2,630
Views
0
CrossRef citations to date
0
Altmetric
BANKING & FINANCE

Central Bank Governor Turnover And Inflation In Zambia:Using Complex Wavelets for a Clearer Picture

ORCID Icon
Article: 2132610 | Received 01 May 2022, Accepted 01 Oct 2022, Published online: 11 Oct 2022

References

  • Adam, C. (1995). Fiscal adjustment, financial liberalization, and the dynamics of inflation: Some evidence from Zambia. World Development, 23(5), 735–16. https://doi.org/10.1016/0305-750X(95)00012-2
  • Agoba, A., Abor, J., Osei, K., & Sa-Aadu, J. (2017a). The Independence of central banks, political institutional quality and financial sector development. Journal of Emerging Market Finance, 19(2), 154–188. https://doi.org/10.1177/0972652719877474
  • Agoba, A., Abor, J., Sa-Aadu, J., & Sa-Aadu, J. (2017a). Central bank Independence and inflation in Africa: The role of financial systems and institutional quality. Central Bank Review, 17(4), 131–146. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.cbrev.2017.11.001
  • Aguiar-Conraria, L., Martins, M., & Soares, J. (2012). The yield curve and the macroeconomy across time and frequency. Journal of Economic Dynamics & Control, 36(12), 1950–1970. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jedc.2012.05.008
  • Aguiar-Conraria, L., Martins, M., & Soares, J. (2018). Estimating the Tylor rule in the time-frequency domain. Journal of Macroeconomics, 57(3), 122–137. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2018.05.008
  • Aguiar-Conraria, L., Martins, M., & Soares, J. (2019). “The Phillips curve at 60: Time for time and frequency”, NIPE Working Papers No. 04, May.
  • Aguiar-Conraria, L., & Soares, J. (2014). Continous wavelet transforms: Moving beyond uni- and bivariate analysis. Journal of Economic Surveys, 28(2), 344–375. https://doi.org/10.1111/joes.12012
  • Alesina, A., & Summers, L. (1993). Central bank Independence and macroeconomic performance: Some comparative evidence. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 25(2), 151–162. https://doi.org/10.2307/2077833
  • Aron, J., & Elbadawi, I. (1992). “Parallel markets, the foreign exchange auction, and exchange rate unification in Zambia”, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series No. 909, May.
  • Artha, K., & de Hann, J. (2015). Financial crises and the dismissal of central bank governors: New evidence. International Journal of Finance and Economics, 20(1), 80–95. https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.1508
  • Barro, R., & Gordon, R. (1983). A positive theory of monetary policy in a natural rate model. Journal of Political Economy, 91(4), 589–610. https://doi.org/10.1086/261167
  • Baumann, P., Schomaker, M., & Rossi, E. (2021). Estimating the effect of central bank Independence on inflation using longitudinal targeted maximum likelihood estimation. Journal of Causal Inference, 9(1), 109–146. https://doi.org/10.1515/jci-2020-0016
  • Bernanke, B., & Mishkin, F. (1997). Inflation targeting: A new framework for monetary policy? Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11(2), 97–116. https://doi.org/10.1257/jep.11.2.97
  • Bouwman, K., Jong-A-Pin, R., & de Haan, J. (2005). On the relationship between central bank Independence and inflation: Some more bad new. Applied Financial Economic Letters, 1(6), 381–385. https://doi.org/10.1080/17446540500395604
  • Brownbridge, M. (1996). “Financial policies and the banking sector in Zambia’, IDS Working Paper 32, Brighton.
  • Cheelo, C., & Banda, T. (2017). “Towards an inflation targeting regime in Zambia”, ZIPAR Working Paper No. 23.
  • Cheelo, C., & Hinfelaar, M. (2020). “Bank of Zambia autonomy amidst political turnovers in Zambia”, ESID Working Paper No. 153.
  • Chipili, J. (2021). “Inflation dynamics in Zambia”, AERC Policy Brief. 742.
