2 SAS Regiment, War Crimes Investigations, and British Intelligence: Intelligence Officials and the Natzweiler Trial

References

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• See, for example, the OSS file regarding atrocities committed against members of the Dawes Mission: Record Group 226, Entry 90, Box 3, Folder 36; RG 226, Entry 136, Box 26, Folder 264; RG 226, Entry 190, Box 22, Folder 1 (Bari-1, X-2 counter-intelligence file), all National Archives II, College Park, MD
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• 1971 . The Special Air Service London : William Kimber . Letter from “Minningman” [illegible] Lieutenant-Colonel Commander, 1 British Airborne Corps (Rear), to The Under Secretary of State, The WO (A.G.3 V.W.) cc. to HQ SAS Troops and OC 2 SAS Regiment, 18 August, 1945: National Archives, Kew, London, (hereafter NA), WO 311/694. See also: memo attached to the letter summarizing the fate of SAS soldiers in Europe. This stated that of 39 members of 2 SAS Regiment who had been captured by the Germans whilst in uniform, 7 returned home safely, 13 were killed after surrender, 1 killed by Allied bombing and 18 unaccounted for, ibid. For histories of the SAS see Philip Warner, (John Strawson, History of the SAS Regiment (London: Batsford, 1969); James D. Ladd, SAS Operations (London; Robert Hale, 1986); Anthony Kemp, The SAS at War (London: Penguin Books, 1993); Roy Farran, Winged Dagger: Adventures on Special Service (1948; London: Cassell, 1998); J. Fraser McLuskey, Parachute Padre: Behind Enemy Lines With the SAS France 1944 (Stevenage: Spa Books Ltd, 1985); Roy Close, In Action with the SAS (Barnsley: Pen and Sword, 2005); Eric Morris, Guerrillas in Uniform (London: Hutchinson, 1989); J.V. Byrne, The General Salutes a Soldier (London: Robert Hale, 1986); Adrian Weale; Secret Warfare (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1997); Paul Gaujac, Special Forces in the Invasion of France (Paris: Histoire et Collections, 1999); Derrick Harrison, These Men are Dangerous (London: Blandford Press, 1988). For a critical historiography of the SAS see: John Newsinger, Dangerous Men; The SAS and Popular Culture (London: Pluto Press, 1997), 71–93
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• Breitman . 2005 . US Intelligence; on the immunity from prosecution for SS General Wolfe see: K. von Lingen and M. Salter, “Contrasting Strategies within the War Crimes Trials of Kesselring and Wolff,” Liverpool Law Review 26 (: 225–66. See also: the postwar recruitment by the US Army Chemical Corps of scientists, who had either been prosecuted at Nuremberg, or, in effect, traded their scientific expertise for legal immunity: Linda Hunt, “U.S. Cover up of Nazi Scientists,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (April 1985): 16ff.; idem, Secret Agenda: the United States Government, Nazi Scientist, and Project Paperclip, 1945 to 1990 (NY: St Martins Press, 1991); C. Simpson, The Splendid Blond Beast: Money, Law and Genocide in the 20th Century (NY: Grove Press, 1993), 26; C. Lasby, Project Paperclip: German Scientists and the Cold War (NY: Atheneum, 1975); J. Gimbel, “German Scientists, United States Denazification Policy, and the ‘Paperclip Conspiracy’,” International History Review 12 (1990): 441–65; J. Gimbel, “Project Paperclip: German Scientists, American Policy, and the Cold War,” Diplomatic History 14 (1990): 343–365. On the atrocities associated with the Dora Camp, see: Michael J. Neufeld, The Rocket and the Reich: Peenemuende and the Coming of the Ballistic Missile Era (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995); Andre Sellier, A History of the Dora Camp: The Untold Story of the Nazi Slave Labor Camp that Secretly Manufactured V-2 Rockets (Chicago: Ivan R. Dee, 2003). On more recent research see papers published in 2006 on CIA files released in 2005: Timothy Naftali, ‘New Information on Cold War CIA Stay- Behind Operations in Germany and on the Adolf Eichmann Case’: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/naftali.pdf; Robert Wolfe, ‘Gustav Hilger: From Hitler's Foreign Office to CIA Consultant’: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/wolfe.pdf; Richard Breitman, ‘Tscherim Soobzokov’: http://www.fas.org/sgp/eprint/breitman.pdf [3 August 2006]. Similarly, MI5 and MI6 (SIS) recruited anti-Soviet agents from amongst Displaced Persons, including Axis collaborators and known war criminals. SIS recruited former Latvian Waffen-SS for anti-Soviet operations in Latvia: David Cesarini, Justice Delayed (London: Heinemann, 1992), 6, 142–43. Similarly, Frank G. Wisner, former OSS then CIA, involved in recruiting Gehlen's network, used Eastern European émigrés in collaboration with British military intelligence: Cesarini Justice Delayed, 154–56. Recently declassified documents (August 2005) reveal the details of Home Office permission to allow over 9,000 of the Ukranian Waffen SS ‘Galicia’ Division, to settle en masse in Britain: NA, HO 213/1851, 1853, 1518
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• Salter . “The Prosecution of Nazi War Criminals.”
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• 2005 . Struthof Paris : Nuee Bleue . In fact only three were SOE. See below for further discussion. Natzweiler-Struthof was the only extermination camp on French soil. It was situated in Alsace in the Vosges: Steegman and Aycoberry, (Raymond Couraud et al., Struthof: Natzweiler (ParisHirle,2004. Natzweiler had some seventy (Gilbert claims twenty) satellite labour camps; the first executions took place there on 18 September 1942: M. Gilbert, The Routledge Atlas of the Holocaust (London: Routledge, 2002), 75. H. Adamo and F. Herve, Natzweiler- Struthof (Essen: Klartext Verlag, 2002). By September 1944 the Germans had evacuated the prisoners, most to Dachau. Prisoner memoirs displayed at the museum state that the Germans destroyed papers before they left. Allied forces entered the camp 23 November 1944. There are various conflicting accounts concerning numbers who died, numbers of sub-camps etc. and the above. Details can be found at The United States Memorial Holocaust Museum: http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/article.php?ModuleId=10005337 (2 August 2006)
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• 2002 . War in History For co-operation between SOE and SID see: I. Herrington, “The SID and SOE in Norway 1940–1945: Conflict or Co-operation?” 9 (: 82–110. For SOE/SAS see from personal experience: McLuskey, Parachute Padre, 91–93. For an opposing perspective see: Alan Hoe, David Stirling (London: Little, Brown, 1992), 203–204. Although an ‘authorized’ biography, Hoe makes no mention of 2 SAS WCIT
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• 1949 . The Natzweiler Trial London : William Hodge and Co. . The trial transcript is accessible to the reader, having been published in 1949: M. Webb ed. The original type-written transcript is held at the National Archives, London, NA, WO 235/336 and 337. There are some minor differences between that transcription and the published version
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• Kemp . SAS at War 118 – 19 . Its existence was only publicized in March 1945 when Eisenhower made a wireless proclamation: “Report, 23 June 1948”: Kemp, Secret Hunters, 24, 118–19. A copy of the Order, 18 October 1942, can be accessed at: http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/commando1.htm [25 June 2006]. The Supplementary Order of the Fuehrer, 19 October 1942, can be accessed at: http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/genocide/commando2.htm [25 June 2006]
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• Hadaway , Stuart . 2006 . “The Royal Air Force Missing Research and Enquiry Service 1944–1952”, Paper presented at the ” . In Social History Society Conference University of Reading, March Public demand was, in part, triggered by the Air Ministry practice of only declaring an airman dead if his body could be positively identified by a reliable source, otherwise ‘Missing Believed Killed’. On the importance of this issue in shaping British war crimes policy, see: Priscilla Dale Jones, “Nazi Atrocities against Allied Airmen: Stalag Luft III and the end of British War Crimes Trials,” The Historical Journal 41 (1998): 543–65
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• The decision to expand the Service was taken on 26 July 1945: NA, AIR 20/9050/3 (document supplied by Hadaway; forthwith noted as “SH”). Five units were set up in Europe and one in the Far East, each with twenty-five search teams, an HQ and clerical staff. Logistical support would come from RAF units already established in Europe. In December 1944 a team of six search officers and six drivers had landed in France to begin the search: Jones, “Nazi Atrocities”. See also: “Minutes of Meeting of Committee (appointed by A.M.P.) to consider the detailed organization and establishments necessary for an expanded Missing Research and Enquiry Service,”2 August 1945: NA, AIR 20/9050/4. (SH)
