 1995. The benefits of “Guanxi”: The value of relationships in developing the Chinese market. Industrial Marketing Management 24 (3):207–14. doi:10.1016/0019-8501(94)00079-C.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dyck, A., N. Volchkova, and L. Zingales. 2008. The corporate governance role of the media: Evidence from Russia. The Journal of Finance 63 (3):1093–135. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2008.01353.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Edgerton, J. 2012. Agency problems in public firms: Evidence from corporate jets in leveraged buyouts. Journal of Finance 67 (6):2187–213. doi:10.1111/j.1540-6261.2012.01784.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Emerson, R. M. 1976. Social exchange theory. Annual Review of Sociology 2:335–62. doi:10.1146/annurev.so.02.080176.002003.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Engelberg, J., P. Gao, and C. A. Parsons. 2013. The price of a CEO’s Rolodex. Review of Financial Studies 26 (1):79–114. doi:10.1093/rfs/hhs114.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fan, J. P. H., T. J. Wong, and T. Zhang. 2007. Politically connected CEOs, corporate governance, and Post-IPO performance of China’s newly partially privatized firms. Journal of Financial Economics 84 (2):330–57. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2006.03.008.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Fracassi, C. 2017. Corporate finance policies and social networks[J]. Management Science 63 (8):2420–38.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Freeman, L. C. 1978. Centrality in social networks conceptual clarification[J]. Social Networks 1 (3):215–39.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Geletkanycz, M. A., B. K. Boyd, and S. Finkelstein. 2001. The strategic value of CEO external directorate networks: Implications for CEO compensation. Strategic Management Journal 22 (9):889–98. doi:10.1002/smj.172.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hart, O. 2001. Financial contracting. Journal of Economic Literature 39 (4):1079–100. doi:10.1257/jel.39.4.1079.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hillman, A. J., and T. Dalziel. 2003. Boards of directors and firm performance: Integrating agency and resource dependence perspectives. Academy of Management Review 28 (3):383–96. doi:10.2307/30040728.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hirsch, F. 1976. Social limits to growth. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Horton, J., Y. Millo, and G. Serafeim. 2012. Resources or power? Implications of social networks on compensation and firm performance. Journal of Business Finance and Accounting 39 (3–4):399–426. doi:10.1111/j.1468-5957.2011.02276.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hwang, K. 1987. Face and favor: The Chinese power game. American Journal of Sociology 92 (4):944–74. doi:10.1086/228588.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Jensen, M., and W. Meckling. 1976. Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs, and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics 3 (76):305–60. doi:10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X.
   Google Scholar
• Joe, J. R., H. Louis, and D. Robinson. 2009. Managers’ and investors’ responses to media exposure of board ineffectiveness. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 44 (3):579–605. doi:10.1017/S0022109009990044.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kato, T., and C. Long. 2006. Executive compensation, firm performance, and corporate governance in China: Evidence from firms listed in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. Economic Development and Cultural Change 54 (4):945–83. doi:10.1086/503583.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kong, X. 2011. Why are social network transactions important? Evidence based on the concentration of key suppliers and customers in China. China Journal of Accounting Research 4 (3):121–33. doi:10.1016/j.cjar.2011.06.003.
   Google Scholar
• Kroszner, R. S., and P. E. Strahan. 2001. Bankers on boards: Monitoring, conflicts of interest, and lender liability. Journal of Financial Economics 62 (3):415–52. doi:10.1016/S0304-405X(01)00082-4.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kuang, Y. F., and G. Lee. 2017. Corporate fraud and external social connectedness of independent directors. Journal of Corporate Finance 45:401–27. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2017.05.014.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lang, M. H., K. V. Lins, and D. P. Miller. 2004. Concentrated control, analyst following, and valuation: Do analysts matter most when investors are protected least? Journal of Accounting Research 42 (3):589–623. doi:10.1111/j.1475-679X.2004.t01-1-00142.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Larcker, D. F., E. C. So, C. C. Y. Wang, D. F. Larcker, E. C. So, and C. C. Y. Wang. 2013. Boardroom centrality and firm performance. Journal of Accounting and Economics 55 (2–3):225–50. doi:10.1016/j.jacceco.2013.01.006.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Luo, W., Y. Zhang, and N. Zhu. 2011. Bank ownership and executive perquisites: New evidence from an emerging market. Journal of Corporate Finance 17 (2):352–70. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2010.09.010.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Miller, G. S. 2006. The press as a watchdog for accounting fraud. Journal of Accounting Research 44 (5):1001–33. doi:10.1111/j.1475-679X.2006.00224.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Mizruchi, M. S. 1996. What do interlocks do? An analysis, critique, and assessment of research on interlocking directorates. Annual Review of Sociology 22:271–98. doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.22.1.271.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Omer, T. C., M. K. Shelley, and F. M. Tice. 2016. Do director networks matter for financial reporting quality? Evidence from restatements. Unpublished Working Paper. Available at SSRN. doi:10.2139/ssrn.2379151.