  • Chrigui, Z., Boujelbene, Y., & Mhamdi, G. (2011). Central Bank Independence and inflation: Evidence from emerging countries. Journal of Policy Modeling, 33(3), 453–469. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpolmod.2010.06.002
  • Crowe, C., & Meade, E. (2008). Central bank Independence and transparency: Evolution and effectiveness. European Journal of Political Economy, 24(4), 763–777. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.06.004
  • Cukierman, A. (2008). Central bank Independence and monetary policy-making institutions: Past, present and future. European Journal of Political Economy, 24(4), 722–736. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.07.007
  • Cukierman, A., Miller, G., & Neyapti, B. (2002). Central bank reform, liberalization and inflation in transition economies: An international perspective. Journal of Monetary Economics, 49(2), 237–264. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-3932(01)00107-6
  • Cukierman, A., & Webb, S. (1995). Political influence on the central bank: International evidence. The World Bank Economic Review, 9(3), 397–423. https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/9.3.397
  • Cukierman, A., Webb, S., & Neyapti, B. (1992). Measuring the Independence of central banks and its effects on policy outcomes. The World Bank Economic Review, 6(3), 353–398. https://doi.org/10.1093/wber/6.3.353
  • De Haan, J., & Kooi, W. (2000). Does central bank Independence really mater? New evidence for developing countries using a new indicator. Journal of Banking and Finance, 24(4), 643–664. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0378-4266(99)00084-9
  • De Haan, J., & Siermann, L. (1996). Central bank Independence, inflation and political instability in developing countries. The Journal of Policy Reform, 1(2), 135–147. https://doi.org/10.1080/13841289608523360
  • Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E., & de Haan, J. (2008). Does high inflation cause central bankers to lose their job: Evidence based on a new dataset. Journal of Political Economy, 24(4), 778–787. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.04.001
  • Dreher, A., Sturm, J.-E., & de Haan, J. (2010). When is a central bank governor replaced? Evidence based on a new data set. Journal of Macroeconomics, 32(3), 766–781. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2010.04.001
  • Eijffinger, S., Schaling, E., & Hoeberichts, M. (1998). Central bank Independence: A sensitivity analysis. European Journal of Political Economy, 14(1), 73–88. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0176-2680(97)00040-2
  • Fouad, J., Fayed, M., & Emam, H. (2019). A new insight into the measurement of central bank Independence. Journal of Central Banking Theory and Practice, 8(1), 67–96. https://doi.org/10.2478/jcbtp-2019-0004
  • Ftiti, Z., Aguir, A., & Smida, M. (2017). Time-inconsistency and expansionary business cycle theories: What does matter for the central bank Independence-inflation relationship. Economic Modelling, 67, 215–227. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2016.12.013
  • Gallegati, M., Gallegati, M., Ramsey, J., & Semmier, W. (2011). The US wage Phillips curve across frequencies and time. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 73(4), 489–508. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0084.2010.00624.x
  • Gallegati, M., Ramsey, J., & Semmier, W. (2014). Interest rate spreads and output: A time scale decomposition analysis using wavelets. Computational Statistics and Data Analysis, 76, 283–290. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.csda.2014.02.024
  • Garriga, A. (2016). Central bank Independence in the world: A new dataset. International Interactions, 42(5), 849–868. https://doi.org/10.1080/03050629.2016.1188813
  • Garriga, A., & Rodriguez, C. (2020). More effective than we thought: Central Bank Independence and inflation in developing countries. Economic Modelling, 85, 87–105. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econmod.2019.05.009
  • Haga, M. (2015). On central bank Independence and political cycles. Journal of Applied Economics, 18(2), 267–296. https://doi.org/10.1016/S1514-0326(15)30012-X
  • Hayat, M., & Farque, E. (2011). When are central bankers removed? Revenue Economique, 62(3), 471–478. https://doi.org/10.3917/reco.623.0471
  • Jalakas, R. (1987). “Foreign exchange Zambia: An evaluation of the auction system in the Zambian economy”, SIDA Evaluation Report 1987/2.