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• Kemp . 1986 . The Secret Hunters London : Michael O'Mara Books Ltd. . (idem, The SAS at War, 97–98; Gavin Mortimer, Stirling's Men (London: Weidenfeld and Nicholson, 2004); Weale, Secret Warfare. By the end of 1943 there were five SAS squadrons (later Regiments), HQ, two British, two French and one Belgian. These were grouped into SAS Brigade; by the summer of 1944 the Brigade had a total strength of 2,500. They were under the command of Brigadier (later General) Roderick McLeod a Royal Artillery officer, and were based in Ayrshire, near Prestwick Aerodrome, to train for operations in Europe: Ladd, SAS Operations, 68–71;Weale, Secret Warfare, 121. On the description of life at HQ, see: McLuskey, Parachute Padre, 43–55
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• 2005 . Intelligence and National Security Defined as: “encouraging and supporting armed resistance in hostile territory by specialist personnel of the armed forces or intelligence services”: Simon Anglim, “MI(R), G(R) and British Covert Operations, 1939–42,” 20 (: 631–53, 633. MI(R) was incorporated into SOE, and the training continued: William Mackenzie, The Secret History of SOE Special Operations Executive 1940–45 (London: St Ermin's Press, 2000), 62–71, 734, the ‘internal’ SOE history written between 1945–47, but not published until this date, although available to ‘official’ historians earlier; M.R.D. Foot, SOE: The Special Operations Executive1940–6 (London: Pimlico, 1999), 6. On some of the detail of that training see: Hoe, David Stirling, 47–48; Foot, SOE, 79–85, Foot served with the SAS
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• Hoe . David Stirling 260; on their activities in the field see: McLuskey, Parachute Padre, 106–109. Captain Henry Druce, recruited into MI6 in 1943, joined the SAS in 1944; he continued his MI6 role until 1951: Mortimer, Stirling's Men, 187, 354
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• 1985 . Dangerous Vol. 4 , London : Grafton Books . A sceptical account can be found in: Newsinger, Men, 7–12; more positively see: Warner, The Special Air Service, 79–80; Strawson, A History of the SAS Regiment, 129; Ladd, SAS Operations, 7499. The extent of this “co-operation” must be evaluated in the context of David Stirling's reminiscences of the early days of the SAS. He detailed three enemies; Middle East Headquarters: “fossilised layers of shit”, the Germans, and SOE: Hoe, David Stirling, 117–18. In N.W. Europe things seem to have operated more smoothly, with the Jedburgh teams of SOE/OSS agents working directly with the SAS: Mackenzie, The Secret History, 604. For a full account see OSS microfilm: “War Diary SO Branch, OSS London. Vol., JEDBURGHS”: National Archives Microfilm Publications, USA held at: Imperial War Museum (IWM), 04/26/1
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• Justice Delayed It has been estimated that seven million German soldiers had surrendered in the west, one and a half million German civilians had fled from the Red Army into the other occupied zones, some 8 million foreign workers were displaced and ten million German urban residents had fled to the countryside. In total, seven million people were on the move; responsibility for the maintenance of order and restoration of basic amenities lay initially with SHAEF: Cesarini, 34–36
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• 1991 . Leo Beck Institute Year Book In November 1944 the cabinet formally decided that military courts, established in Germany or where appropriate, should try cases concerning war crimes committed against British subjects or in British territory: Jones, “Nazi Atrocities” 547: NA, WM (44) 152. Lord Simon, Lord Chancellor, stated: “a great advantage of military tribunals was the dispatch of their proceedings”: 18 February 1943: NA, FO 371/39008 CI6362/14/62. See also: Priscilla Dale Jones, “British policy towards German Crimes against German Jews, 1939–1945”, 36 (: 339–66
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• NA, WO 309; WO 267/600–2
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• 16 October 1945 . NA, WO 219/5045–54. 148–50. One of these, however, is referred to in a report: “Confidential JAG London to DJAG”, giving details of a “SHAEF court of inquiry”: NA, WO 311/742
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• NA, WO 235. The Royal Warrant had to be amended to cover cases committed by Germans against Germans and other non-British nationals
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• 1948 . History of the United Nations War Crimes Commission London : HMSO . NA, TS 26/876–891 and FO 371. For a full official history see: UNWCC, 109–67. On the initial function and organization see: NA, FO 945/343; WO 309/122200; WO 309/1426; WO 311/619; WO 311/620-2. On the military structure and organization of tracing and apprehending war criminals see: History UNWCC, 344–91
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• NA, WO 311/60; WO 309/1703–6
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• Genocide on Trial 4 October 1944: NA, FO 371/39003 CI3575/14/62. The FO had primacy; Bloxham, 27
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• Jones . “Nazi Atrocities”, 544
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• Genocide on Trial Ibid., 551; Bloxham, 33. On 4 November 1946 the cabinet took the decision to begin winding down the war crimes process: NA, PREM 8/391, CM (46) 94th conclusions
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• Bloxham . 1997 . Genocide on Trial. On the influence of anti-Communism upon this decision see: Tom Bowyer, Blind Eye to Murder; Bitain, America and the Purging of Nazi Germany-A Pledge Betrayed (London; Warner, However, for a critique of Bowyer's work see: Priscilla Dale Jones, “British Policy Towards ‘Minor’ Nazi War Criminals, 1939–1958” (University of Cambridge: D. Phil, 1989). Historiographical consensus has suggested that Britain was ahead of the US in perceiving, before the end of the war, the threat Soviet expansionism posed to Europe: Anne Deighton, The Impossible Peace: Britain, the Division of Germany and the Origins of the Cold War (Oxford: OUP, 1990), 25
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• “Somerhough Situation Report WCG (NWE)” to Shapcott, 20 September 1947: NA, FO 371/64718 C13471/7675/180. After much debate, it was decided that no new trials should begin after 31 August 1948, with no advance publicity: Jones. “Nazi Atrocities”, 548–63. Ending the trials was initially opposed by Bevin, but by May 1948 he too was anxious for the trials to end by September of that year: NA, FO 371/70818 CG1954/34/184. MRES was disbanded in July 1949: NA, AIR 20/9050/26. (SH)
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• Jones . “Nazi Atrocities”, 545
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• 1949 . Belsen Trial London : William Hodge and Sons . The took place September-November 1945 at Luneberg, Germany: Raymond Phillips, ed., Trial of Joseph Kramer and Forty-Four Others
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• Hoe . David Stirling 137 Calvert, SAS Brigade commander, naturally disagreeing with this perspective, internally circulated his views on the value of the SAS: “My experience is that SAS and SOE are complementary to each other. SAS cannot successfully operate without good intelligence, guides etc. SOE can only do a certain amount before requiring, when their operations become overt, highly trained, armed bodies in uniform to operate and set an example to the local resistance… All senior officers of SOE with whom I have discussed this point agree to this principle”. Cited in: Strawson, A History of the SAS, 278
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• Secret Hunters Franks was ordered to return to England before the massacre occurred: Kemp, 46; Fowler, Behind Enemy Lines, 87–88; Mortimer, Stirling's Men, 255–67
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• Stirling's Men , 215 Mortimer, 255–67; Kemp: Secret Hunters, 25–35, 45–53. The massacres occurred at the town of Moussey, a few miles east of the German border. In reprisals for assisting the SAS, 256 local men were taken to various concentration camps including Natzweiler-Struthof; 144 did not return. The SAS have continued a special relationship with the citizens of Moussey, returning in 1979 for a memorial service. In September 2004, on the 60th anniversary, a number of SAS veterans visited many sites in France where soldiers had died, amongst these were Moussey and Natzweiler-Struthof: Roy Close, In Action with the SAS, 194–95
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• Kemp . 2005 . Secret Hunters 46 – 47 . London : Collins . The SAS at War, 229–30; Will Fowler, SAS, Behind Enemy Lines 87–88, 100; Gordon Stevens, The Originals (London: Ebury Press, 2005), 322
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• 1885 . Flames in the Field, the Story of Four SOE Agents in Occupied France London : Michael Joseph . Stonehouse was sent to Dachau in September 1944, with other surviving prisoners, when the Germans evacuated Natzweiler-Struthof. A bilingual artist, he drew some of the victims from memory: Rita Kramer, 17–19, 40, 44, 53
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• Kemp . Secret Hunters 37 – 43 . 102, Appendices A, B, C and D. Parts of this report can be found at: http://www.scrapbookpages.com/Natzweiler/History/ArmyReport.html [12 May 2006]
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• Secret Hunters Galitzine served in the WO: “Adjutant-General's Branch 3—Violation of the Laws and Usages of War.” In 1986, he stated: “My own personal experiences made me strongly aware of the whole war crime picture and a feeling that something ought to be done about it”: Kemp, 43–44
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• The Special Air Service , 54 150 Randolf Churchill served briefly with the SAS in Egypt, but was injured in a car crash after a raid on Benghazi in 1942. He later acted as SAS liaison in Italy having returned to the Highland Division: Warner,. Churchill also served with SOE; for his service with partisans in Yugoslavia, see his SOE personnel file (released 2005): NA, HS 9/316/2
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• Hoe . David Stirling 416 Moreover, Hoe states that Stirling was a “family friend” of Winston Churchill, ibid., 414. Kemp records that SAS HQ and WCIT were: “paid directly by the WO”: Secret Hunters, 51. The declassified files used for this study are WO records
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• 18 August 1945 . Memorandum attached to letter from “Minningman” [illegible] Lieutenant-Colonel Commander, 1 British Airborne Corps (Rear), to The Under Secretary of State, the WO (A.G.3 (V.W.), cc 'd to HQ SAS Troops and OC 2 SAS Regiment,: NA, WO 311/694
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• 24 December 1945 . Ibid. JAG responded to suggestions in the letter concerning the division of responsibility as regards the prosecution of war crimes; “(a) JAG (WCS): Investigation and immediate apprehension where they arise out of such investigations of War Criminals. Preparation of cases for submission to JAG, London for registration etc. and ultimate advice to C-in-C, and conduct of the prosecution where such prosecutions undertaken by JAG staff; (b) JAG is responsible for subsequent legal review; (c) “a” Branch is responsible for the production of accused at the trial. And, similarly, for the production of prosecution and defence witnesses, the machinery of the trial and disposal of all accused witnesses connected therewith. Apprehension of accused in other zones and in circumstances other than that arising immediately out of investigation.” Letter from Lt-Col. N. Ashton Hill (JAG) to Col. R. H. Harden A(PS), ibid
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• 1932 . A Guide to Air Force Law Procedure: From Minor Offences to Court-martial Aldershot : Gale and Polden Ltd. . NA, WO 311/695. “I know you feel you should control the unit, but I hope you will agree to change your mind”: Letter from Col. R. H. Harden (APS) “A” Branch to Gp. Capt Somerhough, JAG (WCS) 16 December 1945: NA, WO 311/682. Somerhough authored: After the war, Somerhough continued his legal career. He was appointed Deputy Public Prosecutor (Kenya) 1950 and Acting Solicitor General in 1953; he was a member of the High Court of Northern Rhodesia at the time of his death in 1960: Who Was Who: Vol. V1951–1960 (London: A & C Black Ltd, 1961)
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• Letter from Gp. Capt Somerhough, JAG (WCS) at HQ BAOR to Lt. Col. A. Harris at A(PS.4), 24 November 1945: NA, WO 311/682. This was in response to the Report “Man Hunting” nd. or signed, but probably November 1945 from Lt. Col. A Harris at A(PS.4), which roused the ire of Somerhough, ibid
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• The circulation list for these reports included MI5/6, as well as JAG, amongst many others. These reports began around the middle week in February 1946. Thus: “in accordance with H.Q. B.A.O.R. instructions to S.A.S. W.C.I.T., A.G.3(V.W.) will pass… situation reports… which are received by wireless from GAGGENAU”. Such co-operation was not always wholehearted: “No report was issued last week as O.C. S.A.S. W.C.I.T. was away at H.Q. B.A.O.R. on admin business”: “S.A.S. W.C.I.T. Weekly Sitrep- No.4”, for week ending 13 March 1946: NA, WO 311/742. In addition, Barkworth, was concerned about: “being interrupted in his work by unnecessary ‘directions’.” Plus, he had been required to make three journeys of 300 miles in a few weeks to report to HQ BAOR. Report, “SAS War Crimes Investigation Team-Policy,” 7 February 1946, accompanying a letter from Col. R. H. Harden (APS) “A” Branch to the WO, 8 February 1946: NA, WO 311/694
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• 1946 . Letter from Col. R. H. Harden (APS) “A” Branch to Gp. Capt Somerhough JAG (WCS) 16 December 1945: NA, WO 311/682. Difficulties between the SAS, and JAG BAOR were such that even as late as February it was suggested that someone should approach: “JAGs Office (Mil. Dept.) London, with a request that they should help improve the team's position.” Letter, 8 February 1946: NA, WO 311/694
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• 16 December 1945 . “It is considered that SAS officers are likely to be of the type who would take readily to the work involved and that the advantages of retaining officers of 2 SAS to command ex SAS personnel outweigh any advantage the employment of JAG Staff Pool officers might offer in the early stages”: note to JAG, from Col. R. H. Harden A(PS): NA, WO 311/682
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• 19 December 1945 . The proposal from HQ BAOR was for a “Special Search Unit” to be based at HQ, with a three section HQ and ten detachments. Letter from Field Marshall's Office (C-in-C, BAOR) to the WO (cc. JAG), ibid. For details of the proposed: “Distribution of Rank and File by Trades and Duties,” listing officers and other ranks required, transport, weapons and deployment location. See also: “Special Search Unit For Establishment (i) Personnel” accompanying letter from Col. R. H. Harden (APS) “A” Branch to Gp. Capt Somerhough, JAG (WCS) 16 December 1945, and the additional note to JAG, 16 December 1945, from Col. R. H. Harden A(PS), ibid
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• 29 December 1945 . “[A] photographer (sgt) has been added to unit HQ to reproduce photographs of wanted persons. His equipment should include an enlarger.” Letter from Field Marshall's Office (C-in-C, BAOR) to The WO (cc'd to JAG),: NA, WO 311/682
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• Report entitled “Man Hunting”: NA, WO 311/682; Barkworth's: “ideal establishment” for the SAS WCIT, was an: “O.C. Major, 2 other offices, Capt or Lieuts. Same number of Other Ranks with additional drivers if further transport is authorised.” One officer would check the PW camps, the other: “should be an Administrative Officer and should be responsible for keeping the team on the road and for liaison with B.A.O.R.” Two specific individuals were suggested, one, a Lieutenant: “already earmarked for Man Hunting,” the other: “a Captain, an Administrative Officer of the 2 SAS.” Report, “SAS War Crimes Investigation Team-Policy,” 7 February 1946, accompanying a letter from Col. R. H. Harden (APS) “A” Branch to the WO, 8 February 1946: NA, WO 311/694
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• Barkworth complained about this specifically, ibid. The RAF MRES suffered a similar lack of reliable transport, and equal problems in obtaining vehicles. Letter, Air Marshall Philip Wigglesworth, AHQ (Ops) B AFO, to Air Minister for Personnel, complaining that the MRES were draining his resources. August 1947: NA, AIR 20/9050. (SH)
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• 10 October 1945 . 2 SAS were due to be disbanded by the end of September 1945, and their headquarters, the base for the team in Alsace, derequisitioned on It was predicted that these actions: “would seriously dislocate operation.” However, SAS Intelligence section, based at HQ, was to be retained as a team: “Through long service in section are invaluable assistance as they know way about voluminous filing system and remember details previous operations,” which had resulted in the capture and torture of former colleagues: NA, WO 311/695. JAG London, dealing with Barkworth's SAS cases, also experienced personnel difficulties. The major originally handling the cases was released in December 1945, his replacement, due for release in March 1946, had agreed to stay, but: “not much longer than the end of April to prepare and prosecute the case.” However, although 2 SAS Regiment was being disbanded, there is evidence that personnel were being held back against future need by WCIT, for example: “2 drivers, who can be obtained from list of 2 SAS personnel frozen for Man-Hunting teams”: Report, “SAS War Crimes Investigation Team-Policy,” 7 February 1946, accompanying a letter from Col. R. H. Harden (APS) “A” Branch to the WO, 8 February 1946: NA, WO 311/694. WO authority was sought for a “Special Search Unit”: “its formation and equipment. It is further understood that you will arrange for the necessary personnel to be specially selected from disbanding units.” Letter from the Field Marshall's Office (C-in-C, BAOR) to The WO (cc. JAG), 29 December 1945: NA, WO 311/682
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• Genocide on Trial Barkworth had experienced some difficulties in working with French officials during his time investigating in the Vosges; Memorandum attached to letter from “Minningman” [illegible] Lieutenant-Colonel Commander, 1 British Airborne Corps (Rear), to The Under Secretary of State, The WO (A.G.3 V.W.) cc'd to HQ SAS Troops and OC 2 SAS Regiment, 18 August, 1945: NA, WO 311/694. However, the French tried more war criminals than Britain and the US together: Bloxham, x
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• Justice Delayed For example; Barkworth to AAG Liaison Brit WCD US, request, re Wild: “clear living in Russian zone and that the matter of whether we or the French obtain extradition for him from the American zone is purely academic and serves no useful purpose. Can we can get cooperation from Russian zone.” 7 November 1946: NA, WO 311/744. JAG found German witnesses reluctant to go to Yugoslavia, Poland or the Soviet Union to give evidence and were: “unwilling to force them to do so”: “Somerhough Situation Report”. WCG (NWE) to Shapcott, 20 September 1947: NA, FO 371/64718 c13471/7675/180. This lack of cooperation operated at the highest level. Thus the British, after debating the matter at Cabinet level, refused to hand over war criminals to the Russians: Cesarini, 59–65
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• Secret Hunters Amongst many other matters, Barkworth's letter highlighted five bodies discovered by the French at a camp near Baden Baden and not followed up; a report on the case of Lieut. Silly, forwarded to the French authorities but never passed on: NA, WO 311/694. In contrast, Galitzine remembers good relations with the French; Kemp, 51
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• Calvert , J. M. 23 July 1945 . Letter to Brigadier “Confidential”, Commander SAS Troops, from Lt-Col Franks C.C. 2 SAS, Circulation included the WO: NA, WO 311/694. See also letter: 26 July 1945, from Lt. Col. “Collins” [illegible] Commander 1 British Airborne Corps (Rear), Rickmansworth, to the WO, CROWCASS, Special Forces HQ, and HQ SAS amongst others. This emphasised the importance of Barkworth's report and the confidential accompanying letter
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• Memorandum attached to letter from “Minningman” [illegible] Lieutenant-Colonel Commander, 1 British Airborne Corps (Rear), to The Under Secretary of State, The WO (A.G.3 V.W.) cc HQ SAS Troops and OC 2 SAS Regiment, 18 August, 1945, ibid
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• “In some cases Germans held by countries formerly occupied by themselves are successfully blackmailing their captors into either releasing them or not showing them as held on PW lists, for fear of exposure as collaborators. This is particularly true in the French zone where some of the leading accused in the S.A.S. case have only been found by unofficial enquiry”: report entitled “Man Hunting”: NA, WO 311/682
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• Justice Delayed “Examples of this are the French recruits in Alsace where several pure-blooded Germans have been traced and arrested by S.A.S. W.C.I.T. as serving members of French forces. Again in Italy the Polish II Corps is increasing at a tremendous rate, volunteers being taken from ‘so-called Poles’ who have been impressed into the German Army and are ex-German PW. The Corps is now 150,000 strong and it is suspected that War Criminals may be finding refuge there”, ibid. Cesarini notes that in fact the French screened more carefully than the British before accepting Displaced Persons:, 91
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• By 1946 there is evidence of some agreement: 19 Sept. 46. AAG to AAG Liaison Brit US zone. Noailles SAS case: “it is requested you try to make a gentleman's agreement with the French. In the past in other SAS cases they have agreed to loan accused to BAOR for trial on the understanding that they are handed over afterwards regardless of sentence”: NA, WO 311/744. 2 SAS WCIT developed a more cooperative relationship with other agencies and Allies over suspect transfers. One sample entry, to serve for many, is Barkworth's report for S.A.S. W.C.I.T. to H.Q. B.A.O.R, 19 August 1946. He asks HQ to check if Alfred Achossig has been arrested by the Russians; that Streiner, wanted for killing 29 British parachutists and one American be extradited and so on: SAS War crimes cases vol 2; folios 101–199. Indexed, 1 May 1946 August 1946: NA, WO 311/743
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• NA, WO 311/695. See also letter of praise concerning Barkworth's investigations in Baden and Alsace, and also expressing thanks for the use of a pathologist (Kuscherer). Colonel Chavez, (US) WCIU, A.P.O. 752 to A.G.3 (V.W.), 7 December 1945: NA, WO 311/694. Franks also wrote: “I had a long talk with Col. Chavez and was much impressed by his desire to help us. He expressed amazement that the British investigation of 27 cases should be left in the hands of a single officer. He showed great gratitude for the assistance he had received from Barkworth and is incorporating his report in his own to 7 Army. It is to be hoped that the Gaggenau cases may be dealt with through American sources”: Letter to Brigadier J. M. Calvert, “Confidential,” Commander SAS Troops, from Lt-Col Franks C.C. 2 SAS, 23 July 1945, ibid
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• Barkworth wrote to Chavez from 2 SAS WCIT local HQ, Gaggenau: “In view of the many occasions this unit has received help from the American authorities, and particularly from your team, it is a great pleasure to have the opportunity to be of some assistance to you”: Letter from Major Barkworth 2 SAS to Col. Chavez US War Crimes Team, 30 October 1945: NA, WO 311/747
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• Secret Hunters NA, WO 311/694; Kemp, 48–49. The MRES could call on the assistance of pathologists from London if required: Hadaway, “Royal Air Force.” Warner notes that three senior Gestapo officials were tried and executed for these murders in 1946: Special Air Service, 173
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• The memo continues: “Barkworth and his party have made themselves somewhat unpopular with the French, who feel considerable resentment at the way they have circulated in French territory without apparently informing the French of their presence and intentions, and have finally written a report on the attitude of the French which the French regard as highly offensive. He has now applied to USFET for a laissez passer for his party in the American Zone; the Americans have referred the letter to us but before we back the application we would like to have him and his team officially attached to this HQ. We can then brief him as to the need for tact in Allied areas before we let him lose. We would like this attachment to be for the purposes of war crimes investigations in general, and NOT exclusively for the SAS cases”: Memo Lt.-Colonel Harris, HQ BAOR to Col G.R. Bradshaw, WO, 6 October 1945: NA, WO 311/694
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• A memo from JAG concerning liaison with the Provost Marshal's Dept states that there is no objection to MRES tracing war criminals: “as a sideline, provided it does not interfere with their regular work.” The memo continues: “The War Crimes Commission (WCC) is concerned with the criminals; the MRES is concerned, inter alia, with their victims”: “Missing Research Memorandum (MRM) No.5. Liaison with Provost Marshal's Dept” P.4 CAS & IMR Group Captain Burgess, JAG Section at BAOR, 6, September 1945: Air Force Museum Archives, Hendon, (AFM), DC 74/39/13. (SH)
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• The transport difficulties caused by: “unserviceable” vehicles (P.Us), exacerbated by the distances vehicles had to travel (over 200 miles per day). Report, “SAS War Crimes Investigation Team-Policy,” 7 February 1946: NA, WO 311/694
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• 13 February 1946 . “Loose Minute” AG3(VW) [illegible probably Harden) ibid
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• 14 March 1946 . It was finally established that: “Major Barkworth has been absorbed into the War Crimes Investigation Unit, BAOR and is now under command of the Officer Commanding that Unit for all administrative purposes. Operationally he continues to work under J.A.G., Spring Gardens, London”; Letter from Col. N.E. Savill, ibid
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• 13 February 1946 . It was noted that all the staff were ex 2 SAS, investigating purely cases involving 2 SAS Regt; “Loose Minute,”, ibid
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• Burt , T. Capt. MBE, 2 SAS and the Buffs, was selected for his: “Special qualifications for this operation [in Alsace]”, ibid. Burt and his men accompanied Jedburg team ‘Harold’ dropped into the Vendee in France 15/16 July 1944, ‘OSS Report’: IWM, 04/26/1, 502
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• Letter from Canadian Joint Staff Mission to JAG (War Crimes Section) HQ BAOR 9 December 1947: NA, WO 311/724
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• 1944 . Secret Hunters Andrée “Denise” Borrell was a shop assistant who trained as a nurse on the outbreak of the Second World War and joined the French resistance after the surrender of France. In 1942 she traveled to London and was recruited by SOE. Borrell and Lise de Baissac became the first woman agents to be parachuted into France in September 1942, and Borrell moved to Paris to join the Prosper network. She was arrested in June 1943 and sent to Fresnes prison, where she was held until being transported to Germany in May For her SOE personnel file see: NA, HS 9/183; Anthony Kemp, 67
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• Secret Hunters Diana Rowden was flown by Lysander in July 1943 to act as courier for Acrobat. She was arrested in November in Lons-le-Saunier. For her SOE personnel file see: NA, HS 9/1287/6; Kemp, 68
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• Secret Hunters Vera Leigh arrived in May 1943 to join Inventor. She was betrayed and arrested in October in Paris. For her SOE personnel file see: NA, HS 9/910; Kemp, 68
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• Olschanezky , Sonia . 1930 . A Life in Secrets London : Little, Brown . b. 1923 at Chemnitz to a secular Russian Jewish family who moved to Paris in but retained their Russian nationality. Sonia trained as a dancer. Through her relationship with Jacques Weil, Sonia began to work for the resistance, initially as a courier for Juggler. Later, when Prospect collapsed, Sonia managed to contact London and continue her work. Sonia was picked up in Paris on 21 January 1944 attempting to meet up with a British contact. She was sent to Fresnes, then Karlshruhe with six other women. There, prison officials contacted their RHSA superiors in Berlin for instructions concerning these women held in: “protective custody.” Sonia and the three other women were to be transferred to Natzweiler-Struthof on 6 July for: “special treatment”. In 1956, two British journalists, Anthony Terry and Elisabeth Nicholas, finally established Sonia's identity: http://edechambost.ifrance.com/Sonia.htm72 (11 May 2006). See also: S. Helm, (2005, 242–43, 295–96, 329
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• Secret Hunters In addition, CSM Rhodes (2 SAS) later explained that he saw livid scars on Hauptscharfuhrer Straub's face when he arrested him: Kemp, 76
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• A Life in Secrets. For Atkins personnel file see: NA, HS 9/59/2. For her autobiography and her role in these investigations see: Helm, Atkins interrogated Straub and Hartjenstein. Later she interrogated officials from Flossenbürg, Ravensbrück and Auschwitz amongst others: Kemp, Secret Hunters, 76–80
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• 1996 . Forearmed: A History of the Intelligence Corps London : Brassey's . Lieutenant Colonel M.J. Buckmaster was in charge of section F operations in France and the Low Countries: Anthony Clayton, 100. See also: Helm, A Life in Secrets, xviii. For details of the training of these particular SOE operatives see: NA, HS 9/183; HS 9/1287/6; HS 9/910
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• Secret Hunters , 69 O'Leary's real name was Albert Marie Guerisse, a Belgian doctor. He was commissioned into the Royal Navy and took part in clandestine operations in France where he was arrested posing as a French-Canadian officer. He had been transferred to Dachau when Natzweiler-Struthof was abandoned by the Germans: Kemp:: Kramer, Flames in the Field, 57
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• Kemp . Secret Hunters 68 – 74 . Atkins was commissioned as Squadron Leader in the Women's Auxiliary Air Force (WAAF) as cover, and perhaps to regularize her position as a war crimes investigator. Helm states that Atkins was funded by MI6 and reported monthly: Helm, A Life in Secrets, 201
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• Helm . A Life in Secrets 192 – 96 . 202 350. Atkins described Somerhough as: “the quickest brain I have ever known”, ibid., xx
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• A Life in Secrets Affadavit signed Georges Boogaerts, witnessed Squadron Officer V.M. Atkins, 11 April 1946: NA, WO 311/665; Helm, 244–46
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• 14 March 1946 . Natzweiler Trial Barkworth took depositions at Gaggenau, from Teresa Becker, wardress at the Karlsruhe Prison, and Kaenemund, a former political prisoner there, now run by the Americans, 20 March 1946, (Trial Exhibit 2): NA, WO 311/665. Rohde and Hartjenstein gave their statements to Barkworth on 14 April 1946: Webb, 83–85, 87–88. Wanted lists circulated include: 10 January 1946, Straub; 24 January, Berg (in custody); 1 February, Zeuss (delivery); 12 February, Zeuss and Straub (in US Zone); SAS weekly Sitrep. report week ending 24 March lists the Natzweiler case amongst others and details of trial preparations; 4 April, Hartjenstein (delivery), 6 April to British Liaison, US, concerning Zeuss, Rohde, Hartjenstein, Zeuss; 7 April, JAG to US WCB extradite Straub; 8 April, request delivery of various suspects including Berg from the US Zone; 9 April JAG to US WCB extradite Zeuss; 9 April JAG to US WCB extradition Rohde, including a note that Galitzine would arrange his collection by 1 Corps: NA, WO 311/742
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• 28 April 1946, 15 defendants were listed; on 20 May, 17 defendants listed: NA, WO 311/665
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• Natzweiler Trial); Those accused were; Dr. Kurt aus dem Bruch und Harberg (SS, camp dentist; not guilty); Franz Berg (prisoner, habitual criminal, responsible for stoking the crematorium and Straub 's assistant: guilty, five years, already facing death penalty for other crimes); Emil Bruttel (camp medical orderly; guilty, four years imprisonment); Fritz Hartjenstein (SS, Commandant of the Natzweiler group of Concentration Camps: guilty, life imprisonment, also sentenced to same by French in their Emil Meier (Guard Commander: not guilty); Dr. Werner Rohde (SS, Camp Medical Officer; guilty, sentenced to death, already under sentence of death, formerly with Mengele at Auschwitz); Peter Straub (clerk in the Political Department responsible for making arrangements for executions, de facto camp executioner; guilty, thirteen years, already under sentence of death); Magnus Wochner (Gestapo, head of the camp Political Department: guilty); Wolfgang Zeuss (SS, staff sergeant; not guilty): Webb, Natzweiler Trial, 17. The Camp Doctor, Heinrich Plaza, whom Rohdes replaced and who was present at the murder of the women and had also served at Auschwitz was sought, but never found: Helm, A Life in Secrets, 348. Otto was also not found to stand trial, and Ganninger (SS) committed suicide shortly after being questioned by Barkworth, ibid., 187. A tenth accused, Harberg (Karlsruhe Gestapo), was acquitted on the first day of trial, no evidence offered
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• A Life in Secrets Described as a: “young trainee solicitor”: Helm, 241
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• Webb . Natzweiler Trial 37 – 38 .
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• Atkins stated: “1. From April 1941 to July 1944 I was Intelligence Officer to the French Section of M. O. I. S. P. working in London, and as such my duties were to brief Allied women agents in this country prior to their proceeding to the Continent on special missions. 2. Among those whom I briefed but who failed to return to this country were Miss Denise BORRELL, Section Officer Diane ROWDEN, W.A.A.F. A.S.O. Nora INAYAT-KHAN, W.A.A.F., Miss Vera LEIGH, F.A.N.Y… 4. On the 26 April 1946 I visited the Public Safety Officer, Military Government Karlsruhe and was introduced by him to the Prison Director of the Karlsruhe Prison and the Riefstahlstrasse who informed me that during a further search of the records of the prison he had discovered the records of 7 of the 8 British women who had been confined in Karlsruhe Prison in the summer of 1944. He handed me the originals and the records of 3 of these women namely of Vera LEIGH, Dianne ROWDEN and Denise BORRELL which are attached hereto”, ibid., 35
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• Hague Convention 1907 clarifies the distinction between spies and soldiers: Regulations concerning the Laws and Customs of War on Land, “Art. 29. A person can be considered a spy when, acting clandestinely or on false pretences, he obtains or endeavours to obtain information in the zone of operation of a belligerent, with the intention of communicating it to the hostile party. Thus soldiers not wearing a disguise who have penetrated into the zone of operations of the hostile army for this purpose are not considered spies: soldiers and civilians, carrying out their mission openly, entrusted with the delivery of dispatches, intended either for their own army or the enemies' army.”
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• Webb . Natzweiler Trial 40
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• Ibid., 107
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• Groebel read an opinion to the court from an advisor to the Nuremberg Trials, Professor Mosler of the University of Bonn, a leading German expert on International Law: “‘Treatment according to usages of war does not require the lawful guarantee of a proper trial. It is sufficient to ascertain that a war criminal offence has been committed.’ At another point he states the following: ‘Usages of war do not know of any regulations on who could pass a sentence. Normally the Commanding Officer of the troops who brought about the arrest would be the one to ascertain the guilt, the punishment, and the execution, and would order the execution. Competence to permit shooting even in a small trial is doubtful and may only be granted if the offence is evident and considering military circumstance, speed is necessary.’” Groebel argued that: “We Germans have been hermetically sealed off from the rest of the world and I do not know how proceedings are carried on there now”, ibid., 98–99
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• Ibid
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• 1985 . Un printemps de mort et d'espoir Paris : Robert Laffont . In addition, by the end of 1943, the local newspapers stated that 78 had been sentenced to death and 38 executed: Henri Amouroux, 371–72
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• 3 May 1946 . Trial of Robert Wagner, Gauleiter and Head of Civil Government of Alsace during the Occupation and six others Atrocities at the camp, including the ‘medical’ experiments appear in the Indictment in Case no. 13, Strasbourg, 23 April to and Court of Appeal 24 July 1946: Law Reports UNWCC, vol. III, 1948. Report available at: http://www.ess.uwe.ac.uk/WCC/wagner1.htm [8 May 2006]
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• F.A.N.Y. Invicta Ibid., 42. Atkins was being disingenuous. Ward, for example, records that Borrel: “was always chosen for the most dangerous and delicate work such as recruiting and arranging rendez-vous… she took part in several coups de mains, notably an operation against the Chevilly power station in March 1943”:, 214
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• 1999 . In Obedience to Instructions: FANY with the SOE in the Mediterranean Barnsley : Leo Cooper . FANY were ideal for SOE as there were no military restrictions on their use of arms, unlike the other women's services: Margaret Pawley, 8–9. For histories of FANY see: Irene Ward, F. A, N, Y. Invicta (London: Hutchinson, 1955); FANY members carried out many tasks including secretarial duties, accountants, cooks, drivers, including dispatch and ambulances, wireless operators and agents. These Special Unit FANY members signed the Official Secrets Act. Seventy-three were trained as agents of whom, thirty-nine went into the field: Hugh Popham, F.A.N.Y. The Story of the Women”s Transport Service 1907–1984 (London: Leo Cooper, 1984), 87–88, 91, 98–101. In 1944, SOE records indicate some 1,500 FANY personnel attached to their organization, many received specialist training by SOE: MacKenzie, Secret History, 719, 740
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• A Life in Secrets It was argued at the highest level, by Colonel Gubbins, head of SOE (who took the decision to use FANY for security purposes) that as FANY was a civilian organization they were not subject to the rules governing the services and thus not breaching the rules of war: Helm, 9–10; Pawley, In Obedience, 162; Ward, F.A.N.Y Invicta, 219, Kramer, Flames in the Field, 65. Many intelligence FANY were originally WAAFs before recruitment into SOE, and some were enrolled into the WAAFs to regularize their position, including ensuring salary and pension rights, others such as Vera Leigh, were FANY ATS: Popham, F.A.N.Y., 98; Ward, F.A.N.Y Invicta, 219–21; Kramer, Flames in the Field, 61
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• Webb . Natzweiler Trial 42
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• Ibid., 42–43. Such depositions were admissible in evidence under the amended courts-martial procedure
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• Ibid. Brian Stonehouse' evidence was by affidavit, witnessed by an officer of JAG at HQ BAOR, 5 April 1946: 45–46, Dr. Boogaerts, 52
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• Shultz , Walter . a political prisoner at the camp, gave evidence that he overheard a conversation between Hoos (Gestapo, a member of the Political Department) and Wochner (one of the accused). Schultz reported that: “Hoos was agitated and stated that: ‘these women should have been treated as soldiers because they belonged to some voluntary army. W.V.A.F’, or something similar ‘, and then he said,’ Well where does the Geneva Convention [sic] come in?'”, ibid., 63
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• Webb . Natzweiler Trial 203 – 204 . 217, 222
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• There is a postscript to his story. It consists of an extradition application on file 12 November 1946, for Rhode for war crimes: “Rohde was member of the medical corps of the direction of the Concentration camp NATZWEILER-STRUTHOF, and took part in the medical experiences [sic] practiced on the prisoners. Likewise he is responsible for the extermination of numerous jews [sic] in the Concentration Camp AUSCHWITZ.” At the bottom of the sheet is a hand-written notation: “Executed 11/10/46.” Issued by the French War Crimes Liaison Group, BAOR. Rohde had appealed against the death sentence and was supported in this by a number of clergy, at least one of whom, Pastor Bongards, was well thought of by the Religious Affairs Branch, BAOR. See: Letter 18 September 1946 to Penal Branch BAOR. Letters of support included two from Hans Kleyer, padre for the Penitentiary Camp, 24 and 26 August 1946; also a letter from Dr. Manfried Germer, parson and camp-chaplain in the American Prisoner of War Enclosure, Bad Aibling, 5 August 1946: NA, WO 309/730
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• Peacock , Margaret . “ a journalist at the trail, records that the journalists present agreed to this: “[A] decision she has since regretted for she feels the account of the trial achieved far less prominence than it deserved and failed to make a lasting impression”: Ward ” . In F.A.N.Y. Invicta 228
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• Sunday Express “Parachute W.A.A.F were tortured. Four British girls burned alive-one German to die. Girl fought at oven door. Wuppertal, Saturday. For burning alive four British women parachutists—two W.A.A.F. and two F.A.N.Y. officers—one German—out of ten charged- was today sentenced to death by hanging. The trial was watched by a young W.A.A.F. intelligence officer who briefed them for their mission and traced their road to death”:, 2 June 1946: NA, WO 311/665
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• Telegram from EXFOR to the WO and JAG, London: “Believed Galitzine to be material witness… Atkins available now Hunt and Barkworth available…”: NA, WO 311/665
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• 1946 . Natzweiler Trial This trial immediately followed the, at Wupperthal, in June Eleven officials were tried and five sentenced to death, including Straub, Hartjenstein and Berg (all accused at the Natzweiler Trial), five to imprisonment. Barkworth and his men were quartered in the building: History UNWCC, 537, 541–42; Kemp, Secret Hunters, 86–87
