References
- Arlen, G. (2017, April 14). Broadcasters start repack process. TV Technology. https://www.tvtechnology.com/news/broadcasters-start-repack-process
- Coase, R. H. (1959). The Federal Communications Commission. Journal of Law and Economics, 2, 1–40. https://doi.org/10.1086/466549
- Cramton, P., Lopez, H., Malec, D., & Sujarittanonta, P. (2015). Design of the reverse auction in the FCC incentive auction. Working Paper. University of Maryland.
- Dal Bó, E. (2006). Regulatory capture: A review. Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 22(2), 203–225. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxrep/grj013
- Ebersole, J. (2017, January 24). FCC’s airwaves auction gets mixed reviews. Law360. https://www.law360.com/articles/883682/fcc-s-airwaves-auction-gets-mixed-reviews.
- Eggerton, J. (2017, January 18). FCC’s incentive auction to end after stage 4. Broadcasting & Cable. https://www.broadcastingcable.com/news/fccs-incentive-auction-end-after-stage-4-162589
- Eisenach, J. A. (2011). Spectrum reallocation and the national broadband plan. Federal Communication Law Journal, 64(1), 87–136.
- Eisenach, J. A., & Singer, H. J. (2013). Avoiding rent-seeking in secondary market spectrum transitions. Federal Communications Law Journal, 65(3), 261–296.
- Eisner, M. A. (2000). Regulatory politics in transition. The Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Engebretson, J. (2015, January 29). AWS-3 auction finally ends, raising $45 billion. Telecompetitor.
- Federal Communications Commission. (2010, March 17). Connecting America: The national broadband plan. http://www.broadband.gov
- Fitzgerald, T. (2019, March 29). How many streaming video services does the average person subscribe to? Vindicia in the News, https://www.vindicia.com/company/in-the-news/how-many-streaming-video-services-does-average-person-subscribe.
- Galperin, H. (2004). New television, old politics: The transition to digital TV in the United States and Britain. Cambridge University Press.
- Geradin, D., & Kerf, M. (2003). Controlling market power in telecommunications. Oxford University Press.
- Hazlett, T. (1998). Assigning property rights to radio spectrum users: Why did FCC license auctions take 67 years? Journal of Law & Economics, 41(2), 29–75. https://doi.org/10.1086/467402
- Hazlett, T. (2014). Efficient spectrum reallocation with hold-ups and without nirvana. George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 14-16. Available at SSRN. http://ssrn.com/abstract=2440003
- Hazlett, T. W. (1990). The rationality of US regulation of the broadcast spectrum. The Journal of Law and Economics, 33(1), 133–175. https://doi.org/10.1086/467202
- Hazlett, T. W. (2017). The political spectrum. Yale University Press.
- Herzel, L. (1951). “Public interest” and the market in colour television regulation. (1951). The University of Chicago Law Review, 18(4), 802–816. https://doi.org/10.2307/1598016
- Kim, J., Kim, S., & Yeo, J. (2014). Implications of incentive auction: Focusing on key issues in U.S. The Journal of Korean Institute of Communication and Information Service, 39(12), 1352–1361. https://doi.org/10.7840/kics.2014.39C.12.1352
- Levy, A. (2017, April 18). Why Verizon isn’t paying the FCC to improve its wireless network. The Motley Fool. https://www.fool.com/investing/2017/04/18/why-verizon-isnt-paying-the-fcc-to-improve-its-wir.aspx.
- McChesney, R. W. (2004). The problem of the media: U.S. communication politics in the twenty-first century. Monthly Review Press.
- Milgrom, P. (2000). Putting auction theory to work: The simultaneous ascending auction. Journal of Political Economy, 108(2), 245–272. https://doi.org/10.1086/262118
- Neilsen. 2018. Estimates 119.9 million tv homes in the U.S. for the 2018-2019 tv season (2018, September 7). Retrieved from https://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/article/2018/nielsen-estimates-119-9-million-tv-homes-in-the-us-for-the-2018-19-season/#:~:text=
- Perez, S. (2019, January 15). Nielsen: 16M U.S. homes now get TV over-the-air, a 48% increase over the past 8 years. TechCrunch, https://techcrunch.com/2019/01/15/nielsen-16m-u-s-homes-now-get-tv-over-the-air-a-48-increase-over-past-8-years/.
- Sashkin, D. (2015, February 8). Incentive auction update: Projected opening bids shoot up in latest Greenhill report. CommLawBlog.
- Shelanski, H., & Huber, P. (1998). Administrative creation of property rights to radio spectrum. Journal of Law & Economics, 41(2), 581–607. https://doi.org/10.1086/467404
- Shipan, C. (1997). Interest groups, judicial review, and the origins of broadcast regulation. Administrative Law Review, 49(3), 549–584.
- Solomon, Y. (2017, April 17). T-Mobile is the biggest winner in the FCC spectrum auction. Inc. https://www.inc.com/yoram-solomon/t-mobile-is-the-biggest-winner-in-fcc-spectrum-auction.html
- Stigler, G. J. (1971). The theory of economic regulation. The Bell Journal of Economics and Management Science, 2(1), 3–21. https://doi.org/10.2307/3003160
- Wansley, M. (2015). Virtuous capture. Administrative Law Review, 67(3), 419–479.
- Weiser, P. J. (2009). FCC reform and the future of telecommunications policy [Paper presentation]. The Reforming the Federal Communications Commission conference, Washington D.C.
- Weiser, P. J., & Hatfield, D. N. (2005). Policing the spectrum commons. Fordham Law Review, 74(2), 663–694.
- Wyatt, E. (2014, October 24). F.C.C. delays auction of TV airwaves for mobile. The New York Times, B2.
- Wyatt, E., & Steinhauer, J. (2012, February 17). Congress will auction public airwaves to pay for benefits. The New York Times, A1.
- Zarkin, M. J. (2003). Social learning and the history of U.S. telecommunications policy 1900-1996. The Edwin Meller Press.