  • Klomp, J., & de Haan, J., & Klomp and de Haan. (2010). Do central bank law reforms affect the term in office of central bank governors? Economic Letters, 106(3), 219–222. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2009.12.004
  • Kokoszczynki, R., & Mackiewicz-Lyziak, J. (2020). Central bank Independence and inflation – Old story told a new. International Journal of Finance and Economics, 25(1), 72–89. https://doi.org/10.1002/ijfe.1730
  • Kusi, B., Nortey, O., & Dzeha, G. (2019). Central bank Independence and economic welfare in Africa: Do institutional quality and levels of central bank Independence matter? Review of Development Finance Journal, 9(1), 79–93. https://hdl.handle.net/10520/EJC-17cee9acee
  • Kydd, J. (1988). Coffee after copper? Structural adjustment, liberalization, and agriculture in Zambia. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 26(2), 227–251. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022278X00010454
  • Kydland, F., & Prescott, E. (1997). Rules rather than discretion: The inconsistency of optimal plans. The Journal of Political Economy, 85(3), 473–492. https://doi.org/10.1086/260580
  • Lim, J. (2021). The limits to central bank Independence for inflation performance. Public Choice, 186(3–4), 309–335. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-019-00771-8
  • Maimbo, S. (2002). The diagnosis and prediction of bank failures in Zambia, 1990-98. Development Policy Review, 20(3), 261–278. https://doi.org/10.1111/1467-7679.00170
  • Morlet, J., Arens, G., Fourgeau, E., & Giard, D. (1982). Wave propagation and sampling theory; Part I, complex signal and scattering in multi-layered media. Geophysics, 47(2), 203–221. https://doi.org/10.1190/1.1441328
  • Moser, C., & Dreher, A. (2010). Do markets care about central governor changes? Evidence from emerging markets. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 42(8), 1589–1612. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2010.00355.x
  • Mwafulirwa, J. (2019). “Estimation of monetary policy response function in Zambia”, BoZ Working Paper No. 2019-04.
  • Odhiambo, N. (2012). The impact of inflation on financial sector development: Experience from Zambia. The Journal of Applied Business Research, 28(6), 1497–1508. https://doi.org/10.19030/jabr.v28i6.7357
  • Ojo, M., Aguiar-Conraria, L., & Soares, M. (2020). A time-frequency analysis of the Canadian macroeconomy and the yield curve. Empirical Economics, 58(5), 2333–2351. https://doi.org/10.1007/s00181-018-1580-y
  • Raihan, S., Wen, Y., & Zeng, B. (2005). “Wavelet: A new tool for business cycle analysis”, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2005-050.
  • Roger, L., Smith, G., & Morrissey, O. (2017). “Exchange rate and inflation dynamics in Zambia”, World Bank Policy Research Paper No. 8128.
  • Rogoff, K. (1985). The optimal degree of commitment to an intermediate monetary target. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100(4), 1169–1189. https://doi.org/10.2307/1885679
  • Siklos, P. (2008). No single definition of central bank Independence is right for all countries. European Journal of Political Economy, 24(4), 802–816. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2008.07.004
  • Simatele, M. (2004). “Financial sector reforms and monetary policy reforms in Zambia”, MPRA Paper. 21575.
  • Simatele, M., Schaling, E., & Alagidede, P. (2015). Is Zambia ready for inflation targeting? African Review of Economics and Finance, 7(2), 1–26. https://hdl.handle.net/10520/EJC182434
  • Simpasa, A., Nandwa, B., & Nabassaga, T. (2015). Bank lending channel of monetary policy transmission in Zambia: Evidence from bank-level data. Journal of Economic Studies, 42(6), 1159–1174. https://doi.org/10.1108/JES-10-2014-0172
  • Simuchile, H., & Pamu, E. (2004). Exchange rate pass-through to domestic prices: The case of Zambia. BoZ Reader, 1(2), 64–75. extension://efaidnbmnnnibpcajpcglclefindmkaj/https://www.boz.zm/THEREADER2004.pdf
  • Sturm, J., & de Haan, J. (2001), “Inflation in developing countries: Does central bank Independence matter?”, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 511.
  • Svensson, L. (1997). Optimal inflation targets, ‘conservative’ central banks, and linear inflation contracts. American Economic Review, 87(1), 98–114. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2950856
  • Torrence, C., & Compo, G. (1998). A practical guide to Wavelet analysis. Bulletin of the American Meteorological Society, 79(1), 61–78. https://doi.org/10.1175/1520-0477(1998)079<0061:APGTWA>2.0.CO;2
  • Vuletin, G., & Zhu, L. (2011). Replacing a “disobedient” central bank governor with a “docile” one: A novel measure of central bank Independence and its effect on inflation. Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking, 43(6), 1185–1215. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1538-4616.2011.00422.x
  • Walsh, C. (1995). Optimal contracts for central bankers. American Economic Review, 85(1), 150–167. https://www.jstor.org/stable/2118001
  • Wulf, J. (1988). Zambia under the IMF regime. African Affairs, 87(349), 579–594. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordjournals.afraf.a098092