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• Memo from Brigadier J.L. von der Heyde (Lieutenant General Commander I Corps District) to the President of the War Crimes Court, Wuppertal, 3 June 1946: NA, WO 309/1520
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• History UNWCC 542
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• Helm . A Life in Secrets 196 – 98 . After the War Galitzine wrote a ‘Plan’ for the US Government for setting up a World Information Service. This can be found in the C.D. Jackson Papers held at the Dwight D. Eisenhower Library, Abilene, Texas, US: http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/listofholdingshtml/listofholdingsJ/JACKSONCDPapers193167.pdf [3 June 2006]
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• Berlin the Downfall 1945: Galitzine had a more personal connection with FANY. He married Jean Dawnay, a FANY officer and former cipher expert who acted as an assistant to Air Chief Marshal Sholto Douglas in Berlin, then served later with the Control Commission. Cited in author's cuts, Anthony Beevor, http://www.antonybeevor.com/Berlin/berlin-authorcuts.htm [3 June 2006]
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• Reg. 8 (1) of the Royal Warrant. These include written statements made under oath, which would not be received as evidence in English Courts. Similarly, Reg. 8 (1) a, permits uncorroborated reports of conversations as evidence
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• 1942 . Law Reports of Trials of War Criminals, The UNWCC If the Officer agrees, only on the grounds of ‘substantial miscarriage of justice,’ then the case is referred to JAG. This position has not been challenged in Britain but has been the subject of judicial review in the US: ex parte Quirin and others in re Yamashita (1946), re Homma (1946):, Vol. I, (London: HMSO, 1947)
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• NA, AIR/10121. (SH). In fact, this trial was one of the last to take place: Jones, “Nazi Atrocities”
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• SOE Atkins spent a year in pursuit of information concerning 118 missing F agents, she discovered the fate of 117: Foot, 356
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• 11 May 45. Letter: “Unknown Sender German” [65th Infantry Division] to father of Capt Dudgeon d. Italy 3 Oct 1943 on the road Parma-La Spenzia. One of 2 British soldiers several hundred miles behind enemy lines carrying explosives who: “would probably be shot”, by “existing order of the Fuhrer”: NA, WO 311/630. 7 Aug 45: Confidential memo, HQ Brit Airborne Corps Herts. To Under Sec State WO AG3 (VW): “[A]ttached is copy letter received 2SAS from German Officer Victor Schmit describing the shooting of Capt Dudgeon, Gen von Zielberg responsible, should he be dealt with as War Criminal. Do you wish Capt. Parker 2 SAS to take up this with AFHQ when he goes out to Italy?” Copy JAG, ibid. 23 August 45, “Teleg from Troopers AG3 to HQ 1 Brit Airborne Corp.” “Gen von Zeilberg not held in UK. Name sent to Central Registry with special enquiry”, ibid
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• For example, there is evidence of referrals to the IMT: 4 July 46. Message to Nuremberg: “… have you objection to execution of Andergassen, Storz, Schiffer sentenced to death by CMF for murder of 2 British and 4 Americans at Bolzano about 19 Mar 45?”, ibid.; 15 July 46. Secret Cypher Teleg. “From AFHQ to AGWAR ref NAF 1167”, “no reply UNWCC London or ONGUS if interested in these men as witnesses or to be interrogated therefore stay of execution pending further instructions”, ibid; 17 July 46: Secret Cypher Teleg: “From AFHQ Italy to AGWAR”, “ref your TAM 775 execution stayed pending your instructions. US Chief Consul Nuremburg IMT and Cabinet Offices have advised they do not desire subjects”, ibid
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• Jones . “Nazi Atrocities.”
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• Hadaway . “Royal Air Force”: NA, AIR 2/7088/31. (SH)
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• 1945 . Belsen Trial Report from Galitzine, “Report of visit to N. W. Europe, Sept 10—Sept 15” 19 September 1945: NA, WO 311/695. Kramer was tried and sentenced to death by hanging at the earlier, 27 November 1945: Phillips, Trial of Joseph Kramer, 643
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• 1987 . War Crimes, War Criminals and War Crimes Trials NY : Greenwood Press . For an extensive list of contemporary legal analysis see: Norman Tutorow, 5869, 313–17
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• Phillips . Trial of Joseph Kramer 174
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• Mason , Peter . 1998 . Official Assassin: Winston Churchill's SAS Hit Team Williamstown NJ : Phillips Publications . This autobiography vividly evokes the military and civilian environment in Germany at the end of the war
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• 28 December 1999 . Official Assassin Mason identifies these men as Klaus Baur, Abwehr, specializing in Soviet communications and SS Unterscharfuehrer Leopold Opelt from Natzweiler-Struthof. The latter's assassination ordered in the presence of Barkworth by CO WO (unnamed), Galitzine having left the room:, 29–30; 129–39. In support a file entry of 19 April 1946, lists Opelt as: ‘wanted for murder of four women and 30 SAS’: WO 311/742; later Opelt is listed in the files as: ‘wanted for the murder of 16 British parachutists’: NA, WO 311/743. A third victim, Otto Ortegies, a Hitler Youth leader is named by Mason in an interview with the Sunday Times
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• Nd. note, probably 7/8 August 1945: Capt Parker AAC 2 SAS: ‘with jeep and driver is authorized to proceed on duty to Italy by road at the request of AFHQ pass through American, French and British Zones and get assistance, rations, etc from each’. NA, WO 311/630. Memos between 10/21 August 1945; ‘AG3 (VW) to HQ Brit Airborne Corps Herts. Parker. 2 copies of authority forwarded.’ This document gives details of the complexity of travel and assorted authorities required, and is issued by AG3(VW)
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• 19 April 1946. Machatachek, Opelt, Stark, Koch, Grim, for the murders of four women and 30 SAS, AAG to US WCB: NA, WO 311/742
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• Kemp . Secret Hunters 115
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• Mason . Official Assassin 131
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• Official Assassin 2 September, 1946. Opelt listed; 6 September to extradition section, US, with photograph of Opelt; on 18 September approx. nd. teletype message Barkworth wants photograph of Opelt (returned?); same date telephone message (unusual), Barkworth requesting: ‘sit rep on Opelt’: NA, WO 311/744. On Mason's claim to have been shown Opelt's photograph:, 131
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• NA, WO 311/744
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• Mason . 2002 . Official Assassin 131 – 40 . For the significance of British rather than US involvement in this alleged assassination see: Kevin Conley Ruffner, “You are Never Going to Be Able to Run an Intelligence Unit: SSU Confronts the Black Market in Berlin”, Journal of Intelligence History 2 Mason describes the OSS as unable to infiltrate Opelt's gang as they are: “a little squeaky clean”: Official Assassin, 132
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• Mason . 28 December 1997 . Official Assassin 28 Further details are provided in an interview Mason gave to the Sunday Times
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• 2005 . “‘The Jews are Coming’: Violence and Revenge in post-Nazi Europe” . In Law Culture and the Humanities See for example: Shai Lavi 1 (: 282–301
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• Secret Hunters “Barkworth, who was no respecter of persons, started being fairly rough with [the peasants]… but after a bit of bullying and kicking doors we found a pair of flying boots in somebody's house”: Kemp, 64–65
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• Secret Hunters For example, 2 SAS CSM Rhodes impersonated a Warrant Officer to pick up a German working for the US Army Legal Department: Kemp, 63
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• 1990 . SAS Operations The SAS seemed to attract more than its share of aristocrats; for example, Major the Honourable J. J. Astor, drafted into the Brigade as a radio operator: Ladd, 69; one former soldier recalls: “they seemed to favour the swashbuckling informality of the SAS”: Challoner and Draper, Tanky Challenor: SAS and the Met (London: Leo Cooper, 116; and another: “… all the time I served with the SAS I never quite overcame the impression that I belonged to a species of banditti”: John Hislop, Anything but a Soldier (London: Michael Joseph, 1965), 122–23; “The SAS had room for the buccaneer”: Foot, SOE, 241. See also: McLuskey, on the ‘glamour’ of these Special Forces soldiers and the informal relationship between officers and men: Parachute Padre, 50–51, 55; Harrison These Men are Dangerous.