   Google Scholar
• Park, S. H., and Y. Luo. 2001. Guanxi and organizational dynamics: Organizational networking in Chinese firms. Strategic Management Journal 22 (5):455–77. doi:10.1002/smj.167.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Peng, M. W., and Y. Luo. 2000. Managerial ties and firm performance in a transition economy: The nature of a micro-macro link. The Academy of Management Journal 43 (3):486–501.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Penrose, E. T. 1959. The theory of the growth of the firm. London: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Pfeffer, J. 1972. Size and composition of corporate boards of directors: The organization and its environment. Administrative Science Quarterly 17:218–28. doi:10.2307/2393956.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Phan, P. H., S. H. Lee, and S. C. Lau. 2003. The performance impact of interlocking directorates: The case of Singapore[J]. Journal of Managerial Issues 15:338–52.
   Google Scholar
• Putnam, R. D. 2000. Bowling alone. New York: Simon & Schuster.
   Google Scholar
• Rajan, R. G., and J. Wulf. 2006. Are perks purely managerial excess? Journal of Financial Economics 79 (1):1–33. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.01.003.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Redding, S. G., and N. Michael. 1983. The role of “face” in the organizational perceptions of Chinese managers. International Studies of Management & Organization 13 (3):92–123. doi:10.1080/00208825.1983.11656369.
   Google Scholar
• Sarkar, J., and S. Sarkar. 2009. Multiple board appointments and firm performance in emerging economies: Evidence from India. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal 17 (2):271–93. doi:10.1016/j.pacfin.2008.02.002.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Schabus, M. 2022. Do director networks help managers forecast better?[J]. The Accounting Review 97 (2):397–426.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sisli‐Ciamarra, E. 2012. Monitoring by affiliated bankers on board of directors: Evidence from corporate financing outcomes. Financial Management 41 (3). doi:10.1111/j.1755-053X.2012.01191.x.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sun, S., L. Li, and Y. Chen. 2016. The formation mechanism of perks’ economic effect and the influence of corporate governance on it. China Industrial Economy (In Chinese) 01:37–51.
   Google Scholar
• Westphal, J. D., M. D. L. Seidel, and K. J. Stewart. 2001. Second-order imitation: Uncovering latent effects of board network ties. Administrative Science Quarterly 46 (4):717–47. doi:10.2307/3094829.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Westphal, J. D., and P. Khanna. 2003. Keeping directors in line: Social distancing as a control mechanism in the corporate elite. Administrative Science Quarterly 48 (3):361–98. doi:10.2307/3556678.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Xu, N., X. Li, Q. Yuan, and K. C. Chan. 2014. Excess perks and stock price crash risk: Evidence from China. Journal of Corporate Finance 25:419–34. doi:10.1016/j.jcorpfin.2014.01.006.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Yang, R., Y. Wang, and H. Nie. 2013. The promotion mechanism of “Quasi-Officials”: Evidence from China’s state-owned enterprises. Management World (In Chinese) 3:23–33.
   Google Scholar
• Yermack, D. 2006. Flights of fancy: Corporate jets, CEO perquisites, and inferior shareholder returns. Journal of Financial Economics 80 (1):211–42. doi:10.1016/j.jfineco.2005.05.002.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Yeung, I. Y. M., and R. L. Tung. 1996. Achieving business success in Confucian societies: The importance of guanxi (connections). Organizational Dynamics 25 (2):54–65. doi:10.1016/S0090-2616(96)90025-X.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zona, F., L. R. Gomez-Mejia, and M. C. Withers. 2018. Board interlocks and firm performance: Toward a combined agency–resource dependence perspective. Journal of Management 44 (2):589–618. doi:10.1177/0149206315579512.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar