Cold War Radar Intelligence: Operation ‘Cerberus’

References

• 1995 . A Century of Spies New York : Oxford University Press . For Penkovskiy's career see Jeffery Richelson, 274–79
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• The Penkovskiy Papers. After Penkovskiy's death the CIA leaked a small part of the information he provided to journalist Frank Gibney, who published them under the title These, however, were just a few of the over 10,000 pages of reports gleaned from Penkovskiy's various debriefings, rolls of film and written reports
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• The SAM-2 was developed and manufactured at the Soviet Lavochkin OKB laboratories
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• 1983 . Vietnam: A History New York : The Viking Press . The North Vietnamese developed a formidable anti-aircraft defense system by linking up over 200 SAM batteries to centralized control centers, thus subjecting the incoming US bombers to constant and accurate anti-aircraft fire. See Stanley Karnow, 457
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• 1970 . Bomber Düsseldorf : Econ . Already during WWII the British developed a system of spreading from bombers long strips of aluminum foil over the target areas to jam the German night-fighter radars. See Len Deighton, 253
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• Some only thought this would be possible in projecting a small, defused image, but not one which could precisely emulate a ship or aircraft. Ibid., 156–59
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• Ibid., 246
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• 1987 . MRCA TORNADO—Ruestung und Politik in der Bundesrepublik Bad Honnef : Osang Verlag . The German Luftwaffe had four squadrons of Starfighters equipped with ‘dual-key’ nuclear weapons, controlled jointly by German and US officers. See Alfred Mechtersheim er, 17–21
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• MRCA TORNADO The requirement for an aircraft capable of vertical takeoff and landing came from the perceived ability of the Soviet forces in Europe to inflict severe damage on NATO airfields during the first hours of a possible attack. See Mechtersheimer, 21–26
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• 25 September 1990 . BMVg Bericht—Ablauf und Stand des Vorhabens Stoer- und Taeuschsenders CERBERUS/TSPJ German Ministry of Defence (BMVg), NV-NfD (Bonn: 30
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• 8 August 1990 . ”…auf strengste Diskretion in allen Bereichen achten. Leber instructed that the people indoctrinated with the CERBERUS project must” Quoted in a confidential report to the German Minister of Defence, Bonn
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• BMVg Bericht—Ablauf und Stand des Vorhabens Stoer- und Taeuschsenders CERBERUS/TSPJ German Ministry of Defence, 92
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• 1989 . Signal ELTA is a subsidiary of Israel Aircraft Industries (IAI), which is owned by the Israeli government. The complex structure and ownership of Israel's major defence manufacturers is explained in Marvin Leibstone, “Israel's Electronics Industry”, (August: 83–89
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• 1978 . The Plumbat Affair Mossad agent Marianne Gladnikoff, arrested in 1973 in Norway after the Lillehammer fiasco, has previously worked for Elta as a programmer on the Mossad's computers. See Elaine Davenport, Paul Eddy and Peter Gillman, (Philadelphia: I.B. Lippincott Company, 137
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• BMVg Bericht—Ablauf und Stand des Vorhabens Stoer- und Taeuschsenders CERBERUS/TSPJ German Ministry of Defence, 83–85
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• 1988 . Deep Black—The Secrets of Space Espionage The issue of Soviet radar frequencies played a major role in US intelligence activities against the Soviet Union. The CIA set up various electronic ‘radar listening-posts’ in Europe to identify radar signals as early as 1950, and also tried to obtain Soviet radar readings by using specially-modified Liberty ships stationed off Soviet coasts. See William Burrows, (London: Bantam, 56–58
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• 1981 . The Israeli Airforce Tel-Aviv : Revivim Publishers . AMAN has already possessed an older version of this radar, P-30, but this system was incapable of detecting low-flying aircraft and that is why it was being replaced by the Egyptians with the vastly superior P-12. Zeev Schiff, 121
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• Ibid
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• Ulfkotte , Udo . 1997 . Verschlusssache BND 344 Munich : Koehler & Amelang .
