- Decisions of the Constitutional Court of the Federal Republic of Germany (BVerfGE) 7, 198, 207.
- R Alexy, A Theory of Constitutional Rights, J Rivers (tr), (Oxford University Press 2002), 66–69.
- See, for example, Case “relating to certain aspect of laws on the use of languages in education in Belgium” v Belgium (merits), Series A no 6, (ECHR 23 July 1968), 31; Marckx v Belgium, Series A no 31, (ECHR 13 March 1978), 15, para 31; Keegan v Ireland, Series A no 290, (ECHR 26 May 1994), 19, paras 48, 49.
- E-W Böckenförde, “Grundrechte als Grundsatznormen” [Constitutional Rights as Principles], in E-W Böckenförde, Staat, Verfassung, Demokratie (Frankfurt, Suhrkamp, 1991), 198.
- Ibid, 189.
- Ibid, 198.
- Ibid, 190.
- Ibid, 198. See also ibid, 194.
- See Alexy, supra, n 2, 296, 300–48.
- See P Lerche, “Die Verfassung als Quelle von Optimierungsgeboten?” [The Constitution as Source of Optimization Requirements?], in J Burmeister (ed), Festschrift für Klaus Stern (Munich, Beck, 1997), 205; id, “Facetten der ‘Konkretisierung’ von Verfassungsrecht” [Facets of the “Concretisation” of Constitutional Law], in I Koller, J Hager, M Junker, R Singer, and J Neuner (eds), Einheit und Folgerichtigkeit im Juristischen Denken (Munich, Beck, 1998), 21; R Wahl, “Der Vorrang der Verfassung” [The Priority of the Constitution] (1981) 20 Der Staat 485, 504; A Scherzberg, Grundrechtsschutz und “Eingriffsintensität„ [Protection of Constitutional Rights and “Intensity of Interference”], (Berlin, Duncker & Humblot, 1989), 174.
- See J Isensee, “Das Grundrecht als Abwehrrecht und als staatliche Schutzpflicht” [Constitutional Rights as Defensive Rights and as State Obligations to Grant Protection], in J Isensee and P Kirchhof (eds), Handbuch des Staatsrechts, vol. 5 (Heidelberg, C F Müller, 1992), 232.
- See G Lübbe-Wolff, Die Grundrechte als Eingriffsabwehrrechte [Constitutional Rights as Defensive Rights], (Baden-Baden, Nomos, 1988), 40.
- Alexy, supra, n 2, 66–69.
- Ibid, 47.
- Ibid, 102.
- Ibid, 419, note 97.
- R Alexy, “On Balancing and Subsumption. A Structural Comparison” (2003) 16 Ratio Juris 433, 446. For the most detailed presentation see R Alexy, “The Weight Formula”, in J Stelmach, B Brożek and W Załuski (eds), Studies in the Philosophy of Law, vol 3 (Cracow, Jagiellonien Univ. Press, 2007), 20–27.
- BVerfGE 86, 1.
- Ibid, 11.
- See Alexy, “On Balancing and Subsumption“, supra, n 17, 445.
- The prohibition of too much (Übermaßverbot) is violated when the principle of proportionality is violated by an act that interferes with a defensive right. The prohibition of too little (Untermaßverbot) is violated when the principle of proportionality is violated by an omission of protection. This omission can be the omission of any protection whatever or the omission of a certain degree of protection. Hain is, therefore, correct when he says that the prohibition of too little demands nothing that is not already demanded by the principle of proportionality. Our example shows, however, that he is mistaken in further maintaining that the result of the application of the principle of proportionality to the defensive right already implies the result of the application of the principle of proportionality to the protective right, which would once again imply that there always exists only one means or measure Mn, which is proportional (see K-E Hain, “Der Gesetzgeber in der Klemme zwischen Übermaß- und Untermaßverbot?” [Does the Legislator Face a Dilemma between the Prohibition of Too Much and the Prohibition of Too Little?] (1983) 108 Deutsches Verwaltungsblatt 982, 983. The possibility of both M2 and M3 shows that it is not true that there is always “no span” between the prohibition of too much and the prohibition of too little (ibid), and that this is due not only to epistemic but also to substantial discretion. The rough character of the scale and alternativity entail that identity of structure does not imply identity of result.
- W Cremer, Freiheitsgrundrechte [Constitutional Liberty Rights] (Tübingen, Mohr Siebeck, 2003), 323.
- BVerfGE 77, 84, 110.
- See on this Alexy, “The Weight Formula”, supra, n 17, 26–27.
- In the case of three means, M1, M2, and M3, 27 different combinations of l, m, and s can be attributed to Ii and to Ij, respectively, if no distribution of values is excluded, that is, sss is allowed as well as, say, mlm and lms. This means that 729 pairs of these 27 combinations are conceivable. If the number of protective means (Mn) increases or if, instead of the simple triadic scale, a more refined scale, say, the double-triadic scale, is used, the number of possibilities increases exponentially. It would not come as a surprise to discover that a great many unknown problems lurked in this jungle of possibilities. Fortunately, many combinations that are logically possible do not have a very high empirical probability. An example is Ii (l, m, s) and Ij (m, l, s). Why should a severe (s) interference (Ij) with the defensive right (Pj) imply a severe non-protection (Ii) of the protective right (Pi), while less severe interferences with Pj (m, l) provide for less severe non-protection (l, m), that is, more protection, of Pi? In such a case, life comes to the aid of logic. Nevertheless, even our unrealistic pair of combinations can yield a solution. M3 (s, s) is excluded as not necessary, for less intensive interference with Pj can be realized by M1 or M2 with more protection of Pi. M1 is to the same degree unfavourable to Pj as M2 is to Pi. This is a special case of a stalemate line. The normal form of a stalemate line is Ii (s, m, l) and Ij (s, m, l). Such a stalemate line expresses a “meta-statement”. There exists not only a stalemate between s and s, and m and m, and l and l, but also between ss and mm and ll. In our example, the relations lm and ml correspond to this under the condition that losses and gains are taken as seriously on the side of protective rights as on the side of defensive rights where both kinds of rights are of equal abstract weight. In this case, we can speak, with respect to lm and ml, of a “cross-stalemate“.
- See M Borowski, “Grundrechtliche Leistungsrechte” [Constitutional Rights to Positive State Action] (2002) 50 Jahrbuch des Öffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart 301, 319–20.
- In Alexy, supra, n 2, 310, 393, 395, only the term “structural” is used.
- On this distinction see R Alexy, “Verfassungsrecht und einfaches Recht – Verfassungsgerichtsbarkeit und Fachgerichtsbarkeit” [Constitutional Law and Statutory Law – Constitutional Review and Adjudication in Courts of Ordinary Jurisdiction] (2002) 61 Veröffentlichungen der Vereinigung der Deutschen Staatsrechtslehrer 7, 26.
- BVerfGE 97, 169, 176.
- Ibid.
- Ibid, 180, emphasis added.
Legisprudence
Volume 3, 2009 - Issue 1