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Special Section on Statistical and Mathematical Methods for Redistricting and Assessment of Gerrymandering

A Computational Approach to Measuring Vote Elasticity and Competitiveness

, &
Pages 69-86 | Received 11 Oct 2019, Accepted 31 May 2020, Published online: 16 Sep 2020

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