Incentive equilibrium strategies of transboundary industrial pollution control under emission permit trading

References

• Bayramoglu, A. (2006). Transboundary pollution in the Black Sea: Comparison of institutional arrangements. Environmental and Resource Economics, 35(4), 289–325. doi: 10.1007/s10640-006-9016-0
   Google Scholar
• Breton, M., Sbragia, L., & Zaccour, G. (2010). A dynamic model for international environmental agreements. Environmental and Resource Economics, 45, 25–48. doi: 10.1007/s10640-009-9304-6
   Google Scholar
• Chiarella, C., Kemp, M. C., Van Long, N., & Okuguchi, K. (1984). On the economics of international fisheries. International Economic Review, 25, 85–92. doi: 10.2307/2648869
   Google Scholar
• Dockner, E. J., & Long, N. V. (1993). International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 25, 13–29. doi: 10.1006/jeem.1993.1023
   Google Scholar
• Dockner, E. J., & Nishimura, K. (1999). Transboundary pollution in a dynamic game model. The Japanese Economic Review, 50, 443–456. doi: 10.1111/1468-5876.00131
   Google Scholar
• Dragone, D., Lambertini, L., Leitmann, G., & Palestini, A. (2010). A stochastic optimal control model of pollution abatement. Nonlinear Dynamics and Systems Theory, 10, 117–124.
   Google Scholar
• Dutta, P. K., & Radner, R. (2004). Self-enforcing climate-change treaties. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 101, 5174–5179. doi: 10.1073/pnas.0400489101
   Google Scholar
• Dutta, P. K., & Radner, R. (2006). Population growth and technological change in a global warming model. Economic Theory, 29, 251–270. doi: 10.1007/s00199-005-0056-4
   Google Scholar
• Dutta, P. K., & Radner, R. (2009). A strategic analysis of global warming: Theory and some numbers. Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, 71(2), 187–209. doi: 10.1016/j.jebo.2009.01.013
   Google Scholar
• Dutta, P. K., & Radner, R. (2010). Capital growth in a global warming model: Will China and India sign a climate treaty? Economic Theory, 49, 411–443. doi: 10.1007/s00199-010-0590-6
   Google Scholar
• Ehtamo, H., & Hämäläinen, R. P. (1986). On incentive design for dynamic decision problems. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 10, 41–43. doi: 10.1016/0165-1889(86)90015-1
   Google Scholar
• Ehtamo, H., & Hämäläinen, R. P. (1989). Incentive strategies and equilibria for dynamic games with delayed information. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 63, 355–369. doi: 10.1007/BF00939802
   Google Scholar
• Ehtamo, H., & Hämäläinen, R. P. (1993). A cooperative incentive equilibrium for a resource management problem. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 17, 659–678. doi: 10.1016/0165-1889(93)90051-S
   Google Scholar
• Ehtamo, H., & Hämäläinen, R. P. (1995). Credibility of linear equilibrium strategies in a discrete time fishery management game. Group Decision and Negotiation, 4, 27–37. doi: 10.1007/BF01384291
   Google Scholar
• Fernandez, L. (2009). Wastewater pollution abatement across an international border. Environment and Development Economics, 14(1), 67–88. doi: 10.1017/S1355770X08004543
   Google Scholar
• Hoel, M. (1992). Emission taxes in a dynamic international game of CO2 emissions. In R. Pethig (Ed.), Conflicts and cooperations in managing environmental resources. Berlin: Springer-Verlag.
   Google Scholar
• Hoel, M. (1993). Intertemporal properties of an international carbon tax. Resource and Energy Economics, 15, 51–70. doi: 10.1016/0928-7655(93)90018-P
   Google Scholar
• Jørgensen, S. (2010a). A dynamic game of waste management. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 34, 258–265. doi: 10.1016/j.jedc.2009.09.005
   Google Scholar
• Jørgensen, S., Martin, G. H., & Zaccour, G. (2010b). Dynamic games in the economics and management of pollution. Environmental Modeling and Assessment, 15, 433–467. doi: 10.1007/s10666-010-9221-7
   Google Scholar
• Jørgensen, S., & Zaccour, G. (2001). Incentive equilibrium strategies and welfare allocation in a dynamic game of pollution control. Automatica, 37, 29–36. doi: 10.1016/S0005-1098(00)00119-9
   Google Scholar
• Jørgensen, S., & Zaccour, G. (2002). Channel coordination over time: Incentive equilibria and credibility. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 27, 801–822. doi: 10.1016/S0165-1889(01)00072-0
   Google Scholar
• Jørgensen, S., & Zaccour, G. (2003). A differential game of retailer promotions. Automatica, 39, 1145–1155. doi: 10.1016/S0005-1098(03)00082-7
   Google Scholar
• Kaitala, V., & Pohjola, M. (1990). Economic development and agreeable redistribution in capitalism: Efficient game equilibria in a two-class neoclassical growth model. International Economic Review, 31, 421–438. doi: 10.2307/2526848
   Google Scholar
• Kaitala, V., Pohjola, M., & Tahvonen, O. (1992a). Transboundary air pollution and soil acidification: A dynamic analysis of an acid rain game between Finland and the USSR. Environmental and Resource Economics, 2, 161–181.
   Google Scholar
• Kaitala, V., Pohjola, M., & Tahvonen, O. (1992b). An economic analysis of transboundary air pollution between Finland and the Soviet Union. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 94, 409–424. doi: 10.2307/3440070
   Google Scholar
• Kossioris, G., Plexousakis, M., Xepapadeas, A., de Zeeuw, A., & Mäler, K.-G. (2008). Feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games in pollution control. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 32, 1312–1331. doi: 10.1016/j.jedc.2007.05.008
   Google Scholar
• Li, S. D. (2014). A differential game model of transboundary industrial pollution with emission permits trading. Journal of Optimization Theory & Applications, 163, 642–659. doi: 10.1007/s10957-013-0384-7
   Google Scholar
• List, J. A., & Mason, C. F. (2001). Optimal institutional arrangements for transboundary pollutants in a second-best world: Evidence from a differential game with asymmetric players. Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, 42, 277–296. doi: 10.1006/jeem.2000.1163
   Google Scholar
• Long, N. V. (1992). Pollution control: A differential game approach. Annals of Operations Research, 37, 283–296. doi: 10.1007/BF02071061
   Google Scholar
• Long, N. V. (2012). Applications of dynamic games to global and transboundary environmental issues: A review of the literature. Strategic Behavior and the Environment, 2, 1–59. doi: 10.1561/102.00000009
   Google Scholar
• Martín-Herrán, G., & Rincon-Zapatero, J. P. (2005b). Efficient Markov perfect Nash equilibria: Theory and application to dynamic fishery games. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 29(6), 1073–1096. doi: 10.1016/j.jedc.2004.08.004
   Google Scholar
• Martín-Herrán, G., & Zaccour, G. (2005a). Credibility of incentive equilibrium strategies in linear-state differential games. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 126, 367–389. doi: 10.1007/s10957-005-4722-2
   Google Scholar
• Mason, C. M., Polasky, S., & Tarui, N. (2011). Cooperation on climate-change mitigation (Working paper). University of Wyoming.
   Google Scholar
• Osborne, D. K. (1976). Cartel problems. American Economic Review, 66, 835–844.
   Google Scholar
• van Ploeg, F., & de Zeeuw, A. J. (1992). International aspects of pollution control. Environmental and Resource Economics, 2, 117–139. doi: 10.1007/BF00338239
   Google Scholar
• Rincón-Zapatero, J. P., Martín-Herrán, G., & Martinez, J. (2000). Identification of efficient subgame-perfect Nash equilibria in a class of differential games. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 104, 235–242. doi: 10.1023/A:1004693109541
   Google Scholar
• Rubio, S. J., & Casino, B. (2002). A note on cooperative versus non-cooperative strategies in international pollution control. Resource and Energy Economics, 24, 251–261. doi: 10.1016/S0928-7655(02)00002-7
   Google Scholar
• Wende, S. (2009). Business cycle dynamics. Economic Analysis and Policy, 39, 205–234. doi: 10.1016/S0313-5926(09)50018-5
   Google Scholar
• Wirl, F. (2004). International greenhouse gas emissions when global warming is a stochastic process. Applied Stochastic Models in Business and Industry, 20, 95–114. doi: 10.1002/asmb.530
   Google Scholar
• Wirl, F. (2007). Do multiple Nash equilibria in Markov strategies mitigate the tragedy of the commons? Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 31, 3723–3740. doi: 10.1016/j.jedc.2006.12.009
   Google Scholar
• Wirl, F. (2008). Tragedy of the commons in a stochastic dynamic game of a stock externality. Journal of Public Economic Theory, 10(1), 99–124. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2008.00353.x
   Google Scholar
• Yanase, A. (2007). Dynamic games of environmental policy in a global economy: Taxes versus quotas. Review of International Economics, 15, 592–611. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2007.00690.x
   Google Scholar
• Yanase, A. (2009). Global environment and dynamics games of environmental policy in an international duopoly. Journal of Economics, 97, 121–140. doi: 10.1007/s00712-009-0068-9
   Google Scholar
• Yanase, A. (2010). Trade, strategic environmental policy, and global pollution. Review of International Economics, 18, 493–512. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9396.2010.00883.x
   Google Scholar
• Yeung, D. W. K. (1992). A differential game of industrial pollution management. Annals of Operations Research, 37, 297–311. doi: 10.1007/BF02071062
   Google Scholar
• Yeung, D. W. K. (2007). Dynamically consistent cooperative solution in a differential game of transboundary industrial pollution. Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications, 134, 143–160. doi: 10.1007/s10957-007-9240-y
   Google Scholar
• Yeung, D. W. K., & Petrosyan, L. A. (2008). A cooperative stochastic differential game of transboundary industrial pollution. Automatica, 44, 1532–1544. doi: 10.1016/j.automatica.2008.03.005
   Google Scholar