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• Dangerous Men For a full discussion of this mythology see: Newsinger, 77–85
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• Secret Hunters In at least one case MRES officers hypnotized a gravedigger, who was then able to re-locate an unmarked grave where he had buried some aircrew several years before: Hadaway, “The Royal Air Force.” Galitzine recalls Harris, Assistant Adjutant-General for 21 Army Group, stating that Barkworth was his own worst enemy: “He will in fact insult generals or brigadiers… He'll walk into a mess improperly dressed or he'll bring a sergeant-major into the officer's mess…”: Kemp, 52
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• See files on SAS war crimes investigation: France and Germany, 1 May1945- 31 October 1945: NA, WO 311/695; 31 October 1945–30 November 1945: NA, WO 311/696; 1 December 1945–31 December 1945: NA, WO 311/697; 1 June 1945–28 February 1945: WO 311/698; 1 January 1946–31 March 1946: NA, WO 311/699; 1 March 1946–31 March 1946: NA, WO 311/700; 1 September 1946–31 October 1946: NA, WO 311/701; 1 April 1945–31 March 1947: NA, WO 311/702. Affidavits and trial exhibits: NA WO311/665; War crimes policy file, France and Germany, 1 July 1945–3 May 1946: NA, WO311/694; 1 May1945- 31 October 1945: NA, WO 311/695; SAS War crimes cases vol 1; folios 1–100. Indexed, 1 August 1945–31 May 1946: NA, WO 311/742; SAS War crimes cases vol 2; folios 101–199. Indexed, 1 May 1946–31 August 1946: NA, WO 311/743; SAS War Crimes Investigation File, 1 October 1945–28 February 1946: NA, WO 311/747
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• 14 May 1946 . Sometimes 2 SAS provided evidence of innocence: “This man is stated to be able to give evidence that the accused was NOT at the scene of the murder”. “REQUEST FOR A DELIVERY OF A PERSON DESIGNATED A WITNESS IN A TRIAL FOR A WAR CRIME”,: NA, WO 311/743
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• History UNWCC 344 – 91 . 461–75
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• British military courts heard 357 war crimes cases between 23 July 1945 and 19 December 1949, involving over 1,000 Axis nationals and collaborators: Jones, “Nazi Atrocities”, 543–44
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• 25 August 1945, Capt Scott Intelligence Troop 2 SAS Colchester Essex to Galitzine. Discusses the interrogation of Schmidt. Gives details of who was responsible plus two more shot, Foster and Shortall. Scott suggests that if Schmidt continues to co-operate there: “might be reason to hope for commutation life sentence”. NA, WO 311/630. See also; Capt. Y. N. Galitzine, “Report of visit to N. W. Europe, Sept. 10th—Sept. 15th 1945,” 19 September 1945: NA, WO 311/695
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• By comparison, OSS' ‘manipulation’ within the Nuremberg trial process appears to have operated at a much higher level: Von Lingen and Salter, “Contrasting Strategies,” concerning the immunity from prosecution given to Waffen SS General Karl Wolff
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• Kemp . Secret Hunters 61
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• Nacht und Nebel. One account states that between 1940 and 1944 a total of 45,000 inmates were sent there, of whom 25,000 perished, mostly worked to death; more died in the seventy satellite camps. Many prisoners were resistors classified as Others died as victims of pseudo-medical experiments. Camp victims included Jews, Gypsies, POWs, resistance fighters, homosexuals and Jehovah's Witnessess: Adamo and Herve, Natzweiler-Struthof. Yad Vashem holds photographs of the bodies of camp prisoners: http://microformguides.gale.com/Data/Download/3061000F.pdf [2 August 2006]
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• Secret Hunters Galitzine stated forty years later: “I'd had a lot of very scarring experiences… For many years I just could not bear to be in the same room with a German and it made me absolutely shake… at the back of my mind, I shall never forget what happened before and I think it was very important that we did look for these people. I think it was very important they were brought to justice. [so] that young people. know what happened. because it could happen again”: Kemp, 96–97
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• 1994 . Genocide on Trial. This is particularly true of the massacre of European Jewry: Bloxham, Muriel Klein-Zolty, “Perception du Genocide juif dans le ‘DNA’ et dans Le Monde de 1944 a 1946,” Le Monde Juif, no.150 109–20. On the theoretical and intelligence background to US choice to prioritize persecution of Christian Churches see: C. Hulme and M. Salter, ‘The Nazi's persecution of religion as a war crime: the OSS's response within the Nuremberg trials process,’ Rutgers Journal of Law and Religion (2002) at: http://www-camlaw.rutgers.edu/publications/law-religion/articles/RJLR_3_1_2.pdf [10 May 2006]; Salter, “The Visibility of the Holocaust: Franz Neumann and the Nuremberg Trials,” in Robert Fine ed., Social Theory After the Holocaust (Liverpool: Liverpool Univ. Press, 2000), 201–11. For an historian's alternative reading of this choice see: Donald Bloxham, “The Genocidal Past in Western Germany and the Experience of Occupation, 1945–6,” European History Quarterly 34 (2004): 305–35
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• Webb . Natzweiler Trial 31
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• Bloxham , Donald . 2002 . “Genocidal Past in Western Germany” . In Genocide on Trial; Bernard D. Meltzer, “The Nuremberg Trial: A Prosecutor's Perspective,” Journal of Genocide Research 4 (: 561–68. For a very differing perspective, see: Henry T. King Jr, “Robert H. Jackson and the Triumph of Justice at Nuremberg,” Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 35 (2003): 263–72. King and Meltzer were both part of the US prosecution team at Nuremberg
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• Findlay , Mark and Henham , Ralph . 2005 . Transforming International Criminal Justice Devon : Willan Publishing . ix-xx. This work identifies access and inclusion as the primary indication of fairness to all, in particular lay participants within the trial process and develops the theme of restorative justice. Indeed, in recognition of the impossibility of continuing the process and with some sense of its legal failure, the FO moved: “to establish the rule of law in the British zone… as soon as possible… move towards a more normal [sic] situation in all legal matters”: Draft FO memorandum, undated: NA, FO 371 70815 cG495/34/184
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• IMT vi, 278–88; Bloxham, Genocide on Trial, 100–102
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• Bloxham . Genocide on Trial 54
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• 2006 . Liverpool Law Review For discussion of this see: Salter and Charlesworth, ‘Prosecuting and Defending Diplomats as War Criminals: Ribbentrop at the Nuremberg Trial,’ 27 (: 67–96 at 67–77
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