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• 1993 . Der BND Duesseldorf : Econ . Husum has long been used as a base for both BND and Bundeswehr intelligence activities. See Erich Schmidt-Eenboom, 225, 237
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• 1995 . The US Intelligence Community Boulder : Westview . Richelson mentioned the CIA side of the agreement but does not refer to the BND's role in this arrangement. Jeffrey Richelson, 280
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• Schmidt-Eenboom , Erich . 1993 . Der BND 245 Duesseldorf : Econ .
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• 1990 . Chronologie der Entwicklung und Beschaffung des Stoer- und Taeuschsenders CERBERUS Bonn BMVg, (: 8 August
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• BMVg Bericht—Ablauf und Stand des Vorhabens Stoer- und Taeuschsenders CERBERUS/TSPJ German Ministry of Defence, 45
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• Ibid
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• 1978 . The ‘C’ stands for CERBERUS and the number denoted product generation. C-I was an early experimental model, C-II entered service in C-III entered service in 1986, and C-IV entered service in the mid 1990s
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• Chronologie der Entwicklung und Beschaffung des Stoer- und Taeuschsenders CERBERUS. BMVg
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• 9 August 1990 . Major-General Wibel, Fuehrungsstab der Luftwaffe, in a report to the Bundestag Defence Committee
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• 30 August 1990 . Letter, Parlamaentarischer Staatssekraeter Wimmer to the Bundestag Defence Committee, 4
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• 21 August 1998 . Forschungsgesellschaft fuer angewandte Naturwissenschaft A report by the (FGAN) from stated that the overall results were positive. The summary of individual points reports that “concept—good and modern; threat prevention—adequate techniques and resources; comparison with other systems—no better system is known”.
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• „Zunaechst ist kein Zweifel moeglich, dass das NKF (Tornado) ein Flugzeug der ‘Flexible Response’ werden sollte und nur aus dieser Konzeption zu rechtfertigen war”. Mechtersheimer, MRCA TORNADO, 101
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• 1987 . Die Bundeswehr Mannheim : Meyers . For the process of planning and formulation of strategy at the BMVg and Bundeswehr see Werner von Scheven and Hartmut Schmidt-Petri, 96–97
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• Retaliation by all available nuclear weapons, the aim being that the potential damage to the enemy from such an all-out strike would be so great as to deter any move of war
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• 1993 . Die Nuklearen Kurzstreckenwaffen der NATO 1945–1991: Strategie und Politik Sankt Augustin : KAS . Proportional nuclear response by NATO to the level of attack launched against it. This required more diverse delivery methods which could survive a nuclear attack and still maintain such a response as to deter attack in the first place. See Karl-Heinz Kamp, 121–84
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• 1991 . Die Nuklearen Kurzstreckenwaffen der NATO 1945–1991 London : Palgrave MacMillian . There is a wide body of literature on NATO nuclear strategy. A good summary can be found in Kamp, 15–31, 98–110. For more detailed analyses see John Baylis and John Garnett, Makers of Nuclear Strategy (Daniel Charles, Nuclear Planning in NATO (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987); Donald Cotter, The Nuclear Balance in Europe (Washington: United States Strategic Institute, 1987); Michael Legge, Theater Nuclear Weapons and NATO Strategy of Flexible Response (Santa Monika: Rand, 1983)
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• MRCA TORNADO Mechtersheimer, 99–108
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• Die Nuklearen Kurzstreckenwaffen der NATO 1945–1991 For the issue of US-German command sharing over nuclear weapons, often referred to as ‘dual-key systems’, see Kamp, 200–205. for the problems of controlling nuclear weapons in wartime, 222–33
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• MRCA TORNADO For the strategic and tactical deployment of Soviet air defenses in the Warsaw Pact countries see Mechtersheimer, 50
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• Sachstandvermerk zur Umstrukturierung des Vorhabens Tornado Self Protection Jammer Annex to the German Federal Government's Annual Report on the Tornado and CERBERUS project for 1994/95 indicates that “the CERBERUS program is now more important than ever before because of the higher probability of German Tornados coming under combat conditions”., BMVg, 2.11.1995
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