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Research Article

Domains of reciprocity beyond monetary compensation: How do non-pecuniary factors affect effort and shirking?

& | (Reviewing Editor)
Article: 1178884 | Received 24 Jul 2015, Accepted 11 Apr 2016, Published online: 05 May 2016

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